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Abstract
Since the appointment of Chief Justice G. Roberts to the U.S. Supreme Court, political
scientists and legal scholars have assessed the Court’s behavior in a diverse array of cases and
issue areas, including those touching on federalism, reproductive rights, voting rights, and
economic liberty (cases involving businesses and corporations). Few issues have proven as
vexing as the Court’s constitution of the First Amendment’s command “Congress shall make no
law…abridging the freedom of speech…”
In light of the Court’s ongoing constitution of the scope and coverage of the First
Amendment, a narrative has emerged that paints the Court as distinctly conservative. In a
number of widely publicized, controversial decisions, the Court under Chief Justice Roberts has
incrementally dismantled federal and state efforts at campaign finance reform, made union
fundraising more difficult, and restricted the availability of First Amendment protection for
students, prisoners, and government employees. This explanation, however intuitive and
prevalent, is complicated by another narrative. During the same period, the Court has issued
incredibly speech-protective decisions in cases involving the distribution of videos depicting dog
fights, violence in videogames, protesters at the funerals of fallen service members, lying about
military awards, NGOs working abroad to address the AIDS epidemic, roadside signage, and
even government employees. Adding another wrinkle to the fold is entire corpus of anti-speech
claimant decisions that have been issued by a unanimous Court, or a Court divided in a way
unexpected by the ‘liberals versus conservatives’ characterization of our nation’s highest
tribunal.
These dual storylines present a puzzle that motivate a set of interrelated research
questions: What is the nature of the Roberts Court’s constitution of freedom of expression? Is

judicial behavior within this politically salient issue area explained by the ideological preferences
or attitudes of the justices? If not, what is the alternative explanation? And, more broadly, what
are the limitations of the conventional means by which scholars study judicial behavior? This
dissertation explores these questions through a set of conventional and innovative approaches to
the study of judicial decision-making. It examines the entire universe of free speech decisions of
the Roberts Court from external and internal approaches to the study of judicial decision-making.
To do so, the dissertation employs a multi-method approach, including large and medium-N
analyses of Roberts Court free speech decisions and qualitative tools of conceptual development
and process tracing.
This project offers four key findings related to the effect of judicial attitudes on the
constitution of protection for freedom of expression during the Roberts Era. First, as indicators
have incrementally improved upon accurately measuring a key concept of interest – the
ideological direction of decisions in freedom of expression cases – the bivariate relationship
between judicial attitudes and ideological voting becomes more tenuous. This suggests the need
for a continuing research program focused on conceptually valid operationalization of decision
direction in freedom of expression cases and beyond. Second, with the Rehnquist Court Era as a
comparison point, the effect of judicial attitudes across all votes during the Roberts Era is
statistically significant – stronger conservatism scores correlate positively with a pro-speech
decision. While this relationship does not exist for the Rehnquist Court, a conceptual typology
of cases comparing the ordering of voting coalitions to the direction of decisions in those cases
reveals that the Roberts Court is, in some ways, less ideological than the Rehnquist Court Era.
Third, through the tool of process tracing and the use of “hoop tests,” the Roberts Court is best
understood as having a conservative orientation though not monolithically so – there is

considerable heterogeneity in terms of the ideological orientation and conceptions of the judicial
role held by the justices that frequently result in unexpected voting alignments. Fourth, the
Court’s certiorari process in free expression controversies is better explained by jurisprudential
concerns rather than ideological cues. However, once disaggregating the Court’s certiorari
docket by issue area, there is evidence for both the ideological and legal explanations for the
Court’s behavior in free expression decisions.
The central finding wrought from this project is that the judicial constitution of
contemporary free expression protection in the U.S. cannot be reduced to single-cause
explanations. The complex and often secret nature of various stages of judicial decision-making
at the US Supreme Court, as well as the competing, longstanding epistemological approaches to
understanding judicial behavior, strongly suggests that scholars must take care to question the
assumptions of and examine behavior from both “internal” and “external” perspectives on Court
behavior. Sacrificing the former at the altar of the latter leaves interested observers without a
clear idea of the structure and language through which high politics is contested at the Court – a
language that makes some claims possible and others untenable. The reverse is also problematic:
Taking the justices at their word and assuming that fidelity to legal principles and sincerely-held
conceptions of the judicial role explains judicial behavior ignores what appear to be patterns of
partisan or ideologically driven voting. Beyond answering a substantive question of great interest
for scholars, lawyers, litigants, and citizens alike, this research presents new directions for the
study of judicial decision-making that have great potential for traveling to other issue areas and
constitutional courts Syracuse University.
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Chapter 1
In the Vanguard?
Introduction

On December 6, 2005, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in No. 041152, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR). The case involved an
association of law schools and faculty who argued that provisions of the federal Solomon
Amendment requiring military recruiter access equal to the access allowed by other professional
recruiters violated FAIR’s First Amendment rights of speech and association. 1 Under the law,
denial of equal access to military recruiters would result in a forfeiture of federal funding.
According to FAIR’s brief, compliance with the federal law “conflict[ed] with law schools’
longstanding and evenhanded policies of refusing to assist employers that invidiously
discriminate against their students.” 2 Specifically, the respondent law schools and faculties
protested the military policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” authorizing enlistment and retention
distinctions made on the basis of sexual orientation of soldiers, airmen, seamen, marines, and
other members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Among other arguments, E. Joshua Rosenkranz’s brief for FAIR claimed that the
“Solomon Amendment requires law schools to give military recruiters more than just ‘access to
campus’ and more than just ‘access to students’ on campus…the Solomon Amendment requires
law schools to suspend their anti-discrimination policies…the Solomon Amendment requires law
schools to collaborate with military recruiters in an effort - discriminatory recruiting - that the
schools consider fundamentally unjust.” 3 While not among the collection of speech-protective

Freedom of Association is a derivative right of the US Constitution’s First Amendment Freedom of Speech clause.
Brief for Respondents, 2004 U.S. Briefs 1152, i (2005).
3 2004 U.S. Briefs 1152, 34-35 (2005).
1
2

2
decisions cited in the brief, FAIR’s First Amendment argument could easily have cited Justice
Robert Jackson’s famous dicta in West Virginia v. Barnette (1943):

If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us (319 U.S.
624, 642 (1943)).

Beyond the important substantive issues of law presented by the case – a confluence of
the values of liberty and equality –FAIR is notable for being the first substantive free expression
case heard by Chief Justice John Roberts, who was confirmed as 17th Chief Justice on September
29, 2005 (Babington and Baker 2005). Shortly after oral arguments in FAIR but prior to the
Court’s decision, Justice Samuel Alito was confirmed by the U.S. Senate to the Associate Justice
position vacated by the retiring Sandra Day O’Connor, long thought to be at the ideological
center of the Court (Keck 2004, 199-203). The twin appointments of Roberts and Alito marked
the end of an 11-year period of stasis on the Court, and signaled a transition from the Rehnquist
to the Roberts Court. Writing for The New York Times, correspondent David Stout noted that the
appointment of Alito (following Roberts) was “a triumph for the conservative movement, whose
adherents have longed to tilt the balance of the Court to the right.” (Stout 2006).
First Amendment claims have long occupied an important position on the Court’s docket
(Lewis 2010; Perry 1991, 262), though the magnitude and ideological tenor of free expression
votes and jurisprudence have varied over the years. Scholars have found that while the Court
under Chief Justice Earl Warren was remarkably protective of freedom of expression (Powe
2009; Epstein and Segal 2011, 6), the Burger and Rehnquist Courts were considerably less
willing to rule in favor of free speech claimants. In addition, Justice O’Connor’s role as the
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swing vote on the Court during the Rehnquist Era often resulted in “minimalist” decisions
(Bybee 2001, 943-944); in the free expression context it was O’Connor (and sometimes
Rehnquist) who were willing to uphold campaign finance regulations against First Amendment
challenges (Keck 2004). Spectators of the Court gained their first glimpse of the Roberts Court
approach to freedom of expression on March 6, 2005, with the announcement of the Court’s
unanimous opinion in Rumsfeld v. FAIR (547 U.S. 47 (2006)).
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Roberts held that the Solomon Amendment’s
requirement of equal access for military recruiters did not violate the First Amendment. In
dispensing with FAIR’s free expression claims, Roberts noted that “The Solomon Amendment
neither limits what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything,” that the recruiting
assistance mandated by the Solomon Act “is a far cry from the compelled speech in
Barnette…plainly incident to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of conduct,” and that
“Nothing about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters, and
nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what the law schools may say about the military’s
policies.” Concluding the Court’s opinion, the Chief Justice opined that “FAIR has attempted to
stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines
protect.”
While the Court’s unanimous holding in FAIR was an inauspicious start to the Roberts
Court’s constitution of free expression, the Court has since demonstrated a willingness to deliver
surprisingly robust protections of speech in a number of cases. “Speech Rights Triumph as U.S.
High Court Limits Government Power,” read the headline at the conclusion of the Roberts
Court’s 2010 term. Greg Stohr, Supreme Court Reporter for Bloomberg News, noted a series of
speech protective decisions that prohibited state governments from restricting big pharmaceutical
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companies’ access to prescription information (Sorrell v. IMS Health (131 S.Ct. 2653 (2011))
and minors’ access to violent videogames (Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (131
S.Ct. 2729 (2011)). The article also noted decisions striking down a jury verdict for punitive
damages resulting from the intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case pitting the
Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, KS against the father of a marine killed in the line of duty
in Iraq (Snyder v. Phelps (131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011)) and a series of decisions striking down state
and national limitations on election campaign financing (Citizens United v. FEC (558 U.S. 310
(2010)) and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (131 S.Ct. 2806 (2011)).
Stohr summarized the Roberts Court record on protecting freedom of speech as follows:
“Whether the topic was violent video games, pharmaceutical marketing campaigns or political
contributions, the justices cast a skeptical eye toward government regulation of speech as they
closed out their year with a flurry of First Amendment rulings” (Stohr 2011).
Conferring the ringing distinction of “pro-speech” on the Roberts Court blinks at reality,
however, as the narrative exists alongside competing portraits of the Court as “not a free speech
Court” (Chemerinsky 2011), or one only willing to uphold free expression claims in “slam-dunk”
cases (Youn 2011).

Ten years into the Roberts Court era, the Court’s decisions in Walker v.

Sons of Confederate Veterans (135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015)) and Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona on
June 18, 2015 reinforced the Janus-faced nature of the contemporary Court’s record on free
expression. In the former case, the Court through Justice Stephen Breyer held that Texas’
decision to reject a proposed license plate message did not violate the First Amendment rights of
the Sons of Confederate Veterans because license plates constitute government speech, which is
insulated from First Amendment suits. In the latter case, a unanimous – but fractured in rationale
– Court (through Justice Clarence Thomas) held that the Town of Gilbert’s differential regulation
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of temporary signs was sufficient to infer impermissible content-based regulation, which remains
the dominant categorical mode of analysis in free expression cases.
The result in Sons of Confederate Veterans was anti-expression, while the result in Reed
was pro-speech. In the former, the Justices split on ideological lines, with one notable defection
– Justice Thomas (considered to be one of the Court’s most conservative members) joined
Breyer’s majority opinion, along with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and
Elena Kagan. In the latter, while all Justices voted for Reed, the majority rationale (delivered by
Thomas) was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy,
Samuel Alito Jr., and Sonia Sotomayor. Justices Breyer and Kagan each filed concurring
opinions that disagreed with Thomas’ rigid categorical analysis, which read more like dissents
than concurrences (Denniston 2015). The former case result appears more consistent with
models of judicial decision-making that give primacy to the unobserved ideological values and
preferences of the justices as key causal variables, while the latter appears to be less easily
explained by these conventions. And, in Sons of Confederate Veterans, the voting alignment
was marked by a notable defection – Justice Clarence Thomas – drawing attention to the link
between aggregate measures examining the effect of judicial values across a large number of
votes and the observed voting alignments in decisions on the merits. Are such defections the
product of deeply held ideological convictions, or are they attributable to tough legal questions
resulting from the facts of each case?

Explaining Contemporary Freedom of Expression
How is it that a conservative majority Court has gained the title – albeit disputed – of the
most pro-speech Court in history, despite the long pedigree of First Amendment jurisprudence as
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a “lodestar of liberalism” (Epstein and Segal 2006)? Why do some decisions appear consistent
with the idea that ideological or partisan considerations dictate the votes of the justices, while
still others suggest that a broad commitment to protecting unpopular speech from legislative or
executive encroachment is shared by all justices – liberal and conservative? Do these decisions
appreciably differ from the prior Rehnquist Court – characterized as the most activist in history
(Keck 2004) – and what is the nature of that difference? And what, if anything do jurisprudential
considerations have to do with the decisions issued by this conservative majority Court? This
dissertation is an effort to answer these questions, by contextualizing modern free expression
decisions in broader scholarly debates about the nature of ideological and legal (doctrinal)
influences on Supreme Court decision-making.
In this dissertation, I describe and explain the scope and coverage of contemporary
freedom of expression protection in the United States through behavioralist and historical
institutional lenses, with a focus on the votes of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States from the 2005 through the 2014 terms. The central, substantive claim of this dissertation is
that the free speech agenda of the Roberts Court Era cannot be explained by externally-imposed
ideological preferences alone. An accurate, systematic explanation of the Robert’s Court’s
constitution of freedom of expression is possible only by expanding the scope of inquiry beyond
aggregations of individual judicial votes on the merits. In addition to the conventional
ideological scoring of case factors and judicial preferences, judicial decision-making studies
attempting to explain this area of normative importance for journalists, scholars, and the average
citizen alike can and should take account of the following: the measurement of the concept of
ideology when scoring indicators for the direction of a decision, the composition of the voting
coalitions (rather than aggregated, individual votes) in merits decisions, the interaction among
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jurisprudential structures and different conceptions of the judicial role held by justices within and
across cases, and patterns appearing in the decision to grant or deny certiorari. By examining
each of these aspects of the Court’s behavior from varying epistemological perspectives, I assess
the dimensions and overall veracity of the claim that the current Court’s record on freedom of
expression can be explained by reference to the conservative, political preferences of a majority
of the justices.
This dissertation also builds on the study of judicial decision-making by pushing back
against single-method driven research. Voting patterns can and should be contextualized within
the broader historical traditions and legal structures that constitute judicial decision-making. In
examining contemporary free speech from these various methodological and epistemological
perspectives, I find that variance in the Roberts Era free expression agenda is explained by a
combination of non-monolithic ideological preferences, contested jurisprudential structures, and
divergent conceptions of the judicial role. Correlations between values and votes alone cannot
explain the development of US free expression law; nor can this acontextual approach reveal
how this area of law is constituted by competing jurisprudential and philosophical ideals that
intersect with conceptions of the judicial role and ideological values of the justices. Simply put,
the explanation is incomplete without attending to the ways in which the values of the justices,
understood to be revealed in voting patterns across cases, are constituted by conventional legal
structures. The answer to the question of whether it is preferences or principles that explain free
expression decision-making in the contemporary era is “both.”
This chapter provides a broad overview of the contemporary free expression agenda in
the United States, reviewing recent work at the intersection of judicial decision-making, free
expression, and political science and contextualizing this project in broader scholarly debates
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about the study of judicial behavior. I explain how this project not only explains an important
outcome of interest for a specific period of the Court’s history, but also engages with broader
theoretical arguments in the study of judicial decision-making by linking “external” and
“internal” perspectives on judging (Feldman 2005). Chapters two through five represent the
substantive portions of the project, each concerned with a specific aspect of the judicial process
and epistemological assumptions concerning how and which data are best analyzed for the
question at hand. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I provide an introduction to the
content and study of freedom of expression in America. I begin by contextualizing free speech
as an important component of pluralist democracy in America. I also provide a general overview
of debates about freedom of expression within the broader agenda of the Roberts Court, as well
as the findings and limitations of recent research designs that inform the questions asked and
methods employed by this dissertation.
The remainder of this chapter summarizes the road ahead, offering general theoretical
and research design components which will be elaborated upon within each specific chapter.

Free Expression as Social, Legal, and Ideological Commitment
Near the end of his career, Anthony Lewis noted that while the Supreme Court has
wavered on rights-based claims in the areas of privacy and equality (citing decisions in the
aftermath of Roe v. Wade and Bowers v. Hardwick), “Since the middle of the twentieth century,
the idea of the First Amendment has acquired a powerful hold on the American imagination.
Even conservatives, who had been found on the repressive side of speech controversies, now join
in exaltation of freedom of expression. People invoke ‘the First Amendment’ as if those words
would settle whatever issue was being debated” (Lewis 2010, 169). True to form, Americans
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have invoked the free expression guarantees of the First Amendment in contemporary
controversies ranging from the anti-marriage equality stance articulated by the founder of ChickFil-A (Bomboy 2012), to comments made by Phil Robertson of Duck Dynasty fame (Curry
2013), to a ban on the sale of Confederate Flags in the state of California (LA Times Editorial
Board 2016). The First Amendment has also been invoked recently in the higher education
context, with the revocation of a job offer by the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign to
Professor Steven Salaita for social media comments critical of Israel, as well as the perception
that college campuses are ground zero for “political correctness” and regulating
“microaggressions;” policies that may or may not be in tension with commitments to free inquiry
and ideological diversity (Lukianoff and Haidt 2015).
The ingrained commitment to the First Amendment among Americans parallels the right
to free expression’s preferred place in the constellation of constitutional freedoms. Because of
its relationship to the democratic process – ensuring the continually refined search for truth in an
abstract “marketplace of ideas” or furthering the ideal of “self-government” in a democracy – the
free speech protections of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution are unlike other valuable
though ultimately inapposite protections of the Bill of Rights. Freedom of speech is central to
the American system of government in a way that the other protections are not. One need not be
the subject of criminal charges, incarcerated, or an ongoing trial to draw upon the protections of
the First Amendment – it has application to the displaying of signs on public property, voicing
displeasure with government policies, public works of art, depictions of sexual activity,
videogames, door-to-door solicitation, economic advertising – even the location of newspaper
racks.
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Put another way, ten words of the United States’ most exalted legal document’s First (and
originally, Third) Amendment permeate an incredible amount of the day-to-day components of
society, and function as a barrier to government conduct that calls into action other important
safeguards – being secure in one’s papers and possessions, protection against cruel and unusual
punishment, a speedy and fair trial by jury, and the like. It is prior to the protections afforded to
citizens in the face of government prosecution, the freedom that makes liberty in a republican
democracy possible, the lynchpin of the ideal pluralist system that locates the common good in a
process whereby organized interests compete to gain resources, from institutions of government
(Feldman 2008; 2013). In the words of Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz, “Speech is powerful.
It’s the lifeblood of democracy, a precondition for the discovery of truth, and vital to our selfdevelopment” (2014, 122).
Understanding the Roberts Court record on freedom of speech, then, is not just another
arena for a strawman assessment of whether it is law or politics that best explains the
motivations of justices: It has important empirical and normative implications for scholarly
understandings of the nature of the democratic process in America. When scholars like Anthony
Lewis point to the Court’s First Amendment tradition of protecting free expression and question
whether the Court has generally favored speech claimants – from institutions such as
corporations and unions to the traditional soapbox orators of the “dissent” tradition of free
expression (Shiffrin 1999) – there is at least an implicit concern with the functioning of the
democratic system. In other words, there is a presupposition of a guarantee that must be
available to all Americans wishing to speak on matters of political concern, to contribute to the
free trade in ideas, and to foster self-realization and fulfillment of the idea of individual
autonomy.
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Broader Theoretical Debates
The political behavior orientation is not a substitute for other perspectives, but
supplements the approaches to knowledge which have been and continue to be the
hallmark of more traditional workways. All research into politics and government in the
final analysis shares a common goal, i.e. to give meaning to the political phenomena
which we experience. This is no less true of the traditional approaches with their focus on
events, ideologies, institutions, and structures than of the behavioral orientation which
features the analysis of personal and group behavior in a political context. (Ulmer 1960;
cited in Bradley 2003, 109).

The Roberts Court speech docket also speaks to the longstanding but still relevant debate
among scholars concerning the behavior of justices. The First Amendment is a substantial
component of the civil liberties docket considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, and civil liberties
has been a flashpoint for the ongoing debate concerning the influence of law and politics on the
decision-making of justices. While the attitudinal model of judging (discussed in greater detail
in chapters two and three) has demonstrated a high degree of correlation between the
conservative and liberal values of justices and their subsequent votes on the merits in civil
liberties cases (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Knight 1995; Segal and
Spaeth 2002, 320-323; Gillman 2003, 14), some scholars have argued that free expression is an
exception to this general association. To build upon the previous section, this project is valuable
not only for its substantive importance, but also because a single-issue area (the free speech
clause of the First Amendment) decided by the same set of judges appears to defy the dominant
forms of the attitudinal paradigm of US Supreme Court decision-making.
In an extended discussion of U.S. v. Alvarez (132 S.Ct. 2537 (2012)), a decision striking
down The Stolen Valor Act of 2005 as unconstitutional, Mark Tushnet (2013) noted that “In
many First Amendment cases the justices don’t line up according to the dominant ‘conservative
versus liberal’ narrative. You need doctrinal background to understand U.S. v. Alvarez” (217).
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Tushnet is not alone in suggesting that free expression is something of an exception to
conventional attitudinal explanations: Lucas “Scot” Powe noted that despite the general
conservatism of the post-Warren Court years, “The First Amendment continued to enjoy
prominence in the justices’ hearts, and with modest recalibrations, the Court continued on the
liberal path of the Warren years” (2009, 284).
Later, in discussing the landmark decision of Texas v. Johnson (491 U.S. 397 (1989)),
striking down a Texas flag desecration law as unconstitutional under the First Amendment) and
U.S. v. Eichman (496 U.S. 310 (1990)), striking down a federal flag protection law enacted in
response to the Court’s Johnson ruling) Powe commented,
There is something about flag burning. Reagan appointees Antonin Scalia and Anthony
Kennedy were in the majority protecting the act, while Rehnquist was a dissenter. The
two cases, like an earlier one from the Warren Court, produced splits along no discernible
ideological lines. On all other constitutional issues, however, conservatives stayed
conservative and liberals remained liberal” (289).
These comments resonate with Keck’s analysis of the Rehnquist Court, who found in an
assessment of all decisions where that Court invalidated federal statutes, the free expression
cases of that particular era were often decided by voting coalitions not predicted by the
attitudinal model of judging (2007). Other scholars, even those as critical of the “free market
Constitution” historically articulated by the Court as Timothy Kuhner, discerned a willingness on
the part of liberal and conservative justices to reach a surprising, compromise decision in the
landmark campaign finance decision of Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976); discussed in
Kuhner 2014, 33-39). Finally, in an eclectic edited volume on differing judicial philosophies in
the area of free expression, Helen Knowles and Steven Lichtman (2015) note the erratic voting
alignments in Roberts Court free speech cases and surmise that there is more to the story of

13
judging (at least in the realm of the First Amendment) than the political preferences of judges
(239-243).
On the other hand, a different perspective on the Court’s free expression record suggests
that these decisions – like other civil liberties decisions – can be explained by partisan or
ideological commitments of the judges. Cornell Clayton and Lucas McMillan, zeroing in on the
Court’s much maligned and unpopular campaign finance decisions, have argued that “Campaign
finance and the First Amendment is another area clearly reflecting the conservative movement in
constitutional law, if not the even more immediate electoral interests of the GOP” (2012, 139). 4
David Gans of the Constitution Accountability Center, specifically reviewing Chief Justice
Roberts’ record after a decade on the Court, narrated that “At the same time that Chief Justice
Roberts and his conservative colleagues have substantially expanded First Amendment
protections for corporations, the Court’s conservative majority has also reinterpreted the First
Amendment to gut long-recognized protections for unions, striking a serious blow against
organized labor” (2015, 10). Political explanations are suggested in work by Youn (2011) and
Chemerinsky (2011), who have both pointed to decisions striking down campaign finance laws
and making union fundraising more difficult as evidence for the claim that the Roberts Court is
generally conservative, and freedom of speech is not an exception to the attitudinal rule.

A national survey conducted by Pew Research from Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015, found broad bipartisan support for the
idea that campaign finance laws “would be effective in reducing the role of money in politics.” (DeSilver and Van
Kessel 2015). A previous Pew Research survey conducted from Jan. 11-16, 2012 found that of those respondents
aware of the Citizens United ruling, 60% of self-identified Republicans, 63% of Democrats, and 67% of
Independents agreed that the decision was having a negative impact on the 2012 Presidential campaign (Pew
Research Center 2012). A nationwide poll by the Gallup organization conducted from Oct. 1-2, 2009 - shortly after
oral arguments in Citizens United – found that while majorities of Democrats (62%) and Republicans (64%) and a
plurality of Independents (48%) agreed that “campaign contributions are free speech,” 61% of those surveyed also
agreed that “government should be able to place limits on how much money individuals can give to a political
candidate,” and 71% agreed that “government should be able to place limits on how much money corporations or
unions can give to a political candidate.” When asked directly to prioritize either “placing limits on campaign
contributions” or “protecting right to support campaigns,” 54% of Democrats, 53% of Independents, and 49% of
Republicans prioritized limits on campaign spending (Saad 2010).
4
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In sum, this debate about the Roberts Court’s constitution of free expression is yet
another manifestation of a longstanding, broader theoretical debate concerning the motivations of
judges. Arguments critical of the Court’s record on free speech often boil down to claims that it
is the conservative ideologies or “attitudes” of the justices that explains the Court’s record on
free expression, while those focusing on the Court’s willingness to protect liars, unpopular
religious minorities, distributors of videos alleged to promote animal cruelty, and recognize
videogames as artistic expression either explicitly or implicitly suggest that something other than
traditional liberal or conservative ideological commitments is motivating the justices in First
Amendment free expression cases.

Competing and Disparate Explanations
The Roberts Court has proven a slippery concept for scholars of judicial decisionmaking. Calling to mind the observation that the “Cases you choose affect the results you get”
(Geddes 1990), scholars have looked at the contemporary Court from a diverse collection of
ontological assumptions and methodological approaches in order to gain traction on explanations
of the Court’s votes and decisions. For example, Marcia Coyle (2013) singled out four key areas
of the Roberts Court’s agenda in constructing a narrative of a conservative Court muscularly
flexing the power of judicial review to, among other things, recognize a 2nd Amendment right to
own a firearm for self-defense in one’s home in D.C. v. Heller (554 U.S. 570 (2008)), and in
short order incorporating that right against state and local governments in McDonald v. Chicago
(561 U.S. 742 (2010)), dismantling federal and state campaign finance laws in Citizens United v.
FEC (558 U.S. 310 (2010)) and Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett (564
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U.S. 721 (2011)), and narrowly upholding the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act while striking down its Medicaid expansion conditions imposed on the
states in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012)).
In another account of the Roberts Court Era, Mark Tushnet raised the important insight
that sometimes a Justice may deviate from his or her “core” liberal or conservative inclinations,
though his treatment ultimately focuses on a sliver of the Court’s docket. This observation is not
to accuse these scholars and others of purposefully cherry-picking cases to reach a foregone
conclusion: Tushnet is explicit in that he intentionally focuses on the portion of the docket with
politically salient overtones, or “most-likely” cases for the political Court argument. Such case
selection strategies, however, paint an incomplete picture of the Court and may unintentionally
bias findings, whether they are in constructing a narrative of the Court as conservative, liberal, or
the result of a complex mixture of ideology, jurisprudence, long-term strategic considerations, or
deviations from ideological expectations. Even Laurence Tribe and Joshua Matz (2014), who
recognize a “dizzying array of considerations” affecting the decision-making calculus of the
justices, ultimately reject the utility of “deep explanations,” or those that tend to look for patterns
of the effect of ideology or a particular jurisprudential regime across cases (4). Instead, the
authors provide richly detailed, contextual narratives of a number of cases across nine areas of
law on the Roberts Court agenda in making the claim that the state of the law is mired in a level
of uncertainty.
While there is nothing inherently wrong about these approaches, they are not without key
epistemological and methodological limitations. In other words, it is difficult to know the nature
of the Court without attending to matters of case selection. Limiting assessments of the Court’s
political dimension to those cases deemed “politically salient” (Tushnet 2013) and subsequently
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finding that ideology or politics matters is not a difficult bar to jump. The highly interpretive
nature of these studies does not lend itself well to the sort of hypothesis testing associated with
more systematic requirements of social science.
Recognizing the tradeoff between more parsimonious, cut-and-dried effects-of-causes
research efforts - which typically look at the effect of one or two key variables of interest across
a large number of cases - and richly detailed, interpretive causes-of-effects research - which
typically examines the relationship among a number of relevant variables within a small number
of cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012), some scholars have attempted to study judicial decisionmaking from a middle ground of sorts. For example, Diana Kapiszewski (2011) conducted an
analysis of “26 politically crucial cases decided by the STF [Brazilian Supreme Federal
Tribunal] between 1985 and 2004” so as to systematically facilitate “detailed analysis of each
case and augmented the study’s internal validity” (473-474). Similarly, Keck’s analysis of
judicial coalitions in all 53 cases where the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a federal statute
from 1981 to 2005 was structured by a medium-N approach to case selection and analysis, a
“methodological choice [providing] a universe of cases large enough to look for patterns across
decisions, but small enough to present some context and detail for each case” (2007, 324).
The Roberts Court free speech agenda has been the subject of sustained attention for
political scientists working within a more positivist, large-N epistemological tradition as well. In
2006, Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal suggested that the winds of freedom of speech had shifted –
that the longstanding “liberal” right to free expression was quickly becoming a lodestar of
conservatism (Epstein and Segal 2006). The authors found support for the claim that the justices
use free speech claims to instrumentally advance other ideological or political goals, noting that
the Court’s liberal justices were more likely to vote against free speech claims when they
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conflicted with another ideological commitment, such as the right to privacy. In a follow-up
effort, Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2013) found evidence that the justices tend to support free
speech claims argued by members of their own ideological in-group – particularly the Court’s
conservative justices – though the authors’ conclusions have been subject to criticism (Pettys
2014; 2015). In both efforts, the authors examined the effect of judicial attitudes across a large
number of cases.
During the same period, Monica Youn of the Brennan Center found that the Roberts
Court ruled in favor of free speech claims in only 44% of the cases granted certiorari and argued
on the merits. Epstein and Segal (2011), conducting a similar study, came to a similar
conclusion in simply examining the outcomes of Roberts Court free speech cases. The focus on
judicial attitudes as the key explanatory variable for free speech decisions has not been limited to
large-N studies. By 2014, Chemerinsky dedicated a portion of a book-length condemnation of
the Supreme Court’s historical performance to the Roberts Court’s oft-maligned campaign
finance decisions (Chemerinsky 2014). Similarly, Tribe and Matz (2014) argued that while
“Well-defined categories of intensely protected speech can occasionally constrain judges in ways
that matter” (146), ideological divisions on the Court go a long way in explaining the Roberts
Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment: “Partly because of rulings like Brown [striking
down a California law restricting the sale of violent videogames to minors] and Snyder [finding
the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, KS could not be sued under the tort of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)], the Roberts Court enjoys a strong “pro-speech”
reputation. Appearances deceive” (152).
Many of these accounts have been less than comprehensive and at times fairly
impressionistic, while others have facilitated very narrow inferences (though see Collins 2013).
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Youn’s brief 2011 study (similar in method and style to Epstein and Segal’s brief 2011 report), ,
reduced the question to one of whether the Court was a free speech “maximalist” one (Volokh
2002). Eugene Volokh, a noted First Amendment scholar, simply coded each vote in Rehnquist
Era free expression decisions as pro- or anti-First Amendment – with fractional values assigned
to indicate when concurring opinions were more or less protective of speech than the majority in
a particular case. According to Volokh, such conceptual trade-offs may be necessary in order to
protect against subjective biases: “Injecting my views about whether the Justices were right or
wrong, and from subdividing the cases along categories (for example, government-as-sovereign
vs. government-as-funder, sexually themed speech vs. political speech) that would ultimately just
reflect my own biases” (Volokh 2002). Tribe and Matz’s recent contribution, citing the Court’s
opinions in Morse v. Frederick (551 U.S. 393 (2007), upholding the suspension of a high school
student for the display of a banner reading ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS”), Garcetti v. Ceballos (547
U.S. 410 (2006), upholding the transfer of a Los Angeles area DA for comments related to
corruption in a criminal trial), Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (564 U.S. 786
(2011)), and Alvarez, note that a number of cases rejecting free speech claims have split the
Court along ideological lines (2014, 153). However, the authors attribute the broader agenda to
the Court’s general categorical approach to First Amendment cases, where “speech is either fully
protected by the First Amendment or entirely excluded” (153). Similarly, Tushnet argues that
the pattern of free speech decisions can be attributed to “a desire for simple rules,” while
“politics doesn’t explain much” (2013, 215).
In sum, legal scholars have faced difficulty in gaining traction on the Roberts Court as a
concept, at once finding the Court is deeply polarized and divided, conservative while also
producing rights-based rulings favoring liberal causes, often united yet still producing sharply
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split voting coalitions that fracture along ideological cleavages. One contributor to the apparent
slippery nature of the contemporary Court appears to be the case selection strategies selected by
scholars, which go a long way in producing the results of scholarly inquiry. Some have focused
on a narrower range of cases thought to be particularly crucial or important for assessing
hypotheses about the Court’s behavior. Given the multitude of factors thought to influence the
decision-making of justices, other scholars have attempted to gain traction on Court behavior
through the methodological choice of Medium-N analyses – allowing for examination of patterns
of influence of key variables of influence across many cases, while also leaving room for more
fine-grained, detailed analyses of individual cases that demonstrate how multiple causal factors
produce an outcome. Still others have studied correlations between judicial preferences and case
outcomes across entire populations of votes to gain inferential leverage. Each of these
orientations is not without limits, however, and fail if a necessary condition for the “big picture”
understanding of Court behavior is comprehensiveness in case selection and description.

Beyond Dichotomies
Behavioral studies based upon quantitative aggregation of the votes of individual justices
continue to emphasize parsimony over richer, multi-dimensional understandings of the
motivations of justices. During the 2014 Jordan Saunders Seminar in Constitutional History at
Stanford University, legal scholar Robert Gordon noted that, “Political Scientists have always
been more interested in the bottom line,” while practitioners and law school professors continue
to emphasize doctrinal norms, precedent, and the culture of judging over “counting votes”
(Whittington 2000; Feldman 2005; Tamanaha 1996). Going back to at least 1988 with Rogers
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Smith’s influential article on incorporating the social, cultural, and legal context of judging to
bear on what had become a generally behavioralist approach to public law studies, the “NeoInstitutional” strand of judicial decision-making literature has emphasized the role legal factors
play in constituting decisions (Smith 1988; Clayton 1999; Whittington 2000; Feldman 2005). In
terms of epistemological approaches, scholars have successfully done so within interpretivist
(Graber 1992; Gillman 1993; Bybee 1998; Bussiere 1999; Keck 2004, 11; Richards 2013) and
positivist (Hansford and Spriggs 2008; Richards and Kritzer 2002; Bartels and O’Geen 2015)
research traditions.
However valuable diversity of research orientations might be for the production of
knowledge, the insights gleaned from disparate efforts are limited in contributing to studies of
judicial decision-making so long as they continue to resemble ships passing in the night. The
review of recent scholarship aimed at explaining the constitution of freedom of expression by
SCOTUS motivates the core substantive goal of the dissertation, but it also informs broader
questions about judicial decision-making grappled with in the chapters to follow. Rather than
staking a paradigmatic claim to the exclusion of other possibilities, this dissertation follows the
recommendations and ontological orientation of Stephen Feldman in unifying what have become
known as “external” and “internal” approaches to the study of judicial behavior.
According to Feldman, external approaches are premised on the idea that “Judges'
decisions are responses to stimuli that are substantially independent of legal rules, principles, and
precedents,” while internal approaches believe “that precedents and legal rules have at least some
influence on judicial decisionmaking.” (Feldman 2005, 93, 96). For Feldman, when either of
these paradigms structure the study of judicial behavior to the exclusion of the other, research
findings are impoverished by a lack of comprehensiveness. The external view has merit for its
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systematic modeling and prediction of judicial votes, but falls short by tilting at legal model
windmills that few scholars actually believe. It can also be problematically acontextual,
particularly when imposing ideological meaning on votes that may be too monolithic or do not
easily map onto commonly understood meanings of liberal or conservative, or by ignoring how
political preferences are constituted by the unique role of judging internalized by the institution’s
actors.
Conversely, the merits of the internal approach lie in the recognition that law is
fundamentally an interpretive project, with judges in general agreement in terms of which
jurisprudential rules and structures must be used to constitute decisions. For critics, however,
this approach falls short in that it is mainly descriptive (or, as in law reviews, descriptive but also
offering normative recommendations and concerns), and at times seems unconcerned with the
fact that the Supreme Court often hears hard cases where “the law has run out,” leaving policy
concerns to fill the jurisprudential void. It has also been criticized by eminent, positivist scholars
for being an unfalsifiable and even naïve account of the effect of law on decision-making
(Spaeth and Segal 1999, 288; Segal and Spaeth 2002, 44-53), as it is incredibly difficult to
establish that, in the presence of various legal structures and tests, a justice votes differently than
he or she would absent those purported constraints (though see Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward
2013 for evidence that law may act as a “decision-making vice” in some cases). Keith
Whittington has pointed out that these critiques may miss the mark entirely, insofar as the
practice of law is best understood as an institution that shapes the preferences of actors – even
those with political preferences: “Justices are likely to think about and act on public problems
differently as a consequence of their experiences and expectations on the Court.” (Whittington
2000, 615).
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Linking these two perspectives on judicial decision-making remains an untidy enterprise,
though some efforts since the publication of Feldman’s article have attempted to bring both
perspectives together in a single frame (Corley et al. 2013; Richards 2013). Barring
epistemological and methodological orthodoxy, there is little reason to maintain a firm division
between research projects interested in the genesis and influence of the preferences of judges,
whether legal or political. Because context is important and the meaning of legal norms and
ideological preferences is characterized by periods of stability and fluidity (Smith 1988; Gerring
1997), any explanation of judicial decision-making drawing on both perspectives would benefit
from carefully specified periods and carefully specified areas of law. A careful specification of
scope conditions allows scholars interested in the effects of political or legal preferences across a
series of decisions or votes to have a higher degree of confidence in the accuracy of results. The
obvious trade-off to this approach is generalizability for accuracy, as the emphasis is on
explaining an outcome for a well-defined period rather than a universal, longitudinal trend across
many decisions and contexts.
The Court’s First Amendment, freedom of expression project remains an important
flashpoint for scholars in the ongoing debate concerning the relative influences of legal and
ideological factors on Supreme Court judicial decision-making. In fact, the state of scholarship
on the subject tracks the messy state of contemporary First Amendment free speech
jurisprudence, with competing theoretical approaches and research designs mirroring
increasingly complex subsets of jurisprudence, from the government speech to traditional content
neutrality doctrines. Due to these scattered and disparate treatments, it remains an open question
as to whether the Roberts Court is a pro- or anti-speech Court, whether free expression represents
an exception to the attitudinal model of judging, whether the Roberts Court has reconstituted free
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expression in a marked break from the previous Court, and the extent to which ideological
preferences of justices or well-defined legal categories carries provides leverage on the question.
In developing answers to these questions in the course of this dissertation, the project
examines the constitution of contemporary freedom of expression law from both perspectives.
Here, the term “constitution” refers to the fact that the justices, as members of a particular
institution and set of practices embedded within a particular historical context, set the contours
and limits of First Amendment protection in an ongoing, fluid process of adversarial legalism.
This constitution of freedom of expression is best understood as a shared practice of norms
among members of a particular community, structured by a set of rules that are neither wholly
determinate or hopelessly indeterminate. It accepts the premise that justices have an institutional
duty to balance social facts and moral concerns, and that this practice is often fraught with
“[cases] both similar to, and different from, a finite pattern of behavior in an infinite number of
ways. Judicial discretion is inevitable because it is impossible for finite beings to guide conduct
in ways that resolve every conceivable question.” (Shapiro 2011, 251).
Because of law’s simultaneous, fundamental indeterminacy in hard cases – precisely the
type likely to populate the U.S. Supreme Court’s agenda – and its ability to provide general
guidelines that steer collective decision-making by a particular standard like a principle of
content-neutrality (akin to Hart’s “rule of recognition”(Hart 1994, 94-95, 98, 102-103)), studies
of judging must account for the influences of social and moral preferences and legal principles
alike. 5 These efforts must take seriously the different types of knowledge gleaned from internal

Shapiro invokes Hart’s “rule of recognition” and distinction between primary and secondary rules in suggesting
constitutional law adjudication approaches a secondary rule – or rule of recognition – that government officials have
a duty to “evaluate the conduct of citizens according to the rules these citizens are obligated to follow.” In dispute
resolution before Courts on issues of constitutional law, Article III (2011, 84-86) functions as a primary rule, and is
a rule of recognition agreed to by government officials. In this project and specifically in chapter four, I view the
5
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and external approaches to the study of judicial behavior and attempt to integrate them so as to
gain the broadest possible perspective on an outcome of interest. This dissertation pushes back
against the balkanization of judicial decision-making studies into camps sometimes bearing the
labels quantitative and qualitative, behavioralist and post-behavioralist, attitudinalists and
historical institutionalist. There is no guarantee that this structure will produce neat findings,
however: To some, the findings may be as easily digestible as a Bob Ross landscape but to
others a big picture akin to Jackson Pollock’s work. This should be expected in any effort that
brings the insights of competing perspectives together in offering a comprehensive answer to
important political questions, providing empirical, quantitative analyses revealing measurable
effects-of-causes, but also a detailed, complex causes-of-effects account. If persuasive, the
project not only explains an important outcome of interest but will also serve as a model for
judicial decision-making scholars interested in particular periods and/or issue areas to follow.

Plan of the Dissertation and a Brief Note on Research Design
Overall, the freedom of speech agenda of the contemporary Court is the broad outcome
of interest to be explained in this dissertation project. More broadly, the project also uses
contemporary freedom of speech as a proving ground for a number of longstanding conventions
of judicial decision-making, especially a primary focus on individual judicial votes (and
aggregations) and the merits stage of decision-making. In light of this structure and its
accompanying methodological and epistemological pluralism, each individual chapter provides a
specialized review of relevant literature and research design specific to the interrogation of the
Supreme Court bench as a microcosm of society and the justices as players who agree to the rule of recognition that
content-based regulations of speech by government actors are highly suspect under the First Amendment.
Previewing a theme explored in chapter four, I argue that the secondary rule of fidelity to this jurisprudential regime
rests on increasingly shaky ground.
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conception of the judicial process at issue. 6 Material related to coding standards is included in
the body of chapter two, and is developed further in a Appendices A through H of the
dissertation. Data have been generated by the observable portions of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision-making processes and gleaned primarily from the close reading of judicial opinions and
existing, universally accessible databases including the Supreme Court Database and the website
of Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn. The universe of free speech decisions decided on the
merits during the Roberts and Rehnquist Court Eras was determined by cross-verification of
several sources, including recent scholarship, The First Amendment Center, searches of the
Supreme Court Database, and Westlaw key cites performed in connection with the Global Free
Speech Repository (GFSR) at Syracuse University.
The following paragraphs provide an overview of each substantive chapter as well as key
findings from each stage of the data analysis. Chapter two begins with the most fundamental part
of judicial decision-making studies that may be taken for granted: the development of and
scoring of indicators that accurately reflect concepts of interest. Scholars have recently
developed new indicators in free speech decisions that move beyond the conventional “policy
direction” variable assigned by the Supreme Court Database, a variable that has been of key
importance in attitudinal studies of judicial decision-making. These ongoing efforts are a
reminder that the scoring of indicators developed to measure key concepts is a key first step in
any research endeavor (Adcock and Collier 2000). In chapter two, I develop and assess a new
composite directional variable based on the idea of “INUS” conditions, defined as “an
insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the
Beyond that qualification – and consistent with best practices associated with data maintenance and transparency
collected and examined by the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-method Research at Syracuse University (IQMR) all data have been stored securely on a laptop hard drive with flash drive back-up copies and have also been
uploaded to Dropbox with two-step authentication required for access. Data, including STATA analysis do-files,
will be made available publicly to all parties via dataverse.com following submission of the project.
6
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result.” (Mackie 1965, 245; see also Mahoney and Vanderpoel 2015, 79-82). This composite
indicator incorporates the identity of the speaker, speech act, and speech suppressor in assigning
an ideological direction to judicial votes – each a necessary piece of information for determining
the direction of a decision but none alone sufficient for characterizing a decision as liberal,
conservative, or undetermined.
Chapter three assesses the Roberts Era free speech plenary (or merits) agenda from the
perspective of the attitudinal model, specifying the probability of pro-speech votes primarily as a
function of judicial attitudes (or ideological preferences) while controlling for a number of
relevant case factors. This approach is part replication and part building upon the models and
findings offered by Richards (2013) in a book-length treatment of the influence of factors beyond
ideology on the Court’s free expression decisions. I also argue for greater attention to the
voting coalitions in cases as the key dependent variable of interest, rather than the probability of
a pro-speech or anti-speech vote occurring given an aggregation of judicial votes. To examine
the concept of voting disorder on the Court, I construct and elaborate on a series of descriptive
typologies.
Chapter four builds upon the ideological explanation by considering the influence of
jurisprudential structures, differing conceptions of the judicial role, and free speech philosophies
within and across cases. This chronological and “causes of effects” explanation relies upon
counterfactuals, cross-case, and cross-justice comparisons in the spirit of early work by C.
Herman Pritchett, a pioneer of judicial behavior research who recognized the limits of effects-ofcauses research designs that – to varying degrees – have emphasized ideological preferences
over other possible explanations. While the model specified in this chapter is more complex than
common judicial decision-making specifications, care is taken to mitigate against what could
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become a scenario where “everything is somehow connected to everything else.” (Smith 1988,
101; see also Davis 1999, 152).
Chapter five takes a different, innovative tack and leverages a different part of the
judicial process in an attempt to pinpoint what lies behind the Roberts Era free speech agenda:
the certiorari cut-point. To date, no issue-oriented study of the Supreme Court agenda has
adequately – if at all –accounted for the non-random, discretionary nature of the Court’s agenda.
This strategy is not without its own perils. The secrecy of the certiorari process, possible
strategic motivations, and questions of what constitutes “certworthiness” all contribute to a
number of difficult case selection and research design choices. I develop an original dataset of
all fairly comparable denials of certiorari in free speech cases from 2006-2015, and examine
these cases via logit regression and case studies of issue area subsets within modern First
Amendment law. The logic of looking to the body of cases denied certiorari is fairly
straightforward, though complicated by the secrecy of the Court’s review process: If the Court’s
free expression agenda is ideologically motivated, we may expect to observe similar patterns at
the certiorari stage.
Chapter six summarizes the findings of this project, suggesting how this study could be a
useful research program for other scholars interested in assessments of broad issue areas before
the Court. Overall, the key finding of the dissertation is that the Roberts Court’s constitution of
freedom of expression is both ideological and legal. The findings are consistent with a Court
interested in advancing a particular political agenda – hostility to campaign finance regulations
and unions, sympathy to expanding the scope of freedom of expression to include commercial
transactions - while also clearly marking the bounds of the scope of free expression protection.
The Court’s agenda has a clear conservative cast, though it is clearly not solely motivated by
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conservative preferences. The Court regularly deviates from the expectations of the attitudinal
model of judging, and the nature of these deviations is consistent with post-behavioral
understandings of the Court as populated by actors with heterogeneous ideological and legal
preferences. Simply put, the constitution of freedom of expression by the contemporary Court
does not lend itself to bright-line dichotomies or categories.
Beyond the substantive outcome of interest, the conclusion also connects the assumptions
and approaches offered here to the internal and external perspectives on law described above. It
also suggests how this project may be expanded moving forward in the comparative courts
context, the role of free speech in U.S. society, and the role of litigators in bringing cases before
the Court. If this account is persuasive, then, it will successfully describe and explain the
contemporary free expression agenda of the Roberts Era Court: It will also improve conventions
relied upon in quantitatively and qualitatively (or positivist and interpretive) oriented studies of
judicial decision-making.
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Chapter 2
Rethinking Concept Measurement in the Study of U.S. Freedom of Expression

Introduction
The ideological coding of case outcomes is a key component of studies of Supreme Court
decision-making. Foundational work in the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making has
found strong correlations between the ideological values of justices and career voting patterns
(Segal and Cover 1989; Segal and Spaeth 1993, 2002). The Supreme Court Database, a valuable
research tool available to scholars of law and courts, has historically coded pro-free speech
decisions as liberal – with some evolving exceptions, as in the case of decisions against
provisions of federal and state campaign finance laws. Yet scholars from both the behavioral
and doctrinal judicial decision-making camps have noted that there are conservative and liberal
free speech traditions (Epstein and Segal 2006), as well as multiple potential indicators in any
free expression controversy (Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013; Pettys 2015). 7 If the indicators for
ideological case factors do not closely reflect the underlying concept of interest - whether a
decision’s direction is liberal or conservative - then the foundation of judicial decision-making
studies may be flawed (Adcock and Collier 2000). Thus, contemporary freedom of expression
cases may represent a unique test population for some of the assumptions of what has become
known as the attitudinal model of judging.
Consider the sustained scholarly debate concerning the nature of the Court’s recent free
speech decisions. Some of the Roberts Court’s free expression decisions – particularly those
involving campaign finance regulations and union fundraising - appear to be consistent with the
For variation, cases generally concerning the First Amendment’s free speech clause during the period of analysis in
this dissertation use the terms “free speech” and “free expression” interchangeably.
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attitudinal theory of judging, while others do not appear to fit so easily within the attitudinal
paradigm, including cases involving protestors at military funerals, a federal animal cruelty law,
a state law regulating the sale of violent videogames to minors, and even a federal law restoring
copyright protections to artistic works previously in the public domain. Indeed, for a number of
recent free expression decisions, it is not immediately clear which case-level indicator best
reflects the ideological content of the case: The ideological, “in-group” affiliation of the speaker?
The partisan identity of the speech suppressor? Or what about the ideological valence of the
speech act itself?
The issue, then, is both substantive and methodological. Legal scholars continue to offer
explanations of judicial behavior in Roberts Court Era free expression cases from a diverse array
of epistemological perspectives and employing different methodological approaches (Youn
2011; Coyle 2013, 199-219; Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013; Richards 2013; Tushnet 2013, 215246; Tribe and Matz 2014, 121-153; Pettys 2014; 2015; Knowles and Lichtman 2015, 239-254).
This sustained focus on the coverage and scope of free expression protection is connected to the
First Amendment’s place as a “lodestar” of democracy in the United States, a right that, when
litigated, has frequently produced strange bedfellows among the Court’s Justices (Edelman,
Klein, and Lindquist 2008) and even among interest groups filing amicus curiae briefs in merits
cases before the Court (Swenson 2016).Whether operationalized through quantitative scoring
and regression techniques or richly detailed, interpretive narratives, all of these accounts share an
implicit concern for the relationships between the ideological values of the Justices and the
ideological direction of votes in decisions on the merits.
Recently, some scholars have drawn attention to the importance of accurately measuring
the values of the justices, stressing the importance of accurately measuring the ideological
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preferences of Justices (Johnston, Mak, and Sidman 2016). Alternatively, other scholars have
highlighted the importance of accurately measuring ideology on the “votes” side of this
relationship (Shapiro 2010; Hagle 2015). What else can be done to improve upon the content
validity of the dependent variable operationalized in quantitative analyses of judicial decisionmaking? In this chapter, I focus on the votes side of the equation and develop an alternative,
composite indicator for coding the ideological direction of decision direction in contemporary
free expression controversies. Drawing on concept formation literature and the notion of “INUS
Conditions,” or “an insufficient but non-redundant part of a condition which is
itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie 1965, 245), I develop a decision
direction indicator that takes into account the speaker, speech suppressor, and valence of the
speech act identified in each free speech decision issued by the Roberts Court since 2005. In
other words, membership in the sets of “conservative,” “liberal,” or “unspecified” categories of
Supreme Court decisions follows from the presence of multiple conditions – the type of speaker
(rights claimant), speech act (the content of the speech), and the partisan identity of the speech
suppressor (entity enacting the law or taking action suppressing speech) - which can be
configured in multiple ways.
This chapter proceeds as follows: First, I describe the conventional policy basis for
coding ideological direction developed by the curators of the Supreme Court Database, a
resource widely-used by judicial decision-making scholars. Next, I review recent scholarship
that has sought to improve upon the policy-based scoring of indicators by instead looking to the
ideological affiliation of the speaker in a given case before the Court, as well as an emerging
critique of this speaker-centric approach. A key theme that has come to light in a recent
exchange between judicial decision-making scholars is the multiplicity of potential indicators
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that may function as stimuli for justices considering free expression controversies, including the
identity of the speaker but also the content of the speech and identity of the speech suppressor.
To build upon this emerging research program, I develop a composite indicator for ideological
direction that also accounts for the latter two considerations. Finally, I assess the composite
indicator’s performance by replicating the original values and votes regression appearing in
conventional analyses of judicial behavior. I find that as scholars have refined the indicators for
decision direction assignment, the relationship between values and votes has not remained
constant but become more tenuous.
This replication of conventional analyses with new concept measurement techniques has
immediate implications for the study of contemporary free expression decisions, where the
conservative voting percentages of Roberts Court Justices in free speech cases from the 20052014 terms may be overstated. While the inferences drawn from this piece are necessarily
limited in scope to recent free expression decisions and one possible model specification of
many, the problem of multiple indicators and coding choices has implications for any study
relying on the decision direction indicator assigned by the Supreme Court Database. More
broadly, it is hoped that this project will encourage continued discussion across the quantitative
and qualitative cultures in the epistemologically and methodologically diverse subfield of law
and courts.

Measuring Decision Direction: The Policy-Based Approach
Ideology is a notoriously slippery concept. As John Gerring notes, “it has become
customary to begin any discussion of ideology with some observation concerning its semantic
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promiscuity.” Gerring defines ideology as “a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that
belong to one another in a non-random fashion.” (Gerring 1997, 957, 980). This definition
captures the core element of the concept of ideology, and allows the researcher to add and
subtract particular attributes as dictated by case factors that resonate with modern liberalism or
conservatism. In the dominant judicial decision-making paradigm, Supreme Court Justices, legal
actors appointed in a political process to serve on the nation’s highest tribunal as a co-equal
policymaking branch of the federal government, face fewer institutional constraints in voting on
cases and are therefore likely to vote ideological preferences rather than (or in addition to)
commitments to precedent (Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000, 12; Hansford and Spriggs
2008; Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward 2013). Generally, there are two dimensions used to gauge
ideological preferences in American politics – one economic and one social (Fiorina, Abrams,
and Pope 2011, 170-173). For illustration, pro-business decisions are coded as conservative
while pro-union decisions are coded as liberal. On the social axis, a conservative decision is one
that favors evangelical Christianity, while a liberal decision is one that favors social equality (of
ethnic minorities, LGBT causes, etc.).
In a recent series of exchanges, judicial decision-making scholars have brought attention
to potential problems with the assignment of decision direction indicator employed by the
Supreme Court Database (SCDB)(Epstein and Segal 2006; Shapiro 2010; Epstein, Parker, and
Segal 2013; Pettys 2014; 2015). These exchanges point toward the importance of accurately
measuring the direction of votes. The most important factor in determining the ideological
content of cases coded by the SCDB is the issue area. The Supreme Court Database emphasizes
that, “Although criteria for the identification of issues are hard to articulate, the focus here is on
the subject matter of the controversy (e.g., sex discrimination, state tax, affirmative action) rather
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than its legal basis (e.g., the equal protection clause),” and that “The objective is to categorize the
case from a public policy standpoint…” 8 At some point, the decision direction coding for First
Amendment is the issue area cases began to make exceptions, such that some pro-First
Amendment decisions were coded as conservative (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 149-151).
For example, the current coding for First Amendment issue area decisions describes liberal
decisions as those that are “pro-civil liberties or civil rights claimant, especially those exercising
less protected civil rights (e.g. homosexuality),” “pro-accountability and/or anti-corruption in
campaign spending,” “pro-privacy vis-à-vis the 1st Amendment where the privacy invaded is that
of mental incompetents,” and “pro-underdog,” while conservative decisions are “the reverse of
above” (Supreme Court Database 2015). As one illustration, in campaign finance cases where
the Court strikes down such regulations as inconsistent with the First Amendment, the database
codes these pro-First Amendment votes as conservative under the anti-corruption criteria –
though even here the choice of issue area and coding seems problematic. 9

Basic Concerns: Multiple Issue Areas and Ad Hoc Adjustments
Commentators have occasionally questioned the degree to which coder discretion is
constrained or scoring decisions can be replicated by the coding rules adopted by the SCDB
(Hagle 2015). First, some cases present multiple issue areas. Sometimes, the SCDB recognizes
this by disaggregating a case and coding each issue separately, but sometimes multiple issues are
The Supreme Court Database, 2015 release.
Even in this limited subset of First Amendment decisions, it remains unclear how the issue area is decided. In
American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, a 2012 per curiam decision holding unconstitutional a Montana statute
prohibiting corporate spending in judicial elections, the database coded the decision as “liberal” in identifying the
issue area as “First Amendment: Commercial speech, excluding attorneys.” Nor is it clear why decisions favoring
commercial speech claims are coded as liberal, given the link between such speech and a conservative/libertarian
free market philosophy.

8
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not recognized by database coders (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2012). Consider a
contemporary free expression controversy recently coded by the Database: Walker v. Sons of
Confederate Veterans (135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015)). In a 5-4 decision with Justice Thomas breaking
with the Court’s conservative bloc and joining Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, the Court held
that the Texas Motor Vehicle Board’s rejection of a license plate design featuring the
Confederate Flag was not subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it constituted
government, rather than private, speech. Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, attacked the majority for misinterpreting the
precedent established in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (555 U.S. 460 (2009)), another
government speech case decided unanimously and also authored by Alito.
According to the SCDB, the issue area in the case is the First Amendment, a coding
choice that dictates the decision direction should be conservative, and that individual votes in
favor of the Sons of the Confederate Veterans in the case should be coded as liberal. But is that
the only issue area in the case? Lurking in the background is an issue about deference to states, a
familiar theme for the Court’s more conservative jurists during Rehnquist era (Volokh 2015).
Should an additional issue area be added for the case (States’ Rights), with the decision coded as
conservative and dissenting votes coded as liberal (anti-states’ rights)? Or, ad hoc, should an
additional issue area category be added (right-wing speech), similar to the addition of the “anticorruption” in campaign finance cases that transforms otherwise liberal First Amendment
decisions to conservative ones because they struck down campaign finance regulations?
The potential to subtract and add coding rules without detailed explanation points to a
related coding discretion issue: ad hoc measurement adjustments. As Carolyn Shapiro has noted,
the issue area decision is important because it dictates the subsequent decision direction indicator

36
scoring. This choice has direct bearing on the dependent variables employed in attitudinal
analyses of judicial decision-making (Shapiro 2010). In a recent book-length treatment of the
behavior of federal judges, one of the book’s co-authors offered corrections to a number of
coding decisions in the SCDB based on a random sample of 110 cases drawn from the database:
“We changed all votes to other from conservative or liberal in case type 30020, where every vote
for the plaintiff in a commercial speech case had been coded as liberal, and in 30140, where
likewise every vote in favor of requiring accountability in campaign spending had been coded as
liberal.” (Epstein et al. 2013, 150). The authors’ notes on coding changes end with a comment
on coding exercises of judicial review from liberal to “other,” as “It would require a careful
examination, which we have not undertaken, of individual cases to determine the ideological
direction of a vote in favor of the exercise of judicial power.” (Epstein et al. 2013, 151).
If, however, “The acid test of the role of ideology in Supreme Court decision-making is
the ideological valence of the Justices’ votes,” then it should follow that a careful examination of
case factors is appropriate for all types of decisions (Epstein et al. 2013, 105). This concern is not
merely theoretical, as the Roberts Court’s decision in Milavetz, Gallop, and Milavetz v. U.S. (559
U.S. 229 (2010)) illustrates. Here, the Court ruled against a First Amendment challenge brought
by a law firm specializing in bankruptcy claims, which was restricted from advising clients to
incur additional debt under amendments to the Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Another contested provision of
the law required that “debt relief” agencies disclose their identity in advertisements. Should
“Commercial speech” decisions in favor of the claimant be coded as conservative, while
commercial speech decisions in favor of lawyers be coded as liberal, based on the finding that
attorneys tend to contribute campaign donations to Democrats? (Bonica and Sen 2015) On the
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commercial speech issue, the SCDB codes the decision as liberal (Commercial Speech,
Attorneys (cf. Commercial Speech)), while on the First Amendment issue the Database codes the
decision direction as conservative (First Amendment, Miscellaneous)(cf. Comity: First
Amendment)). 10 It is not clear why the two First Amendment issues point in different directions,
or how to decide which decision (if it can be considered more than a single decision) should be
given primacy – taking the case as a whole, is the proper decision direction “unspecifiable”?
Table 2.1 – Decision Direction Assignments, SCDB (1946-2014 Terms)
Conservative
Liberal
Unspecifiable
Total

Number of Cases
4,131
4,356
143
8,630

Percentage
47.87%
50.48
1.66
100.00

Table 2.1 illustrates how rarely the unspecified code has been assigned by the SCDB. In
Roberts Court free expression decisions, the unspecified code has never been assigned. 11 As
Shapiro notes, this remains problematic for scholars in both the empirical and traditional legal
studies fields: The behavioral approach linking values to votes “assumes that there is a single
dimension – liberal to conservative – along which all cases’ ideological character can be
measured…In the U.S. Supreme Court Database, not only is the ideology coding unidimensional
but it also binary.” (Shapiro 2010, 88).

10 Unless stated otherwise, Database results obtained via the Analysis tool (Analysis Case Detail) at the Supreme
Court Database at http://supremecourtdatabase.org/analysis.php.
11 Shapiro’s claim that the SCDB direction coding is binary is not technically true, but in practice the unspecified
code is rarely assigned. Since the 2005 term, the SCDB has assigned the unspecified code a total of 11 times. The
code has not been assigned to any First Amendment free speech decisions during that period.
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The In-Group Bias Debate
With these concerns in mind, scholars have recently developed an alternative indicator
based on the ideological identity of the speaker in free speech cases (Epstein, Parker, and Segal
2013; see also Richards and Kritzer 2002 and Richards 2013 for earlier efforts at controlling for
the identity of the speaker in free expression cases). In other words, the relevant stimulus for the
justices is posited as the ideological identity of the claimant in a case, and the directionality of a
judicial vote is determined by the purported alignment of the free speech claimant’s ideology
with the conservative or liberal values of the justices. Specifically, Epstein, Parker, and Segal
define a “Nature of Expression” variable, “to assess the ideological direction of the expression
(or expresser) – such that homophobic (e.g., [Boy Scouts of America v. Dale]) or racist (e.g.
Wisconsin v. Mitchell [1993]) behavior, to provide but two examples, are coded as
“conservative” expression. Nature of expression is liberal if the expression was, e.g., burning an
American flag (e.g. Texas v. Johnson [1989]), providing support to (e.g. Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project [2010]), associating with un-American organizations (e.g. Barenblatt v. United
States [1959]), and so on.” (Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013, 7).
The authors ultimately conclude that justices opportunistically rule in favor of pro-speech
claims brought by members of their own ideological in-group, but with the caveat that
“regardless of whether the law is liberal, conservative, or neutral, liberal justices are more likely
to vote in favor of the expression,” while conservative justices are only more likely to vote in
favor of expression when the nature of expression is conservative (Epstein et al. 2013, 10; see
also Liptak 2014). The study builds on conventional judicial decision-making scholarship in that
it has spurred a re-assessment of whether free expression is simply another instrumental
constitutional provision that justices put into service in the pursuit of liberal and conservative
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causes, but the authors’ operationalizing the nature of expression variable may also hinder our
ability to draw inferences. By failing to clearly distinguish between the nature of the expression
and the identity of the expressor, the authors’ indicator may fail to reflect the underlying concept
of interest. As legal scholar Todd Pettys suggests, there are at least two potential indicators
present – the nature of the expression and the identity of the speaker (Pettys 2014, 16-17).
Epstein, Parker, and Segal responded to this charge and others in an ongoing debate with
Pettys, who has found a number of coding errors and questionable operationalization issues in
the study. One response by Epstein, Parker, and Segal included the admonition: “Another
common misstep on [Pettys’] part is to conflate ideology and partisanship. Were he devising the
coding rules, it seems that he would always code, for example, a challenge to an election law
brought by a Democrat as liberal (and a Republican, as conservative). But that’s not our
approach. In these kinds of cases, a challenge motivated to bring about greater inclusion in the
political process is liberal regardless of the challenger’s partisan label.” (Epstein, Parker, and
Segal 2014, 1). This response not only draws attention to the muddy distinction between the
nature of the speech at issue and identity of the speaker, but also stakes the claim that
partisanship and ideology are two distinct, easily separable indicators. Recent scholarship in the
political parties subdiscipline suggests that this claim may be more tenuous in contemporary
politics, as the Democratic and Republican parties have become increasingly (though
asymmetrically) more liberal and conservative, respectively, with partisan goals often reflecting
the core ideological orientations of members of each party (Abramowitz 2011; Fiorina, Abrams,
and Pope 2011). The point is not that the in-group bias approach to measurement is
fundamentally incorrect in distinguishing partisan from ideological identity, but that the
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distinction is not as cut-and-dried as their response suggests and that indicators employed to
reflect concepts may be historically contingent.
Epstein, Parker, and Segal also code laws - the “speech suppressor” - on the basis of
whether they are liberal or conservative, but the authors’ definition is relatively thin: “For our
study (as in all the others), conservative laws are actions taken by government that tend to
restrict liberal speech (e.g. restrictions on flag burning); liberal laws are the reverse (restrictions
on anti-union expression). The omitted category in our analysis is neutral laws – those that apply
equally to liberal and conservative speakers, such as restrictions on campaign financing.”
(Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2014). Of course, laws against flag desecration or anti-union speech
may have the effect of suppressing liberal or conservative speech, respectively, but these are
obvious cases (Pettys 2015, 10). Here, it is not immediately clear whether the authors are coding
the identity of the speech suppressor or their impression of the effect of that suppression. If it is
the latter, and assuming the authors are serious about the claim that “votes to strike (and uphold)
statutes tend to reflect [justices’] political preferences toward the policy content of the law,” then
it is unclear why campaign finance statutes are excluded from the “liberal” category, as the
conservative opposition to such regulations has been well-documented and predates the
contemporary Court.
Overall, this exchange underscores the importance of establishing a high degree of
symmetry between systematized concepts and indicators: “Researchers routinely make complex
choices about linking concepts to observations, that is, about connecting ideas with facts. These
choices raise the basic question of measurement validity: Do the observations meaningfully
capture the ideas contained in the concepts?” (Adcock and Collier 2000, 529, 531). In studies of
judicial decision-making seeking to assess relationships between values and votes, measurement
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concerns apply to both the independent variable – as is the case in the EPS study – and
dependent variable.
Shifting the focus to the dependent variable in fundamental assessments of this
relationship, it remains unclear how multiple, identity-based conditions present in cases should
be accounted for when scoring the directional indicator. Consider another recent free expression
case, Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015)), a 5-4 decision upholding the
Florida Supreme Court’s adoption of the Bar’s canon of conduct prohibiting candidates for
judicial elections from soliciting campaign donations. Lanell Williams-Yulee is a member of a
racial minority class and criminal-defense lawyer, suggesting the speaker identity for the case
should be coded as liberal. The nature of the expression, however, concerns soliciting
contributions for electoral campaigns – speech that resonates with the conservative, free market
commitment equating money with speech. Further complicating matters is that the Florida
Supreme Court adopted what is essentially an anti-corruption provision in regulating judicial
elections in Florida. Is a decision against Williams-Yulee conservative, on the basis of her
ideological identity? Liberal, on the basis of the speech suppressor in the case and the nature of
her expression? How should scholars choose among these indicators that appear to point in
different directions when operationalizing the concept of ideological direction of the decision?

Building on Recent Work: Case Conditions as INUS Conditions
The upshot of this emerging judicial decision-making scholarship has been the
identification of a number of potential ideological indicators in free expression decisions, to
include the identity of the speaker, the identity of the speech suppressor, and the nature of the
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expression itself. Observers of the Court have no clear way of adjudicating among these
components in terms of which is most relevant for assigning directional coding to a decision, as
each component may have a conservative or liberal ideological valence. To choose one defining
characteristic of the ideological content of a case at the expense of others raises questions about
measurement validity and may lead to inaccurate relationships between values and votes. To
contribute to this ongoing discussion concerning measurement in judicial decision-making
studies, I offer an alternative approach that evaluates the ideological content of multiple
theoretically relevant defining characteristics of contemporary free expression cases. I argue
that accounting for these multiple, case-level factors yields more accurate characterizations of
the decision direction of a case and, in turn, a better understanding of the relationship between
values and votes. In the sections that follow, I build upon the speaker “in-group” account and its
critiques by operationalizing the speech suppressor and speech act variables for Roberts Court
Era free expression controversies. I then demonstrate how these indicators can be considered as
multiple conditions that, when present, indicate membership in the categories of “conservative,”
“liberal,” or “unspecified” through the qualitative tool known as INUS Conditions.

The Speech Suppressor
If justices are responding to the ideological valence of the entity enacting laws that
suppress speech, scholars require an indicator that captures this valence. To operationalize the
“speech suppressor” indicator in a way that is replicable and transparent, I draw upon a body of
judicial decision-making literature emphasizing that Supreme Court Justices are appointed and
confirmed by national partisan actors and will likely uphold statutes consistent with partisan
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regime commitments and strike those inconsistent with said commitments (Dahl 1957). The
notion of regime politics is defined as “the various ways in which governing coalitions organize
their power and advance their political agenda within a system of interrelated
institutions.”(Gillman 2006, 107). As the parties have become more polarized – with
conservatives likely to identify as Republicans, liberals likely to identify as Democrats, the
partisan composition of enacting legislative coalitions has become a more plausible proxy
measure for the ideological nature of laws.
At least one scholar has already looked to the composition of enacting legislative
coalitions to facilitate inferences about the nature of judicial review by the Supreme Court (Keck
2007, 325). To the extent that partisanship is highly correlated with ideology in contemporary
politics, the partisan composition of legislative coalitions voting in favor of relevant amendments
(i.e. BCRA’s “Millionaire’s Amendment”) or a relevant bill (i.e. The PROTECT Act) is a useful
proxy for the ideological identity of the speech suppressor in a given case. As a proxy indicator,
this approach is not without measurement validity concerns. However, I argue that it still
represents an improvement over directional scoring that does not attempt to account for a
measurable condition present in free expression controversies. Another limitation stems from
data collection, as similar data on state-level legislative coalitions may not be readily available.
When this is the case, scholars may look to well-documented regime commitments operating in
the context of the case as a proxy. Ultimately, the assignment of a partisan or ideological
identity to a government action suppressing speech calls for coder discretion. Recognizing this,
Appendix A provides details on how this discretion was exercised.
Take for example the Roberts Court’s decision in Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, Local 1000 (132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012)), which struck down a public workers’
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union fee assessment for electoral or ideological purposes as compelled speech prohibited under
the First Amendment. The suppressor in this case, a union fee assessment policy, is consistent
with a longstanding Democratic regime commitment to labor unions, a key part of the
Democratic electoral coalition (Karol 2009, 28-29, 37). 12 In these state and local level cases,
when the partisan identity of a suppressor is not available due to missing legislative records or
when the speech suppressor is an unelected official, I code the suppressor as Republican (or
Democratic) when it is consistent with documented regime commitments expressed in national
party platforms. 13 When such information is not available or the identity of the suppressor is
unclear, set membership is coded as undetermined.
For example, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (559 U.S. 440 (2007)), the Court held
that electioneering provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 were
unconstitutional as applied to the anti-Democratic candidate speech that Wisconsin Right to Life,
a pro-life (conservative) 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation, wished to engage in. The Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act – despite its namesake – was passed with overwhelming Democratic and
minimal Republican support. 14 As such, WRTL II is a case of a conservative speaker and
Democratic speech suppressor. Any provision of a federal law can be categorized in the same
way. If the challenged provision of a law in question in a free expression case passed with both
majority Democratic support and Republican support in the House or Senate, it is coded as

As Karol notes, the problems associated with inferring unity and disagreement solely through reading positions
articulated in platforms, I also adopt his recommendation of looking at votes cast by parties in the national
legislature. The purposes of this project differ from Karol’s in that his goal is to explain party coalition management,
while mine is to develop indicators for the ideological direction of court case decisions. Party platforms offered by
increasingly polarized elites are one way of doing so.
13 “Moving America Forward: 2012 Democratic National Platform,” last accessed Oct. 29, 2015,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101962.pdf; “We Believe in America: 2012 Republican Platform,” last
accessed Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101961.pdf.
14 Roll Call Vote Information for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 as follows: House of
Representatives, Feb. 14, 2002: Democrats – 198Y, 12N; GOP – 41Y, 176N. U.S. Senate, Mar. 20, 2002:
Democrats – 49Y, 2N; GOP – 11Y, 38N.
12
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Bipartisan. For challenges to federal laws where the relevant provision was not offered by
amendment, the roll call votes for the enrolled bill will be used to code the suppressor variable.
If a federal law was enacted with majority Democratic (Republican) support, but with a majority
of Republicans (Democrats) in opposition, then the nature of the speech suppressor is
Democratic (Republican). Of course, sometimes laws that suppress speech will not have a clear
partisan identity, such as the one in question in U.S. v. Alvarez: The Stolen Valor Act of 2005
was enacted with broad bipartisan support. In other words, the identity of the suppressor is
neither Democratic (liberal) or Republican (conservative), but bipartisan. Coding suppressors as
bipartisan or undetermined bears some similarities to coding speakers without any obvious or
commonly understood ideological identity as unspecified. Appendix A provides descriptions of
federal statute coding decisions.
A point of caution is in order: the basic assumption for coding the suppressor in a given
speech controversy is that the justices respond to the valence of the legislative coalition or
official because it is a known entity. The difficulty associated with finding and determining party
positions via legislative votes and even party platform positions suggests that the justices are not
familiar with the in-group identity of these political actors or which partisan coalitions favored
speech suppressive laws. Admittedly, the results that follow in Table 2.3 do little to assuage this
concern. However, if scholars remain convinced that this potential effect should be controlled
for in attitudinal analyses and replications, this operationalization offers a degree of transparency
not present in previous analyses.
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The Nature of the Speech Act (Speech Content)
The shift from issue area to speaker identity followed work by Epstein and Segal (2006)
that suggested that it is not at all obvious that all pro-free speech claimant decisions should be
classified as liberal, notwithstanding the liberal tradition of robust protection for civil liberties.
As Feldman has argued, a conservative free speech tradition exists alongside the liberal one – a
tradition with distinctly Burkean elements (as in the Roberts Court’s decision in Morse v.
Frederick (551 U.S. 393 (2007)), as well as free-market, libertarian elements, as witnessed in the
Roberts Court’s line of decisions striking down campaign finance regulations (Feldman 2013,
144-146). Similarly, Timothy Kuhner (2014) has argued that the conception of a “free market
Constitution” has influenced the justices in freedom of speech cases going back to at least
Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976)) and has served to reframe economic controversies as civil
liberties disputes. Here, the focus is on the conservative economic valence of the free market
argument for speech, an argument that has appeared with regularity in the claims filed by
speakers protesting restrictions on unfettered campaign spending and contributions.
To the extent that a conservative free speech tradition exists, it exists alongside
competing liberal traditions as well. In McCutcheon v. FEC( 134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)), Chief
Justice Roberts’ opinion for the Court striking down aggregate contribution limits on individuals
under provisions of FECA was also part of a broader debate with Justice Stephen Breyer
(speaking for the Court’s liberal bloc) about the role of free speech in the U.S. constitutional
democracy. Roberts (along with the Court’s more conservative justices) place heavy emphasis on
the negative liberty component of the First Amendment’s protections, while Breyer and the
Court’s liberal bloc interpret the First Amendment’s command as a positive liberty. The work of
Feldman (2013), Tushnet (2013), and Kuhner (2014), as well as Pettys’ critique of the in-group
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bias study (2015, 16-17) points to the relevance of the content of the locution at issue, or the
nature of the speech act itself.
Late 20th and early 21st Century free speech jurisprudence has often turned on broader
partisan and ideological commitments to protecting a “free market” conception of speech,
extending coverage to claims against campaign finance regulations and commercial speech on
the basis of ensuring an unfettered exchange of ideas. As Kathleen Sullivan (2010) has
explained, this tradition has sometimes clashed with commitments to egalitarianism, or speech
acts that appeal to equal treatment. In some controversies before the Court, this will be strongly
correlated with the identity of the claimant. Consider again the case of Knox, where a class
action against a local shop of the Service Employees International Union was filed by nonmembers of a union who objected to paying an additional fee assessed by the union to, in part,
engage in ideological, pro-union speech in the heat of an election campaign. The speaker –
union non-members opposed to pro-union political activities – is best scored as conservative and
the speech act – protesting being compelled to contribute to pro-union ideological fundraising –
can also be understood as a conservative speech act.
Other cases, however, do not feature this tidy convergence. Milavetz, described above, is
one such example where the speaker in the case – a debt relief agency (lawyers) make a speech
claim with conservative ideological valence (commercial speech). In this case, then, scholars
attempting to score indicators are faced with a speech suppressor – the BAPCPA of 2005 –
passed with bipartisan majorities, a liberal speaker (lawyers), and a speech act with conservative
valence. Without a rule or weighting principle (or a view into the minds of the Justices to
determine which factor was relevant in their respective voting decisions), how should coders
proceed?
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Table 2.2 – Proposed Coding Indicators for Roberts and Rehnquist Era Free Speech
Cases 15

Liberal

Undetermined

Speaker

Speech

Suppressor

Lawyers; prisoners;
unions; students; faculty;
Democratic politicians;
oppressed racial/ethnic
minorities, liberal interest
groups; government
employees (except
police); purveyors of
adult entertainment and
pornography; mainstream
media outlets

Pro-racial, LGBT
equality;
pro-Democratic Party;
secular speech; academic
speech; anti-war speech;
whistleblower speech;
controversial left-wing
speech (anti-war; animal
rights); artistic speech
including pornographic
images and nude dancing

Federal Laws/provisions enacted
with majority (minority)
Democratic (Republican)
support; laws consistent with
most recent Democratic Party
Platofrm.

No clear ideological
identity; conflicting
identities

Speech act lacks clear
ideological component

Federal Laws/provisions enacted
with majority support of both
parties

State and local laws/actions
beneficial to unions, regulating
campaigns, progressive-style
ethics reforms; business
regulations; abortion protections

State and local laws without
clear ideological purpose/object

Conservative

Businesses; doctors; law
enforcement officials
(police, corrections
officers), mainstream and
fundamental JudeoChristian groups and
individuals, GOP
politicians, conservative
interest groups, members
of pro-life movement

Pro-life; anti-LGBT or
racial equality;
mainstream and
fundamental JudeoChristian speech;
commercial speech; free
market (anti-campaign
finance and anti-tax)
electoral speech; pro-GOP
electoral speech;
controversial right-wing
speech (KKK; white
nationalism, etc.)

Federal Laws/provisions enacted
with majority (minority)
Republican (Democratic)
support; laws consistent with
most recent GOP Party Platform
State and local laws/actions
beneficial to union non-members
and right-to-work ideology,
regulations of pornography/adult
entertainment, actions by law
enforcement officials; antiabortion legislation/actions

Human discretion in measurement decisions is inevitable, and the meanings of
ideological terms like “liberal” and “conservative” are period-specific. To ensure scholars may
15 Note that the identity of the speaker may be distinct from the speech act, such that if a student protests the use of
university funds subsidizing “liberal” campus groups, absent other identifying information about the student the
coding for the speaker would be “liberal” and the speech act “conservative.” In addition, labeling controversial
speech by KKK members as conservative or ardent animal rights supporters as liberal indicates a general valence of
the speech act that should not be taken to mean all conservatives are KKK sympathizers or all liberals animal rights
activists. Such codes assume the speech act does, however, resonate with one part of the spectrum.
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evaluate this measure on their own terms – a transparency issue - and to facilitate replication,
Table 2.2 provides a summary of the proposed ideological coding rules for the composite
indicator components for the contemporary Court. These classifications build on judicial
behavior literature in the context of First Amendment theory so that “liberal” reflects a
commitment to egalitarianism and political equality, while “conservative” tends to reflect an
affinity for speech rationales committed to a free market theory of the First Amendment
(Sullivan 2010). They also reflect general ideological and partisan regime commitments, so that
decisions favoring unions, prisoners, and students and their speech claims are generally “liberal,”
while those favoring mainstream, Christian religious groups, businesses, police, and conservative
interest groups are coded as “conservative.” As concept measurement entails a great deal of
description, the guidelines in Table 2.2 represent an effort to be transparent so that others may
build upon and attempt to replicate this analysis (George and Bennett 2005, 105-106). Others
may disagree with these choices and configurations; critiques are valuable and welcomed in
moving this broader research program forward.
Pettys’ charge that the EPS study conflates speaker and speech identity is an empirical
question that can be systematically assessed through conventional statistical modeling. In the
study, EPS model votes on the speech claim in a given case (=1 for a pro-speech vote) as the
effect of a number of theoretically relevant factors. Support for the claim that the justices
generally support speakers of their own ideological stripe is found in an interaction term between
the ideological preferences of the Justices (Segal-Cover scores) and the nature of expression
variable described above. The authors find statistically significant support for the in-group bias
claim for the Rehnquist and Warren Courts, but not the Burger Court. As for the Roberts Court,
the authors’ reported coefficient is in the expected negative direction (suggesting the current,
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conservative Court is less likely to support liberal expression), though its magnitude approaches
zero and does not register at conventional levels of statistical significance. The authors attribute
this to “the relatively small number of votes cast by the Roberts Justices (N=248, from 28
cases).” (Epstein et al. 2013, 11).
At the conclusion of the 2014 term, that count stands at 388 individual justice votes.
Scholars interested in the Roberts Court now have a decade of observations and 44 cases to
leverage causal claims. The death of Justice Antonin Scalia in early 2016 also represents a clear
break from the previous ten year period , though the nature of the post-Scalia period is difficult
to even speculate on given recent obstructionism by the GOP-controlled Senate and uncertainty
related to President Trump’s forthcoming nominee. With these new data and cases across a
fairly stable period of Court membership, scholars can attempt to replicate or assess the in-group
bias account. In addition, scholars have also benefitted from the critiques of Pettys and others
who have raised conceptual measurement concerns with the in-group bias account. For example,
the nature of expression variable can and should be operationalized as two separate indicators:
one for the identity of the speaker, and a separate one for the identity of the speech act, or
content of the expression. A replication may either confirm the widely publicized findings of the
initial study – at least as concerning the Roberts Court – or serve as a call for more circumspect
characterizations of the modern Court’s work.
To assess the in-group bias account’s claims, I use logit analysis to model the vote on a
free expression claim (=1 if pro-speech) as the result of the Justices’ ideological preferences
(Segal-Cover scores), whether the law in question was a federal statute or official action (=1),
the identity of the speaker in a case, the identity of the speech act, the partisan or ideological
identity of the speech suppressor in a case, and interaction terms between the Justices’
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ideological preferences and the speaker, speech, and speech suppressor variables. The speech
and speaker variables were coded categorically, including liberal (=0), undetermined (=1), and
conservative (=2). Speech suppressor was coded categorically as well, with the difference being
liberal/Democratic suppressor (=0), undetermined (=1), and conservative/Republican suppressor
(=2). The undetermined categories are important to include in the model, because as Epstein and
King (2002) note, “the quickest way to create a biased measure is to develop a procedure that
relies in a biased way on responses from the population under analysis” (92-93). The baseline
category for the speaker and speech variables is the liberal category, while the suppressor
baseline is conservative/Republican suppressor. Standard errors are clustered on the Justices for
a total of twelve clusters. Following the expectations of the EPS study, a positive sign on the
speaker and speech variables would indicate that conservative justices are less likely to support
liberal speakers and speech. As well, positive coefficients on the interaction terms between
ideological preferences and speakers and ideological preferences and speech would suggest that
the “gap between liberal and conservative justices in their support for free expression grows
when the speech under consideration is liberal speech.” (Epstein et al. 2012, 7).
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Table 2.3 – In-Group Bias Account, Roberts Era (2005-2014 Terms)

Justice Level
Ideology (Segal-Cover)
Case Level
Federal Law
Speaker
Liberal (Baseline)
Undetermined
Conservative
Speech
Liberal (Baseline)
Undetermined
Conservative
Suppressor
Liberal/Democratic (Baseline)
Undetermined
Conservative/GOP
Interactions
Speaker
Ideology x Liberal (Baseline)
Ideology x Undetermined
Ideology x Conservative
Speech
Ideology x Liberal (Baseline)
Ideology x Undetermined
Ideology x Conservative
Suppressor
Ideology x Lib/Dem (Baseline)
Ideology x Undetermined
Ideology x Conservative/GOP
Constant
N = 388

Coef.

R.S.E.

-1.016

.6298

.2566

.2609

--1.592
.2104

--1.214
.6404

--.4563
-3.284***

--1.263
1.102

--.6698
-1.803***

--.5748
.5339

---1.325
.7969

--1.907
.9032

---.4968
4.666****

--1.490
1.311

---2.086***
-.6208

--.6657
1.303

.5430

.4614

Note: Logit coefficients with standard errors clustered on
Justice (C.S.E.). p<.001****, p<.01***, p<.05**, p<.10*.
Pseudo R2=0.1585.

Table 2.3 reports the size, direction, and magnitude of logit coefficients for voting
patterns for all freedom of speech decisions during the Roberts Court Era. Compared to the
initial EPS study, neither the speaker nor suppressor variables register at conventional levels of
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statistical significance. In addition, while the sign on the undetermined speaker variable is
positive and significant, the sign on the speech variable’s highest category (conservative) is
negative, which suggests that the presence of conservative speech is less likely to result in a prospeech decision. This could be due to hostility to conservative speech claims brought by liberal
speakers (such as lawyers, in the case of Williams-Yulee). In addition, neither of the categories
for the speech suppressor variable register at conventional levels of statistical significance, and
the coefficient direction is the opposite of what would be expected.
More important for this replication effort and the lynchpin of the EPS study are the
coefficients for the interactions between ideology and each of the theoretically relevant case
factor categories. None of the interactions between ideology and speaker are statistically
significant, though the direction of the coefficient indicates that conservative justices are more
likely to vote for speech claims brought by conservative speakers. What is more important,
consistent with Pettys’ critique , is the content of the speech in a case – the coefficient on the
interaction between ideology and conservative speech acts is strong and statistically significant
(2014, 5 (fn. 17)). A statistically significant relationship exists for the interaction between
ideology and the speech suppressor when the identity of the suppressor is bipartisan or
undetermined, as conservative justices are less likely to vote for the pro-speech position.
However, the relationship is not significant for the interaction between ideology and liberal or
Democratic-enacted laws. In other words, there is reason to believe that either the concept that
truly matters is the content of the speech act, or the finding of in-group bias may not apply to the
current Court – at least as conceptualized in the EPS study. Fundamentally, these findings
suggest that the conclusions reached in the EPS study are not wholly supported by the data.
Additionally, these findings suggest that evaluating correlations between each of these
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constituent components and judicial votes may be insufficient for measuring and estimating the
relationship between judicial values and votes in free expression cases.

Visualizing and Applying INUS Conditions
The central claim of this chapter is that knowing the ideological or partisan affiliation of
any one of these components alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for coding the ideological
direction of a case. To ensure the decision direction indicator reflects the underlying concept to
be measured, scholars should account for the presence of multiple conditions when faced with
coding choices. In contemporary free expression controversies, the identity of the speaker,
speech act, and speech suppressor can be viewed as conditions that are “Insufficient but
Nonredundant components of a combination of conditions that is Unnecessary but Sufficient,” or
what are commonly referred to in the qualitative methods literature as INUS conditions (Mackie
1965; quoted in Mahoney and Vanderpoel 2015, 79). Knowing the ideological identity of the
speaker alone is not enough to classify the decision as liberal or conservative; one must also
consider the valence of the speech act in a particular legal controversy and/or the
ideological/partisan affiliation of the speech suppressor. The interplay of these three
theoretically relevant components in free expression cases can be depicted visually as well.
Following Mahoney and Vanderpoel (2015, 79-82), Figure 2.1 depicts these relationships
through the use of family resemblance and INUS concept formation diagrams.
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Figure 2.1 – Family Resemblance and INUS Conditions for Direction Assignments 16
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Speech Suppressor
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16 Some ideological objects cannot be assigned a liberal or conservative coding, or involve laws enacted with
bipartisan support (or actions without any clear ideological component). As such, a middle “undetermined”
category exists (similar to the “unspecifiable” category available – but infrequently assigned – at the Supreme Court
Database).
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Figure 2.1 can be interpreted as follows: Conservative (liberal) decision direction is
assigned when a case is a member of the following sets: ABC, AB~C, AC~B, or BC~A. 17 The
“~” notation preceding a set category represents “not (set condition).” AB~C reads as
“conditions A and B are present but not C.” In the contemporary free expression context, a case
presenting a conservative speaker (business) engaged in conservative speech (commercial
speech) but not presenting a Liberal/Democratic law or action claimed to be suppressing speech
is sufficient for assigning a pro-speech vote (decision) the ideological direction of conservative.
When only one member of the set can be classified as conservative (liberal) and the other two
sets take on the values of undetermined, then the directional coding of liberal or conservative
cannot be assigned with any certainty. Again, this is because multiple considerations exist in a
given case and it is not known which of those considerations ranks first for any member of the
majority (or dissent) even if it is in fact A, B, or C alone that led to a conservative or liberal
decision.
In some cases, free speech conflicts arise between two members of the same ideological
group. For example, Morse v. Frederick (551 U.S. 393 (2007) ) is understood as a conflict
between a student and school administrator, arguably both a speaker and suppressor with liberal
identities. One argument against this scoring of speaker and suppressor indicators is that the
school official, Deborah Morse, is suppressing student speech so in this dialectic she is more
properly scored as a conservative suppressor. However, the rule adopted here relies on the type
of speech category to break the tie – Frederick’s speech was pro-drug, political, student speech,
which is coded as liberal. The Supreme Court’s anti-speech decision in favor of Morse and
17 The “~” notation preceding a set category represents “not (set condition).” AB~C reads as “conditions A and B
are present but not C.” In this context, the presence of a conservative speaker (business) engaged in conservative
speech (commercial speech) but not a Liberal/Democratic law or action claimed to be suppressing speech is
sufficient for assigning a pro-speech vote (decision) the ideological direction of conservative.
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against Frederick, then, is conservative on the basis that it is AB~C. Another Roberts Court case
featuring a conflict between two ideological identities is Garcetti v. Ceballos (547 U.S. 410
(2007)), where Democratic District Attorney Gil Garcetti’s retaliatory actions against Deputy
District Attorney Ceballos is decided by the nature of Ceballos’ speech. His administrative
reassignment followed what can be considered “whistleblower” speech, for his efforts in alerting
defense counsel in an ongoing criminal case of problems relating to a inaccuracies in an affidavit
leading to the issue of a search warrant.
Again, the scoring of the decision as conservative, anti-speech follows from the presence
of case factors as AB~C. A complete listing of the combinations for classifying case outcomes
is provided in Appendix B. The qualitative tools of concept formation – family resemblance and
INUS conditions – consider the multiple ideological components of a free expression
controversy in assigning ideological codes to merits decisions and therefore produce a more
accurate indicator of the underlying concept of interest. In this approach to concept
measurement, determining the ideological direction of the decision is independent of the votes of
the justices and treats relevant case facts as defining characteristics rather than causal indicators
(Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 127-138). Concept measurement and determining the essence of a
concept is prior to causal identification or quantification (Sartori 1970, 1038). Accordingly, the
composite indicator incorporates the theoretically relevant sets of speaker identity, speech
suppressor, and type of expression in making determinations of decision direction for any given
free expression case.
Using this conceptual framework, Appendix C contains the coding of case ideological
content for all Roberts Court First Amendment free expression cases from the 2005 through 2014
terms along with the directional coding assigned by the composite indicator developed here, the
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issue area based decision direction coding assigned by the SCDB, and the ideological direction
as assigned in light of the identity of the speaker in the EPS study. For comparison purposes,
Appendix D provides the same for the Rehnquist Era (1994-2004 terms). For each case, the
ideological direction of a decision (and by extension, the justices’ votes) turns on the totality of
circumstances for a given case – in other words, there must be evidence from at least two of the
three categories in order to categorize a given vote as liberal or conservative. For example, a
decision is coded as conservative when the vote is for a conservative speech claimant and
conservative expression (i.e. a conservative non-profit interest group protesting campaign
contribution or expenditure limits)), a conservative claimant and a Democratic (or liberal) law
(speech suppressor), or some combination of at least two of the three categories that point toward
the conservative end of the ideological spectrum.
This approach is not without limitations. First, measurement decisions concerning the
ideological identity of theoretically relevant case factors are likely to vary greatly across time
periods. Earlier canonical free expression decisions may be understood as “liberal” based on the
Carolene Products commitment to protecting unpopular speakers and speech from government
suppression. Writing in 2006, Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal noted that “political scientists have
long equated liberalism with a fundamental commitment to the First Amendment guarantees of
speech, press, assembly, and association.” (Epstein and Segal 2006, 82). Consider Brandenburg
v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444 (1969), which featured a member of the Ku Klux Klan punished for
making a number of racially inflammatory statements at a ritual cross-burning. During this
period of the development of free expression jurisprudence by the liberal Warren Court, the
decision for Clarence Brandenburg may be best understood as a liberal, pro-expression decision:
Direction assignment is based on scoring the speaker as “liberal” under the unpopular speaker
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understanding, the speech type (racist speech) might be properly scored as “conservative” even
during this era, but the official action of censoring expression could plausibly be scored as a
conservative speech suppressor (a general, period-specific concern with government actions
stifling expression).
This point hints at a second assumption made in judicial decision-making studies,
sometimes implicit but often animating judicial decision-making studies: A judicial vote can and
should be reduced to interest in a particular partisan or ideological position, whether it is a policy
orientation as imposed by the SCDB or a psychological affinity for members of a particular ingroup in the EPS study. The meaning of a judicial vote is a subject that will likely continue to
divide scholars, though recent evidence from a series of experiments – the gold standard in
inferring causation – suggests that this reduction to this bottom-line motivation is problematic
(Kahan, Hoffman, Evans, Devins, Lucci, and Cheng 2014, 4): Judges tend to be more resistant to
the sort of “top-down” reasoning assumed in external approaches. The goal of the INUS
composite indicator is to account for the different ideological or partisan referents in freedom of
speech controversies, which places this effort squarely in the “external” camp of judicial
decision-making studies. But engagement with this understanding of judicial votes on its own
terms should not be mistaken with an endorsement of that view. Wallace Mendelson cautioned
long ago that “no matter how precise and objective the neo-behavioralist's calculating machine, it
cannot rise above the errors that are fed into it.” (Mendelson 1963, 595). Though the approach
outlined here may still – however unintentionally - feed Mendelson’s beast, it answers the charge
to more carefully develop a system of indicators put to use in behavioral studies.
To summarize, the scoring of decision direction – with this composite indicator and any
other approach to measuring the direction of votes – rests upon the meanings of these terms
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within the social and political context of those terms at different points in U.S. history. The
approach is consistent with the “external” approach to decision-making studies described in
chapter one, which reduces votes to a series of ideological indicators. While the idea of using the
INUS conditions specified here travels to all free expression decisions issued by the Supreme
Court, different issue areas embedded in different political and social arrangements entail the
development of ideological indicators that account for these differences. A full discussion or
application of this approach to every issue area or time period is beyond the scope of this
dissertation, but a brief example may help illustrate how scholars can employ this approach in
other areas: In the federalism context, for example, an INUS approach to coding might consider
the identity of the partisan identity of a legislative act allegedly encroaching on state sovereignty
under the 10th Amendment, the in-group identity of the claimant if such information is available,
or the ideological orientation of the state challenging a federal law. As with the approach offered
here, scholars would become familiar with the general characteristics of cases within the
federalism issue area and, based on extant scholarship and theory, isolate theoretically relevant
indicators of interest. In the words of Hagle (2015, 384), “To understand the forest, one also
needs a solid working knowledge of the trees.”
Finally, the INUS approach builds upon extant scholarship but it does not completely
reinvent the wheel. Table 2.4 illustrates the degree to which the composite indicator coding
correlates with the measurements employed by the SCDB and Epstein, Parker, and Segal (EPS).
While they do not approach congruency, the generally high levels of actual compared to
expected agreement suggest each indicator at least partially reflects the concept of interest
(ideological decision direction of votes)(Viera and Garrett 2005). In the next section, I assess the
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performance of each of these measures through a series of basic, bivariate models designed to
assess the degree to which Justices’ values and votes are correlated.
Table 2.4 – Agreement With Composite Indicator, Roberts and Rehnquist Court Eras
Paired Observations

Supreme Court
Database
Epstein, Parker,
Segal (EPS)

43

Supreme Court
Database (SCDB)
Epstein, Parker,
Segal (EPS)

54

26

52

Agreement
Kappa
(Expected)
Roberts Era (2005-2014)
62.79%
0.3195
(45.32)
71.34%
0.4043
(52.04)
Rehnquist Era (1994-2004)
49.06%
0.1390
(40.83)
76.47%
0.5984
(41.41)

Significance

.0018
.0008

.0936
0.0000

The Bivariate Case Revisited
To assess the performance of the composite indicator and to replicate models
demonstrating a strong correlation between values and votes, I construct the original bivariate
relationship that appears in early and more recent attitudinal scholarship (Segal and Cover 1989;
Segal, Epstein, Cameron, and Spaeth 1995; Segal and Spaeth 1993; 2002; Epstein et al. 2013). It
is true that scholars have elaborated upon this relationship through other techniques (logit
modeling) and have offered a number of control variables: The EPS study focuses on developing
a directional indicator that explains the free expression votes of the Justices, establishing
probabilities for pro-expression votes. Instead, this chapter focuses on measuring a concept
related to the dependent variable in a number of judicial decision-making studies, past and
present (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995; Segal and Spaeth 1993; 2002; Epstein et al.
2013; Bryan and Kromphardt 2016, 11; Johnston, Mak, and Sidman 2016, 173).
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The decision to reassess the bivariate model evaluating the relationship between values
and votes is that it remains the most fundamental evaluation – or “acid test” - of this relationship
(Epstein et al. 2013, 105). In this relationship, as Justices’ Segal-Cover scores increase so too
should their career conservative voting percentages. Generally, plots of actual and fitted
(predicted) votes reveal something about the performance of a model specification: A model
featuring minimal residuals between the actual and predicted votes represents a good fit.
However, if the indicator employed to reflect the concept of decision direction does not account
for the multiple factors presenting themselves in controversies before the Court, then the model
may be inaccurate – the model’s goodness of fit will be an artifact of concept measurement that
is imperfect. Importantly, this measurement concern is prior to estimating causal effects and
subsequent econometric concerns about biased estimators and the potential for error terms in the
dependent variable to be correlated with independent variables (Adcock and Collier 2000; Goertz
and Mahoney 2012; Wooldridge 2009, 316-318).
If concept measurement issues distort the relationship between values and votes, we may
expect that as indicators have improved in reflecting the concept of decision direction, residuals
between the justices’ positions and a line of best fit will likely increase. If this is the case, then
basic assumptions about the relationship between values and votes may be incorrect – they may
fail the “acid test” of judicial behavior. As such, assessing the bivariate relationship between
values and votes with new measurements of the decision direction variable is a replication effort
with substantive implications for the study of contemporary free expression controversies and
broader methodological and substantive implications for the study of judicial decision-making.
The dependent variable for the models that follow is the percentage of conservative votes cast by
each Justice since the October 2005 term (the beginning of the Roberts Court Era), while the
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independent variable is each Justice’s exogenously determined Segal-Cover score. In the first
model, to calculate the percentage of conservative votes cast for each justice during this period I
use the decision direction variable assigned by the SCDB. In the second model, I base the
conservative vote percentages on the speaker identity indicator developed in the EPS study. In
the third model, decision direction is scored based on the composite indicator developed via the
INUS approach.
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Table 2.5 – Ideological Scores and Percentages by Indicator
Justice

A. Scalia
S. Alito
J. G. Roberts
C. Thomas
J. P. Stevens
D. Souter
A. Kennedy
S. Breyer
R. B. Ginsburg
E. Kagan
S. Sotomayor

SC

% Conservative FS % Conservative FS % Conservative FS
(SCDB)
(EPS)
(Composite)
Roberts Court (2005-2014 Terms)
1
72.5
77.78
72.09
.90
70.27
75.00
62.50
0.88
65.00
81.48
67.44
0.84
72.50
74.07
69.77
0.75
50.00
52.38
27.27
0.675
50.00
50.00
37.50
0.635
72.50
77.78
67.44
0.525
52.50
51.85
30.23
0.32
47.50
48.15
32.56
0.27
40.00
50.00
27.78
0.22
43.48
54.54
34.62

Differences
(SCDB/EPS)
-0.41/-5.69
-7.77/-12.50
+2.44/-14.04
-2.73/-4.30
-22.73/-25.11
-12.5/-12.5
-5.06/-10.34
-22.27/-21.62
-14.94/-15.59
-12.22/-22.22
-8.86/-19.92

Note: N=11. Percentages based on conservative voting percentages of each Justice from the 2005-2014 terms of the
Court (the Roberts Court Era). For the SCDB and Composite vote percentages, the total number of decisions scored
is 43. Due to the replacement of Souter and Stevens with Sotomayor and Kagan, respectively, the number of cases
each of these Justices participated in is less than 43 (Justice Alito also did not participate in three of these cases at
the beginning of his tenure on the Court).
In addition, data collected in the EPS study for the Roberts Court Era is only available for the 2005-2010 terms of
the Court. For EPS vote percentages, the total number of cases scored is 27. Justice Alito voted in 24 of these
cases, Stevens in 21, Souter in 16, Sotomayor in 11, and Kagan in 6.

A. Scalia
W. Rehnquist
C. Thomas
J. P. Stevens
D. Souter
A. Kennedy
S. D. O’Connor
S. Breyer
R. B. Ginsburg

1
.955
0.84
0.75
0.675
0.635
0.585
0.525
0.32

75.93
62.96
68.52
29.63
33.33
51.85
55.56
50.00
35.18

Rehnquist Court (1994-2004 Terms)
78.85
67.31
75.00
28.85
40.38
67.31
63.46
44.23
36.54

64.81
55.56
61.11
31.48
38.89
64.81
53.70
38.89
31.48

-11.12/-14.04
-7.4/-11.75
-7.41/-13.89
+1.85/+2.63
+5.56/-1.49
+12.96/-2.5
-1.86/-9.76
-11.11/-5.34
-3.7/-5.06

Note: N=9. Percentages are the conservative voting percentages of each Justice from the 1994-2004 terms of the
Court (the “stable” Rehnquist Court Era). For the SCDB and Composite indicator vote percentages, the total
number of decisions scored is 54. For the EPS percentage, the authors do not code two First Amendment free
speech decisions: Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) and San Diego v. Roe,
543 U.S. 77 (2004).

Table 2.5 arrays the justices in descending order of their rescaled Segal-Cover scores,
beginning with the most conservative (Scalia) and ending with the most liberal (Sotomayor).
The table also includes the percentage of conservative votes cast by each justice in free speech
cases since the Court’s 2005 term, using the ideological direction variable for cases at the SCDB,
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EPS study, and the composite indicator. The difference column takes a positive value when a
justice’s proportion of conservative votes increased under the composite indicator, while
negative values indicate the proportion of conservative votes decreased compared to the SCDB
policy-based coding and the EPS speaker coding, respectively. Table 2.6 provides the results of
each model estimated with OLS regression, including robust standard errors.
Table 2.6 – Bivariate Models: SCDB, EPS, and Composite Indicator

Model 1 (SCDB)
Segal-Cover Value
Constant
R2
Model 2 (EPS)
Segal-Cover Value
Constant
R2
Model 3 (Composite)
Segal-Cover Value
Constant
R2

Roberts Era
OLS Coefficient
(R.S.E.)

Rehnquist Era
OLS Coefficient
(R.S.E.)

38.68****
(4.06)
33.18****
(2.73)
0.68

48.54***
(12.27)
17.54*
(8.24)
0.41

37.71****
(6.70)
38.96****
(4.68)
0.55

52.11***
(11.42)
19.38*
(8.24)
0.37

52.65****
(8.83)
14.53**
(5.72)
0.55

38.75***
(8.75)
21.91**
(7.40)
0.36

Notes: N=11 for Roberts Era; N=9 for Rehnquist Era. p<.001****,
p<.01***, p<.05**; p<.10*. Robust Standard Errors.

The first point of interest is that there is a clear, statistically significant relationship
between values and votes in each model specification. Figure 2.2 displays the results of the
attitudinal model’s bivariate regression as applied to Roberts Court free expression cases.
Moving from left to right, the models plot the Justices’ positions relative to the line of best fit
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based on predicted values of the dependent variable, using the SCDB, EPS, and composite
indicator coding, respectively. Justices closer to the line are well-predicted by the model. If
measurement of the underlying concept of decision direction does not vary across the models,
this would indicate precision in measurement but not necessarily accuracy. If, however, the
residuals vary markedly across the models, then concerns about model fit are somewhat
irrelevant: accurate measurement of concepts is prior to these concerns. Again, the central
argument of this chapter is that the fundamental correlations among values and votes offered in
support of the attitudinal model may be a product of suspect indicators. If the structure of the
composite indicator is persuasive, then large deviations from predicted values of the dependent
variable may suggest that in contemporary free expression cases, considerations beyond ideology
may be motivating the Justices. Specifically, if the fit becomes more tenuous as scholars refine
the direction assignment indicator, then there is reason to believe that free expression decisions
in the Roberts Court Era are motivated by considerations beyond ideological preferences, or that
the ideological values of the justices in this area of law during this time period are somehow
different.
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Figure 2.2 – Actual and Predicted Votes, Free Expression Cases (2005-2014)
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The SCDB model reveals that the Court’s conservative justices – as measured by
exogenous, Segal-Cover scores - tend to vote conservatively (for the conservative position in a
case) at higher rates than the Court’s liberal justices, though even the liberal justices’
conservative vote proportions are greater than or approach 50%. Justice Kennedy tends to vote
conservatively more frequently than would be predicted by the model, while Chief Justice
Roberts’ position suggests that he is less conservative than would be predicted by the model.
This suggests that the Chief Justice may indeed be at the helm of the Court in contemporary free
expression cases (Baker 2015a). This model specification is consistent with characterizations of
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the Roberts Court record on free expression as generally conservative, as Erwin Chemerinsky
(2011), Monica Youn (2011), Epstein et al. (2013), and Burt Neuborne (2015, 10) have
suggested.
Though the minimal residuals suggest the model is a good fit, it is beside the point if
indicators lack measurement validity. The model using the EPS indicator – which the authors
argue is an improvement over the SCDB policy issue coding – features larger residuals yet still
captures a general relationship between the values and votes of the Justices. While the
dependent variable in this specification is calculated with 17 fewer cases (and should therefore
be interpreted cautiously), a clear relationship is present for the earlier Roberts Court period.
Compared to the SCDB specification, Justices Breyer, Souter, and Stevens’ votes are less
frequently conservative than would be predicted by the model. In addition, Chief Justice
Roberts’ actual conservative voting percentage is larger than the model’s predictions. Under this
specification, observers might expect Justice Thomas to be a key player in the contemporary
Court’s free expression merits agenda, with a conservative voting percentage aligned with the
model’s fitted predictions and the lowest overall percentage of the Court’s conservative bloc.
One recent narrative of the Court’s behavior in this issue area suggests that Thomas’s conception
of the judicial role differs from other members of the Court's Republican-appointed bloc (Tribe
and Matz 2014, 141, 153). This specification is consistent with that account.
At first glance, the general slope of the composite indicator model is similar to that
observed in the SCDB and EPS specifications. But note the plots of the individual justices by
their actual and predicted conservative vote percentages. The Court’s liberal justices are far less
conservative than the issue area oriented bivariate model predicts, especially Justice Breyer.
This may be the biggest difference between the composite variable and the EPS and SCDB
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variables: It shifts most Justices points toward the less conservative end of the plots. The
conservative voting percentages of the Court’s conservative justices are predicted well by the
model, but these too are generally lower than the SCDB and EPS models. Although some
commentators have suggested that it is the “Roberts Court” and not the “Kennedy Court” when it
comes to free expression (Baker 2015b), the composite indicator model suggests that Justice
Alito has voted less conservatively than any other member of the conservative bloc on the Court.
While the Chief Justice clearly has a special interest in free expression (Collins 2013), in practice
his vote may only be controlling in some of the Court’s closely divided decisions – the most
recent example being Williams-Yulee. Overall, this analysis suggests that while the Court often
divides on ideological lines in contemporary free expression controversies, the degree to which
the justices are characterized as conservative in using the coding of the SCDB and EPS study
may be overstated.
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The finding that residuals tend to increase as indicators move beyond the coding imposed
by the SCDB is also true for the stable Rehnquist Court Era prior to the Roberts Court. Figure
2.3 suggests the fit between values and votes is an effect of coding choices for the decision
direction variable. Substituting the EPS variable for the SCDB direction codes reveals that
Kennedy and O’Connor in particular vote more conservatively than their values would predict,
while Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist remain in the same relative positions. Breyer’s position is
closer to the predicted trend line, though the in-group bias codes suggest he is less conservative
than the conventional bivariate model would predict. Similarly, the wider residuals associated
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with the composite indicator predictions more closely approximate the EPS codes than the
SCDB, with the exception of Sandra Day O’Connor. Interestingly, the composite measure
suggests members of the Court’s liberal bloc vote in that direction more often than the SCDB
and EPS models, while members of the conservative bloc tend to be less conservative overall
than in those competing specifications. A similar pattern appeared in the comparison of the
Roberts Court specifications in Figure 2.2.

Discussion
The importance of developing indicators that accurately reflect underlying concepts of
interest is a standard shared across social science research traditions. Determining what
something is – sometimes known as content validity – as detailed knowledge and descriptions of
case conditions comes prior to preferred model specifications (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994,
44-45). In the judicial decision-making tradition, scholars have made great progress in
developing and refining indicators that facilitate empirical assessments of the relationship
between judicial ideologies and judicial votes. Indeed, that project continues in earnest on the
values side of the equation with scholars examining the performance of interval versus
categorical level measures of Justices’ preferences (Johnston, Mak, and Sidman 2016). But even
this study relies heavily on the assumption that indicators for the ideological direction of votes
are accurately coded (173). The EPS study – while substantively focused on the motivations of
Justices in free expression controversies – represents a refinement of this concept by developing
a novel, speaker-centric indicator to reflect the ideological direction of votes. Pettys’ critique of
the in-group bias study encourages scholars to continue to refine and make clear how indicators
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are developed and scored so as to ensure descriptive and subsequent analytical accuracy in
establishing causal linkages between values and votes in free expression cases.
Caution is counseled in interpreting these findings. As should be clear, this is an effort in
improving on measurement accuracy in a set of decisions within a particular issue area and
particular time period. The ability to replicate these measures is a precision concern, and one
that can be examined more closely in future work in this vein (Pettys 2015). In addition,
scholars can continue to assess the accuracy of measures through competing model specifications
– the fundamental relationship examined in this chapter represents a first step in a broader effort
to continue to refine indicators that will prove useful to traditional and empirical legal scholars,
whether the focus is on the forest or the trees (Hagle 2015, 384). The composite indicator
developed and assessed here does not claim perfection; it is best understood as a provisional
alternative with application to a specific period and issue area of the Supreme Court’s docket. It
is based on a qualitative tool of concept formation that has the potential to travel to other issue
areas and time periods. The finding that the model’s relationship becomes more tenuous as
measures of decision direction have improved points toward alternative approaches in assessing
the link between values and votes in judicial decision-making studies, including qualitative tools
of descriptive inference. For example, scholars interested in studying the influence of
ideological preferences in conjunction with other considerations germane to free expression
cases could conduct a broader “within case” study of a particular Court. As chapter four of this
dissertation demonstrates, carefully tracing the development of this issue area within a bounded
period where individual cases can be reconceptualized as diagnostic, “causal process
observations” that function as “hoop tests” for hypotheses to jump through (Collier 2011, 825).
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These research design choices are at the discretion of the scholar: If a number of cases
within a period feature voting alignments not predicted by the attitudinal model – a necessary
condition for the hypothesis – then scholars have good reason to closely assess what other
conditions in a case may be present and exerting an effect on a decision. If scholars find,
through closely reading judicial opinions, that justices regularly interpret such jurisprudential
rules as the content-neutrality doctrine in a less categorical manner or appear to be motivated by
a certain conception of the judicial role, these findings may be sufficient conditions to validate
“ideology-plus” hypotheses of judicial behavior. This process-tracing approach is only one of
many rigorous research design choices available to scholars interrogating this relationship. While
social scientists may generally be divided into “two cultures,” it is hoped that the INUS approach
to defining essential, ideological aspects of free expression controversies developed above is a
bridge of sorts between the two worlds (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).

Conclusion
Correlations among judicial values and votes have shown great promise in enriching our
understanding of judicial behavior, and these contributions cannot be overstated. However,
indicators used in quantitative studies of judicial decisionmaking – including the bivariate model
often invoked in defense of the attitudinal model of judging – must accurately reflect the
underlying concept of interest. Scholars interested in studying judicial decision-making must
consider multiple, theoretically relevant case facts unique to certain issue areas and historical
periods before deciding to define a decision as conservative, liberal, or undetermined. One
factor that has contributed to sustained scholarly interest surrounding the contemporary Court’s
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free speech decisions is the centrality of the First Amendment to the U.S. ideal of selfgovernance in a democratic republic. If the Justices’ voting percentages are less strongly
correlated with exogenously determined values than would be expected as indicators are
improved upon, then perhaps the idea that the Court’s constitutional protection extends only to
“free speech for me, but not for thee” is something of an overstatement (Hentoff 1992).
Giovanni Sartori’s admonition that conceptualization comes before quantification is increasingly
relevant, as scholars strive to explain the motivations of the Roberts Court: A Court that has
often decided to decide cases with wide-ranging implications for the role of free expression in
the United States’ republican democracy. In the next chapter, I assess the Court’s record from
additional external perspectives on judicial decision-making.

75
Chapter 3
Modern Judicial Conservatism and Contemporary Free Speech: Attitudes, Votes, and
Voting Order
“When it comes to freedom of speech, the Roberts Court has been very much a
conservative court. I think you can understand what the Roberts Court has done with
regard to free speech by just focusing on traditional, contemporary, conservative
ideology. I have often said I think you can understand the Roberts Court better by reading
the 2008 Republican platform than by reading the Federalist Papers, and I think that is
certainly true with regard to freedom of speech” (Chemerinsky 2011, 581).
“With the important exception of cases involving advertising and similar business
activities that happen to fall under the First Amendment, politics doesn’t explain much”
(Tushnet 2013, 215).

The observations by Erwin Chemerinsky and Mark Tushnet bring the spotlight back to
the primary puzzle motivating this project: A number of Roberts Court free expression decisions
appear to be consistent with attitudinal explanations of judicial decision-making; these decisions
often involve challenges to campaign finance statutes at the state and national level, union
challenges to restrictions on the collection of fees, and union non-member challenges to union
fee assessments. Another group of decisions, however, appear to be less well explained by
dominant attitudinal model. These cases include disputes involving the criminalization of
depictions of animal cruelty, the sale of violent videogames to minors, and the prosecution of a
government official for lying about military service.
Chapter two argued that characterizations of the Roberts Court as a conservative court are
partially attributable to concept measurement issues. In replicating the bivariate model
establishing a relationship between judicial values and judicial votes using three different
indicators – the directional coding assigned by the Supreme Court Database, the speaker
ideology indicator developed by Epstein, Parker, and Segal, and the composite indicator that
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accounts for the identity of the speaker, speech, and speech suppressor through a basic set
membership approach –the relationship between values and votes became more tenuous as
measures of the ideological direction of free expression decisions improved. That analysis
followed from the finding that, contra the speaker in-group account developed by Epstein,
Parker, and Segal, the purported ideological identity of the free speech claimant in First
Amendment cases does not predict a vote in favor of the claimant.
Chapter two also found that votes in freedom of expression cases appear partially
explainable by judicial attitudes, which moves this project to another broader issue in the study
of judicial decision-making at the Supreme Court. The justice-centric, attitudinal explanation of
judicial behavior generally models the probability of a binary outcome (a vote in favor of or
against a particular position in a case) occurring given a set of theoretically relevant covariates.
Scholarship in this vein has demonstrated the average effect of a particular variable – the
ideological attitudes of the justices – across all votes within particular subsets of the Court’s
merits docket, whether civil liberties, economic cases, or statutory decisions (Segal et al. 1995).
Some recent work has measured the effect of judicial attitudes across all votes on the
Court’s free expression agenda (Epstein et al. 2013; Richards 2013), though the effect during the
Roberts Era is less clear. However, scholars have not systematically compared the nature of this
effect to any comparable, well-defined period in the Court’s history. In addition, scholars in this
tradition have rarely deviated from this effects-of-causes approach, treating each case as little
more than a loose collection of votes to be aggregated with other votes in other cases. These
observations raise a series of interrelated questions: What is the average effect of judicial
attitudes across votes in freedom of expression decisions? What can this effect, once identified,
be compared to? Is this approach, with its reliance on pooled votes, a useful way to identify the
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ideological nature of the Court’s decisions in this important area of law? If not, what alternative
assessments may shed more light on this aspect of the relationship between law and politics?
This empirical chapter presents a number of goals and testable claims that draw upon the
contributions of previous attitudinal scholarship, and also offers an alternative approach to
gauging the extent to which the free expression agenda of historical Courts can be characterized
as ideologically driven. Here, the analysis moves beyond concept measurement and the
fundamental model replicated in chapter two and assesses the relationship between values and
the likelihood of a pro-free speech vote while controlling for a set of theoretically relevant
covariates. To do so, this chapter employs two limited categorical dependent variable models
(logit) to assess the extent to which the aggregated ideological preferences of the justices predict
pro-speech claimant votes in First Amendment free expression cases during the Roberts (20052015) and Rehnquist (1994-2005) Courts.
The Rehnquist period represents a period of stability on the Court prior to the current era
that serves as a comparison point for claims about the degree to which the current Court can be
considered pro-speech claimant or conservative. I find that, compared to the Rehnquist Era, the
Roberts Court Era free expression decisions are well explained by judicial attitudes: The effect
of ideology is strong and significant across all judicial votes. In fact, the effect of judicial
attitudes on freedom of expression votes in the Rehnquist Era does not register at conventional
levels of statistical significance, suggesting the limits of that Court’s well-documented
conservatism. The second part of this chapter develops an alternative to this conventional
modeling approach that, instead of pooling individual judicial votes across cases, shifts the
analytical focus back to the cases themselves. Specifically, I develop a descriptive typology of
the judicial voting coalitions present in all free expression decisions during the Roberts Era. I
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demonstrate that “disordered voting” – or judicial coalitions that do not easily map onto the
ordering predicted by quantitative measures of judicial values – is a more useful approach to
discerning the role political values play in judicial decision-making, for scholars and
practitioners alike.
From what has been described as a more agnostic perspective on judicial behavior
(Fischman and Law 2009, 30-34), the typology reveals that a clear majority (67%) of Roberts
Era decisions fit somewhat uncomfortably with conventional attitudinal expectations; that is,
they feature disordered voting or are decided unanimously. This is a higher percentage than the
Rehnquist Era (62%), additional evidence suggesting that there is something special about the
Roberts Era constitution of free expression. Once accounting for the salience – or perceived
importance of cases - by the justices, however, it is also clear that the current Court’s constitution
of the right to freedom of expression is more polarized than previous Courts. Importantly (and
as with chapter two), this analytical approach has broader theoretical potential for the study of
judicial behavior: If this account is persuasive, scholars interested in predicting case outcomes
as part of ongoing litigation efforts or connecting judicial behavior to longstanding judicial
decision-making paradigms – such as realism or the new institutionalism – should consider the
limits of effects-of-causes modeling when describing and attempting to predict judicial behavior.
This perspective on judicial decision-making has the potential to travel to other areas of the
Court’s docket beyond contemporary First Amendment free expression controversies.
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A Brief Review of the Attitudinal Model
Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth’s influential characterization of the primary causal factor
(ideology) of judicial decision-making continues to resonate among political scientists. Going
back to the work of C. Herman Pritchett (1953) and even beyond with the work of the early-20th
century legal realists (Holmes 1897; Frank 1931-1932; Fisher, Horwitz, and Reed 1993,
Tamanaha 2010), scholars have long argued that judges – and especially Supreme Court Justices
- are at least as much political as legal actors. As Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002) go to great
lengths to demonstrate in two book-length accounts, Supreme Court Justices are appointed in a
highly politicized process by the national leader of either the Democratic or Republican Party
and subject to confirmation by the U.S. Senate (see also Epstein and Segal 2007).
Once appointed, justices enjoy life tenure, generally lack political ambitions beyond the
Supreme Court, and (due to the high bar required for a constitutional amendment) have the
ability to be the final arbiters of the meaning of the U.S. Constitution (Segal and Spaeth 2002,
92-97). As such, the justices are relatively unconstrained in voting their sincere political
preferences when it comes to the merits of a case. The bivariate relationship between judicial
attitudes as scaled by Segal and Cover and the proportion of conservative or liberal votes cast
represents prima facie empirical evidence in support of this claim. In other words, in a
counterfactual world where justices were primarily motivated by law – or were structurally
constrained from voting their ideological preferences -we would not expect such robust
correlations between the two variables.
The bivariate model replicated in chapter two – following the early work of Segal and
Cover (1989) and Segal and Spaeth (1993, 2002) as well as recent work by Epstein, Landes, and
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Posner (2013, 137-142) - establishes a statistically significant relationship between values and
votes. Importantly, chapter two also demonstrates the importance of concept measurement in
developing the indicator that has been the foundation of the attitudinal model. The fit between
values and votes using the traditional “policy issue” coding could be problematic, given the
numerous ideological referents (speaker, speech, and suppressor) present in any free expression
controversy. The composite indicator is not without limitations, however: It does not help
scholars understand the probability of voting for a pro-speech claimant given a group of control
variables. Recognizing this in developing the attitudinal paradigm of judicial decision-making
studies, Segal and Spaeth built upon the work of Segal and Cover (1989) and modeled the
likelihood of a vote for a particular position as the result of judicial attitudes (Segal-Cover
scores) and a number of case facts theoretically relevant to a particular area of law.
For Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases, for example, Segal and Spaeth model
the likelihood of a liberal vote (those prohibiting searches and seizures for being unreasonable
due to evidentiary concerns or execution) as influenced by the presence of such facts as the
location of the search (house, business, car), the circumstances under which government action
occurred (warrant, probable cause), and exceptions to warrant requirements (incident to a lawful
arrest)(Segal and Spaeth 2002, 316-318, 325). They conclude, following logit analysis, that “one
is clearly better off knowing the attitudes of the justices than the facts of the case.” (Segal and
Spaeth 2002, 324). This specific test of the attitudinal model of judicial decision-making has
been replicated across other areas of the Court’s agenda and theoretically relevant covariates,
including more recent work concerning the Court’s attitudes toward the First Amendment (see
Epstein and Segal 2006 for a case-centric account; Richards 2013).
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Although some recent efforts have provided insight to the nature of the Roberts Era
constitution of free expression, the takeaways have been more akin to a watercolor painting than
polaroid. Epstein and Segal’s 2006 analysis, “Trumping the First Amendment?,” found support
for the theory that the justices vote for the pro-speech position in First Amendment cases in an
instrumental way, such that when claims intersect with another value – such as LGBT equality as
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale – the “liberal” value appears to dictate the votes of the Court’s
liberal justices (90-91). As described in chapter two, Epstein, Parker, and Segal develop this
instrumental First Amendment account further with a theory of ideological in-group bias, finding
some support for the theory that conservative and liberal justices vote for free speech claims
brought by members of their own ideological in-group. This account remains somewhat
underdeveloped, however, as legal scholars have raised important questions about the
assumptions motivating the authors’ operationalization of the speaker indicator (Pettys 2014;
2015; Hagle 2015).
In perhaps the most ambitious account of judicial behavior in First Amendment freedom
of expression cases, Richards coded 2672 votes by justices from the 1953 to 2011 terms and
found that judicial ideology – measured by Segal-Cover estimates – is a statistically significant
predictor of a pro-speech decision across all eras, and both before and after the Court’s decision
in Grayned v. City of Rockford (408 U.S. 104 (1972))(2013, 93-95). Richards’ goal was to
demonstrate the existence of a content-neutrality regime that, once established, caused the
justices to issue more speech protective decisions and, as such, does not disaggregate his analysis
by particular historical eras of the Court. Thus, readers interested in understanding why the
Court decides free expression cases as it does in particular eras are left without defined periods
allowing historical comparisons.
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Richards’ template, geared toward assessing the influence of jurisprudential regimes, is
nevertheless incredibly detailed and provides a useful building block for making these
comparisons. Comparing the Roberts Court to the Rehnquist Court era is a sensible approach
because both Courts have operated in a political climate (increasingly) animated by polarization
and so-called “culture wars,” and both Courts feature relatively stable periods of membership.
This comparison also serves as an extension and replication of Richards’ account, which found a
general correlation between increasing Segal-Cover scores (more liberal attitudes) and the
likelihood of a pro-speech decision (conventionally viewed as a liberal decision, though as
chapter two notes the SCDB has since made some adjustments in this assignment).
The disagreement among scholars like Chemerinsky and Tushnet is an empirical issue:
Do higher values of conservatism among the justices predict a pro-speech outcome? The claim
appears to be facially valid, given the proportion of pro-speech claimant cases featuring
conservative claimants and conservative expression. In fact, the only clear “liberal” win in the
conventional understanding of the term has been Alliance for Open Society International v.
Agency for International Development (2013), a 6-3 decision through Chief Justice Roberts
holding that forcing NGOs fighting HIV and AIDS abroad to adopt an anti-prostitution plank in
order to receive federal funding amounted to compelled speech in violation of the First
Amendment. If one stretches the liberal label to include such cases as Alvarez, U.S. v. Stevens
(559 U.S. 460 (2010)), and Snyder v. Phelps (562 U.S. 443 (2011)) by reasoning that these are
“unpopular speakers” within the traditional liberal tradition established by such decisions as West
Virginia v. Barnette (1943), however, then the criteria for scoring claimants and types of
expression as “liberal” are open to charges of vagueness. The dependent variable of interest in
this story, however, is the likelihood of a vote in favor of a First Amendment claim given
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conventional measurements of the ideological attitudes of the justices. The fundamental test of
the conservative Court narrative can be constructed such that as the conservatism of the justices
increases, so does the likelihood of a pro-speech claim vote.

Research Design
To estimate the latent propensity to vote for a pro-speech claim, I estimate four logit
regression models with the justices’ ideological values as the key independent variable of
interest and the likelihood of a vote for a pro-speech claimant in a case as the limited dependent
variable to be estimated. I operationalize ideological values as the estimates developed by Segal
and Cover (Segal-Cover scores), which assign values of 0 (most conservative) to 1 (most liberal)
based on newspaper editorial characterizations of Supreme Court nominees from the time of
nomination to the point at which the nominee is confirmed by the Senate. I then invert this scale
such that 1 is the most conservative score and 0 the most liberal, so that the expected relationship
between a pro-speech vote (=1) and values is positive. Segal-Cover scores for all justices are
available in The Behavior of Federal Judges (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 108-109, 111).
The measure is most appropriate for regression analyses measuring the relationship between
votes and behavior because it is exogenously determined: The measures are based on
characterizations of the justices prior to established voting patterns while serving on the U.S.
Supreme Court. The tradeoff is that Segal-Cover scores do not account for ideological drift over
a judicial career (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal 2007, 1491-1492).
The units of analysis for the first and second model are individual judicial votes in all
Roberts Era cases (N=380), and the individual judicial votes in all Rehnquist Era cases (N=477)
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for the third and fourth models. The second and fourth models are restricted to the relationship
between ideological values and votes, dropping all other theoretically relevant covariates. If the
conservative Court hypothesis is correct, the relationship between ideological values and votes
should hold in the full and restricted specifications. The logit specification is appropriate
because the goal of the analysis is to determine the latent, unobserved propensity (y*) of a prospeech vote (y=1) given a set of theoretically relevant case factors. The specification of either
logit or probit differs in the magnitude of the coefficients produced because of the assumed
modeling of the variance in the error term, which is an arbitrary choice (Long 1997, 60). Stated
differently, the predicted probability of a pro-speech vote is unaffected by assumptions about the
nature of the variance for the latent variable (Long 1997, 61).

Variables
Judicial votes are coded as “1” if the vote in a case is for the speech claimant and “0” if
against. Following the model specified by Segal and Spaeth that includes case facts (1993, 218220) and judicial attitudes (2002, 320-324) as independent variables in the context of 4th
Amendment search and seizure cases, as well as the work of Mark Richards (2013, 90-91; see
also Richards and Kritzer 2002, 318), I include a number of case factor control variables. These
factors include dummy variables for the level of government involved (local, state, or federal),
the identity of the speaker (i.e. religious, union, union non-member, government employee,
politician, academic, student, non-profit/public interest group, business, media outlet, political
party, politician, lawyer), and the type of speech involved in each case to control for the
possibility that the justices may be more protective of certain types of speech (i.e. religious, free
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market electoral (anti-campaign finance restrictions), commercial, whistleblowing, general
election or policy speech, speech related to sex or gender, newsreporting, anti-equality, proequality, pro-union, anti-union) than others.
The case factor categories were determined inductively and assigned values by closely
reading the published opinion for the case, generally following the inductively determined
variable lists specified by Richards and Kritzer (2002) and Richards (2013). When the US
Supreme Court opinion did not provide detailed information on the litigants or nature of
expression involved in a case, the immediate lower court decision was used. While it is true that
the facts deemed relevant by the majority opinion may be endogenous to unobserved ideological
preferences, it is worth noting that lower court opinions – as well as the briefs filed by petitioners
and respondents – may also be read by the justices to make sense of a particular controversy.
There is no perfect solution to this issue other than to closely read both opinions to ensure as
accurate coding of case facts as possible.
These factors are often noted in the first or section sections of the majority opinions. It
must also be noted that this assessment departs from that of Richards and Kritzer (2002) and
Richards (2013) in that I am not interested in developing a theory of jurisprudential regimes.
Chapter four specifically addresses the insights of jurisprudential regime theory, but the
substantive goal here is to explain an outcome of interest – the constitution of free expression by
the modern Court – via comparisons with the closest situated Court in terms of political climate,
membership stability, and similar ideological composition.
Finally, I also control for amicus briefs filed in support of each position in each decision.
I searched for each decision via the Lexis-Nexis Academic database and tallied the number of
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amici filed in support of the petitioner and respondent and characterized each position as either
pro- or anti-speech. When the number of briefs for the pro-speech position in a case was greater
(less than) than the anti-speech position, I assigned that case the positive (negative) differential
between the two. Drawing on scholarship finding a positive relationship between the number of
briefs filed for a particular position and an eventual decision for that position (Collins 2007, 62),
I expect that as the amicus differential increases so too will the likelihood of a pro-speech vote.

Limitations
There is a danger in this so-called garbage can regression approach insofar as the
inclusion of many variables in a logit model may make “coefficients zip around” when variables
are removed and included in models (Achen 2005, 336). Long also cautions against modeling too
many independent variables as binary regression models appear to require more observations in
order to ensure accurate convergence (1997, 67). In the full models, the various speaker and
speech categories are unrelated to one another so that the direct effect of each variable is not
diminished by the inclusion of another (Achen 2002; 2005, 329). Cases involving lawyers as
speakers – conventionally thought of as liberal claimants – have regularly featured commercial
speech claims, a type of claim that has conventionally been characterized as conservative
(Supreme Court Database 2016; Batchis 2016, 130-139; Gillman, Graber, and Whittington 2012,
795). Achen’s call for renewed emphasis on simpler tabulations and creative data presentation is
answered in part by the typology approach described later in this chapter, though the logit
models in the following pages are admittedly the types Achen cautions against. This is primarily
because of the status of scholarship in this vein and the present effort aims at confirming or
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casting doubt on existing theories about Court behavior. As a check against having too many
independent variables and too few observations, I also compare the results of the full model to a
restricted model regressing votes on Segal-Cover scores alone to ensure that the effect is robust
in both specifications (see Achen 2002, 445-447 on the benefits of “A Rule of Three”
independent variables).
With these considerations in mind, the logit regression results that follow test a key
hypothesis concerning the nature of the Roberts Court record on speech. In assessing whether
the conservative Court narrative is true, I expect that – given the set of relevant variables
included in the model and the general conservative tilt of the Court - as the ideological values of
justices increase from 0 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative), the likelihood of a pro-speech
vote will increase with the most conservative justices the most likely to vote in favor of a speech
claim. Specifically, the models will reveal whether and how much ideological preferences and
case factors affect votes in constitutional freedom of expression cases. This approach is a
conventional “effects of causes” analysis concerned with determining the average effect of
particular causes across many individual cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41-42). The units of
analysis are individual judicial votes occurring within two discrete and generally stable eras of
the Court (Rehnquist and Roberts).
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Table 3.1 – Logit Regression, Case Factors and Rehnquist-Roberts Court Pro-Speech Votes
Roberts Era (2005-2014)(Full)
Coef.

Roberts Era (2005-2014)(Restricted)

R.S.E.

Coef.

Rehnquist Era (1994-2004)(Full)

R.S.E.

Coef.

Rehnquist Era (1994-2004)(Restricted)

Variable
Justice Ideology
Segal-Cover Attitudes
Post-Citizens United

R.S.E.

Coef.

1.426****
.8255****

.3250
.2087

.6644**
---

.1928
---

.0481
---

.5242
---

.0146
---

.4396
---

Level of Government
Federal
State
Local

-2.747
-3.453
-7.392*

2.354
2.387
4.407

-------

-------

1.085
.3695
-.7246

1.128
1.067
.9136

-------

-------

Speaker Types
Academic
Student
Business
Religious
Union
Union Nonmember
Media Outlet
Lawyer
Gov’t Employee
Non-profit or Interest Group
Private Individual
Political Party
Politician/Official

-4.988
-3.295
.7407**
-12.459****
.2076
.3585
#
-.9751
4.065*
.7198
-.8206*
.9610
-.3488

3.582
2.377
.2737
2.074
.7557
.9555
#
.5402
2.455
.4471
.4682
.6630
.2591

---------------------------

---------------------------

-1.166*
-2.392****
.4700
1.006
-.2558
#
.5881
.6579
.9565
.5070
-.5213
-.4542
1.462*

.6384
.5888
.6839
1.421
.8582
#
.5297
1.134
.7940
.5709
.3997
.9062
.7806

---------------------------

---------------------------

Speech Type
Free Market Electoral (Anti-CF)
Religious Expression
Commercial Expression
Union Fundraising/Pro-Union
Union Nonmember/Anti-union
Anti-equality
Pro-Equality
Whistleblower/Gov’t Corruption
Sex/Gender-related speech
General Electoral/Policy Speech

.7299
16.84****
-.9551
#
#
-1.124*
-1.455
-.2556
-.5415
-.1703

1.065
.8445
.9375
#
#
.6238
.9410
1.052
.6768
.4919

---------------------

---------------------

-2.177*
1.596
-.5402
#
#
.9867
-1.374*
.5408
-.1490
1.042****

1.177
2.186
.8389
#
#
.6113
.8076
.6583
.3108
.2459

---------------------

---------------------

Amici Differential

.0158**

.0064

---

---

.0146****

.0039

---

---

Constant
.6132
3.266
-.6955****
.1594
-1.629*
.9287
-.0144
N
380
388
468
477
Pseudo R2
.2248
.0050
.1223
.0000
Note: Logit coefficients with robust standard errors (R.S.E.) clustered on justices. p<.001****, p<.01***, p<.05**, p<.10*. # denotes dropped due to collinearity or perfectly predicting success.
Log likelihood reduction from restricted to full model for: Roberts Era = -264.64 to -200.97; Rehnquist Era = -330.63 to -284.69.

R.S.E.

.3394
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Table 3.1 reports the logit coefficients, robust standard errors (clustered on the justices),
and levels of significance for the case factors included in the full model of all votes on free
expression issues by Roberts Court justices from the 2005-2014 terms and Rehnquist Court
justices from the 1994-2004 terms, as well as the initial models restricted to the effect of judicial
attitudes. Of particular interest is the magnitude and significance of the coefficient for SegalCover scores. For the Roberts Court Era, the direction of the Segal-Cover coefficient is
significant and in the expected direction; that is, as a justice’s score increases toward the
conservative end of the continuum, the likelihood of a pro-speech decision increases. This
relationship holds for the restricted and full models, and demonstrates support for the
conservative Court hypothesis.
Of some interest is that this average effect finding is inconsistent with part of Richards’
account, which found in a similar limited dependent variable model of free expression voting
that the liberalism of the justices predicted a pro-speech vote (Richards 2013, 95). Richards’
account – primarily concerned with detecting the existence of jurisprudential regimes (described
more fully in chapter four) - divides data chronologically into pre- and post-Grayned free
expression decisions and does not disaggregate further by historical Courts, which suggests this
design choice misses the development of a conservative freedom of expression jurisprudence
(see generally Batchis 2016). It also suggests that, despite the Court’s adoption of the contentneutrality regime, those jurisprudential principles have been put to use in the service of
conservative causes (Segal and Spaeth 2003, 33). Using Stata’s margins command and setting
all other variables at their respective means (Williams 2017), Figure 3.1 illustrates this positive
relationship between the probability of a pro-First Amendment claim vote and Segal-Cover
values for the Roberts Court Era (2005-2014).
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Figure 3.1 – Marginal Effects of Judicial Ideology on Pro-Speech Vote (2005-2014)
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During the Roberts Era, Figure 3.1 illustrates that while a justice characterized as highly
conservative like Scalia (1.0) is likely to vote for a First Amendment claimant approximately
59% of the time, a liberal jurist like Justice Sotomayor (.368) votes for that position at a rate just
over 36%. Another interesting finding is the weak magnitude and lack of significance of SegalCover scores as predictors of pro-speech votes during the Rehnquist Court Era. From this
effects-of-causes perspective across all votes, judicial attitudes are not robust predictors of voting
in freedom of expression cases in either the full or restricted model. In contrast with the Roberts
Era, the marginal change in the probability of a pro-speech vote from the most liberal to most
conservative judicial ideology score is less than 2 percentage points (49.5 to 50.93%).
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This unanticipated, null finding may be partially attributed to that Court’s willingness to
uphold some types of laws that its successor has been far more hostile to, such as the campaign
finance cases. In terms of robustness, these results do not change appreciably when substituting
Martin-Quinn for Segal-Cover measures of ideology for either Court – both indicators are
significant predictors of votes for the Roberts Era but not the Rehnquist Era. This suggests that
the Rehnquist Era freedom of expression merits agenda was less motivated by judicial
ideological preferences than the Roberts Era. Part of the explanation for this result may lie in the
types of cases decided by each Court, described in greater detail in the discussion of voting
disorder that follows. During the Roberts Era, other coefficients register in the expected direction
and at conventional levels of statistical significance including the dummy variables for union and
academic speakers (both negative). Less intuitive are the coefficients for religious speakers and
government employees, with the former negatively associated with a pro-speech vote while the
latter is positively associated with a pro-speech vote. In addition, the significance and direction
of the dummy variable for decisions after the Citizens United decision suggests that the Roberts
Court pro-speech voting pattern is a relatively recent phenomenon.
The conventional models specified above provide some support for the conservative
Court hypothesis. Compared to the previous era, judicial attitudes during the Roberts Era
emerge as statistically significant predictors of pro-speech votes in First Amendment free
expression cases. The relationship holds after controlling for a number of case factors, including
the identities of speakers and speech types. These models build upon and replicate the
contributions of Richards and others, yet this approach has inferential limits. In the remainder of
this chapter, I develop an alternative assessment of the Court’s merits agenda that draws upon the
qualitative tool of conceptual typologies and a measurement strategy that connects the
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ideological direction of decisions with voting alignments. I find initial evidence that suggests the
importance of accounting for conceptions of the judicial role held by the justices – a theme
developed further in chapter four.

Behavior in Institutional Context: Voting Disorder, Typologies, and Judicial Decisionmaking
The analysis of aggregated votes via limited dependent variable models reveals that in
contemporary free expression decisions, as a justice’s conservatism increases so does the
likelihood of casting a pro-speech claimant vote. This relationship is stronger during the Roberts
Court Era, which supports the “conservative Court” hypothesis advanced in various forms by
Chemerinsky (2011), Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2012), and Youn (2011), and is all the more
striking given the lack of a relationship during the previous Rehnquist Era. But this is only part
of the story: Frequently, members of the Court’s liberal bloc have joined the Court’s
conservatives in decisions that can be characterized as conservative. Oftentimes, these
conservative decisions have been unanimous, as was the case in the recent decisions of Wood v.
Moss (134 S.Ct. 2056 (2014)) and Reed v. Town of Gilbert (135 S.Ct. 2218 (2015)). Less
frequently (but notably), members of the Court’s conservative bloc have joined the Court’s
liberals in liberal decisions. In the Court’s most recent term, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Clarence Thomas did so in Williams-Yulee and Sons of Confederate Veterans, respectively. To
be fair, the attitudinal model does not (and cannot) make point predictions about votes in
particular cases – the goal is to ascertain the average effect of one theoretically dominant cause
across a large population of cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).
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This critique follows from the epistemological limitations of effects-of-causes research:
Causation is inferred from the effect of an independent variable of interest (here, unidimensional
judicial ideologies or values) across a population of observations (here, case decisions). In
judicial decision-making studies of the Supreme Court, this dependent variable may take the
form of a broader population of cases (i.e. “What is the effect of values across all cases where the
Court heard a constitutional claim?”), or a narrower subset (i.e. “What is the effect of values
across all Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure cases?”). The analytical focus is geared
toward determining the effect of an independent variable of interest, with the assumption that
there are multiple potential independent variables that may lead to a particular outcome, known
as equifinality (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 41-42, 59-60). But this epistemological assumption
and the methods designed to provide an average effect estimate are somewhat divorced from the
practice of litigation at the US Supreme Court: Because different doctrinal boundaries exist on
the larger planet of First Amendment free expression jurisprudence, because reasoning by
analogy is fundamentally an imperfect exercise, and because the justices clearly do not
mechanistically vote ideological or partisan preferences, average treatment effects cannot be the
end of the story. The focus on aggregated votes at the expense of individual cases shifts attention
away from the votes on the merits that matter for lower court judges, cause lawyers, and scholars
interested in making inferences about the Court’s behavior.
Stated differently, this conventional assessment of the influence of ideological values on
decisions is divorced from the actual practice of legal contestation at the US Supreme Court. To
be sure, there is scholarly and practical value in knowing that Justice Kennedy’s voting patterns
place him at the median of the Court. And there is something to be learned from knowing that
Justice Scalia’s ideological values correlated with his observed, career conservative voting
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percentage. However, the goal of predicting outcomes at the US Supreme Court – whether to
refine theories of judicial decision-making, to further various political causes via judicial fiat, to
earn a victory for a so-called “one shot” litigant or repeat players (Galanter 1974)– has always
been connected to the ruling of the Court in or across particular cases. It has not been connected
to correlations across aggregations of values and votes where the unit of analysis is an individual
judicial vote. In general, these individual judicial votes are wrenched from the context of each
particular controversy and, most important for this effort, the particular arrangement of the
justices on the bench at any one time.
At its core, this difference in perspective is tied to longstanding epistemological conflicts
informing divergent research traditions, often reduced to a divide between quantitative and
qualitative scholars. In the field of U.S. Supreme Court judicial decision-making, the issue is
less about whether or not to “count cases” and more an issue of which unit of analysis is most
appropriate when attempting to make inferences about judicial behavior. The primary argument
of this chapter is that voting alignments within and across cases are more appropriate units of
analysis when attempting to infer the influence of ideological values on court decisions. To date,
judicial decision-making studies continue to rely on aggregations of individual judicial votes
(Richards 2013; Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 137-144; though see Bartels and O’Geen,
2015 for a case outcome-centered test of Richards and Kritzer, 2002 and the effect of
jurisprudential regimes) in advancing explanations of Court behavior. This approach is
incomplete and less useful because it is divorced from the process of judicial decision-making at
the Supreme Court as it is actually practiced. To correct for this oversight, the next section
develops the concept of voting disorder, building upon extant scholarship in demonstrating its
applicability to explaining the constitution of free expression during the Roberts Era.
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The Voting Order Assumption
According to Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist (2008, 821), voting disorder is an indication
that something other than political or ideological attitudes is motivating the Justices in any given
case. The attitudinal model assumes that the justices can be arrayed spatially on a onedimensional continuum, ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, using either
the Segal-Cover or Martin-Quinn scores (or any other metric, for that matter). Voting disorder is
a concept that highlights the limitations of the attitudinal model, which tries “to explain why
Justice A is moderate over a series of cases while Justice B is liberal” (Segal and Cover 1989,
562). Knowing that Justice Scalia’s high levels of conservatism tend to correlate with the prospeech position over a range of cases – that is, gauging the effect of values on aggregated votes –
is obviously useful for predicting Scalia’s general behavior in future cases.
However, what litigants, elite litigators, lower court judges, and even scholars are
ultimately interested in are the case decisions themselves. The point of emphasis here is that it is
the majority decision in a particular case that establishes a rule or precedent for lower courts to
follow, and it is the signal transmitted by voting coalitions that ultimately determines the
contours of future litigation (Baird 2007), the structure of jurisprudence (whether one considers it
to be a relevant mediating variable (Richards and Kritzer 2002; Richards 2013; Corley et al.
2013) or an invariable mechanism that merely functions as a cloak for policy preference (Segal
and Cover 1989, 562; Spaeth and Segal 2002, 53). Simply put, examining the attitudinal model
in light of the voting order of the justices in individual cases shifts the focus of judicial decisionmaking from individual justices to the Court speaking as an institution.
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Figure 3.2 illustrates the expectations for ordered voting during the Court’s 2013 term.
This visual illustration has previously been used in scholarship interested in developing
continuous measures of case outcomes (Jacobi and Sag 2009, 21). Each justice is placed on a
spectrum ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative according to his or her
rescaled Martin-Quinn score, with higher values – those approaching one – representing more
conservative attitudes and lower values (approaching zero) representing more liberal attitudes.
Martin-Quinn scores are endogenous measures of the ideological attitudes of the justices,
meaning that the scores are calculated – in part – by considering the previous votes of the justice.
As such, these scores may be open to the circularity criticism associated with some of Segal and
Spaeth’s early models examining the relationship between values and votes. Rather than use
Martin-Quinn scores as an independent variable to predict votes, here the scores are used as a
baseline for the most precise estimate of ordered voting for any given Supreme Court term.

Figure 3.2 – Illustration of Voting Disorder (Martin-Quinn Scores, 2013 Term)
2013
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For the 2013 term, based on the scores calculated by Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn,
the alignment above represents an educated guess as to the vote ordering in any given case
before the Court. We would expect coalitions that split the justices between Stephen Breyer and
Anthony Kennedy, but also at any cutpoint on the spectrum so long as justices do not deviate
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from their expected position. In McCutcheon v. FEC (134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)), for example, the
Court’s decision to strike down federal aggregate contribution limits split the justices between
Breyer and Kennedy. The decision was ordered as expected by the term’s Martin-Quinn scores,
and could be characterized as “strongly ordered” in that the result is an exemplar or essence of
the attitudinal model’s predictions. Voting disorder is a matter of degree: Some decisions are
likely to be ordered and characterized by a clear split along liberal-conservative lines. In
McCutcheon, the conservative majority on the Court voted against the dissenting liberal bloc in
striking down aggregate campaign contribution limitations as inconsistent with the First
Amendment. Others, like Alvarez, may be ordered as expected but the majority coalition cuts
across the ideological divide – the justices were divided (but ordered) at a point between Justice
Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts.
Alternatively, some decisions may feature a single Justice who votes in a way that creates
voting disorder: For example, Justice Stevens joined the Court’s conservative bloc in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S. 1 (2010)), a decision upholding the constitutionality of a
federal statute prohibiting material aid (including aid in the form of teaching groups how to
peacefully petition in lieu of violence) to groups placed on a government terror watchlist.
Stevens, the most liberal justice of the term, jumped Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor to
join a conservative majority opinion penned by Chief Justice Roberts. Similarly, “strong” voting
disorder can be operationalized as those cases where more than one Justice deviates from the
expected ideological array. In Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000 (132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012)), Justices
Sotomayor and Ginsburg voted in favor of non-union member Diana Knox’s claim that the
SEIU’s collection of non-chargeable union expenses without a new “Hudson notice”
accompanying each fee equated to compelled speech, in violation of the First Amendment. In
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other words, both justices jumped their expected voting position to join a conservative majority
led by Justice Alito, while Justices Breyer and Kagan dissented.
In contrast to the ordered and disordered sides of the question, some cases fall on the
edge of the coin and cannot be said to be ordered or disordered. Wood v. Moss (134 S.Ct. 2056
(2014)) saw all justices voting against a viewpoint discrimination claim brought by anti-George
Bush protestors who had been relocated during an unscheduled campaign stop by Bush during
the 2004 election campaign. Unanimous decisions present something of a problem for this
categorical approach, as one can make an argument that unanimity reflects disorder to the extent
that no cut-point is visible in the voting alignment of the justices (conservatives are voting
together with liberals), just as one can argue that the lack of a voting order cut-point indicates
agreement among the justices. Segal and Spaeth (2002) do not take a clear position on this issue,
though subsequent behavioral-oriented scholars have argued that “the fact that a substantial
fraction of the Court’s decisions are unanimous despite the Court’s being ideologically divided
suggests that legalism plays a role too.” (Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 124). 18
Conceptually, a unanimous decision like Moss lies somewhere between the ordered and
disordered categories on the spectrum and would generally be unexpected by attitudinal models
of judging. It is neither ordered nor disordered, and the willingness to vote together despite
18 In their 2002 book-length elaboration of the attitudinal model, Segal and Spaeth are somewhat silent on relevance
and causes of unanimous decisions. The authors’ chapter on “Opinion Assignment and Opinion Coalitions” is silent
on this point (2002, 357-405). Epstein, Landes, and Posner note that this body of decisions represents a
comparatively neglected area of study, and define unanimous decisions as “ones in which no Justice dissented, even
if there were one or more concurring opinions.” (Epstein et al. 2013, 124). The authors’ preferred explanation is that
“when the ideological stakes are small, a combination of dissent aversion and legalistic commitments is likely to
override Justices’ ideological preferences,” and conclude that “ideology plays only a small role in unanimous
decisions.” (126, 136). The authors’ key a priori indicators for determining whether a case is relatively more
ideological are based on the presence of a dissent in the decision below and whether the case involved a civil
liberties dispute. As dissents below do not appear to be associated with a grant of certiorari in free expression
decisions (see chapter five of this dissertation) and all free expression controversies are civil liberties disputes, I am
relatively agnostic on whether cases ultimately decided unanimously can be easily gauged as ideological or nonideological before knowing the eventual decision on the merits.
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measured preferences strongly suggests the decision is not primarily ideological (Corley et al.
2013; Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2013, 124-136; though see Epstein, Landes, and Posner 2012
for limited support for the influence of ideological considerations in unanimous cases).
Concurring opinions, examined more closely in chapter four, do provide some indication of the
nature of the disagreement between justices who otherwise vote together. This chapter, however,
is designed to be as deferential to the attitudinal paradigm of judicial decision-making as
possible: The model generally views votes on the merits as the fundamental indicator on which
causation is inferred; concurrences represent window-dressing on observable votes. Excluding
unanimous decisions from analyses, however, is a research design choice that may overstate the
effect of ideology in Supreme Court decision-making. For this reason and unlike Edelman,
Klein, and Lindquist (2008, 830), I do not exclude them from the analyses that follow.

Research Design
To assess the degree to which free expression decisions are marked by voting disorder, I
compare the judicial voting coalitions in all Roberts Court free speech decisions to the expected
alignment of justices for that term according to the scores developed by Andrew Martin and
Kevin Quinn (2002). These measures can be downloaded from the authors’ website and are
disaggregated by term in Appendix E. 19 The scores - calculated using complex formulae as well
as the votes of the justices – are more precise than Segal-Cover Scores, though the circularity
inherent in using votes to predict voting tendencies generally rules out their use as independent
variables in conventional, quantitative judicial decision-making analyses. They can be used,

19

“Martin-Quinn Scores: Measures.” Last accessed Feb. 19, 2017. http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php
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however, as a more precise approximation of the expected voting alignment for case decisions
under the attitudinal model’s general one-dimensionality assumption of the ideological
preferences of the justices. Scholars have already employed Martin-Quinn scores in assessing the
ideological salience of cases (Shapiro 2010), voting disorder (Edelman et al. 2008), and even
attempts to introduce a gradient characterization of the ideological nature of a decision (Jacobi
and Sag 2009; see Shapiro 2010, 111-128 for an overview and limitations of these efforts).
Scholars have diverged in efforts measuring voting disorder among justices. Edelman,
Klein, and Lindquist measure divergence from expected unidimensionality along a liberalconservative spectrum by calculating the smallest distance Justices must move from their ideal
points (Martin-Quinn score averages for any stable period of a historical Court of at least two
years) to meet the expectations of the unidimensional characterization of Supreme Court
decision-making. Jacobi and Sag (2009, 69) create three separate, continuous measures of case
outcomes and find that a “strategic” measure that relies on the majority coalition median and
mean of Justices (again using Martin-Quinn scores) better reflects gradation in outcomes than
binary conservative or liberal dummy measures imposed by the Supreme Court Database. Yet in
some ways, the approach of comparing individual case results (the authors focus on intellectual
property decisions) with numerical measures of possible causal phenomena highlights the
problem of behavioral equivalence – case outcomes can plausibly be explained in more than one
way (Fischman and Law 2009, 15). It remains unclear whether and how scholars should rely on
myriad, discrete measures of such indicators as the coalition maximizing “strategic median”
measure or the minimizing ideological measure, which assumes that the median Justice ideal
point score is the most useful measure and reflection of ideological judging.

101
These efforts, reliant on complex data modeling and mathematical assumptions - and
geared toward performing large-N analyses - have advanced the study of judicial decisionmaking by pointing toward more reliable empirical characterizations of case outcomes. I build
upon this work by incorporating the new composite indicator developed in chapter two with the
basic Martin-Quinn ordering technique to provide comparative perspective on two Courts in the
modern era within a well-defined area of law featuring a “medium-N” sized set of cases. It is an
approach that balances concerns for accessibility, accuracy, and replicability, allowing for
comparisons across different types of cases combined with respect for the idea that legal norms
may become entrenched for specific periods of the Court’s history (Gillman 1993, 11, 200; see
also Banks and Blakeman 2012, 255-311, for a similar approach in the area of federalism).
By including an undetermined category, this analysis takes seriously the idea that
decisions do not always easily lend themselves to categorizations of decisions as liberal or
conservative. However, it is also a test largely deferential to the theory that justices vote on the
basis of political rather than jurisprudential preferences (Edelman et al. 2008, 829). This design
choice is purposefully an easy test for the attitudinal model’s voting order assumption, and uses
measures of judicial ideology that capture ideological drift over time. Most importantly for the
puzzle to be addressed here, it provides a new and theoretically sound window into how often the
Court behaves in ways unexpected by the unidimensional assumption underpinning canonical
work in the attitudinal paradigm. Chapter four builds upon these analyses by tracing the
development of Roberts Era free speech jurisprudence through the qualitative method of process
tracing.
Methodologically, this approach is best understood as developing a descriptive or
conceptual typology. According to Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright, conceptual typologies are

102
tools that “explicate the meaning of a concept by mapping out its dimensions, which correspond
to the rows and columns in the typology,” creating cell types that “identify and describe the
phenomena under analysis.” (2012, 218). More concretely, a typology of judicial decisionmaking that compares coalition composition to the direction of a decision creates categories that
facilitate descriptive explanations of the Court’s behavior, which may in turn be used to assess
the observable implications of particular theories of judicial decision-making. In this way, these
typologies straddle the line between what Elman has described as descriptive and explanatory
subtypes, as the column and row placement creates property spaces that facilitate theory testing
(Elman 2005, 297-298). While some scholarship in the field of judicial decision-making has
explicitly drawn on typologies in empirical analyses (Keck 2007, 327, 330, 332; Kapiszewksi
2011, 484-485, 487-488; Banks and Blakeman 2012, 279-280, 294), its potential contributions to
the study of judicial behavior remains underdeveloped. Indeed, Seawright, LaPorte, and
Collier’s categorized, bibliographical search of scholarship using typologies as an analytical tool
includes approximately 100 separate examples - across all disciplines of social science - and
none of the entries concern U.S. Supreme Court decision-making or even judicial decisionmaking in general (2012, 4-5). Thus, this assessment not only builds upon this emerging
empirical approach but also pushes back against the aggregation-centric, effects-of-causes
paradigm dominant in the field of judicial decision-making. The immediate hypothesis of
concern is similar to that evaluated from the justice-centered, effects-of-causes perspective
presented above: From this case-centered perspective and focus on the expected ordering of the
justices in case outcomes, if the Roberts Court is a uniquely conservative tribunal in the area of
freedom of expression, then the proportion of cases falling in the ordered columns would be
expected to be higher during this era than in the previous Rehnquist Era.
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Table 3.2 – Voting Disorder of Roberts Court Speech Cases (2005-2014 Terms) 20
Composite
Direction
Conservative

Strong
Ordered
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006)

Ordered
Randall v. Sorrell (2006)

Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C.
(2007)

Unanimous Decisions
Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C.
(2006)
Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006)

Disordered
Beard v. Banks (2006)
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association (2009)

Strong Disorder
Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association
(2011)
Golan v. Holder (2012)

Morse v. Frederick (2007)

Davenport v. WEA (2007)

Davis v. FEC (2008)

New York State Board of Elections
v. Torres (2008)

Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project (2010)
Snyder v. Phelps (2011)

Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, Local
1000 (2012)

Citizens United v. FEC (2010)
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
(2009)

Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett
(2011)

Sorrell v. IMS Health (2012)

Totals
Conservative Decisions:
61.36%
Pro-Speech Decisions as
Proportion of
Conservative Decisions:
55.56%
Pro-Speech Decisions as
Proportion of All
Decisions: 34.09%

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.
v. U.S. (2010)

American Tradition Partnership
v. Bullock (2012)

Reichle v. Howards (2012)

Harris v. Quinn (2014)

Wood v. Moss (2014)

McCutcheon v. F.E.C. (2014)

McCullen v. Coakley (2014)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015)

Undetermined

U.S. v. Alvarez (2012)

TSSAA v. Brentwood Academy
(2007)

U.S. v. Williams (2008)
U.S. v. Stevens (2010)

Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican
Party (2008)

Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011)

Undetermined
Decisions: 13.64%
Undetermined
Proportion: 33.33%
All Decisions: 4.54%

Liberal

Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez (2010)

Doe v. Reed (2010)

Locke v. Karass (2009)

Agency for International
Development v. Alliance
for Open Society
International, Inc. (2013

Nevada Commission on Ethics v.
Carrigan (2011)

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
(2015)

Hartman v. Moore (2006)

Walker v. Sons of Confederate
Veterans (2015)

Pro-Speech Proportion:
30.00%

F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations
(2012)

All Decisions: 6.82%

Lane v. Franks (2014)

(22.73%)

20

(9.1%)

N=44. Pro-speech claimant decisions are indicated by bolded text.

(36.36%)

Liberal Decisions:
22.73%

(20.45%)

(11.36%)
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Table 3.3 – Voting Disorder of Rehnquist Court Speech Cases (1994-2004 Terms) 21
Strong Ordered
Conservative

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia (1995)
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)

Ordered
U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union (1995)
Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette (1995)

Unanimous
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995)
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston (1995)

Disorder
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission (1995)
Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes (1998)

Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly (2001)
LA v. Alameda Books (2002)

Strong Disorder
U.S. v. United Foods, Inc. (2001)
Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center (2002)
Virginia v. Black (2003)

Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC (1996)

44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island
(1996)

Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000)

Shaw v. Murphy (2001)

NEA v. Finley (1998)

Totals
Conservative
Decisions: 59.26%
Pro-Speech
Decisions as
Proportion of
Conservative
Decisions: 53.57%

Good News Club v. Milford (2001)
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
(2002)

Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001)

Thomas v. Chicago Park District
(2002)

Pro-Speech
Decisions as
Proportion of All
Decisions: 34.88%

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society
of NY v. Stratton (2002)

Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002)
Virginia v. Hicks (2003)
U.S. v. American Library Association
(2003)

Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts, Inc. (2004)
San Diego v. Roe (2004)

Undetermined

O’Hare Truck Service v. Northlake
(1996)

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
v. U.S. (1999)

Eldred v. Aschroft (2003)

Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr (1996)

Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC (1996)
Buckley v. American Constitutional
Law Foundation (1999)

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997)

Undetermined
Decisions: 12.96%
Undetermined
Propotion: 71.43%
All Decisions: 9.26%

Tory v. Cochran (2005)
Liberal

Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC
(1997)

FEC v. Beaumont (2003)

Reno v. ACLU (1997)
Board of Regents, UW v. Southworth
(2000)

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. FEC (2001)

Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates,
Inc. (2003)

McConnell v. FEC (2003)

Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.
(1995)

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
(2002)

Liberal Decisions:
27.78%%

Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott (1997)

Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004)

Pro-Speech
Proportion: 26.67%

LAPD v. United Reporting
Publishing Co. (1999)

Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association (2005)

All Decisions: 7.4%

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC
(2000)
U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment
Group (2000)
Hill v. Colorado (2000)
Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez
(2001)

(15.09%)

(22.64%)

(22.64%)

(24.53%)

(15.09%)

21 N=53. Bolded cases indicate a pro-speech claimant decision. Underlined cases indicate a mixed or split decision on the speech claim. For those cases,
composite direction and speech decisions assigned based on counts of how many questions decided by the Court (if three provisions of a law were considered
individually and the Court ruled for the pro-speech decision in two of them, then the case name is underlined but also bolded).
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Tables 3.3 and 3.4 arrange all Roberts and Rehnquist Court speech decisions by decision
direction and the degree of voting disorder present in each case, respectively. Decisions marked
by one justice defecting from his or her predicted position are labeled as disordered, while those
with more than one justice defecting are deemed strongly disordered. Similarly, decisions
characterized by the conventional 5-4 split between the Court’s conservative and liberal wings
are placed in the strongly ordered category, while ordered splits at any other point on the
expected continuum fall into the ordered column. The far right column includes the proportion of
cases with membership in each row, as well as the percentages of pro-speech decisions within
that row and the larger era population. Similarly, the table’s bottom row provides summary
percentages of membership in each voting coalition category.
From this perspective, it is apparent that the Roberts Court free expression record is
generally a conservative one, particularly in campaign finance decisions. A greater proportion of
cases fall into the conservative row in the Roberts Era compared to the Rehnquist Court though
both Courts have typically issued conservative decisions. This finding holds when substituting
the coding judgments of the Supreme Court Database, which features a number of coding
decisions that appear questionable (see Appendices C and D for these typologies). With the
exceptions of Randall v. Sorrell (548 U.S. 230 (2006)), a 6-3 decision by Justice Breyer and
joined by the Court’s conservatives and Wisconsin Right to Life (I), a unanimous decision
holding that a conservative, non-profit advocacy group could present an as-applied challenge to
electioneering provisions of BCRA, these cases have always been 5-4 splits with the Court’s
conservatives voting for the pro-speech position. However, it is also apparent that the Court’s
conservatism in this area is most pronounced in the number of unanimous, conservative
decisions. In fact, the number of unanimous, conservative decisions (10) nearly matches the
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number of strong attitudinal ordered decisions (9, or 43.18% of all cases when taken together).
This finding that the Court’s liberals frequently vote conservatively in free expression cases is
somewhat surprising when juxtaposed with the predictions of the logit model specified above,
and occurs at a higher rate than the previous Rehnquist Era (24.53%).
As far as modern liberal decisions go, there has been only one true win during the
Roberts Era: Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open Society International,
which struck down a federal statute’s requirement that non-governmental organizations receiving
funds to combat AIDS abroad adopt an anti-prostitution mission statement (133 S.Ct. 2321
(2013)). Though Lane and F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations (132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012)) both fall
into the liberal, pro-speech category as well, neither decision is an unqualified victory for free
expression. In the former, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion at once ruled in favor of Lane and held
that Franks was protected from the suit by the doctrine of qualified immunity. In doing so, the
Court gutted any potential remedy for Lane, making the decision “pro-speech” in name only. In
the latter, the Court relied on the 5th Amendment’s vagueness doctrine in striking fines levied
against Fox and ABC for three incidents involving a combination of fleeting expletives during
awards shows and brief nudity. The case is, while unanimously decided, something of an
exception and included in the analysis because of the clear and present First Amendment
implications. 22
Some of the weakly disordered decisions are those that have gained much attention and
have been invoked in narratives portraying the Roberts Court as a pro-free speech Court. Snyder
v. Phelps (131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011)) was a pro-speech holding (through Chief Justice Roberts) that
the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas, could not be sued under the civil tort of
A similar case selection decision was made with regards to Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (564 U.S. 379
(2011)) which is technically a First Amendment petition clause case but the nature of Justice Kennedy’s analysis
closely tracked the Court’s government employee jurisprudence.

22
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Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress (IIED) for protests at military funerals, in part because
the content of that speech was on matters of important political concern. Justice Alito, a reliably
conservative jurist, departed from the rest of the Court and suggested that such speech is at the
periphery of the First Amendment’s ambit.
On the other hand, members of the Court’s liberal bloc have regularly joined the Court’s
conservatives in pro- and anti-speech conservative holdings. Some of these disordered defections
have been minimal. In Humanitarian Law Project, an anti-speech majority through Chief Justice
Roberts held that while a federal law prohibiting material support or resources to groups
designated as foreign terrorist organizations was indeed a content-based restriction on speech,
judicial deference to the elected branches in matters of national security was appropriate – an
institutional capability argument (561 U.S. 1, 25-26 (2010)). Justice Stevens – at the time the
most liberal justice on the Court – joined the conservative bloc, with Justice Breyer writing for
the Court’s liberal wing. Others have been more surprising: In Knox, Justice Sotomayor (joined
by Ginsburg) joined the Court’s conservatives in ruling for non-members of Service Employees
International, Local 1000. For that term, Sotomayor and Ginsburg were the two most liberal
justices on the Court, voting for the same bottom-line result as the Court’s conservatives. 23
Others still have been notable for both conservative and liberal defectors. Entertainment
Merchants Association was a case featuring a conservative speaker (business association) and
arguably, a liberal/Democratic speech suppressor (a majority Democratic California legislature
enacting a law restricting violent videogame access to minors). The type of speech at issue does
not appear to carry any firm ideological valence – are depictions of gratuitous violence
23 The unit of analysis in attitudinal studies – specifically the limited categorical dependent variable models - is
generally votes. As such, these studies generally do not account for concurring opinions that reach the same result
in terms of vote direction. Sotomayor and Ginsburg disagreed with a portion of Justice Alito’s majority opinion that
held union members must affirmatively opt-in (rather than opt-out) of special fee assessments for electoral or
ideological purposes.

108
conservative speech? Or is the speech better understood as artistic speech, a category that
(arguably) better resonates with modern liberalism? The Court’s 7-2 decision in favor of the
Entertainment Merchants Association was even more fractured than the votes reveal. Three of
the Court’s liberals and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Scalia’s sweeping opinion, which cited
Stevens for the proposition that the Court would not carve out a violence exception to the First
Amendment. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Roberts, concurred, but left open the possibility that
the California legislature could craft a law that would survive strict First Amendment scrutiny in
light of the sense that long-term effects of such exposure are difficult to foresee (131 S.Ct. 2729,
2742 (2011)). The dissenters in the case, Justices Thomas and Breyer, could not be further apart
in terms of conventional political ideology and judicial methodologies.
Shifting back to the conservative Court hypothesis, are these findings consistent with the
argument that the Roberts Court record is distinctly conservative? The columns most useful for
answering these questions are those populated by unanimous, disordered, and strongly
disordered decisions. Recall that these decisions are those least well-explained or least
consistent with the predictions of the attitudinal model. If the Roberts Court speech record is
somehow exceptional such that free expression transcends ideological divisions in unexpected
ways, we might expect a greater proportion of cases to fall into these categories compared to the
Rehnquist Court Era. For the Roberts Era, 68.17% of decisions fall into these categories, while
62.26% of cases during the Rehnquist Era fall into these categories - a six-percentage point
difference. Viewed this way, there is minimal though some measurable support for the
“exceptional Court” characterization.
A closer look at the column totals, however, reveals that the increase can be entirely
attributed to the proportion of unanimous decisions rendered during the Roberts Era: The
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proportion of decisions claiming membership in either the disordered or strongly disordered
categories is marginally higher during the Rehnquist Era (4.8 and 3.83% points, respectively),
while the proportion of unanimous decisions is lower (13.72% points). In terms of voting, the
Roberts Court can be understood as less conservative to the extent that the justices manage to
find agreement in a variety of First Amendment issues, though this empirical support is
complicated by the observation that membership in the strongly ordered column jumps from
15.09% in the Rehnquist Era to 22.73% during the Roberts Era. Additionally, membership in the
two “soft” categories of ordered and disordered decisions has decreased from 22.64 and 24.53%,
respectively, to 9.1% and 20.53%.
These findings appear consistent with an emerging phenomenon known as the
“polarization paradox.” As explained by Brandon Bartels, in recent eras, the Court has
increasingly and counterintuitively produced more 5-4 split decisions while simultaneously
producing more unanimous decisions (2015, 24-27). According to Bartels, this empirical trend
might be attributable to the Court’s dual commitments to maintaining what Pacelle has termed a
volitional and exigent (or institutional maintenance) agenda. The former represents the body of
cases for which the Court acts to enforce particular ideological or partisan commitments, while
the latter represents cases that serve to preserve the Court’s image as a legal – rather than
politicized – institution (Pacelle 1991; cited in Bartels 2015, 24-27). While chapter five focuses
explicitly on the Court’s agenda-setting, certiorari docket during the Roberts Era, the conceptual
typology of merits decisions adds a wrinkle to this account with the finding that the proportions
of unanimous decisions that can be categorized as either liberal or undetermined have also
marginally increased during the Roberts Era.
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To systematically assess whether the polarization paradox explains contemporary
freedom of expression decisions, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 include an additional consideration: the
political salience (importance) of the cases decided by each Court. Multiple salience measures
have been established, including a dichotomous variable based on front-page New York Times
coverage after a decision has been rendered (Epstein and Segal 2000), a more nuanced indicator
accounting for media coverage of Supreme Court cases at various stages of the decision-making
process: coverage before oral argument, coverage of oral argument, coverage of cases pending
decision, and the coverage of decisions once issued (Clark, Lax, and Rice 2015, 38-39), and an
indicator designed to reflect the justices’ (rather than media elites’) sense of salient cases based
on the number of words spoken by the bench during oral arguments (Black, Sorenson, and
Johnson 2013).
Black, Sorenson, and Johnson’s measure better reflects the underlying concept of interest
of salience because it is focused on the justices, rather than what cases mainstream media outlets
deem as salient. It is also a more practical measure, as measures are available through the
Court’s 2010 term, while Clark et al. end at the Court’s 2008 term. In addition, Strother’s
assessments of the relationship between public opinion and salience, as well as salience in the
coverage of Supreme Court opinions, found no difference in robustness of results when one
measure was substituted for the other (Strother 2017a; 2017b). These data facilitate testing
additional hypotheses about these Courts’ free expression agendas: If the polarization paradox
applies to these Courts’ free expression agendas, then we expect cases with higher degrees of
salience to appear in the ordered and strongly ordered columns and, given both Courts’ 5-4
conservative majorities, to fall mainly in the conservative row. Because Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy are median or “swing” justices during these two eras, some cases with higher measures
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of salience may also fall in the liberal row. Conversely, cases falling in the disordered or
unanimous columns would be expected to be assigned lower case salience scores.
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Table 3.4 - Polarization Paradox and Roberts Era Free Speech Decisions (2005-2010 Terms)
Composite
Direction
Conservative

Strong
Ordered
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006)
[3.167]

Ordered
Randall v. Sorrell (2006)
[-.3413]

Unanimous Decisions
Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C.
(2006)
[.3285]

Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC
(2007)
[.4430]

Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006)
[.6595]

Morse v. Frederick (2007)
[1.464]

Davenport v. WEA (2007)
[-.4708]

Davis v. FEC (2008)
[-.0163]

New York State Board of Elections
v. Torres (2008)
[-.4474]

Citizens United v. FEC (2010)
[4.150]

Beard v. Banks (2006)
[.3855]
Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association (2009)
[.5441]

Strong Disorder
Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association
(2011)
[1.232]

Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project (2010)
[.3945]

Totals
Conservative Decisions:
64.29%
Pro-Speech Decisions as
Proportion of
Conservative Decisions:
55.56%
Pro-Speech Decisions as
Proportion of All
Decisions: 34.09%

Snyder v. Phelps (2011)
[1.137]

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
(2009)
[1.101]

Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett
(2011)
[.3259]

[1.589]

Disordered

Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.
v. U.S. (2010)
[.0938]
[-.3413]

Undetermined

[.2108]

TSSAA v. Brentwood Academy
(2007)
[-.5474]
Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011)
[-1.344]

[.6153]

U.S. v. Williams (2008)
[.4067]
U.S. v. Stevens (2010)
[.4985]

[1.232]

Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican
Party (2008)
[-.0996]

Average Salience of
Decisions: [.7861]

Undetermined
Decisions: 17.86%
Undetermined
Proportion: 20%
All Decisions: 3.57%

[-.9457]

Liberal

Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez (2010)
[1.009]

Doe v. Reed (2010)
[.9380]

[.4526]

Locke v. Karass (2009)
[.1193]

[-.0996]

Hartman v. Moore (2006)
[.9076]

Nevada Commission on Ethics v.
Carrigan (2011)
[.0215]

Salience: [-.2172]

Liberal Decisions:
17.86%
Pro-Speech Proportion:
0%
All Decisions: 0%

Note: N=28.

[1.009]

[.9380]

[.0704]

(22.73%)
[1.506]

(9.1%)
[.2984]

(36.36%)
[-.0486]

[.9076]

(20.45%)
[.5611]

(11.36%)
[.6800]

Salience: [.5991]

[.5736]
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Table 3.5 - Polarization Paradox and Rehnquist Era Free Speech Decisions (1994-2004 Terms)
Strong Ordered
Conservative

Ordered

Unanimous

Disorder

Rosenberger v. UVA (1995)
[.2545]

U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (1995)
[-.4394]

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995)
[-.4793]

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995)
[-.6715]

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
(2000)
[.9532]

Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v.
Pinette (1995)
[.9335]

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Group of Boston (1995)
[.3348]

Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes
(1998)
[.5018]

Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly
(2001)
[.2923]

Colorado GOP Federal Campaign Committee v.
FEC (1996)
[.4609]

44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island (1996)
[.6193]

NEA v. Finley (1998)
[.3255]

Shaw v. Murphy (2001)
[-.2360]

Good News Club v. Milford (2001)
[1.439]

Thomas v. Chicago Park District (2002)
[-.1424]

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of NY v. Stratton (2002)
[.9745]

LA v. Alameda Books (2002)
[.4589]

Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000)
[.4979]

Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White (2002)
[1.293]

Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001)
[-.3292]
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002)
[-.1390]
U.S. v. American Library Association (2003)
[.5018]

[.6504]
Undetermined

[.2124]
O’Hare Truck Service v. Northlake (1996)
[.6806]

Strong Disorder
U.S. v. United Foods,
Inc. (2001)
[-.4196]
Thompson v. Western
States Medical Center
(2002)
[-.0896]
Virginia v. Black (2003)
[-.2100]

Totals
Conservative
Decisions: 51.92%
Pro-Speech Decisions
as Proportion of
Conservative
Decisions: 62.96%
Pro-Speech Decisions
as Proportion of All
Decisions: 32.69%

Virginia v. Hicks (2003)
[.9227]
Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts, Inc. (2004)
[.4288]

[.2068]
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting v. U.S.
(1999)
[.3110]

[.5139]
Eldred v. Aschroft (2003)
[.0153]

Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr
(1996)
[1.387]

[-.2937]
Denver Area
Educational
Telecommunications
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC
(1996)
[-.3377]

Average Salience of
Cases: [.2976]
Undetermined
Decisions: 15.38%
Pro-Speech Proportion:
62.5%
All Decisions: 9.62%

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997)
[.1176]

Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law
Foundation (1999)
[1.211]

Tory v. Cochran (2005)
[.4789]

Liberal

Turner Broadcasting System v.
FCC (1997)
[-1.138]

[.6660]
FEC v. Beaumont (2003)
[-2.676]

Colorado GOP Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC
(2001)
[-.7603]

[.3110]
Reno v. ACLU (1997)
[-.1056]

[.0153]
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. (1995)
[-1.710]

Board of Regents, UW v. Southworth
(2000)
[1.617]

Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott (1997)
[1.048]

Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.
(2003)
[.4459]

McConnell v. FEC (2003)
[5.456]

LAPD v. United Reporting Publishing Co. (1999)
[.2640]
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC (2000)
[1.200]

[.4367]
Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition (2002)
[.3912]
Ashcroft v. ACLU
(2004)
[-.9759]

Salience: [.4830]
Liberal Decisions:
32.69%
Pro-Speech Proportion:
29.41%
All Decisions: 9.62%

Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association
(2005)
[.4415]

U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group (2000)
[.4989]
Hill v. Colorado (2000)
[1.422]
Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez (2001)
[.0353]
[1.186]
(15.09%)
[.8512]

[-2.676]
(22.64%)
[.1229]

[.6524]
(22.64%)
[.3378]

[.3940]
(24.53%)
[.4110]

[-.0477]
(15.09%)
[.0014]

Salience: [.3208]
[.3182]
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Tables 3.5 and 3.6 add the Black, Sorenson, and Johnson salience measures for each
individual case for the Roberts Court (2005-2010 terms) and Rehnquist Court (1994-2004). The
salience estimates are standardized measures of the number of words spoken during oral
argument and calculate a z-statistic for each combination of Court alignment and the number of
justices present for that argument (Black, Sorenson, and Johnson 2013, 807). For each cell in the
typologies, I calculate the average salience score for cases falling in those cells, as well as row
and column averages. The inclusion of the salience dimension provides additional empirical
support for Bartels’ polarization paradox hypothesis. Cases claiming membership in the strongly
ordered column were viewed by the justices as more salient compared to all others (1.506); the
unanimous column scores lowest on the salience measure (-.0456). In addition, the cell with the
highest average salience score is the conservative-strongly ordered (1.589), while the cell with
the lowest average is the undetermined-unanimous category (-.9457). In other words, the most
polarizing decisions in terms of voting alignment are also those decisions most salient to the
justices. This is what would be expected from a Court that seeks to balance institutional
legitimacy with partisan and ideological commitments, though this dynamic may be a
contributing factor to – contra the Chief Justice’s desire - perceptions of the Court as an
increasingly politicized institution (Barnes 2015).
Viewed alongside the Rehnquist Era typology in Table 3.6, the salience dimension also
suggests an increasingly polarized Court in the field of free expression. The average salience of
unanimous decisions by the Rehnquist Court is considerably higher (.3378) than for its
successor, while the average salience for cases claiming membership in the strongly ordered
column is lower (.8512). In addition, while the average salience measure for the conservativestrongly ordered decision cell is still relatively high (.6504), is also lower than the same cell’s
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average during the Roberts Era. It is the liberal cell within that column with the highest overall
salience score (1.186). This finding should not be overstated, however, as the average is almost
wholly attributable to McConnell v. FEC (540 U.S. 93 (2003)): the other two cases in this cell
both register at negative levels of salience.
While these findings support the polarization hypothesis, it should also be noted that the
average salience of cases claiming membership in the strongly disordered column increases from
.0014 during the Rehnquist Era to .6800 during the Roberts Court. This suggests that while
polarization has occurred, the Roberts Court Era is also marked by cases that are salient to the
justices in ways beyond political importance. Unfortunately, stronger inferences are limited by
data availability: The Black et al. dataset has not been updated beyond the Court’s 2010 term.
This data limitation, along with higher salience averages in the strongly disordered column,
suggests the limits of the polarization paradox while also suggesting that important cases will
also be the most politically charged ones.

Conclusion
This project began with the observation that the Court’s record on free expression is
puzzling, insofar as a number of decisions appear to be explained by conventional, attitudinal
models of decision-making while others do not fit comfortably within that paradigm. Examining
the universe of decisions from both the individual vote and case outcome perspectives, it is
apparent that the Roberts Court’s free expression record is a conservative one. Upon closer
examination and comparison with the previous Rehnquist Court, it is clear that in the field of
First Amendment, freedom of speech litigation, the Roberts Court has balanced commitment to
an ideological or partisan program with what appears to be a shared view of the judicial role that
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simultaneously transcends ideological divisions and reduces First Amendment speech
protections. The proportion of decisions that do not easily fit within the attitudinal paradigm
exceeds that of the previous Court and – due to the discretionary nature of the Court’s docket –
suggests important considerations for the justices beyond the ideological characterizations
conventionally offered by political scientists. At the very least, it calls into question the
unidimensional assumption of ideology imposed on the measurement of both judicial values and
case outcomes and points toward ongoing efforts to introduce new dimensions to this concept
(see Robinson and Swedlow 2014). This window on the US Supreme Court’s freedom of
expression docket contributes to the ongoing scholarly debate concerning proper methods for
teasing out purported influences on case outcomes, bringing the insights of qualitative research
methods to bear on concept formation in attitudinal studies of judicial decision-making.
Specifically, what is generally missing from recent accounts is a closer examination of
extra-ideological factors revealed by the justices’ statements in judicial opinions. Numerical
characterizations of the influence of ideology are limited to the extent that they are based on
either editorial characterizations (Segal-Cover) or actual voting patterns of the justices (MartinQuinn). The considerable variation in outcomes documented so far employ methods ill-equipped
to capture the potential effect of sincerely held conceptions of the judicial role among justices, as
well as variation in the type of ideological commitment sincerely held by the justices. In the next
chapter, the role of these considerations during the Roberts Era is parsed more closely to
determine whether and how differing conceptions of the judicial role and jurisprudential
structures affect decision-making in free speech cases.
To recap, voting disorder occurs regularly in Roberts Court free speech decisions, and
anecdotally appears attributable in part to the somewhat consistent application of differing
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judicial methodologies. Alito’s aversion to extending the sphere of First Amendment protection
to peripheral “distractions” and Breyer’s refusal to let doctrinal categories determine his vote are
recurring themes that illustrate how moving beyond the “bottom line” of merits votes to the
language of opinions informs our understanding of the observable judicial coalitions in
contemporary free expression controversies. These interpretive philosophies may interact with
or trump ideological preferences to produce sometimes surprising decisions, and suggest a need
to study the rationales offered by justices in order to make sense of salient, contemporary areas
of case law. How and when that happens are the questions examined through a comprehensive
analysis developed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Beyond Single-Cause Explanations: Jurisprudence, Ideology, and Conceptions of the
Judicial Role
“The mind of a man who happens to be a judge is the center of many contending
impulses when he is making it up, and an external reconstruction of the process is quite
impossible. However, the rules of the game require that judges supply clues to their
thought processes in the form of written opinions…It would be naïve to assume that
justices in deciding cases are completely free to vote their own preferences, or that a
voting record necessarily mirrors a justice's inner con- victions. On the other hand, it
would be even more naive to assume that a Supreme Court justice merely "looks up the
law" on a subject and applies it to the case in hand.” (Pritchett 1953, 321-322).
“First Amendment doctrinal change…was at least in part ideological. We have seen,
however, that the relationship between ideology and doctrine is far from straightforward.
It is rich and complex. Influence flows in both directions. Ideology and doctrine are both
distinct and overlapping, independent and interdependent. Ideological modeling of
judicial decision making may in some ways serve to clarify but in other important ways
obscure the nature of the relationship.” (Batchis 2016, 227).

The attitudinal model’s emphasis on correlations among justices’ values and lifetime
proportions of conservative (or liberal) votes overstates the degree to which the Court’s decisions
are distinctly ideological. And, more fundamentally, the attitudinal model’s policy-based scoring
of ideological direction ignores indicators that may be unique to free expression controversies –
the recent debate between Epstein, Parker, and Segal (2013) and Pettys (2014; 2015)
demonstrates that the identity of speakers, identity of speech suppressors, and the type of speech
itself are additional, understudied factors that have provisionally been demonstrated to correlate
with merits votes. Suspect indicators aside, while there is predictive value for (extra) judicial
actors in knowing the effect of ideology on the probability of pro-claimant vote given a
population of cases, this conventional approach does not help observers understand when
deviations from expected ideological patterns occur. A substantial proportion of contemporary
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free speech cases are marked by voting disorder among the justices. In addition, the Roberts
Court is often unanimous in deciding free speech cases, suggesting that something beyond
ideological attitudes must be evaluated in attempting to solve the puzzle. How do these
deviations relate to ideological values?
The evolution of judicial support for free expression in the United States from “lodestar
of liberalism” to darling of conservatism will continue to elude comprehension by scholars so
long as analyses give primacy the votes and values of justices at the expense of additional
factors. These factors are not easily operationalized into indicators that are often put into the
service of translating social relationships into logical, numerical expressions. Early to mid-20th
century jurisprudential doctrines developed in cases brought by periodically “unpopular,”
peripheral claimants like Jehovah’s Witnesses, racists, and unions – whether endogenous or
exogenous to ideological preferences – have structured the free speech subset of the broader
conservative rights agenda and have constituted claims previously outside the lexicon of U.S.
free speech jurisprudence. Doctrines once thought solely the province of the unpopular
individual speaker, soapbox orator, or lonely pamphleteer have now become tools of
conservative entrenchment for free market, libertarian economic enterprise (Kuhner 2014).
The replacement of judicial moderate Sandra Day O’Connor with Samuel Alito and
judicial restraintist William Rehqnuist with Chief Justice John Roberts appears to tell part of the
story. Yet this univariate explanation does not tell us why the Court’s conservatives (and
liberals) disagree with one another, not only in terms of voting but also decision rationales. It
cannot tell us how claims once outside the acceptable boundaries of free speech jurisprudence
now rest comfortably within its aura of legitimacy. Nor does it distinguish between the types of
conservative claims the Court has decided, which speaks to the problem of ideological
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heterogeneity in cross-Court comparisons. More concretely, can the difference in the editorialbased conservatism score assigned to Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito tell us anything
about why they disagree on case outcomes beyond restating that one score is marginally different
from the other (see Baum 1999, 202-204)? The general focus on individual merits votes as the
primary unit of analysis – and one interpretation of those votes, to boot - carries the cost of
exacerbating the flattening of judicial behavior, ignoring what scholars have long characterized
as a complex relationship among a variety of ideological, jurisprudential, and interpretive factors
(Pritchett 1953, 321, 324; Shapiro 1963, 339-340; Smith 1988, 95-96; Gillman 1993, 11-19;
Keck 2004, 11-12; Whittington 2000, 620-624; Feldman 2005, 91-92; Fischman and Law 2009,
7-10; Bybee 2012, 73-75).
These concerns are not fresh out of the box by any means – a number of scholars have
noted the limits of the effects-of-causes modeling of judicial ideological preferences, and all too
often this debate has taken on a bitter tone (Law & Courts Newsletter 1994; 2003). For all the
insights gleaned from the vast body of judicial decision-making literature interested in the now
taken for granted correlation between values and votes, the price has been an acontextual
understanding of the relationship between ideological preferences and principles. If judicial
decision-making is a context-specific enterprise marked by endogenous relationships between
preferences and principles, then outcomes should be understood as longitudinal processes
developing over time and contingent upon jurisprudential and ideological arrangements unique
to particular periods of the Court. To understand the present nature of the Roberts Court’s record
on free expression, then, requires an explanation of how this process has unfolded. Within this
broad, historical case, causal inferences may be drawn from diagnostic pieces of evidence
present in individual Court cases. This analytical tool – sometimes known as “process tracing” –
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allows researchers to move beyond effects-of-causes research designs and instead focus on
complex relationships and descriptions of how an outcome came to be (see generally Collier
2011).
In this chapter, I argue that a missing piece of the Roberts Court free expression puzzle
lies in the confluence of competing judicial interpretive philosophies, jurisprudential structures,
conceptions of the judicial role, and ideological preferences. First, I briefly review scholarly
work that has found evidence of the influence of jurisprudential considerations on Supreme
Court decision-making – research that has been both quantitative and qualitative and has relied
upon different epistemological assumptions (i.e. positivism v. interpretivism, or the “external”
and “internal” views of judicial decision-making). From this body of literature, I develop a
description of judicial decision-making featuring ideological, jurisprudential, philosophical, and
interpretive conceptions of the judicial role as constitutive elements of and causes of judicial
decisions. Finally, I offer a descriptive explanation via a comprehensive, “medium-N” study of
the Robert’s Court’s 44 free expression decisions from the 2005 through 2014 terms of the
Court, examining how and when these factors result in outcomes that do not comfortably fit
within the attitudinal paradigm.
I find that substantial heterogeneity within the Court’s conservative and liberal blocs
along with differing conceptions of the judicial role have produced the fractured decisions not
easily predicted by purely ideological models of judging. I also find evidence in support of the
claim that the entrenched “content neutrality” regime structuring modern free speech
controversies has slowly been eroded by this combination of considerations. This development
has occurred simultaneously with the Court’s gradual evolution into a “pro-speech” Court, an
agenda that did not begin outside of the campaign finance decision context until the Court’s 2009
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term and did not fully bloom until well into the Chief Justice’s tenure. On the issue of freedom of
expression jurisprudence, then, the Roberts Court is best understood as a tribunal in transition
and flux rather than an unqualifiedly ‘conservative Court.’These findings underscore that general
correlations among values and votes – even while controlling for theoretically relevant covariates
- offers an understanding of law and politics that is remarkably thin, often divorced from
historical context and the jurisprudential structures that shape judicial decisionmaking. Beyond
the confines of this project, it is hoped that this approach will be useful to scholars seeking to
systematically draw attention to the complexity of judicial decision-making by assessing if, how,
and when factors beyond conventional ideological explanations produce surprising outcomes.

Fundamentals of Judicial Decision-making: An Overview
Battle of the Strawmen: Beyond Conventional Legal and Attitudinal Accounts
The debate concerning the influence of ideological preferences and jurisprudential
principles implies multiple pathways exist in moving from the facts of a case and the eventual
decision on the merits. Unfortunately, a large amount of data is obscured by the self-imposed
“black box” of Supreme Court decision-making: Scholars cannot see the process that unfolds at
weekly conferences, the exchanges between clerks, or the initial grant of certiorari. Theoretical
pathways do exist, however, and Figure 4.1 illustrates the crux of the debate.
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Figure 4.1 – Conventional Mapping of Supreme Court Decision-making
Instrumental (Ideological Preferences)

Case Fact(or)s

Decision on Merits

Good Faith Judging (Application of Jurisprudential Principles)

To varying degrees, the dominant approaches of Supreme Court decision-making are
represented by the multiple pathways illustrated above (see also Weller and Barnes 2014, 1-7,
25, 28-29). The attitudinal approach is generally represented by the upper pathway, where case
factors are interpreted in light of ideological preferences and determine the decision on the merits
for any particular judge. This understanding of judicial decision-making has been characterized
as instrumental, meaning that to the extent jurisprudential principles are invoked in judicial
opinions they are merely used to rationalize the decision – they do not control or, in the model’s
purest form, influence the decision on the merits. This model of judging may be deemed “topdown” reasoning (Bartels 2011; Braman 2009). Alternatively, the lower pathway approaches the
legal model invoked in various forms by scholars claiming that judges wrestle with case facts in
light of precedent, current social context, and other jurisprudential principles in reaching a
decision on the merits (Kahn 1999; Kahn and Kersch 2006). In other words, legal considerations
can and do constrain the calculus of judges, who mostly engage in “analogical reasoning” in
reaching the disposition of a case. This model may also be described as “bottom-up” reasoning
(Bartels 2011; Braman 2009; Carter and Burke 2005, 8-13).
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Each model is an ideal type insofar as in pure form, they are accounts of how judging
occurs given relevant institutional constraints. The lower pathway emphasizes legal constraints
on justices, while the upper pathway generally assumes that justices are able to vote sincere
preferences due to the position of the Court vis-à-vis other federal government actors; it is a
stripped down version of more intricate rational choice judicial decision-making research
programs. Yet ideal types are not real types, and some scholars continue to emphasize that the
process of judging is at least partially political and at least partially legal (Bybee 2010).
Richards and Kritzer (2002) and Richards (2013) have advanced a fairly developed theoretical
account of this middle pathway and have offered large-N, empirical evidence in support of the
claim that judicial decision-making is a process riddled by ideology and legal considerations in
the First Amendment context (see also Batchis 2016, 46-64). This middle pathway is illustrated
by the vertical arrow suggesting a give-and-take between ideological preferences and extraideological preferences related to judging.
The upshot of the middle pathway understanding, which considers both the lack of formal
institutional constraints allowing ideology to operate at the Supreme Court and the constitutive
effect of entrenched jurisprudential principles, is that the influence of factors beyond ideology is
exceptionally difficult (though not impossible) to tease out. Following Keck’s analysis of the the
ideological and jurisprudential development of the Rehnquist Court Era, scholars can compare
jurists’ attitudes and conceptions of the judicial role with votes across a wide-range of cases,
examining opinions for clues as to each jurist’s interpretation of jurisprudential constraints
(2004, 11-12). A decision that appears ideological may nevertheless be the result of different
judicial methodologies applied by the justices, while a decision that appears to be consistent with
established jurisprudential principles could simply be a reflection of the liberalism or
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conservatism of the justices. In a recent account of the persistence of the content-neutrality
regime, Richards (2013, 129-130) argues that the 6-3 decision in U.S. v. Alvarez reflects a
continued though perhaps tenuous commitment to closely scrutinizing laws that regulate speech
on the basis of the subject matter communicated. The likely rejoinder from those who emphasize
the “political” in “political jurisprudence” might be that the decision was driven more by
attitudes than Richards seems to believe, as the justices were divided along an imaginary line just
to the left of Justice Alito and therefore the result is as expected once taking into account the
expected ideological ordering of justices via Martin-Quinn scores.

Application to Contemporary Free Speech: Additional Considerations

A longstanding scholarly tradition has argued that the general attitudinal conception of
judicial decision-making is complicated by claims that judges are socialized into a culture that
places a premium on fidelity to jurisprudential rules and norms - institutional pulls that may
create tension with preferred policy preferences (Dworkin 1978, 35-36; Richards 2013, 36;
Whittington 2000). As one scholar has put it, judges “are constrained by law, even as they
advance contested understandings of what constitutes legitimate law. The strike zone in baseball
is contested, but a pitch that bounces before reaching home plate is a ball…One can argue in
good faith that precedent sanctions presidential wars, but not that Article I mandates a
parliamentary system of government” (Graber 1999, 299-301; 2006, 53). Coupled with the idea
that protection of freedom of speech is a common good in the pluralist vision of democracy
ascendant in the mid-20th Century, as well as the Court’s general commitment to protecting
“preferred freedoms” and Bill of Rights protections post-U.S. v. Carolene Products (304 U.S.
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144 (1938)), it is theoretically plausible to suggest that free speech is a concern of justices that
transcends partisan ideology (Feldman 2008; Tushnet 2013, 215, 217, 244; Knowles and
Lichtman 2015, 242-243). The uniqueness of the issue area of free speech, then, provides an
interesting case study insofar as jurisprudential and philosophical influences may be at their
apogee.
Specifically, the justices of the contemporary Court have inherited multiple
jurisprudential traditions and longstanding theoretical justifications for the protection of free
speech in America. The former include the application of varying tiers of judicial scrutiny to the
suppression of speech based upon whether the suppression at issue regulates speech on the basis
of its subject matter – what Richards and Kritzer (2002) have described as the “content neutrality
regime.” The latter includes philosophical rationales including the so-called “marketplace of
ideas,” the argument from democracy, and self-fulfillment; the first two are consequentialist
justifications insofar as protection for expression is important for its broader salutary social
effects (the pursuit of truth, social progress, and political progress), while the latter is
nonconsequential in that the importance lies in the fulfillment, development, or realization of the
individual – put another way, free expression is an important value in its own right, outside of
any broader salutary effects it might have for political or social progress. Adding to these
jurisprudential and philosophical considerations are varying conceptions of the judicial role, or
the justice’s philosophy of judicial review: Does deference to legislative judgments play a key
role in these decisions? Originalism? And are these interpretive philosophies consistently
applied by the justices of the current Court?
The nature of the jurisprudential and philosophical underpinnings of contemporary free
expression jurisprudence is not merely an academic question. The crux of First Amendment
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judicial analysis has always been an attempt to balance legitimate government interests with the
words that Justice Hugo Black deemed an absolute: “Congress shall make no law.” Of course,
this prohibition requires at least a working definition of what constitutes “speech” and the scope
of that freedom. Students have often readily invoked the Holmesian quip about falsely yelling
“FIRE!” in a crowded theater (Schenck v. U.S, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). But the issue runs
deeper than that, particularly when one considers the communicative aspect of speech. Justices
must decide whether the ambit of the First Amendment extends to speech that is artistic, whether
in a traditional sense or what may be termed obscene, due to its focus on “prurient” sexual
matters. If it does not, there must be some justification for that choice, and likewise if the
protection does extend so far.
Similarly, if the purpose of the First Amendment is deemed to be the protection of
political speech and little else as in the famous account by Alexander Meiklejohn (1948), justices
are expected to articulate the reason for that distinction. And, if protection includes expression
intertwined with conduct, the Court must articulate why some symbolic conduct is protected
while other conduct is not. If the range of symbolic conduct captured by the First Amendment is
extended to include, say, a motorist breaking the speed limit laws as a way of expressing
displeasure with the limit of 65 m.p.h., then nearly all government regulation becomes suspect
under the Constitution’s first freedom. Conversely, if the First Amendment does not cover such
conduct as the burning of draft cards to express opposition to the Vietnam War (U.S. v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367 (1968)), the robustness of that protection is also uncertain.
An imperfect analogy demonstrates a modern First Amendment problem centered on the
question of what counts as speech and what does not: the use of the free speech clause to strike
down government regulations related to economic transactions. In the post-Carolene Products
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era, the Court has generally viewed legislation related to economic matters as subject only to
rational basis scrutiny, a standard of judicial review entailing broad deference to legislatures. In
recent years, the Court has extended the scope of protection available to commercial speech
(expression related to economic transactions) in a variety of contexts, including alcohol content,
casino gambling, tobacco advertising, and even identifying information of doctors ordering
prescriptions for patients. Justice Breyer has compared the extension of free expression
protections to economic transactions to the Lochner Era, the well-known period of Supreme
Court history where justices held “class legislation” to a forerunner of the strict scrutiny standard
(though see Kessler 2016 for a re-examination of this claim).
To recap, the Court’s apparent philosophical struggle to interpret the meaning of the free
speech clause of the First Amendment has effects beyond the content of casebooks.
Philosophical justifications for protecting expression contract or expand the universe of potential
outcomes for free speech controversies and have the potential to affect society and politics in a
variety of ways.

Jurisprudential Constraints: Roots of the Content-Neutrality Regime
Philosophical theories justifying the scope of free expression protection provide the
foundation for judicial methodologies structuring concrete controversies before the Court.
Richards and Kritzer have argued that the Burger Court’s decisions in Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley (408 U.S. 92 (1972)) and Grayned v. Rockford (408 U.S. 104 (1972)) marked
the beginning of a jurisprudential regime – content-based v. content-neutral methodology – that
has since been entrenched as a doctrinal rule and institutional commitment of the Court, curbing
the ability of legislatures and executive officials to regulate speech on the basis of its subject
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matter. The two cases concerned pro-racial equality picketing and the application of antipicketing ordinances that treated “ordinary” picketing and peaceful picketing differently – both
of which were struck down as unconstitutional - and an anti-noise ordinance that regulated the
time, place, and manner of speech (regardless of content), which the Court upheld in Grayned.
The doctrine also provides a common, legitimizing language for justices of various ideological
stripes to explain and coordinate decisions in a way that would not be possible in a world where
justices mechanically voted their preferences (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 308; Richards 2013,
34-35; Lindquist and Klein 2006, 141).
The research of Richards and Kritzer (2002) and Richards (2013) clouds the distinction
between interpretivist and positivist approaches and suggests that justices - who are at once
political and legal actors - create, maintain, are animated by, and (perhaps) constrained by
jurisprudential regimes, defined as a shared commitment to evaluating facts of cases in light of
relevant case factors and the application of appropriate forms of judicial scrutiny (Richards and
Kritzer 2002, 310). More broadly, the concept of jurisprudential regimes describes “the way in
which judges translate their political ideologies and identities into a preferred legal analysis.
This legal analysis is made up of a set of rules, concepts, doctrines, precedents, and tests that
collectively establish a standard operating procedure for the treatment of certain kinds of claims”
(Gillman 2006, 114). These analyses suggest that a shared jurisprudential commitment may
better explain Supreme Court decision-making for particular periods and in particular contexts
than models treating justice ideology or partisanship as the primary explanatory variables of
interest. Qualitative research has also suggested a similar dynamic on the Court. For example,
in a medium-N comparison of all cases when the Rehnquist Court exercised judicial review to
invalidate a federal law, Keck argued that free speech cases were sometimes an apparent

130
exception to ideological or partisan explanations of that Court’s decision-making. Stated
differently, judges behave differently than legislators insofar as the former view freedom of
speech in more expansive terms than the latter (Keck 2007).
The judicial methodology of distinguishing between content-based and content-neutral
regulations is a way for the Court to ensure that the government has not restricted the free flow
of ideas by prohibiting speech solely on the basis of its content. While some justices and
theorists may favor less absolutist, more contextual balancing tests for adjudicating free speech
cases, this method is primarily a categorical approach to adjudicating free speech claims (Smolla
1994, 3-7; Barron and Dienes 2008, 28-44). If the Court views the government action in question
as a regulation of speech on the basis of the content being communicated (i.e. political
advertisements, union speech, speech on abortion), then the government must meet the burden of
either proving that the speech is “low-value” (one of a number of historically well-defined
categories of speech deemed outside of First Amendment protection), or pass the Court’s “strict
scrutiny” test. To do so, the government must show that a regulation is necessary to achieving a
compelling government interest. Regulations that survive this strict scrutiny test are upheld as
constitutional, while those that fail are unconstitutional abridgements of the claimant’s First
Amendment rights.
Alternatively, if the Court views the government action in question as a regulation of
speech unrelated to the content of the speaker’s message, then the government faces a far less
severe burden in defending the law’s constitutionality. Once categorized as content-neutral, the
law in question is generally evaluated on the basis of whether it is a reasonable time, place, or
manner restriction, or whether it satisfies a lesser standard of scrutiny under the Court’s O’Brien
test (U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)). As one scholar has put it (somewhat humorously),

131
“Either a regulation of speech is content-based, in which case it is likely forbidden, or it is
content-neutral, in which case it is likely permitted. The government is free to prohibit your
neighbors from blaring music at high decibels at two in the morning, even though that music
may have expressive value. But it is forbidden to ban only the playing of old Loggins and
Messina records, simply because the government hates the music of Loggins and Messina”
(Horwitz 2013, 32).
This last point serves as a reminder that the doctrine is clearly malleable enough to be put
into the service of protecting liberal (or Democratic) and conservative (or Republican) interests.
The Roberts Court has struck down regulations imposing “floating buffer zones” around
individuals entering abortion clinics as impermissible, content-based regulations of speech,
which could be considered a victory for the pro-life wing of the modern Republican Party. On
the other hand, the conservative Rehnquist Court also struck down state and federal laws making
it a crime to burn the American flag as impermissible content-based regulations of expressive
conduct, a victory for unpopular dissenters (Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); U.S. v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990)). While it does not appear that this shared commitment can be
definitively traced to any clear partisan commitment that eventually became entrenched in the
judiciary (Gillman 1993, 61), the doctrine is compatible with the idea that the Court sometimes
acts in a way to protect what it perceives as uniquely institutional prerogatives from legislative
encroachment.
While the content-neutrality doctrine may have appeal for its simplicity, this masks the
fact that the doctrine does not provide any guidance on how to definitively distinguish contentbased from content-neutral regulations (Horwitz 2013, 32). In other words, even if a
jurisprudential regime establishes a new set of case factors that justices take into account when
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deciding cases, the fundamental definitional problem and subjective nature of determining
whether government regulations are wholly unrelated to the subject matter of the speech in
question in a given case makes plausible the claim that jurisprudential regimes are simply more
formalized vehicles for enacting justice policy preferences (Richards and Kritzer 2002, 310). The
second, more fundamental reason is that ideological preferences and institutional commitments
to principles are not readily observable (Fischman and Law 2009, 11-13). Judges generally
forswear the idea that politics influences decisions, and there is no way of definitively knowing
whether judicial opinions reflect a sincere commitment to jurisprudential rules or instrumentally
draw upon available precedents and rules to justify a preferred ideological outcome.
According to proponents of the attitudinal model of judicial behavior, the institutional
setting the justices operate in makes this pursuit of political preferences a foregone conclusion.
In its purest form, however, this understanding assumes away a claim in need of closer
interrogation: do jurisprudential structures, like the content-neutrality regime, exert any
meaningful constraint on the justices? While difficult to assess, previous scholarship points to a
promising approach to this question. In his re-evaluation of the maligned Lochner Era, Gillman
found that “The patterns of judicial decision making and the preoccupations of judicial opinions
display a remarkable degree of coherence and consistency, down to the kinds of issues the
justices faced with near unanimity and the kinds of issues on which they divided.” (Gillman
1993, 199). For Gillman, the issue is not that studies attributing judicial behavior to ideological
or economic explanations are incorrect (though they appear to be in the case of police powers
jurisprudence during his period of analysis), but that they are fairly incomplete. Explanations of
behavior embedded in particular historical contexts must try to account for “the autonomous
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influence of legal ideology as understood by interpretive communities” within those contexts
(Gillman 1993, 200).

The Chicken and the Egg Problem – Jurisprudence and Ideological Values
While there is evidence for the claim that law may constrain the justices in some
decisions (Pacelle, Curry, and Marshall 2011; Corley, Steigerwalt, and Ward 2013),
jurisprudential regimes can clearly be invoked instrumentally to achieve certain results – that is,
the choice of jurisprudential mode of analysis is likely endogenous to ideological values.
Consider the Court’s recent decision in McCullen v. Coakley (134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014)), a fractured
yet unanimous decision to strike down a Massachusetts law establishing so-called buffer zones
around abortion clinics as incompatible with the First Amendment. All the justices agreed that
the law failed constitutional muster, yet the content of the concurring opinions reveals
disagreement over the jurisprudential regime element. The Court’s four liberals and Chief
Justice Roberts, author of the opinion of the Court, held that the law in question was contentneutral – applying equally to all persons wishing to protest at clinics – and similar to a “time,
place, and manner” restriction on speech. Four of the Court’s conservatives (Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Alito) concurred in the result but viewed the law as a content-based (specifically, a
viewpoint-based) restriction on speech. The former characterization subjects laws to a lower,
intermediate level of constitutional scrutiny, while the latter calls for a more searching standard
(strict scrutiny). What determined the initial characterization of the speech suppression at issue?
Again, the question is not merely academic, as the choice is a cause and effect of political
battles. The Court’s division along a general (though not perfect) liberal-conservative divide on
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the jurisprudential standard suggests that ideological values play a role in the selection of modes
of jurisprudential analysis. Roberts’ characterization of the Massachusetts law as content-neutral
may have been a concession to the Court’s four liberals (Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan) in order to achieve unanimity, but the choice indisputably signals that states may regulate
speech in and around clinics in a way that passes First Amendment scrutiny. The decision to
classify the law as content-based viewpoint discrimination would send a different signal – that
state laws attempting to regulate speech (and safety) at clinics face a tough hurdle and are likely
to be struck down as unconstitutional.
That scholars have historically been divided on the extent to which legal principles and
political preferences affect decisions is well-trod territory. In a symposium critiquing The
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, Segal and Spaeth responded to Herbert
Kritzer’s comments in part by noting that, “If the Court reaches a leading conservative decision
on one issue (e.g. probable cause) and then follows that up with conservative decisions on other
issues (e.g., lessening the protection granted to house searches), that could just as easily be due to
attitudinal considerations as to legal considerations” (2003, 19-21, 33). Richards’ own response
to this critique is that it borders on tautology, at least to the extent that claiming ideological
preferences are the cause of ideological judging is circular (2013, 39-40). Sara Benesh offered a
similar observation in her biography of judicial decision-making pioneer Harold Spaeth, noting
that, “Something caused the Court to vote Z in case X. Later, case Y is decided, and we predict
from case X that the justices will again make decision Z. But, what caused the justices to choose
decision Z in case X?” (Benesh 2003, 123-124). The introduction of Segal-Cover scores,
described in chapters two and three, may not have fully resolved this problem, as the editorials
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on which the ideological scores are based are at least partially a result of a nominee’s previous
political positions or case decisions in lower courts.

Modeling Judicial Decision-making and the Constitution of Free Speech
Figure 4.2 – Multi-factor Mapping of Supreme Court Decision-making

Ideological Preferences
Case Factors

Jurisprudential Structure

Decision on Merits

Philosophical Approaches
Conceptions of the Judicial Role

Figure 4.2 offers a framework of Supreme Court decision-making that takes account of
three commonly referenced, extra-ideological components posited as causal explanations in free
speech judicial decision-making studies, in addition to the ideological preferences of the justices.
While impossible to recreate the total set of impulses animating judges in any given controversy
or to assign relative weights, the basic factors included in this framework represent a synthesis of
and an improvement over existing scholarship that may emphasize one factor (or only part of the
Court’s record) at the cost of others. The framework is specific to studying freedom of speech
judicial decision-making, though the general framework may be imported to other areas of law.
It avoids the tendency to reduce explanations to a single causal factor, recognizing instead that
the development of law is a complex interaction among ideological preferences, jurisprudential
structures, conceptions of the judicial role, and philosophical interpretations.
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This framework admittedly trades parsimonious explanation for deeper analysis of the
interaction of these specified components. This thicker model of judicial decision-making is
designed to bring scholars a step closer to the reality and complexity of Supreme Court decisionmaking. Because, as Robert Gordon has found, “legal forms and practices don't shift with every
realignment of the balance of political force,” it follows that “they are independent variables in
social experience and therefore they require study elaborating their peculiar internal structures
with the aim of finding out how those structures feed back upon social life.” (Gordon 1984, 101).
In the following sections, I provide an overview of recent work that hints at this complex
relationship along with the research design for assessing these factors across the Roberts Era
constitution of free speech.

Scratching the Surface: Roberts Era Speech Controversies
Some recent accounts of judicial decision-making in constitutional free expression
decisions point toward this potentially complex relationship among a variety of causal factors.
Justice Kennedy, one of the Court’s conservatives, frequently votes for pro-speech claims in a
way that belies that ideological label (Knowles 2015, 170). Chief Justice Roberts has also
demonstrated a special concern for freedom of speech, assigning free speech cases to himself at a
higher rate than the other justices (Segal and Epstein 2011; Collins 2013, 465; Baker 2015) and
sometimes breaking with the Court’s other conservatives in free expression cases. Legal
scholars have also touched upon the importance of considering different conceptions of the
judicial role and varying ideological preferences within the current Court’s liberal and
conservative blocs in recent commentaries of the Court’s free expression record. Tribe and
Matz’s account of this portion of the Court’s agenda noted that Justice Alito is “a different kind
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of conservative,” pointing to a series of dissents in Stevens, Phelps, and Alvarez, as well as a
cautious concurrence in Entertainment Merchants Association (2014, 141-142).
Similarly, Mark Tushnet’s assessment of Justice Breyer’s history on free speech
controversies highlights his pragmatic, balancing approach that eschews what Breyer has called
“a jurisprudence of labels” (Tushnet 2015, 215-238). Other projects, like Mark Richards’ booklength treatment of the Court’s content-neutrality regime, have focused on the Court’s voting
alignment in Alvarez in an attempt to tease out divergent understandings of the regime among the
justices (2013, 129-130; see also Collins 2013, 437-439). These accounts are suggestive of the
nuanced interplay among non-monolithic ideological preferences, longstanding jurisprudential
structures, philosophical theories of free expression, and differing conceptions of the judicial role
on the current Court.
Suggestive – but rarely systematic. A systematic explanation entails a comprehensive
examination of votes and opinions across justices and issue areas. Even David Gans’s recent
article on the Roberts Court speech record after ten years focuses disproportionately on the votes
of the Chief Justice, emphasizing the Court’s campaign finance and union decisions (Gans
2015). Others, like Ronald Collins, have attempted to shoehorn the Roberts Era constitution of
free speech into new jurisprudential paradigms (“the new absolutism”) at earlier points in the era
at the expense of other streams of jurisprudence or other theoretically relevant, judicial
preferences (Collins 2013, 413).
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Research Design
To assess the extent to which contemporary free expression is explained by factors
beyond one-dimensional, ideological preferences – including conceptions of the judicial role and
jurisprudential structures – I examine all judicial opinions from 2005 to 2015 written in the 45
free expression merits decisions of the Roberts Era, and divide the Roberts Court Era into three
distinct periods based on voting patterns and commentary focused on the Court’s free speech
project. This periodization reflects the identification of what George and Bennett describe as
“turning points in the causal chain,” which allows researchers to “sort out which independent
variables explain each step in the causal chain” (George and Bennett 2005, 92).
This analysis focuses primarily on majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions, with the
goal of determining whether particular patterns of reasoning structure a particular jurist’s
decisions. For each justice, conceptions of the judicial role apparent in written opinions will be
considered in light of the purported ideological attitudes of the jurist and the decision directions
(liberal or conservative) of votes within and across cases. While this approach treats judicial
opinions as the primary units of analysis, it differs from that of Gillman, whose seminal account
decided “to focus on the jurisprudence and not the jurists.” (Gillman 1993, 15-16). It does share
with Gillman’s account a chronological structure and approach in an effort to detect when
changes appear to have occurred in the Court’s free expression merits agenda and to make the
analysis digestible for the reader (see generally George and Bennett 2005, 92-94).
To provide this context and to collect data, I engage in the interpretive approach of
closely reading judicial opinions in order to determine the preferred rationales of justices
deciding contemporary free expression decisions. This approach explicitly recognizes the value
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of judicial doctrines as both empowering and constraining justices who have preferred
ideological goals: what legal policy should be and who should benefit from it. As Elizabeth
Bussiere has argued, “To some degree, judges who interpret the law through the filter of legal
doctrines are acted upon by such doctrines because the existing categories of analysis shape
judges very perception of, and reasoning in, the cases before them. (That, according to the new
institutionalism, is what gives [justices] their uniquely institutional outlooks.)”(1999, 157-158).
Fundamentally, the method used in this chapter is best described as a medium-N case
study employed to explain an important outcome of interest – the Roberts Court’s constitution of
free speech. By tracing the process through which the Roberts Era freedom of expression project
has developed, this chapter is consistent with a definition offered by Ludvig Norman:
“[Interpretive] process tracing…is a family of tools used to study how causal processes
unfolding over time produce particular outcomes…it is also characterized by efforts to study
intersubjective social institutions as part of causal processes.” (Norman 2015, 4-5). In the
context of judicial decision-making studies, Martin Shapiro describes the approach as a “set of
related decisions, and then develops in the greatest possible detail all the institutional and
individual attitudes and behavior that led up to and out of the decision. Such depth studies are
designed to validate or suggest the broader hypotheses which it is the goal of the social sciences
to formulate.” (Shapiro 1963, 306). This project is medium-N in the sense that it balances indepth, single case analysis with attention to patterns across a manageable population of cases (on
medium-N case studies see Barnes 2005; Keck 2007; and Kapiszewski 2011).
Generalization beyond the specific outcome of interest is always a concern in descriptive,
historical studies, yet there are clear implications beyond the period of analysis in this project.
Borrowing again from George and Bennett, if a number of contemporary free expression cases

140
exhibit voting patterns and opinion language inconsistent with univariate, ideological
explanations, this would not be grounds for revising theories of judicial decision-making across
all issue areas and time periods. However, it does constitute a general argument about how
judges are apparently affected by considerations beyond ideological values, which could then be
developed in additional detail in other medium-N studies of particular constitutional issues in
particular historical and political contexts (George and Bennett 2005, 93).
For each of three periods I have identified based on general periods of the Roberts Era, I
focus on the following themes:
(1) Identify language suggesting guiding philosophical rationale in majority opinions,
concurrences, dissents (equality v. liberty; marketplace/democracy/self-fulfillment). Doing so
allows us to determine the philosophical underpinnings of contemporary free expression
jurisprudence articulated by the Court. Scholars interested in political theory and important
contemporary debates (i.e. deliberative democracy, Rawlsian equality, “Nozickian” liberty) may
find the results here informative for their own projects.
(2) Identify key jurisprudential ideas (categorical approach, balancing, scrutiny tiers, and the
content-neutrality regime). Previous work suggests jurisprudential ideas and regimes may
become entrenched for periods of time and structure or affect the decisionmaking of institutional
actors with varying ideological preferences. Identifying the preferred jurisprudential processes
engaged in by the justices – and whether they do so consistently – allows us to understand
whether entrenched norms transcend or enable the exercise ideological preferences (or both).
(3) Identify jurists’ conceptions of the judicial role (deference to legislative branch; living v.
original interpretation; pragmatism). Judges are not monolithic in terms of their ideological
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preferences, nor do they all subscribe to the same interpretive philosophies. Nor, for that matter,
should opinions be dismissed outright as being entirely window dressing, as the rationale (or,
derisively, rationalization) for a decision may be part of a broader pattern across cases within a
particular issue area. As Pritchett noted long ago, “Every justice in deciding a case must give
some thought to what is appropriate for him as a judge to do…While no justice can be oblivious
to [jurisprudential] pressures, they are not self-enforcing, and he is free to make his own
interpretations of their requirements in guiding his own judicial conduct.” (Pritchett 1953, 324).
More recently, Keck has argued that “To explain the jurisprudence of O’Connor and
Kennedy, and hence that of the Rehnquist Court itself, we need to look at their visions of the
judicial role as well as their political ideologies…Scholarly efforts to explain such decisions
without reference to law tend to remain too vaguely specified to account for the actual pattern of
judicial decisions.”(Keck 2004, 274-275). Identifying different conceptions of the judicial role –
and whether justices are consistent in applying those conceptions – allows us to understand
whether interpretive philosophies prevail over or work in tandem with ideological preferences,
and whether previous findings are limited to specific Court Eras.
(4) Assess the dimensions of the ideological preferences of the justices across cases.
Notwithstanding critiques of attitudinal studies that indict scholars for engaging in “behavioral
equivalence,” or characterizing an outcome as ideologically motivated when the application of
legal principles would lead to the same result, the idea that jurisprudence is endogenous to
attitudes is a claim that must be taken seriously (Baum 1994, 4). The clue that jurisprudential
considerations exert an influence separate from ideological values was touched upon in chapter
three, with the finding that a substantial number of cases exhibited voting disorder or were
unanimously decided.
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Assessing the presence and extent to which extra-ideological factors come into play in
decisions will be conducted in light of the expected ideological ordering of the justices votes as
determined by the relevant term’s Martin-Quinn scoring of the justices’ preferences. While the
ordering predicted by these scores serves as a general reference point, it is important to
emphasize that these measures do not necessarily distinguish between different types of
liberalism or conservatism except in degrees of difference along a single dimension. Again,
attitudinal measures of ideological preferences assume a degree of ideological homogeneity that
cannot distinguish between the conservatism of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas except
to the extent that their voting patterns are more or less conservative – which in turn rests upon
characterizations of decisions as either liberal or conservative (Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal
2012, 712, 714-717).
This is not to impose a preferred explanation – ideological preferences – on the outcome
of interest. It is simply a recognition that ideological preferences are one causal factor among
others to be interrogated, and that the ideological explanation remains dominant in political
scientists’ study of judicial decision-making. In fact, due to the problem of observational
equivalence noted by Baum, the extent to which the Roberts Court’s free expression decisions
are explained by additional considerations in this study could be viewed by some readers as an
understatement of the degree to which these factors matter.
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Methodological Assumptions and Epistemological Objections
Before proceeding with the descriptive explanation of the Roberts Court record on
speech, I wish to address a series of additional, interrelated concerns that scholars operating in
the positivist and/or quantitative tradition may find problematic.
The first issue concerns the lack of parsimony evident in the framework specified in
Figure 4.2. While still a simplified version of reality, it is rife with a number of interpretive
variables that are not easily reduced to numerical representation. The original critiques advanced
by behavioral scholars within the legal realist tradition of early and mid-20th century studies of
judicial decision-making focused on (1) the tendency of legal scholars to emphasize
jurisprudential rules as predictors of judicial behavior and (2) the lack of predictive leverage
offered by interpretive, richly descriptive explanations of judicial behavior. While it is true that
jurisprudential norms, philosophies, and judges’ own descriptions of interpretive philosophies
can function as camouflage for the exercise of ideological preferences, it does not follow that
judges always invoke such considerations instrumentally – or, for that matter, that they can.
Even scholars operating within the behavioral and rational choice traditions of judicial
decision-making have at least implicitly channeled Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist 78 in noting
that the vitality of the judicial branch is at least partially dependent upon maintaining legitimacy
in the eyes of the public and other government actors (Epstein and Knight 1997, 117). In other
words, even if the justices are nothing more than legislators in black robes, successful
policymaking is at least partially dependent upon the justices’ willingness to act as judges –
whether sincerely or strategically - rather than legislators. The justices’ own explanations for
behavior – offered in opinions – can prove valuable when studied alongside expected voting
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patterns specified by attitudinal scholars. If a conservative justice’s preferred rationale is always
accompanied by a conservative vote, then the so-called “window-dressing” assumption might be
warranted. However, if a justice’s preferred rationale – or conception of the judicial role – is
found to be present in both conservative and liberal votes, then opinions can be useful data points
in explanations of judicial behavior. These artifacts may also be useful in assessing whether a
justice agrees with such jurisprudential structures as the content-neutrality regime. Ultimately,
the extent to which opinions matter is an unknown unless scholars take seriously their potential
as additional data in addition to votes (Friedman 2006, 265-267).
It is also evident that the characterizations that follow do not carry the same neatness as
numerical expressions; indicators scored to reflect underlying concepts of interest. The nature of
the variables, in conjunction with an understanding of these broad legal factors as somewhat
amorphous, is a barrier to the sort of quantitative correlations often associated with the
ideological effects of judicial decisionmaking (though see Spaeth and Segal 1999, Hansford and
Spriggs 2008, and Lindquist and Klein 2006 for attempts to characterize relationships among
precedents, circuit conflicts, and textual meaning in a similar fashion). In other words, this
concern is a variant of the charge that scholars not engaged in constructing “rectangular data
sets” (RSDs) grounded in experimental logic and characterized by scoring variables by a readily
observable indicator are prevented from making sound causal inferences (Goertz and Mahoney
2012, 43-45).
One potentially useful way to frame the descriptive explanation that follows can be found
in the distinctions between qualitative and quantitative social research traditions offered by Gary
Goertz and James Mahoney (2012). The “effects-of-causes” tradition, generally concerned with
an effect across a population of cases (observations), is less useful to researchers interested in
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developing “explanations that simultaneously apply to a group of cases and to each individual
case within that group.” (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 46). Reducing complex relationships to
numerical placeholders necessarily entails a loss of context and detail that works at crosspurposes with research questions concerned with – and answered by – contextualized,
descriptive explanations. Here, the object of explanation is a broad outcome of interest – the
Roberts Court’s free expression project. This outcome is the product of an extended process
featuring a number of discrete controversies (cases), and within these cases a number of socalled “causal process observations” (CPOs) can be examined. Prior research has identified free
speech philosophies, differing conceptions of the judicial role, interpretations of the requirements
of jurisprudential structures, and ideological preferences as the key factors affecting outcomes in
individual cases. In order to confirm these explanations as causes – as opposed to the thin
explanation of judicial behavior based primarily on ideological preferences - these within-case
observations should result in outcomes not predicted by the null hypothesis.
In this case, a null finding may be framed as an explanation largely consistent with the
attitudinal model’s predicted alignment of the justices. Endemic to all studies of judicial
decision-making that takes opinions seriously is the realist argument that jurisprudential
language is fungible; that is, it could be employed instrumentally to achieve a preferred
ideological result. In the language of qualitative scholars, invocations of philosophies,
jurisprudential interpretations, and articulations of the proper judicial role are necessary
conditions that are almost always present in the course of judicial decision-making. They
represent easy “hoop tests” that do little work in supporting hypotheses (Goertz and Mahoney
2012, 94). According to Collier (2011), a hypothesis passes a hoop test when evidence is
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necessary for affirming causal inference: “Passing affirms the relevance of [a] hypothesis, but
does not confirm it.” (825).
To contextualize this in the present study, what evidence would disprove the attitudinal
hypothesis? Unexpected voting alignments represent the best observable implication of the
ideology-plus hypothesis, a sufficient condition that allows us to reject the null in cases where
disordered voting occurs (see generally Edelman, Klein, and Lindquist 2008; Keck 2007 for a
variant of this approach). As chapter three argued, vote ordering is a key observable implication
of explanations of Supreme Court behavior such that the presence of disordered voting – failing
the hoop test – somewhat strengthens alternative hypotheses. To move beyond diagnosing by
exclusion, however, there must be positive evidence in favor of some sort of link between
decisions and such factors as jurisprudential structures, philosophical justifications, and
conceptions of the judicial role. This is a difficult task, as Carter and Burke (2005) make clear in
pointing out that legal reasoning is an exercise in law and politics: “The legal process, for all its
political characteristics, is still a distinctive kind of politics…Law, like any language practice,
limits the horizons of what becomes thinkable within that framework.” (22). In other words, the
problem for scholars assessing the role of legal factors in decision-making is developing a case
that principles beyond conventional ideological preferences may be sufficient for producing a
particular outcome.
The analytical move that allows this project to advance beyond description (King,
Keohane, and Verba 1995, 39-41) is comparing these factors as expressed by the justices in the
course of writing opinions to their votes, as well as the votes of the conservative and liberal
coalitions on the Court. If Justice Breyer’s vote in a particular case is disordered, then, this is a
strike against the attitudinal hypothesis. If, however, that vote is accompanied by an opinion that
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makes explicit a certain conception of the judicial role, a unique interpretation of the existing
jurisprudential regime, or relies on a particular philosophy of the First Amendment, we have
some initial evidence in favor of the ideology-plus hypothesis. This hypothesis may be
provisionally accepted if we then find that Breyer consistently articulates these reasons and they
accompany behavior that cannot easily be explained by the attitudinal hypothesis. This adds
some analytical bite to the study of judicial decision-making in a way that moves beyond a
recognition that doctrinal considerations are constitutive elements of judicial decision-making –
it suggests there is a causal element at play as well (NeJaime 2013, 10-11).
A descriptive explanation of the Roberts Court’s constitution of the republic’s free speech
guarantee represents the “internal” perspective on judicial behavior that attempts to understand
judicial decision-making as described by Tamanaha: A “practice based on a shared set of
organized rules and standards” that are “nonetheless heterogeneous... The practice of judging
contains norms oriented toward the application of rules but also norms oriented toward doing
justice, demands which sometimes clash. Beyond the minimum necessary to constitute a practice
as such, there is no reason to postulate or assume that the entire body of norms contained within
that practice is internally consistent.” (Tamanaha 1996, 179). While the gold standard for the
internal approach would be an in-depth, qualitative analysis of all stages of the process –
including observation of behavior behind closed doors – the secrecy of the Court prevents the
sort of richly detailed, interpretive contributions to social science akin to the work of Richard
Fenno (1978) on members of Congress in their home districts or even H.W. Perry’s seminal
account of agenda-setting (1991). Opinions remain the primary and most accessible window to
the practice of judging and provide a different kind of knowledge than externally imposed codes
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on particular behavioral outputs (see Curry 2017 for an overview of this epistemological conflict
in the study of U.S. political institutions).
I also wish to make clear what this descriptive explanation is not. Importantly, this is not
simply an exercise in what Glendon Schubert characterized as “a comparison of the extent to
which empirical policy norms, as stated in judicial opinions, deviate from the ethical content of
ideal norms excogitated from the earlier writings of eminent constitution-makers, judges, and
political philosophers, or depart from the subjective value preferences of the commentators.”
(Schubert 1963, 1). Or, as stated more recently by Brian Pinaire, the purpose is not “to devise a
system of meta-principles – airtight in the abstract – only to apply them to the considerations and
conclusions of the Supreme Court.” (Pinaire 2008, xiii). Instead, it is an effort to synthesize
strands of research presenting evidence that multiple factors affect decisions all while accounting
for the purported ideological preferences of the justices and to assess whether such factors cause
deviations from expected voting alignments. In the words of Rogers Smith, it is an attempt “to
integrate the study of ideas in law with descriptive studies of the historical evolution of
institutions and behavior.” (Smith 1988, 90).
If persuasive, the detailed account that follows provides evidence pointing toward the
sufficiency of legal factors for producing case outcomes. The problem of behavioral
equivalence, absent a method for dissecting the judicial mind, will always prove a barrier for
scholars. However, when viewed alongside alternative accounts and research methods, this
account takes seriously the idea that legal factors may play a role in the calculus of the justices
beyond cloaks for policy preferences.
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Not a Free Speech Court: The Early Period (2005-2008) Terms
The Politics of Free Speech: Campaign Finance, Election Regulations, and Unions
The Court’s free expression agenda began in earnest with Rumsfeld v. FAIR, the 2006
decision discussed at the outset holding that the Solomon Amendment’s military recruiter access
condition to receive federal funding did not create an unconstitutional condition in violation of
the First Amendment’s speech clause. On January 23, 2006, however, the Court unanimously
overturned a decision by the D.C. District Court against a pro-life interest group challenging a
key provision of the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law, formally known as the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).
In FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (546 U.S. 410 (2006)); hereafter referenced as WRTL
I), a unanimous Court held that an as-applied challenge to § 203 of BCRA brought by a nonprofit, issue advocacy group was not foreclosed by the Court’s McConnell decision just three
years earlier. Returning to the D.C. District Court, a divided panel granted summary judgment,
finding Wisconsin Right to Life’s intended radio advertisements (which had aired prior to but not
during the pre-election blackout period marked by § 203) urging listeners to "Contact Senators
Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the filibuster [of President George W. Bush’s federal
judicial appointees]” were constitutionally protected “issue advocacy” statements rather than the
“express advocacy” of federal election candidates barred within the pre-election timeframe
prohibited under § 203 (466 F. Supp. 2d, at 204). The Court granted certiorari in the case and
shortly thereafter heard arguments in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (551 U.S. 449 (2007));
heretofore referenced as WRTL II).
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Writing for himself and Justice Alito – and joined in part by the Court’s conservative
bloc, Chief Justice Roberts affirmed the ruling of the district court, articulating a new test for
determining whether speech fell within § 203 while suggesting general skepticism toward
BCRA’s goals: “A court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy
only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or
against a specific candidate…” (551 U.S. 449, 469-470)), followed by the admonition, “Enough
is enough. Issue ads like WRTL's are by no means equivalent to contributions, and the quid-proquo corruption interest cannot justify regulating them. To equate WRTL's ads with contributions
is to ignore their value as political speech.” (551 U.S. 449, 478-479)). If WRTL I united the
Court in an effort to clarify the reach of BCRA’s prohibitions, WRTL II divided the Court along
what would become the San Andreas fault of this era’s free expression merits agenda.
In the midst of the ongoing litigation in the WRTL cases, the early Roberts Era hinted at
suspicion of state-level efforts to regulate elections as well. In Randall v. Sorrell (548 U.S. 230
(2006)), the Court struck down Vermont’s Act 64 (Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, § 2801 et seq. (2002))
limitations on expenditures as lacking a compelling state interest, finding the argument that
“such limits help to protect candidates from spending too much time raising money rather than
devoting that time to campaigning among ordinary voters” as foreclosed by the Court’s decision
in Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976); 548 U.S. 230, 243), and finding the Act’s contribution
limits to “magnify the advantages of incumbency to the point where they put challengers to a
significant disadvantage…they are too low and too strict to survive First Amendment scrutiny.”
(548 U.S. 230, 248).
The majority opinion in Randall was written by Breyer, who throughout emphasized the
importance of following the precedents established by Buckley and enforcing electoral
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regulations in a way that account for First Amendment concerns, and - among other concerns noted that the Court lacked a “scalpel” to precisely determine the balance). Following the
Martin-Quinn ordering of justices for the 2005 term, Breyer’s willingness to strike down the
Vermont Act’s expenditure and contribution limitations was not unsurprising from an ideological
perspective. Yet the emphasis on balancing and aversion to establishing a bright line test hints at
a particular conception of the judicial role based on what I describe throughout as pragmatism
that consistently – but not unfailingly – appears during the Roberts Era. Breyer’s opinion was
joined in full by Roberts and Alito, which at this stage of the Court’s free speech agenda did not
foreshadow the sharper hostility toward campaign finance regulations that would emerge by the
end of the second era of the Roberts Court’s speech agenda.
The Court’s decision two terms later in Davis continued the scaling back of BCRA, as the
justices were presented with a challenge to § 319(a), the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,”
by Jack Davis, a wealthy, recurring Democratic (and more recently, Republican) candidate in
Western New York. Davis argued that the amendment’s contribution formula – raising the
ceiling on contribution limits for publicly financed candidates running against those privately
financed (and therefore not subject to the same spending restrictions) – was a content-based
regulation that burdened his own speech. Justice Alito and the Court’s conservative bloc agreed,
characterizing the formula as “an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly
exercises” the right to unlimited self-financing in federal congressional campaigns (554 U.S.
724, 739) and rejecting the government’s asserted interest in ensuring “level electoral
opportunities” as inconsistent with the philosophical rationale of “unfettered political speech”
(554 U.S. 724, 739, 742).
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The campaign finance cases – even at this early stage of the Roberts Era – appear to be
ideologically driven. The Court’s conservatives are highly suspicious of legislative bodies in this
area, and have often invoked strongly libertarian language in their opinions. Roberts appealed to
the political speech justification in WRTL II (citing, among other decisions, New York Times v.
Sullivan (376 U.S. 254 (1964)), at 551 U.S. 449, 467, 469), while Alito echoed J.S. Mill (1859,
84-88) and Alexander Meiklejohn (1948) in announcing faith in citizens’ ability to rationally
evaluate candidates’ ideas (despite aggregations of wealth) and carving out robust protections for
political speech related to self-government. Considering the possible broad interpretations these
philosophical principles can take and have taken – Meiklejohn’s argument from democracy has
consistently been appealed to in majority and dissenting opinions - the early Roberts Court
merits agenda can be described as undeniably anti-speech: These ideological and partisan-tinted
decisions are the only decisions that can be characterized as “pro-speech” during the early
Roberts Era.
Two other election-related speech cases have united the Court across ideological lines,
though the decisions in Washington State Grange v. Washington Republican Party et al. (552
U.S. 442 (2008))) and New York v. Lopez-Torres (552 U.S. 196 (2009)) were against the First
Amendment claimants. In Washington State Republican Party et al., Thomas wrote for the
Court in dismissing a freedom of speech and association facial challenge brought by the
Republican, Democratic, and Libertarian parties of Washington state to a ballot initiative (I-872)
allowing candidates to self-identify their party affiliation on primary election ballots (the law
also structured general election ballots so that the top two vote-getters in primaries would appear
on the ballot). Here, Thomas left open the possibility for an as-applied challenge but expressly
eschewed the “strong medicine” of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Roberts, again joined

153
by Alito, concurred in rejecting the facial challenge and mused that, given a well-designed ballot,
“Voters would not regard the listed candidates as "party" candidates, any more than someone
saying ‘I like Campbell's soup’ would be understood to be associated with Campbell's.” (552
U.S. 442, 461). Scalia, joined by Kennedy in dissent, found Roberts’ concurrence especially
problematic, noting that “The electorate's perception of a political party's beliefs is colored by its
perception of those who support the party; and a party's defining act is the selection of a
candidate and advocacy of that candidate's election by conferring upon him the party's
endorsement.” (552 U.S. 442, 462).
Though Lopez-Torres again featured as dispute between establishment political parties
and an underdog – this time, a New York Supreme Court candidate challenging the cryptic,
Tammany-esque selection of candidates via a complex delegate process – the Court unanimously
rejected Judge Margarita Lopez-Torres’ free speech claim. Kennedy, who had joined Scalia in
voting for the Washington State Grange, concurred separately with Breyer and opined that “Rule
of law is secured only by the principled exercise of political will. If New York statutes for
nominating and electing judges do not produce both the perception and the reality of a system
committed to the highest ideals of the law, they ought to be changed and to be changed now.”
(552 U.S. 196, 213). Ultimately, the unexpected voting alignment in Washington State Grange
and the unanimity in Lopez-Torres cast doubt on any unqualified claims about the Court’s
hostility to election regulations, and suggest an unwillingness to expand the First Amendment
beyond traditional jurisprudential structures.
Two additional, unanimous decisions by the Court during the early period were – in
hindsight - early signals of another Roberts Era political project. In 2007, the Washington
Education Association union raised a free speech challenge to § 760 of the Washington Fair
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Campaign Practices Act (Wash. Rev. Code § 42.17.760), which held that unions could not spend
agency shop fees contributed by non-members for election or political purposes unless the nonmember affirmatively opted in to such an arrangement. Writing for a unanimous Court in
Davenport v. Washington Education Association (551 U.S. 177 (2007)), Scalia viewed the
union’s claim as misguided “for the simple reason that unions have no constitutional entitlement
to the fees of nonmember-employees.” (551 U.S. 177, 185). Breyer, concurring and joined by
Roberts and Alito, disagreed only to the extent that the Court considered issues not properly
raised by Washington in its briefs to the Court (551 U.S. 177, 192). Two terms later in Ysursa v.
Pocatello Education Association (555 U.S. 353 (2009)), a divided Court upheld Idaho’s Right to
Work Act (Idaho Code § 44-2001) against a First Amendment challenge by another teachers’
union, which argued that the Act’s prohibition on union payroll deductions for political activities
burdened the union’s constitutional rights.
In an opinion by the Chief Justice, the Court again emphasized that “Idaho does not
suppress political speech but simply declines to promote it through public employer checkoffs
for political activities. The concern that political payroll deductions might be seen as involving
public employers in politics arises only because Idaho permits public employer payroll
deductions in the first place.” (555 U.S. 353, 361). Ginsburg, in her second concurring opinion
of the early Roberts Era, concurred in the judgment only on the narrow grounds that the
municipal ban on payroll deductions was valid because municipalities are entities of the state and
therefore subject to the restriction. For Ginsburg, the controversy was outside of relevant First
Amendment doctrines and marked the beginning of a comparatively disinterested or deferential
take on the First Amendment. Breyer again disagreed with the Court’s First Amendment
analysis, suggesting the case should be remanded to the district court and subject to a form of
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intermediate – rather than rational basis – scrutiny: “I would ask the question that this Court has
asked in other speech-related contexts, namely, whether the statute imposes a burden upon
speech that is disproportionate in light of the other interests the government seeks to achieve.”
(555 U.S. 353, 367). Breyer also doubted whether the Court’s negative liberty interpretation of
the First Amendment could (or should) be relied upon in evaluating all controversies, arguing
instead that “The distinction is neither easy to draw nor likely to prove determinative.” (555 U.S.
353, 366).
Earlier in the 2008 term, the Court heard another union fundraising-related challenge, this
time brought by non-members who opposed fundraising fees assessed by the local shop being
used for national union collective bargaining and litigation efforts – efforts that did not always
directly benefit their local Maine shop. In Locke v. Karass (555 U.S. 207 (2009)), Breyer wrote
for a unanimous Court in dismissing the union non-members’ claim, stating “We can find no
significant difference between litigation activities and other national activities the cost of which
this Court has found chargeable.” (555 U.S. 207, 218). Alito, concurring with the Chief Justice
and Scalia, noted that the result in the case could have been different had non-members
questioned whether the relationship between chargeable expenses for national litigation was in
fact a reciprocal benefit for the local Service Employee’s International Union chapter (suggesting
greater skepticism toward chargeable expenses than the rest of the majority).
Washington Education Association, Pocatello, and Karass marked the beginning of a
series of cases where the Court first rejected free speech claims brought by unions, then became
increasingly sympathetic to claims brought by union non-members. In each instance, the Court
was initially marked by unanimity but became progressively more fractured in the cases’
progeny. Similar to the the campaign finance decisions, the Court’s union decisions began to
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take on a more political tone during the early era. Apart from Justice Breyer’s call for a case-bycase balancing approach in these cases, the Court generally operated within existing doctrinal
structures. But these cases represent approximately half of the early Roberts Era free speech
merits agenda. In suits brought by a government employee, prisoner, high school student, private
school, an unpopular religious group, and an individual found guilty of trade in child
pornography, the Court was consistently unwilling to rule in favor of speech claimants.

Bork’s Renaissance
The early Roberts Era hints that ideological bloc explanations may overstate consensus
within the liberal and conservative blocs came in the form of the student speech case Morse v.
Frederick. But before assessing the rationales and coalitions manifest in the student, government
employee, prisoner, and other disfavored speaker cases, the important context of the extent of the
imaginary sphere of protection requires elaboration beyond the content-neutrality regime.
Following an extended period of concern for protecting speech related to the political process
and scholarly treatises making the case for the highest level of protection for political speech
(Meiklejohn 1948), conservative jurist Robert Bork argued that, “Constitutional protection
should be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political. There is no basis for judicial
intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it scientific, literary or that variety of
expression we call obscene or pornographic…I am, of course aware that this theory departs
drastically from existing Court-made law, from the views of most academic specialists in the
field and that it may strike a chill into the hearts of some civil libertarians.” (Bork 1971-1972,
20).
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On October 23, 1987, Ronald Reagan’s nominee to fill the Supreme Court seat vacated
by moderate Lewis Powell was rejected by the U.S. Senate in a sharply divided 58-42 vote.
While the confirmation hearings were notable for then-U.S. Senator Joseph Biden’s critiques of
Bork’s “neutral principles” and purported judicial restraint, the implications of Bork’s published
formulation of First Amendment theory are no less important to U.S. constitutional democracy.
Bork’s First Amendment was limited in its scope of application to pure political speech, but with
speech falling within that scope subject to absolute protection. The formulation takes the ideas
of Alexander Meiklejohn (1948) to their logical extreme, and fashioned a judicial First
Amendment philosophy that like the shot of a professional sniper was limited in target but
extremely effective. For Bork, “Freedom for political speech could and should be inferred even
if there were no first amendment,” which is “the only form of speech that a principled judge can
prefer to other claimed freedoms. All other forms of speech raise only issues of human
gratification and their protection against legislative regulation involves the judge in making
decisions of the sort made in Griswold v. Connecticut.” (1971-1972, 21, 26).
For others, Bork’s incantation of the Meiklejohnian guide to First Amendment
adjudication portended a world with far less color and sound: “Robert Bork’s America is a land
in which…writers and artists could be censored at the whim of government.” (Reston 1987).
Bork’s nomination was quashed but his ideas live on. Fast forward 20 years to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Frederick, the somewhat amusing controversy arising from a Juneau, Alaska
high school student’s display of a banner during the running of the Olympic Torch (which passed
by the high school) which read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.” High school principal Deborah Morse
saw the banner and suspended student Joseph Frederick for – arguably – promoting a pro-drug
use message during a school event. Frederick was not on school property when he displayed the
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banner, but he was attending the school sanctioned event (congratulating relay runners as the
Torch passed) directly across from the high school. In the tradition of the Tinker line of cases,
Frederick brought suit against Morse under 42 U.S.C.S. 1983, which allows for any person
deprived of constitutional rights to file a civil action against an individual acting “under the
color” of any law, custom, or regulation. 24
The Court split along the expected ideological fracture in Frederick, though Justices
Alito, Breyer, and Thomas all offered different roadmaps to reaching their respective
conclusions, and Justice Stevens (joined by Souter and Ginsburg) provided a take on the First
Amendment opposed to Justice Alito’s emerging disdain for peripheral First Amendment claims
as well as the developing, selectively applied liberty vision of speech most visible in the Court’s
campaign finance agenda. Concurring in Frederick, Alito (joined by Kennedy) emphasized that
the decision “goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a
reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and it provides no support for
any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or
social issue.” (551 U.S. 393, 422). Alito’s emphasis on forum analysis – noting that the special
context of schools relaxes First Amendment standards –disavowed any deviation from existing
precedent that would erode speech protections for students: “Public schools may ban speech
advocating illegal drug use. But I regard such regulation as standing at the far reaches of what
the First Amendment permits.” (551 U.S. 393, 425).

24“Every

person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or
the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.”
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Breyer, the most ideologically moderate liberal by Martin-Quinn estimates during the
2005 term, concurred in the result except to the extent that the majority decision framed and
decided the case as a First Amendment controversy. Seeking to resolve the controversy on
narrow grounds, Breyer argued that, “…the question focuses upon specific content narrowly
defined: May a school board punish students for speech that advocates drug use and, if so,
when?” (551 U.S. 393, 425). In ruling that Morse’s actions constituted qualified immunity from
the monetary claims sought by Frederick, Breyer noted that “Teachers are neither lawyers nor
police officers.” Resolving the case under the qualified immunity doctrine would “avoid the risk
of interpretations that are too broad or too narrow,” and would instead make it “easy to offer
practically valuable guidance.” (551 U.S. 393, 427-428). Breyer’s concurrence, though
consistent with the vote order predicted by attitudinal models, again revealed a concern for
pragmatism that would become a mainstay of his reasoning in free expression controversies in
the Roberts Era. Likewise, the emphasis on original understandings of the role of schools in
society in Thomas’s concurring opinion, would reappear in later Roberts Era decisions. This
early example underscores the potential for differing conceptions of the judicial role to cut
against common ideological rankings of the justices.
Frederick is also a useful jumping off point for assessing the constitution of free speech
consistently articulated by Justices Stevens and Souter during the early Roberts Era, frequently
joined by Justice Ginsburg. In the early Roberts Era, dissents by Justices Souter and Stevens
(with Justice Ginsburg always joining these opinions) have always favored relatively powerless
speech claimants. In Garcetti v. Ceballos (547 U.S. 410 (2006)), Justice Souter’s dissent argued
that Justice Anthony Kennedy’s willingness to protect only government employee speech of
public concern in the employee’s capacity as a citizen – rather than as an employee – effectively
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gutted the limited sphere of protection carved out in Pickering and Myers. For Kennedy, “The
controlling factor in Ceballos' case is that his expressions were made pursuant to his duties as a
calendar deputy… Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee's professional
responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a private
citizen.” (547 U.S. 410, 421-422).
Souter, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, explained that “This significant, albeit qualified,
protection of public employees who irritate the government is understood to flow from the First
Amendment, in part, because a government paycheck does nothing to eliminate the value to an
individual of speaking on public matters, and there is no good reason for categorically
discounting a speaker's interest in commenting on a matter of public concern just because the
government employs him. Still, the First Amendment safeguard rests on something more, being
the value to the public of receiving the opinions and information that a public employee may
disclose.” (547 U.S. 410, 428-429). Stevens dissented separately as well, stressing Souter’s
argument that “The notion that there is a categorical difference between speaking as a citizen and
speaking in the course of one's employment is quite wrong.” (547 U.S. 410, 427).
The concerns expressed by the majority and principal dissent flow from the difficult
context serving as the basis for Ceballos’s claim: His reassignment to another office and denial
of a promotion following his investigation of possible police and prosecutorial misconduct
related to the issuance of a search warrant in a criminal case. Dissenting separately, Breyer
avoided the bright lines drawn by both the majority and principal dissent: “In a word, the
majority says, "never." That word, in my view, is too absolute… While I agree with much of
Justice Souter's analysis, I believe that the constitutional standard he enunciates fails to give
sufficient weight to the serious managerial and administrative concerns that the majority
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describes.” (547 U.S. 410, 446, 447). The dissenters in Ceballos would, however, cite to the
decision in ruling against a private school employee in Tennessee Secondary Schools Athletic
Association v. Brentwood (551 U.S. 291 (2007)), characterizing a state-sponsored, inter-school
district association’s rules on “hard sell” football recruiting as “strik[ing] nowhere near the heart
of the First Amendment.” (551 U.S. 291, 296).
Writing for a Court unanimous in voting but splintered in rationale, Stevens cited
Ceballos favorably for the proposition that government employee speech was limited to speaking
on matters of public concern in employees’ capacity as citizens, concluding that, “We need no
empirical data to credit TSSAA's common sense conclusion that hard-sell tactics directed at
middle school students could lead to exploitation, distort competition between high school teams,
and foster an environment in which athletics are prized more highly than academics.” (551 U.S.
291, 300). Concurring in the result only, Thomas broke with the Court’s reliance on the
government employee speech line of cases, opposing the Court’s willingness to expand the
Court’s lenient yet speech protective standard to Brentwood – a private school (551 U.S. 291,
306-307). The Court’s other conservatives, through Justice Kennedy, appeared to be onboard
with the Court’s government employee analysis though disagreeing with Stevens’ invocation of a
precedent involving a lawyer’s challenge to the in-person solicitation of clients (Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978); cited at 551 U.S. 291, 296).
Stevens has been far more speech-protective in other contexts, however. In Beard v.
Banks (548 U.S. 521 (2006)), an ideologically divided majority ruled that the Pennsylvania
prison system’s Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU) policy prohibiting inmates from having
newspapers, magazines, and photos was constitutional under the precedent established in Turner
v. Safley (482 U.S. 78 (1987)). Stevens, joined by Ginsburg, characterized the deprivation theory
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of rehabilitation permitted by Breyer’s plurality decision as “[having] no limiting principle; if
sufficient, it would provide a ‘rational basis’ for any regulation that deprives a prisoner of a
constitutional right so long as there is at least a theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain
the right at some future time by modifying his behavior,” viewing the prohibition on inmate
literature as “strik[ing] at the core of the First Amendment rights to receive, to read, and to
think,” and preventing access to the exchange of ideas “central to the development and
preservation of individual identity.” (548 U.S. 521, 546, 543, 552). Ginsburg, joining Stevens’
dissent and writing separately, expressed dismay at the plurality’s standard for summary
judgment, fearing that “By elevating the summary judgment opponent's burden to a height
prisoners lacking nimble counsel cannot reach, the plurality effectively tells prison officials they
will succeed in cases of this order, and swiftly, while barely trying.” (548 U.S. 521, 556).
The concern for speech claims brought by unpopular speakers was also a recurring
concern for Souter, dissenting with Ginsburg in the 2007 term case of U.S. v. Williams (553 U.S.
285 (2008)) in viewing provisions of the federal Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B)) as
impermissibly overbroad under the First Amendment. Souter’s disagreement with Scalia’s
majority opinion turned on the Act’s criminalization of engaging in child pornography
“pandering” transactions not involving real images of children. For Souter, “The tension between
ostensibly protecting the material pandered while approving prosecution of the pandering of that
same material, and in allowing the new pandering prohibition to suppress otherwise protected
speech,” violated free speech principles. (553 U.S. 285, 311). Pointing to a consistent though not
all-encompassing concern among the Court’s liberal justices, Souter also noted that “What will
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be lost is short on merit, but intrinsic value is not the reason for protecting unpopular
expression.” (553 U.S. 285, 320).
At the conclusion of the 2007 term, Souter concurred in the Court’s holding against a
claim brought by gnostic Christians in Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (555 U.S. 460 (2009)).
The sect argued that the city’s acceptance of a Ten Commandments statute for display in a local
park while rejecting a monument inscribed with the group’s “Seven Aphorisms” constituted
impermissible viewpoint discrimination under the First Amendment. Alito’s opinion for a
unanimous Court reasoned that accepting Summum’s argument would make government
decisions to approve public displays impossible. Souter expressed some unease with the Court’s
decision, stating, “I have qualms, however, about accepting the position that public monuments
are government speech categorically.” (555 U.S. 460, 485). Breyer, while concurring, stressed
that, “In my view, courts must apply categories such as ‘government speech,’ ‘public forums,’
‘limited public forums,’ and ‘nonpublic forums’ with an eye toward their purposes--lest we turn
‘free speech’ doctrine into a jurisprudence of labels.” (555 U.S. 460, 484). Breyer’s express
pragmatic approach argued that “it helps to ask whether a government action burdens speech
disproportionately in light of the action's tendency to further a legitimate government
objective…After all, parks do not serve speech-related interests alone.” (555 U.S. 460, 484-485).
For his part, Stevens (joined by Ginsburg) characterized the Court’s approach in less than
flattering terms, noting “To date, our decisions relying on the recently minted government
speech doctrine to uphold government action have been few and, in my view, of doubtful merit.”
(555 U.S. 460, 481).
When considered in light of dissents in Frederick and Ceballos, members of the Court’s
liberal wing occasionally – though not consistently and only rarely voting together – raised
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concerns with the Court’s jurisprudential approaches to adjudicating claims. Much as Lochner
Era justices generally decided economic regulation cases within the strictures of the class
interests formula born of a Founding Era fear of special, class-based legislation (Gillman 1993),
the justices in the early Roberts Era were largely united by conventional jurisprudential
structures, disagreeing only to the extent that application of these jurisprudential regimes –
beyond simple content-neutrality and including doctrines calling for lower, intermediate forms of
scrutiny – lead to different results. Breyer’s approach – much as Justice Holmes dissent in
Lochner v. New York (198 U.S. 45, 74-76 (1905)) – is the exception that tests this rule, generally
rejecting the content-neutrality formula. Even when united in votes, the justices provide clues to
their preferred conception of the judicial role. Often, these dicta invoke speech-protective
philosophies that can legitimize either pro- or anti-speech votes. But sometimes, it is apparent
that certain conceptions of the judicial role create tensions not only with expected ideological
voting, but also the conventions of jurisprudential regimes.
The preponderance of evidence gleaned from opinions and observed voting patterns in
merits cases during the early Roberts Era provides marginal support for the ideology-plus
explanation. In the language of process tracing, the attitudinal explanation jumps a number of
“hoops” with a number of cases splitting the Court into the 5-4 voting coalitions predicted by
conventional estimates of ideological preferences. But it also stumbles in a few cases as well:
Banks, Pocatello, and WSRP each featured deviations from those expected alignments. Perhaps
the most notable fracture during this era is the willingness of members of the Court’s liberal bloc
to generally favor speech claims brought by claimants at the “periphery” of the First
Amendment’s aura of coverage, including prisoners, students, and those convicted for soliciting
child pornography. The Court’s conservatives were generally far more willing to protect what
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has been characterized as speech at the “core” of the First Amendment, or political speech.
Table 4.1 provides an overview of behavior and trends in opinion reasoning during this early
period, as well as a brief numerical characterization of each justice’s orientation toward the prospeech position across these cases.
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Table 4.1 – Not a Free Speech Court: The Early Roberts Era (2005-2008 Terms)
Opinions Authored
(Majority, Concurring, Dissenting)
FAIR
WSRP
--Frederick
WRTL II
Pocatello

Interpretive
Preferences
Core
Political,
Institutional
Maintenance

% Pro
Speech
25%

John Paul Stevens

Brentwood

Lopez Torres
Williams
Summum

Ceballos
Randall
Banks
Frederick
Davis
Pocatello

Periphery

31.25%

Antonin Scalia

WEA
Williams
Lopez
Torres

WRTL II
Summum

WSRP

Core
Political,
Originalism

31.25%

Anthony Kennedy

Ceballos

Randall
Brentwood
Lopez Torres

---

Core Political

31.25%

WSRP

David Souter

---

Summum

Ceballos
Randall
WRTL II
Williams
Pocatello

Periphery

31.25%

Banks

Clarence Thomas

WSRP

Randall
Banks
Brentwood
Frederick

---

Originalism,
Core Political

25%

WSRP

Ruth Bader Ginsburg

---

Pocatello

Banks
Davis

Periphery

31.25%

Pocatello

Stephen Breyer

Randall
Banks (P)
Karass

WEA
Frederick
Summum

Ceballos
Pocatello

Pragmatism

25%

Samuel Alito, Jr.

Davis
Summum

Randall
Frederick
Karass

---

Core Political

23.08%

John Roberts

Vote
Deviations

Notes: N=16. Percentage of pro-speech decisions by Court during this period=25%. For “Opinion” column, bolded cases denote
a pro-speech claimant vote. “Interpretive Preferences” denotes themes apparent in the justices’ opinions during this period. “%
Pro-Speech” indicates the proportion of the justices’ votes in favor of speech claims. One case, FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life,
546 U.S. 410 (2006), was a unanimous, per curiam decision and does not appear in the opinion column but the votes are included
in the percentage of pro-speech decisions category and overall N. Another case, Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), was
issued during this era but was omitted due to the absence of Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts during oral argument and the
Court’s decision.
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The Most Pro-Speech Court in History? The 2009-2011 Terms.
Citizens United v. FEC (558 U.S. 310 (2010)) has become something of a touchstone for
characterizations of a Court simultaneously willing to make difficult, speech protective decisions
(Floyd Abrams, quoted in Liptak 2012) and placing hostility to campaign finance regulations
above all other speech claims (Kairys 2013; Chemerinsky 2011; Youn 2011). The decision, in a
lengthy opinion by Justice Kennedy, held BCRA Section 203’s prohibition on electioneering
expenditures from corporate, union, and non-profit treasury funds to be unconstitutional under
the First Amendment for regulating speech on the basis of the subject matter communicated
(political speech). Chief Justice Roberts’ concurring opinion, joined by Justice Alito,
emphasized the Court’s institutional responsibility to make difficult decisions and was likely at
least partially attributable to the draft dissent circulated by Justice Souter after the initial oral
arguments in the case – a dissent that criticized the Court for answering an issue not properly
presented before it (Coyle 2013, 251-252).
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion, joined by Thomas and Alito, reasoned that the First
Amendment is agnostic when it comes to the identity of the speaker involved in a controversy
because corporations had long been viewed as having rights despite a lengthy analysis offered by
Stevens in dissent: “The Framers did not like corporations, the dissent concludes, and therefore it
follows (as night the day) that corporations had no rights of free speech. Of course the Framers'
personal affection or disaffection for corporations is relevant only insofar as it can be thought to
be reflected in the understood meaning of the text they enacted -- not, as the dissent suggests, as
a freestanding substitute for that text.” (558 U.S. 310, 386).
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Scalia’s conception of the judicial role has its limits – he did not join Thomas’s
concurring opinion in Frederick, and the two were at loggerheads in Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association (discussed below). For his part, Thomas dissented to the extent that
Kennedy’s expansive opinion nevertheless upheld BCRA’s disclosure and reporting
requirements: “I cannot endorse a view of the First Amendment that subjects citizens of this
Nation to death threats, ruined careers, damaged or defaced property, or pre-emptive and
threatening warning letters.” (558 U.S. 310, 485). Stevens’ dissent (joined by the Court’s liberal
justices), an attempt to discredit Scalia’s brand of originalism, also feared that dismantling
BCRA’s key regulation came “at the cost of the individual and collective self-expression,” (558
U.S. 310, 475), a theme buried in an extended defense of the anti-corruption, equalizing rationale
underlying Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (494 U.S. 652 (1990)) but would become
more prevalent in later Roberts Era campaign finance decisions.
Until the Court’s near unanimous decision in April 2010 in the animal cruelty case of
U.S. v. Stevens (559 U.S. 460 (2010)), the Court only ruled for speech claimants challenging
state and federal campaign finance regulations. Stevens was the first indication of the Court’s
willingness to emphasize one strain of U.S. free speech jurisprudence – the so-called
“categorical” or “absolutist” understanding, at least in an apparent unwillingness to specify
certain types of speech areas as low-value categories not belonging to the core protections of the
First Amendment. The vehicle for this emerging agenda was a suit filed by Robert J. Stevens,
the producer and distributor of a number of alleged dog fighting and – less cynically – pit bull
educational videos. Congress, viewing animal cruelty in the form of “crush videos” as a social
problem in need of redress, criminalized the possession, distribution, and sale of such videos in
18 U.S.C.S. § 48.
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For the first time in a non-campaign finance case and over four terms into the Roberts
Era, the Court (through Chief Justice Roberts) ruled in favor of a free speech claim and did so
through the “strong medicine” of First Amendment overbreadth doctrine. Roberts subjected the
law to strict scrutiny, finding that Congress “create[d] a criminal prohibition of alarming
breadth,” adding that “There is simply no adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results
in the statute's banning only the depictions the Government would like to ban.” (559 U.S. 460,
474, 479). In sum, the Court declined to recognize depictions of animal cruelty as a categorical
exception to the Court’s strict scrutiny regime and refused to adopt narrowing constructions of
the statute, dismissing an exceptions clause as unconstitutionally underinclusive. Arguably, it
was Stevens that signaled a willingness to aggressively enforce the First Amendment, rather than
the ideologically divisive campaign finance cases.

Alito’s Conservatism (?) and Breyer’s Conception of the Judicial Role
Stevens is also notable for being the first clear instance of what Tribe and Matz have
suggested is Justice Alito’s own brand of “Burkean” conservatism (2014, 141-142). Dissenting
alone in Stevens, Alito noted that “It is undisputed that the conduct depicted in crush videos may
constitutionally be prohibited” by Congress, suggesting Roberts’ characterization of the law as
facially overbroad as “straining” and, referencing the First Amendment philosophical search-fortruth foundation, argued that “the harm caused by the underlying crimes vastly outweighs any
minimal value that the depictions might conceivably be thought to possess.” (559 U.S. 460, 486,
495).
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Alito’s dismissiveness of peripheral (as opposed to core political) speech claimants was
most pronounced during the most pro-speech period of the Roberts Era. This conception of the
judicial role in free speech controversies has resulted in unexpected deviations from the expected
ideological ordering of the justices. In Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association (564 U.S.
786 (2011)), the heterogeneity within the Court’s conservative bloc was hinted at during oral
arguments on November 2, 2010, when in response to a line of questioning by Justice Scalia –
the eventual author of a majority opinion holding that videogames were a form of artistic
expression protected by the First Amendment – Alito interjected, “Well, I think what Justice
Scalia wants to know is what James Madison thought about videogames. Did he enjoy them?”
(Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association - Oral Argument - Nov. 2, 2010; also quoted in
Tribe and Matz 2014, 142).
Alito, joined by the Chief Justice, concurred in the judgment though he refused to enforce
a categorical understanding of the First Amendment that refused to create a category of lowvalue, violent speech less worthy of constitutional protection: “The Court is far too quick to
dismiss the possibility that the experience of playing video games (and the effects on minors of
playing violent video games) may be very different from anything that we have seen before.”
(564 U.S. 786, 816). In dissent, Thomas argued that the decision departed from original
understandings of the First Amendment, putting him at odds with Scalia and underscoring the
difficulty attached to characterizing the decision for an association of businesses as
monolithically “liberal” or “conservative.” Breyer, dissenting separately and somewhat
uncharacteristically, subjected the law to strict scrutiny but found the trove of studies related to
effects of videogame violence on adolescents as a valid, compelling interest (and suggested the
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law would survive as-applied challenges as well, though left that possibility open)(564 U.S. 786,
841, 857).
In the funeral protester case of Snyder v. Phelps (562 U.S. 443 (2011)), Alito was again
the lone dissenter and pitted against another ringing endorsement of free speech penned by the
Chief Justice. The Court reversed a finding of approximately five million dollars in
compensatory and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress for Albert
Snyder, the father of a fallen Marine who had died in the line of duty in Iraq. Snyder
subsequently suffered depression and other ailments after viewing news coverage of the
Westboro Baptist Church’s picketing of his son’s funeral as well as the Westboro Baptist Church
penned “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder," an online post (533 F. Supp. 2d
567, 571-72 (D. Md. 2008)). In finding for Phelps (the leader of the church), Roberts extolled the
vice-protective virtues of free expression, stating, “While these messages may fall short of
refined social or political commentary, the issues they highlight--the political and moral conduct
of the United States and its citizens, the fate of our Nation, homosexuality in the military, and
scandals involving the Catholic clergy--are matters of public import,” (562 U.S. 443, 454
(2011)), and pronouncing that “Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to
tears of both joy and sorrow, and--as it did here--inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we
cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different
course--to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public
debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this
case.” (562 U.S. 443, 460-461).
Alito characterized the decision as allowing a private figure to be “brutalized,” and
arguing that Roberts’ emphasis on protecting political speech was misguided: “This portrayal is

172
quite inaccurate; respondents' attack on Matthew was of central importance. But in any event, I
fail to see why actionable speech should be immunized simply because it is interspersed with
speech that is protected.” (562 U.S. 443, 471). From a jurisprudential angle and with
implications for determining Alito’s conception of the judicial role, the dissent suggests a rigid,
formal component to the adjudication of speech claims as well as the limits of framing
controversies as involving speech on matters of public importance. Stated differently, it is
consistent with the formal Meiklejohnian conception of speech that Bork articulated during the
Nixon/Reagan era of conservatism. Breyer again concurred in the result on the narrower ground
that the Court “…does not hold or imply that the State is always powerless to provide private
individuals with necessary protection. Rather, the Court has reviewed the underlying facts in
detail, as will sometimes prove necessary where First Amendment values and state-protected
(say, privacy-related) interests seriously conflict.” (562 U.S. 443, 462).
Breyer and Alito would again distance themselves from the majority in the copyright case
of Golan v. Holder (132 S. Ct. 873 (2012)), dissenting from Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court
that § 514 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act – restoring previous “public domain” works to
copyright-protected status – violated neither the copyright clause of Article I, Sec. 2 of the U.S.
Constitution nor the speech clause of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment. Breyer, joined
by Alito, dissented on the grounds that “By removing material from the public domain, the
statute, in literal terms, ‘abridges’ a preexisting freedom to speak. In practical terms, members of
the public might well have decided what to say, as well as when and how to say it, in part by
reviewing with a view to repeating, expression that they reasonably believed was, or would be,
freely available. Given these speech implications, it is not surprising that Congress has long
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sought to protect public domain material when revising the copyright laws.” (132 S.Ct. 873,
907).
The claimants in Golan were an amalgam of orchestra conductors and other individuals
who performed or utilized works in the public domain – claimants offering a challenge that did
not easily fit within the core political speech philosophy but resonated instead with human
fulfillment (Emerson 1963, 879-881) and marketplace of ideas rationales (Mill 1859, 84-88;
Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919)). Breyer’s unusually speech protective position - in light of
previous statements seeking a more balanced, narrow rationale in speech controversieshighlights the complexity constituting decision-making, as does Alito joining Breyer’s dissent
given his frequent focus on core political speech. In fact, Alito’s moniker as “a different kind of
conservative” (Tribe and Matz 2014, 141-142) may be something of an overstatement. Alito led
the Court’s most conservative members in a dissent in Alvarez (discussed below), also
characterizing lies about receiving military medals as low-value speech not entitled to robust
constitutional protection (rejecting the content-neutrality requirement of strict scrutiny for the
speech at issue).
Whether best attributed to a different sort of conservative ideological preference or a
philosophical preference that affords the political speech philosophy primacy in free speech
controversies, Alito’s majority opinion in Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local
1000 (132 S.Ct. 2277 (2012)), characterizing the opt-out requirements related to the collection of
union shop non-member fees as unconstitutional compelled speech, built upon an emerging
hostility to union fundraising practices first evident in Washington Education Association and
Pocatello. The decision held that the union’s failure to send out a new “Hudson notice” for new
fees charged to non-members violated the First Amendment, but the Court’s five conservatives
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also held that union non-members must “opt-in” rather than opt-out of fee assessments for
ideological purposes.
Concurring in the result only, Sotomayor (joined by Ginsburg) noted that while the
SEIU’s “Political Fight Back Fund” – the subject of fee assessment in question and explicitly
concerned with opposing anti-union ballot initiatives in California – required an opt-out
provision for non-members, Alito’s majority opinion “proceeds, quite unnecessarily, to reach
significant constitutional issues not contained in the questions presented, briefed, or argued.
Petitioners did not question the validity of our precedents, which consistently have recognized
that an opt-out system of fee collection comports with the Constitution.” (132 S.Ct. 2277, 2297).
Breyer dissented (joined by Kagan), fearing that the Court’s logic would apply to constitutional
“chargeable” expenses related to collective bargaining as well as the non-chargeable, ideological
fundraising activities, and would have upheld the entire SEIU administration of fees as
constitutional under the Court’s Hudson precedent (132 S.Ct. 2277, 2305).
Union cases, like those related to campaign financing , business, and abortion, can be
plausibly viewed as the most politically salient First Amendment cases the Court is likely to
hear. Viewed this way, cases within the development of freedom of speech during the Roberts
Era represent easy hoop tests for the attitudinal hypothesis to jump through. Knox, a union case,
is fairly inconsistent with these expectations, except the bottom-line finding that the Court’s
conservatives voted wholesale against the union position in the case. If we were to expect
deviations from the predicted alignment of the Court in the case, then we might expect Breyer to
take the split-the-baby approach advanced by Sotomayor and Ginsburg – the two most liberal
members of the Court during the 2011 term. Nor can it be said that the case counts squarely in
favor of the ideology-plus explanation – Breyer’s regular aversion to hard and fast rules is in
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tension with administrative deference in Knox, though both historically have appeared in his
jurisprudence (Tushnet 2015, 215-217).

The Value of Concurring Opinions
These various preferences – legal and ideological – are difficult, though not impossible to
disentangle. Though rationales revealed by Alito and Breyer have emerged as tenable
explanations for unusual voting behavior during this period of the Roberts Era, a number of other
examples illustrate diversity across and within voting coalitions on the Court. To provide one
illustration that has received relatively less attention in coverage of the free expression agenda,
consider Doe v. Reed (561 U.S. 186 (2010)), a decision following on the heels of Citizens United
and holding that petition disclosure requirements under the Washington Public Records Act were
not facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The speaker, John Doe (on behalf of
all signatories) was aligned with Protect Marriage Washington, a group opposed to a law
extending benefits to same-sex domestic partners, and expressed that disagreement by signing a
petition in an effort to reach the 4% threshold needed to initiate a popular referendum
challenging the law.
A close reading of the opinions in the case reveals a fairly fractured Court, despite
agreement on the bottom line questions of whether the act of signing a petition is expression and
whether the disclosure of petition signatories can survive a facial challenge. For Roberts, two
factors were especially important: “To the extent a regulation concerns the legal effect of a
particular activity in that process, the government will be afforded substantial latitude to enforce
that regulation. Also pertinent to our analysis is the fact that the PRA [Public Records Act] is not
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a prohibition on speech, but instead a disclosure requirement.” (561 U.S. 186, 195196). Though Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion was joined by five other justices
(Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor), each of those justices also filed concurring
opinions. Breyer characteristically joined the Court’s opinion and Sotomayor’s concurrence to
the extent that careful balancing of interests was necessary for the Court to uphold the statute
(561 U.S. 186, 202), while Alito argued for accommodating as-applied challenges in light of
“The widespread harassment and intimidation suffered by supporters of California's Proposition
8,” suggesting the law was unconstitutional in nearly all applications where a reasonable
possibility of a threat existed while still upholding it under facial challenge (561 U.S. 186, 205).
Sotomayor, joined by Stevens and Ginsburg, challenged Alito directly on that point:
“Allowing case-specific invalidation under a more forgiving standard would unduly diminish the
substantial breathing room States are afforded to adopt and implement reasonable,
nondiscriminatory measures like the disclosure requirement now at issue. Accordingly, courts
presented with an as-applied challenge to a regulation authorizing the disclosure of referendum
petitions should be deeply skeptical of any assertion that the Constitution, which embraces
political transparency, compels States to conceal the identity of persons who seek to participate
in lawmaking through a state-created referendum process.” (561 U.S. 186, 215). Stevens, joined
by Breyer, underscored the speculative nature of Alito’s fears in boiling the case down to “a
neutral, nondiscriminatory policy of disclosing information already in the State's possession that,
it has been alleged, might one day indirectly burden petition signatories.” (561 U.S. 186, 215),
while Scalia thought the controversy was wholly unrelated to the First Amendment, refusing to
engage in “balancing” and providing a historical analysis demonstrating the First Amendment
did not prohibit disclosures of information (561 U.S. 186, 220-221). Thomas, essentially
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elaborating on his dissent in Citizens United and fearing retaliation against petition signatories,
subjected the application of the PRA to petitions to strict scrutiny and found less burdensome
means for Washington to achieve its asserted interest in transparency (561 U.S. 186, 243-246).
The Chief Justice’s nuanced reasoning in Doe, demonstrating a willingness to uphold
some state election regulations affecting expression, was conspicuously absent during this
period’s second campaign finance decision. Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC
v. Bennett (564 U.S. 721 (2011), or AFECFCP), invalidated a state campaign finance law that
subsidized additional speech (campaign funds) for publicly financed candidates facing privately
funded challengers. For each dollar spent by or on behalf of a privately financed candidate
beyond the state public financing cap, Arizona would provide matching funds to candidates
agreeing to the state’s public financing arrangement. The apparent deference to states articulated
in Doe was absent from AFECFCP, with Roberts finding that “The burdens that this regime
places on independent expenditure groups are akin to those imposed on the privately financed
candidates themselves. Just as with the candidate the independent group supports, the more
money spent on that candidate's behalf or in opposition to a publicly funded candidate, the more
money the publicly funded candidate receives from the State.” Roberts concluded that “laws like
Arizona's matching funds provision that inhibit robust and wide-open political debate without
sufficient justification cannot stand.” (564 U.S. 721, 738, 755).
Kagan, speaking for the Court’s liberals in dissent, argued instead that “the law has
quite the opposite effect: It subsidizes and so produces more political speech,” lamenting that
“what petitioners demand is essentially a right to quash others' speech through the prohibition of
a (universally available) subsidy program. Petitioners are able to convey their ideas without
public financing--and they would prefer the field to themselves, so that they can speak free from
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response. To attain that goal, they ask this Court to prevent Arizona from funding electoral
speech--even though that assistance is offered to every state candidate, on the same (entirely
unobjectionable) basis. And this Court gladly obliges. If an ordinary citizen, without the
hindrance of a law degree, thought this result an upending of First Amendment values, he would
be correct.” Kagan sharply characterized the Court’s dismantling of the program as “chutzpah.”
(564 U.S. 721, 763, 766).
Campaign finance decisions appear across all periods of the Roberts Era, and have been
marked by considerable acrimony. Notably, the disagreement is structured by the Court’s
longstanding precedents and aversion to regulations that single out speech on the basis of its
content: a hallmark of the content-neutrality regime. The jurisprudential keys to campaign
finance challenges have been searches for compelling interests, measuring the burdens imposed
on speakers, and an express concern for protecting political speech. It is admittedly difficult to
understand these decisions as anything less than political disagreements in terms of the positions
taken by the justices (Republican appointees always voting to strike, Democratic appointees
almost always voting to uphold). Ironically, John Stuart Mill’s search for truth rationale and the
admonition that “truth depends on a balance to be struck between two sets of conflicting
reasons” appears to have given the justices little pause, all while dividing into camps contesting
how the unfettered exchange of ideas – the means to truth – requires striking or upholding
regulatory measures (Mill 1993 [1859], 88). It is in this subset of cases that the endogeneity
charge advanced by Segal and Spaeth (2003) appears to have its greatest force. However, with
the notable and consistent exception of Thomas, all justices have generally been united by the
regime established in Buckley, differing only on the application of those standards to concrete
controversies. In the language of process tracing, the hypothesis that ideological preferences
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motivate the justices jumps through the hoop here, though the issue of observational equivalence
again makes finding a smoking gun in favor of either the ideological or principle explanations
difficult.
A number of unanimous or near-unanimous decisions also appear during this second
period of the Court’s free speech agenda, though these decisions notably united the Court against
speech claims. Milavetz, Gallop, and Milavetz v. U.S. (559 U.S. 229 (2010)) marked the first
opportunity for Justice Sotomayor to resolve a free speech challenge for the Court, this one
brought by bankruptcy and debt relief attorneys opposed to disclosure provisions in the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA). Writing for
the Court, Sotomayor dismissed the debt relief lawyers’ claims as failing to satisfy the less
exacting scrutiny standard adopted by the Court in controversies involving attorney advertising
and communication: “ § 528's required disclosures are intended to combat the problem of
inherently misleading commercial advertisements--specifically, the promise of debt relief
without any reference to the possibility of filing for bankruptcy, which has inherent costs.” (559
U.S. 229, 250). Concurring separately, Scalia expressed disagreement with the Court’s analysis
of the Act’s legislative history while Thomas wrote separately to express dismay with
commercial speech’s position outside of the content-neutrality regime’s strict scrutiny
requirements: “I have never been persuaded that there is any basis in the First Amendment for
the relaxed scrutiny this Court applies to laws that suppress nonmisleading commercial speech.”
(559 U.S. 229, 255). He would not have to wait long for the Court to revisit this issue.
In Reichle v. Howards (132 S.Ct. 2088 (2012)), a unanimous Court dismissed a
retaliation claim brought by a citizen who approached – and touched the shoulder of - Vice
President Dick Cheney at an appearance at a Colorado Mall. The altercation occurred after
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Secret Service agents overheard a phone conversation where Howards stated, “I’m going to ask
him how many soldiers he killed today.” Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, concurred on the basis that
those charged with protecting government officials must be allowed to make on-the-spot
judgments, but left open the possibility that law enforcement agents could be sued for retaliatory
actions (132 S.Ct. 2088, 2097-2098). In Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan (564 U.S.
117 (2011)), a unanimous Court rejected the speech claim of Carrigan, an elected member of the
Sparks, Nevada council (with GOP affiliation) who violated a state conflict of interest law after
voting for an economic development project (The “Lazy 8” resort) spearheaded by a personal
friend and consultant, Carlos Vasquez. Scalia’s opinion for the Court drifted deeply into a
historical, originalist study of treatments of legislative actions as distinct from speech (564 U.S.
117, 122-125). In cases uniting the Justices, then, the nature of that agreement has been an
unwillingness to expand First Amendment coverage.

The Kennedy Court?
Kennedy, while concurring in the result in Carrigan, suggested that the law had the
potential to penalize any speech or voting that resulted from personal networks and political
supporters through a hypothetical: “Assume a citizen has strong and carefully considered
positions on family life, the environment, economic principles, criminal justice, religious values;
or the rights of persons. Assume, too, that based on those beliefs, he or she has personal ties with
others who share those views. The occasion may arise when, to promote and protect these
beliefs, close friends and associates, perhaps in concert with organized groups with whom the
citizen also has close ties, urge the citizen to run for office. These persons and entities may offer
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strong support in an election campaign, support which itself can be expression in its classic form.
The question then arises what application the Nevada statute has if a legislator who was elected
with that support were to vote upon legislation central to the shared cause, or, for that matter, any
other cause supported by those friends and affiliates.” (564 U.S. 117, 130) Alito, while
concurring in the judgment on the basis of Scalia’s tradition-based argument, sharply disagreed
with the Court’s characterization of legislative voting as separate from speech (564 U.S. 117,
132).
Though evincing a certain concern for electoral speech in Washington State Republican
Party and without exception in the campaign finance decisions, Kennedy also wrote for the
Court in Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri (564 U.S. 379 (2011)), a petition clause case involving
the firing, rehiring (following the filing of union grievances), and sanctioning of a borough
police chief resolved against Guarnieri primarily through the Court’s government employee
speech doctrine. Thomas, doubting that lawsuits against government employers qualified as
petitions, essentially argued that the Court should adopt the Ceballos line of reasoning to
adjudicate petition clause claims, denying claims arising from petitions filed in the claimant’s
capacity as employee and allowing only those petitioning government as sovereign (564 U.S.
379, 399-400). In partial dissent, Scalia largely echoed Thomas’s approach (offering an
originalist analysis of uses of the petition clause) but would allow the retaliation suit brought
under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to stand.
A term later in Fox Television Station v. FCC (132 S.Ct. 2307 (2012)), Kennedy led a
unanimous Court in striking down provisions of the FCC’s 2004 policy on “fleeting expletives”
as unconstitutionally vague – a decision that did not directly address the First Amendment claim
in the case but carried clear implications for expression, nonetheless. Ginsburg concurred, but
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argued that the Court should go further and use Fox as an opportunity to overturn the Court’s
decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726 (1978)), the anti-speech decision against a
radio broadcasting company that had aired comedian George Carlin’s “Seven Dirty Words”
monologue. With the possible exception of Scalia (and Thomas) in Guarnieri, extra-ideological
causes are difficult to isolate from expected voting patterns and unanimous decisions, and the
reliance on existing jurisprudential categories also suggests shared affinity for conventional free
speech legal norms.
Scholars have generally homed in on Kennedy for his median, libertarian position on the
Court in the Roberts Era (Knowles 2013), and for sometimes falling to the left of O’Connor
during the Rehnquist Era (Keck 2004). Kennedy’s opinion in U.S. v. Alvarez (132 S.Ct. 2537
(2012), a decision striking down the Stolen Valor Act as a content-based regulation of speech
(and, for Kennedy, a manifestation of George Orwell’s Oceania), has been offered as evidence to
support the libertarian label (Knowles 2013). As the Court’s reputation for being a pro-speech
Court gained traction during the 2009 to 2011 terms, Justice Kennedy was not always in the
vanguard in free expression cases. As Table 4.2 notes, Kennedy’s proportion of votes for the
pro-speech position (55.56% ) tied with Thomas and lagged slightly behind the Chief Justice and
Scalia, each at 61.1%. If anything, to the extent that Kennedy’s libertarian streak in free
expression cases is overstated, the swing positions on the Court may belong to Roberts, Alito, or
Breyer. With some regularity, these justices have either been hesitant in moving too far too fast
(Roberts, in the campaign finance case progression), or voted and voiced reasoning at odds with
majority coalitions applying fairly standard doctrinal rules. For Kennedy, the strongly protective
rationales advanced in Citizens United, IMS Health, and the Orwellian tone of Alvarez stand
beside opinions that, while sometimes cautious (as in Carrigan and Guarnieri), have been
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dismissive of claims. Kennedy’s vote to join Ginsburg’s opinion in Christian Legal Society, v.
Martinez (561 U.S. 661 (2011), hereafter “CLS”) also belies any broad, consistent libertarian
description of Kennedy’s voting behavior in Roberts Era speech controversies.
The issue in CLS was the application of the Hastings College of Law’s “take all comers”
policy, which prohibited registered student organizations from excluding students with beliefs or
views the organization disagreed with. The Hastings chapter of the Christian Legal Society
argued that the non-discrimination policy violated rights to free speech, association, and free
exercise under the First Amendment, as the “Statement of Faith” required of all official chapters
of the group had the following tenets: “The belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of
marriage between a man and a woman…to exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in
‘unrepentant homosexual conduct,’” and “students who hold religious convictions different from
those in the Statement of Faith.” (561 U.S. 661, 672).
Writing for the Court, Ginsburg’s majority opinion characterized the membership
condition as a “reasonable” and “viewpoint neutral,” applying intermediate scrutiny to the policy
in light of the Court’s intersecting public forum (limited public forum) and free association
strands of jurisprudence. Concurring, Kennedy adopted a consequentialist justification for free
speech that could – arguably – be viewed as anti-speech in the immediate case but broadly proexpression in rationale and potential effects. Fearing the balkanization of student groups and
referencing the loyalty oaths the Court frequently considered during the mid-20th Century,
Kennedy concluded that “A vibrant dialogue is not possible if students wall themselves off from
opposing points of view.” (561 U.S. 661, 705). Stevens, largely in response to Alito’s strongly
worded dissent, argued that the school’s amended policy (not properly before the Court) would
likely also pass constitutional muster, emphasizing equality over speech in the immediate case:”
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In this case, petitioner excludes students who will not sign its Statement of Faith or who engage
in ‘unrepentant homosexual conduct,’ The expressive association argument it presses, however,
is hardly limited to these facts. Other groups may exclude or mistreat Jews, blacks, and women-or those who do not share their contempt for Jews, blacks, and women. A free society must
tolerate such groups. It need not subsidize them, give them its official imprimatur, or grant them
equal access to law school facilities.” (551 U.S. 661, 702-703).
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Table 4.2 – Patterns During the Pro-Speech Period (2009-2011 Terms)
Opinions Authored
(Majority, Concurring, Dissenting)
CU
--Stevens
HLP
Doe
Phelps
AFECFCP

Interpretive
Preferences
ContentNeutrality;
Core Political

% Pro
Speech
61.1%

John Paul Stevens

---

Doe
CLS

CU

Collective

16.67%

HLP

Antonin Scalia

Carrigan
EMA

CU
Milavetz
Doe

Guarnieri

Categorical;
Originalism

61.1%

Guarnieri

Anthony Kennedy

CU
Guarnieri
IMS Health
FOX TV
Alvarez

CLS
Carrigan

---

ContentNeutrality;
Core Political

55.56%

Clarence Thomas

Howards

CU
Milavetz
Guarnieri

Doe
EMA

55.56%

Ruth Bader Ginsburg

CLS
Golan

Howards
Fox TV

---

Core
Political;
ContentNeutrality
Collective;
Deferential

Stephen Breyer

---

Doe
Phelps
Alvarez

HLP
IMS Health
EMA
Golan
Knox
ATP

Pragmatism,
Collective

33.33%

EMA
Golan

Samuel Alito, Jr.

Knox

Doe
Carrigan
EMA

Stevens
CLS
Phelps
Alvarez

Core
Political,
Burkean

50%

Stevens
Golan
Phelps

Sonia Sotomayor

Milavetz

Doe
Knox

---

Deferential

44.44%

Knox

Elena Kagan

---

---

AFECFCP

Collective

40

John Roberts

Vote
Deviations

38.89%

Notes: N=18. Percentage of pro-speech decisions by Court during this period=55.56%. For “Opinion” column, bolded cases
denote a pro-speech claimant decision. “Revealed Interpretive Preferences” denotes themes apparent in the justices’ opinions
during this period. “% Pro-Speech” indicates the proportion of the justices’ votes in favor of speech claims. One case, American
Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S.Ct. 2490 (2012) – or ATP - was a per curiam decision and does not appear in the majority
opinion column. However, the votes are included in the percentage of pro-speech decisions category and overall N.
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Kennedy’s position as median justice suggests that he would be the most likely justice to
vote with the Court’s liberals – a liberal vote for Kennedy, then, based on a nuanced rationale
could be endogenous to ideological preferences (Segal and Spaeth 2003). Yet Kennedy often
takes the hard line in free expression controversies, as illustrated by the Court’s decision in
Sorrell v. IMS Health (564 U.S. 552 (2012)), which struck down Vermont’s Prescription
Confidentiality Law (“Act 90”) as an impermissible, content-based regulation of speech. The
law, which prohibited state pharmaceutical data miners from selling prescriber identifying
information to drug industry salespersons (“detailers”) for fear of market capture and
misinformation by large pharmaceutical companies, was characterized by Justice Kennedy as
“burden[ing] a form of protected expression that [Vermont] found too persuasive.” (564 U.S.
552, 580). Joined by the Court’s conservatives and, unexpectedly, Justice Sotomayor,
Kennedy’s majority opinion found that “Act 80 is designed to impose a specific, content-based
burden on protected expression. It follows that heightened judicial scrutiny is warranted.” (564
U.S. 552, 565). To be clear, the law regulated commerce in data that would be used - among
other things - for more efficient marketing pitches to drug prescribers, yet the majority opinion
appeared to elide and perhaps enhance the Court’s less-scrutinizing commercial speech doctrine.
In dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Ginsburg and Kagan) viewed Vermont’s law as a
regulation of data as a commodity rather than protected speech, and broke with the majority on
the proper jurisprudential standard to be applied as well: “The far stricter, specially ‘heightened’
First Amendment standards that the majority would apply to this instance of commercial
regulation are out of place here.” (564 U.S. 552, 582). Breyer’s vote – essentially against big
pharma – is consistent with an ideological explanation, as are the votes of the Court’s
conservatives (though not Sotomayor’s), and the choice of the stringent, “heightened”
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jurisprudential standard by Kennedy and the deference to the more relaxed, commercial speech
standard by Breyer may be endogenous to broadly understood conservative and liberal policy
attitudes, respectively.
Yet, Breyer’s aversion to the increasingly absolute nature of the Court’s contentneutrality regime has been fairly consistent, as the following and preceding sections detail. Here,
Breyer questioned the Court’s reliance on various labels and tests (“The Court reaches its
conclusion through the use of important First Amendment categories--"content-based," "speakerbased," and "neutral"--but without taking full account of the regulatory context, the nature of the
speech effects, the values these First Amendment categories seek to promote, and prior
precedent.”), and did so in the course of making the point that the decision threatened to return
the Court to “a happily bygone era when judges scrutinized legislation for its interference with
economic liberty.” (564 U.S. 552, 591, 602). It is also worth noting that Breyer’s reference to the
importance of maintaining a robust marketplace of ideas was done so in opposition to a free
speech claim (564 U.S. 552, 583), highlighting the ease with which philosophical justifications
can be put into service of opposing ideological and interpretive positions but also the way that
such longstanding theories structure the adjudication of free speech controversies.
The 2011 term was notable for an incredibly speech protective ending, with Floyd
Abrams proclaiming, “It is unpopular speech, distasteful speech, that most requires First
Amendment protection, and on that score, no prior Supreme Court has been as protective as
this.” (Liptak 2012). Yet it was also during this period that critiques of the pro-speech
assessment emerged as well, particularly those by Erwin Chemerinsky and Monica Youn (2011).
This assessment of merits cases decided during this middle era has revealed the importance of
accounting for thicker understandings of judicial ideological preferences (Alito) and differing
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conceptions of the judicial role, particularly in the cases of Breyer, Alito, and to a lesser extent,
Thomas. This finding, based on reading all cases in light of the four variables of interest
described above, is consistent with Tribe and Matz’s general impression of Roberts Era justices
who often write separately in free speech controversies (2014, 153).
Yet, these disagreements run deeper than ideology. With some regularity, members of the
Roberts Court have disagreed not only with the application of doctrinal tests – sometimes
dividing in ways predicted by attitudinal explanations – but also across philosophies related to
expression coverage (notably, Alito with political speech) and even with the jurisprudential
structure itself (notably, Breyer’s aversion to a jurisprudence of labels like “content-based”).
Sometimes, members within the conservative and liberal blocs have disagreed with one another
in terms of the path taken to a result, and have done so through concurring opinions – not a costfree endeavor for an institution limited by time and a broader case load.

Test of Reputation: The 2012-2014 Terms
By the end of the Court’s 2011 term, the Court had earned something of a Janus-faced
reputation in free speech decisions.

Notable, early anti-speech decisions including FAIR,

Ceballos, Brentwood, Banks, and Frederick had been pushed to the background by a flurry of
decisions striking down campaign finance regulations and cases featuring Youn’s so-called
“colorful” facts, of which Stevens, Brown, Phelps, and Alvarez share affinity. Defections from
expected voting alignments by Justices Breyer and Alito during this period have been suggestive
of the effect of causal factors beyond monolithic ideological preferences, though the argument
that these instances may be isolated cases still stands.
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Following a term that saw a variety of free speech challenges reach the Court, the 2012
docket featured only a single constitutional free expression decision in Alliance for Open Society,
International v. Agency for International Development (133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013)). In an opinion
channeling Justice Robert Jackson’s ringing endorsement of free thought in West Virginia Board
of Education v. Barnette (319 U.S. 624 (1943)), Chief Justice Roberts did not spare rhetorical
flourish in striking down the federal government’s requirement that disbursement of funds to
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fighting HIV and AIDS abroad could not be
conditioned on the adoption of a formal anti-prostitution plank in the organization’s mission
statement.
The 6-2 decision struck down the bipartisan-approved “Policy Act” provision of the U.S.
Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (22 U.S.C. §7601 et al.),
with Roberts characterizing the anti-prostitution statement requirement at issue (§7631(f)) as
creating the unconstitutional condition of “requiring recipients to profess a specific belief,” and
going “beyond defining the limits of the federally funded program to defining the recipient.”
(133 S.Ct. 2321, 2330). For Roberts, the compelled speech controversy was resolved long ago
by Justice Jackson’s famous dicta in Barnette, quoting the opinion for the proposition that “If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” (319 U.S. 624, 642; cited at 133 S.Ct.
2321, 2332). In dissent, Scalia (joined by Thomas) argued that “The First Amendment does not
mandate a viewpoint-neutral government. Government must choose between rival ideas and
adopt some as its own: competition over cartels, solar energy over coal, weapon development
over disarmament, and so forth. Moreover, the government may enlist the assistance of those
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who believe in its ideas to carry them to fruition; and it need not enlist for that purpose those
who oppose or do not support the ideas. That seems to me a matter of the most common common
sense.” (133 S.Ct. 2321, 2332).

The Chief’s Competing Concerns
In Alliance for Open Society International, Roberts was joined by the Court’s liberal bloc,
was well as Justices Kennedy and Alito in an alignment predicted by conventional measures of
ideological preferences. Beyond the sweeping statement and potential walking back of the
Court’s position in FAIR, the decision represents the only unquestionably liberal (in terms of the
identity of the speaker and content of the speech claim), pro-speech decision during the Roberts
Era. It is also during this period that the Chief Justice’s pro-speech reputation has been most
visibly balanced by concerns for institutional maintenance, all while showing fidelity toward
broader conservative and Republican goals. In the 2013 term, Roberts’ opinions for a divided
Court in McCutcheon v. FEC (134 S.Ct. 1434 (2014)) and a unanimous (in terms of votes but not
rationale) Court in McCullen at once demonstrated a willingness to temper the desires of the
Court’s conservative wing while also providing opinions marking clear victories for wealthy
Republican campaign contributors and abortion clinic “sidewalk counselors.”
The question before the Court in McCutcheon was whether the aggregate contribution
regulations established by Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and amended by BCRA (§
441a(a)(3)), capping contributions to candidates and political committees at $48,600 and $74,600
respectively during the 2013-2014 election cycle (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1442-1443). The aggregate
limits were designed to work in tandem with base contribution limits so as to prevent committees
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and party organizations to effectively skirt the base limits by pooling additional contributions
and redistributing them to individual candidates. In a pattern marked by only two exceptions
during the Roberts Era, the Court split 5-4 in striking down the aggregate limits as an
unconstitutional burden on political speech, lacking a closely drawn fit in addressing the
government interest in preventing corruption.
In McCutcheon, Roberts – in no uncertain terms – provided a strongly libertarian defense
of free expression, rooted in concerns for the abstract marketplace of ideas and tossing aside the
egalitarian rationale advanced by Justice Breyer and the Court’s liberal bloc (a rationale that has
slowly developed in dissents by liberal members of the Court during this era). Citing the
fallibility of majorities and rejecting anything approximating ad hoc balancing on the part of the
Court, Roberts found “compelling reasons not to define the boundaries of the First Amendment
by reference to such a generalized conception of the public good.” (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1449).
Breyer’s public good argument , citing to Founding Era figures James Madison and James
Wilson, stressed that the “First Amendment advances not only the individual’s right to engage in
political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which
collective speech matters,” whereas under Roberts’ vision, “a free marketplace of political ideas
loses its point.” (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1467-1468). This

vision of free speech that places the

collective capacity to speak as the object of the First Amendment’s protection builds upon - but
is distinct from - the level playing field rationale rejected by the Court in Citizens United,
AFECFCP, and other recent campaign finance decisions.
From the ideological hypothesis perspective on judicial behavior, the dismantling of
BCRA is likely unsurprising. Yet even here, the Chief Justice did not go as far as dismantling
the regime established under Buckley, apparently subjecting the aggregate contribution limits to
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an intermediate standard of scrutiny rather than the “strict in theory, fatal in fact” approach the
Court applies in cases falling within the content-neutrality regime (134 S.Ct. 1434, 1457).
Roberts’ approach in McCutcheon did not escape comment by Scalia in McCullen, who penned a
concurring opinion (joined by Kennedy and Thomas) noting that Roberts had written “an opinion
that has Something for Everyone,” adding that the “specious unanimity” of the decision was
achieved by answering a question not in need of deciding: “Just a few months past, the Court
found it unnecessary to ‘parse the differences between . . . two [available] standards’ where a
statute challenged on First Amendment grounds ‘fail[s] even under the [less demanding] test…’
What has changed since then? Quite simple: This is an abortion case, and McCutcheon was not.”
(134 S.Ct. 2518, 2542 (internal citations omitted)). As for McCutcheon itself, Roberts once
again avoided dealing a death blow to the Buckley dichotomy between expenditures and
contributions (over Thomas’s protests in a concurring opinion), though there is no denying that
the Roberts Court has left far fewer options on the table for legislative bodies wishing to regulate
the integrity of elections through redistributive instruments
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Table 4.3 – Test of Reputation Period (2012-2015 Terms)
Opinions Authored
(Majority, Concurring, Dissenting)
----AOSI
McCutcheon
McCullen
WilliamsYulee

Interpretive
Preferences
Institutional
Maintenance,
Liberty
Absolutism,
Core Political

% Pro
Speech
81.81

Antonin Scalia

---

McCullen

AOSI
WilliamsYulee

Core Political

77.78

Anthony Kennedy

---

---

WilliamsYulee

Liberty
Absolutism;
Core Political

90.91

Clarence Thomas

Reed

---

---

Absolutism;
ContentNeutrality

63.64

Ruth Bader Ginsburg

Moss

WilliamsYulee

---

Collective;
Pragmatism

45.45

Stephen Breyer

SCV
Heffernan

WilliamsYulee
Reed

McCutcheon

Pragmatism,
Collective

45.45

Samuel Alito, Jr.

Harris

McCullen
Reed

WilliamsYulee
SCV

Core
Political,
Absolutism

72.73

Sonia Sotomayor

Lane

---

---

Collective,
Deferential

45.45

Elena Kagan

---

Reed

Harris

Collective,
Pragmatism

45.45

John Roberts

Vote
Deviations
WilliamsYulee

SCV

Notes: N=10. Percentage of pro-speech decisions by Court during this period=63.64%. For “Opinion” column, bolded cases
denote a pro-speech claimant decision. “Revealed Interpretive Preferences” denotes themes apparent in the justices’ opinions
during this period. “% Pro-Speech” indicates the proportion of the justices’ votes in favor of speech claims. One case, Heffernan
v. City of Paterson (2016) was decided in the post-Scalia period (2015 term). Another case, Friedrich v. California Teachers
Association (2016) does not appear in the table because the decision was an unsigned per curiam opinion for an equally divided
Court.

BCRA had been in jeopardy from the moment it was signed into law, with President
Bush including a signing statement doubting the constitutionality of a number of the law’s
provisions (Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Mar. 27, 2002).
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The effect of the appointments of Roberts and Alito to the Court is most visible in the campaign
finance issue area, with the union speech cases a close second. George W. Bush’s appointees
have voted in lockstep in every single campaign finance case (and some union cases), even
specially concurring together in a handful of cases, demonstrating that ideological preferences of
justices and ideological case factors – with Davis suggesting that the former trumps the latter at
the margins – explain a substantial part of the saga. However, the piecemeal fashion by which
provisions of FECA, BCRA, and a handful of state campaign laws in Vermont, Arizona, and
Montana have been invalidated suggests that Roberts does not wish to move too far, too fast.
The Chief Justice’s willingness to assign a majority of these opinions to himself – Randall,
Davis, and Citizens United as exceptions – suggests a concern for institutional maintenance by
tempering the wishes of the Court’s conservative wing. Thomas – and to lesser degrees, Scalia
and Kennedy – has consistently expressed skepticism of the entire Buckley regime.
McCullen is another indication of the Chief Justice’s apparent willingness to – at times –
give policy considerations equal footing with institutional concerns. The Court’s decision in
McCullen was 9-0 against Massachusetts in striking down the state’s “floating buffer” zone
abortion clinic law, yet the it was the Court’s liberal bloc joining Roberts’ opinion in full and the
Court’s conservatives concurring separately. In striking down the law, Roberts and the majority
found that the law constituted a “time, place, or manner” restriction under the Court’s
longstanding content-neutrality regime, and was therefore subject to intermediate – rather than
strict – judicial scrutiny. Hostility to abortion and women’s reproductive care services has been
a mainstay of the religious conservative prong of the national Republican Party since at least the
mid-1970s and perhaps beyond (see generally Price and Keck 2015, 886-894), and ruling that the
Massachusetts law was content-neutral in purpose yet failing to pass a moderate level of judicial
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scrutiny had the politically important effect of saving other similar state (and likely federal)
legislative efforts from jumping a high First Amendment bar. In other words, had a majority of
justices found the Massachusetts law in question to be a content-based regulation of speech and
subject to more searching judicial scrutiny, future attempts to regulate speech at or adjacent to
women’s reproductive care clinics would be viewed as presumptively unconstitutional.
One term later, in Florida Bar v. Williams-Yulee (135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015)), Roberts again
wrote for the Court but this time upholding a campaign solicitation provision of the Florida
Canon of Ethics as a content-based restriction that nevertheless survived strict scrutiny in light of
the compelling government interest in preserving the perceived integrity of the judiciary. In
terms of votes, Roberts parted company with his conservative colleagues for the first time in a
campaign finance-related case, though the Chief was careful to emphasize that the integrity of
the judiciary presented a special contextual concern for the Court. Scalia (joined by Thomas)
and Kennedy (joined by Alito) each dissented, with Scalia allowing the content-neutrality regime
to do all the lifting in the case, indicting Roberts for “applying the appearance of strict scrutiny”
to a “vital public objective brooding overhead” and relying on original understandings in noting
that “the peaceful coexistence of judicial elections and personal solicitations for most of our
history calls into doubt any claim that allowing personal solicitations would imperil public faith
in judges.” (135 S.Ct. 1656, 1677-1678).
Kennedy, consistent with a recurring libertarian streak, connected the controversy to selffulfillment and self-governance justifications for expression: “First Amendment protections are
both personal and structural. Free speech begins with the right of each person to think and then to
express his or her own ideas. Protecting this personal sphere of intellect and conscience, in turn,
creates structural safeguards for many of the processes that define a free society. The individual
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speech here is political speech. The process is a fair election. These realms ought to be the last
place, not the first, for the Court to allow unprecedented content-based restrictions on speech.”
(135 S.Ct. 1656, 1682-1683). Alito, nodding favorably to the dissents by Scalia and Kennedy,
homed in on the “narrow tailoring” or “fit” requirement of strict scrutiny, viewing the Canon’s
prohibition on mass mailing (which Williams-Yulee had done) to even non-judicial actors as too
restrictive to survive First Amendment scrutiny (135 S.Ct. 1656, 1685).
With the explicit exceptions of Breyer and Ginsburg (discussed below), Williams-Yulee is
another example of the justices generally united by jurisprudential structure, but disagreeing in
its application. While most of the normative work for Scalia was handled simply by the
invocation of the content-neutrality rule, Kennedy took the time to connect judicial methodology
to philosophical principles – though, unlike with Alito, it is more difficult to determine the extent
to which these convictions dictate outcomes. As with McCullen, Roberts’ opinion is interesting
for reaching an unanticipated, anti-speech result. It is an open question as to whether Roberts
would have based his vote on the same jurisprudential rationale had he not been in the position
of institutional steward.

From one scholarly perspective, the difference is meaningless: those

who are skeptical of the constraining power of rules may argue that the precedents established
and jurisprudential regimes relied upon are simply endogenous to ideological preferences. Yet
congruency with the conservative Republican agenda would seem to predict the emphatic
dismantling of key liberal Democratic legislative achievements rather than the hedging observed
in McCullen and to a far lesser (but, I argue, still detectable) extent, McCutcheon.
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Voting Together, Thinking Apart
The most recent terms of the Roberts Era have featured cert. grants for claims brought by
political protestors (Wood v. Moss, 134 S.Ct. 2056 (2014)), another embattled government
employee (Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014)), and a small evangelical congregation seeking
to place directional signs alongside roads in an Arizona town (Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct.
2218 (2015)). These decisions have all been unanimous verdicts, with the former decided
against the speech claimant while the latter two cases serving as free expression victories. In
non-unanimous cases, the Court has rejected a claim brought by the Sons of Confederate
Veterans civic group, upheld the Florida Bar rule prohibiting direct solicitation of campaign
funds by judicial candidates, and ruled in favor of a retaliation claim brought by a Paterson, New
Jersey police officer who had picked up campaign signs for his mother – signs for the candidate
opposed to Democratic Mayor Jose Torres in an upcoming mayoral election (Heffernan v. City of
Paterson, 136 S. Ct. 1412 (2016)). The latter case featured voting alignments predicted by
attitudinal models of judicial behavior, while the former cases – Walker v. Sons of Confederate
Veterans (135 S.Ct. 2239 (2015)) and Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar (135 S.Ct. 1656 (2015)) –
were marked by unexpected coalitions.
In chapter three, unanimity was defined by the votes on the merits of the case – the
bottom line of the decision. This choice was informed by the attitudinal paradigm’s general
skepticism of looking to the content of opinions for explanations of voting behavior, and the
desire to meet the paradigm on its own terms. But, if concurring opinions are viewed instead as
a potentially useful window on some other motivation for behavior, scholars are left with a
painting of a Court far more fractured. Of the unanimous decisions, only the political protest
case – Moss – featured “true” unanimity among the justices: Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg spoke
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for the Court, and no justice offered a concurring opinion. Similar to the Howard case, speech
claims that could be cast as potential threats to the security of the U.S. presidency have fallen on
unsympathetic ears of any ideological stripe. The other two decisions – Lane and Reed– were
each decided by 9-0 votes, but the unanimity among the justices was only vote-deep. In terms of
rationales employed, Reed (and to a lesser extent, Lane) help illustrate the lack of jurisprudential
and interpretive consensus underpinning the Roberts Era free expression agenda.
In Lane, Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for the Court may represent a step back from the
stringent standard for government employee speech articulated by Kennedy in Ceballos – and
may also reflect responsiveness to the high frequency of government employee whistleblower
and retaliation claims petitioned to the Court via certiorari during this period (see Chapter Five).
Edward Lane, following testimony in a federal investigation of alleged fraud and absenteeism by
Alabama state legislator Suzanne Schmitz, was fired from his position as director of a local
youth program at the Central Alabama Community College (CACC) – and was then one of two
employees not rehired following a reassessment of what was originally Lane’s solution for
CACC budget shortfalls. Writing for the Court, Sotomayor announced that “Truthful testimony
under oath by a public employee outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a
citizen for First Amendment purposes. That is so even when the testimony relates to his public
employment or concerns information learned during that employment.” (134 S.Ct. 2369, 2378).
Arguing instead that the Court’s decision in Ceballos controlled the judgment, Thomas (joined
by Alito and Scalia) concurred but noted that “We accordingly have no occasion to address the
quite different question whether a public employee speaks ‘as a citizen’ when he testifies in the
course of his ordinary job responsibilities.” (134 S.Ct. 2369, 2384).
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The Court’s decision in Reed vividly illustrates the tension between ideological
preferences, conceptions of the judicial role, and jurisprudential regimes. Every week, Reed the pastor of a small evangelical church in Gilbert, AZ, and his congregation - placed small
roadside signs indicating the time and location of the week’s services, which rotated according to
logistical and financial considerations. The town of Gilbert had adopted a sign code that treated
such “Temporary Directional Signs” differently from political and other signage, requiring that
signs be no larger than six square feet, be placed no more than 12 hours in advance, and be
removed within one hour of the end of the event (§4.402(P)). In a 9-0 decision, the Court struck
down the sign ordinance as unconstitutional. Justice Thomas’s majority opinion argued the
ordinance was constitutionally suspect on its face because “The restrictions in the Sign Code
that apply to any given sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of the sign.”
(135 S.Ct. 2218, 2227).
Breyer, concurring in the judgment, offered a familiar assessment: “The First
Amendment requires greater judicial sensitivity both to the Amendment’s expressive objectives
and to the public’s legitimate need for regulation than a simple recitation of categories, such as
‘content discrimination’ and ‘strict scrutiny,’ would permit. In my view, the category ‘content
discrimination’ is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a rule of thumb, rather
than as an automatic ‘strict scrutiny’ trigger, leading to almost certain legal condemnation.” (135
S.Ct. 2218, 2234). Kagan, concurring in the judgment, expressed considerable skepticism toward
Thomas’s wide-reaching, content-based assessment, instead narrowly reasoning that “The
absence of any sensible basis for these and other distinctions dooms the Town’s ordinance under
even the intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies to “time, place, or manner” speech
regulations. Accordingly, there is no need to decide in this case whether strict scrutiny applies to
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every sign ordinance in every town across this country containing a subject-matter exemption.”
(135 S.Ct. 2218, 2239).
Reed followed on the heels of Williams-Yulee, the divided decision discussed previously
that upheld – under strict scrutiny – a Florida Bar canon prohibiting in-person campaign
solicitations by judicial candidates. In that decision, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred in
the result but wrote separately to criticize the Court’s characterization of the law as a
constitutionally suspect, content-based regulation of speech. In a brief concurrence, Breyer
emphasized: “As I have previously said, I view this Court's doctrine referring to tiers of scrutiny
as guidelines informing our approach to the case at hand, not tests to be mechanically applied.”
(135 S.Ct. 1656, 1673). Ginsburg, joined by Breyer, rejected the application of strict scrutiny to
state laws regulating judicial elections, as well as the majority’s reliance upon campaign finance
precedents concerned with legislative offices. If the focus is shifted to constituent members of
the Court’s liberal bloc, Williams-Yulee illustrates cracks in the content-neutrality regime.
Breyer’s pragmatic approach has not been without limits.

In Sons of Confederate

Veterans – also decided in the 2014 term – Breyer’s majority opinion could be read as a strong
endorsement of the government speech doctrine, characterizing the messages displayed on statepermitted vanity plates as reasonably interpreted as an endorsement of the message by the state.
In dissent, Justice Alito mused that, “As you sat there watching these [specialty] plates speed by,
would you really think that the sentiments reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the
State of Texas and not those of the owners of the cars? If a car with a plate that says ‘Rather Be
Golfing’ passed by at 8:30 am on a Monday morning, would you think: ‘This is the official
policy of the State--better to golf than to work?’” (135 S.Ct. 2239, 2255). The plate at issue in
the case featured a depiction of a version of the flag of the Southern Confederacy, making the
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division along liberal and conservative lines somewhat predictable – with one notable exception.
Justice Thomas joined the Court’s liberals in rejecting the free speech claim, possibly motivated
by a reprehension of what some might characterize as a vitriolic symbol of hate – as he did
previously in dissent in the Rehnquist Era decision in Virginia v. Black (538 U.S. 343 (2003)) or
perhaps a commitment to states’ rights, as Eugene Volokh has suggested (Volokh 2015).
Nor can it be said that Alito’s Burkean conservatism always pits him against his
conservative colleagues. The concern for limiting coverage to political speech that resulted in
unusual votes in the second period of the Roberts Era has been followed with a period of unity
with his conservative colleagues. As with Knox, Alito penned the Court’s majority opinion in
Harris v. Quinn (134 S.Ct. 2618 (2014)), which invalidated a collective bargaining agreement
among the State of Illinois, SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana, and personal assistants under
Illinois’ Home Services Program as unconstitutional. Following Knox, Alito’s opinion held that
the First Amendment precluded the collection of even chargeable, “fair share” fees assessed on
assistants who did not want to join the union.
For Alito, the relevant distinction was between full-fledged public employees governed
under state collective bargaining arrangements and employees only considered public for the
purpose of collecting fair share fees, as was the case for the home care personal assistants in the
case. Kagan, writing for the Court’s liberal bloc in dissent (united in this case), thought the fact
that the personal assistants were nominally public employees was sufficient grounds for
dismissing the First Amendment challenge, and approved the majority’s decision to not overturn
the Abood precedent that permitted the assessment of fees on non-members to offset free-riding
(134 S.Ct. 2618, 2645). The parallel to the Court’s incremental dismantling of campaign finance
laws is apparent in the union decisions, though the latter has only recently been characterized by
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conservative-liberal splits on the Court. Returning to Alito, along with a dissent in Heffernan
(again limiting the ability of government employees to state First Amendment retaliation claims,
and in opposition to an opinion by Breyer that carved out protections against retaliation for
mistaken assumptions about political beliefs) and joining Roberts’ opinion in McCutcheon,
President Bush’s second appointee regularly though not exclusively votes in ways consistent
with ideological models of judging.

Discussion
Many of these voting patterns are consistent with but not necessarily explained solely by
ideological preferences. The fundamental problem with causation – the inability to observe it –
has long been a problem for judicial decision-making scholars. The foregoing analysis of the
most recent period of the Roberts Era constitution of free speech reveals that, since the 2012
term, the reputation as being a “pro-speech Court” is indeed an accurate assessment, whether
looking at the collective decisions or the voting percentages of each individual justice. If
anything, earlier assessments were prescient but premature. The other emerging trend appears to
be that it is Justice Breyer’s pragmatism that has gained cachet among the Court’s liberal bloc, a
balancing approach that eschews the assertive interpretation of the content-neutrality doctrine
offered by Justice Thomas in Reed.

As seen most clearly in Entertainment Merchants

Association and Golan (but fairly consistently throughout the Roberts Era in concurring
opinions), Breyer’s conception of the judicial role and aversion to labels has sometimes resulted
in votes that are not easily explained by the attitudinal paradigm.
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The willingness of the Court’s liberals to increasingly vote with Breyer’s preferred
rationale also calls into question earlier scholarship portending an emerging “new absolutism” on
the Court (Collins 2013). Previous works by legal scholars and political scientists have suggested
that Justice Kagan’s willingness to spar with the Chief Justice in Arizona Free Enterprise Club
portended an emerging dynamic with Kagan leading the Court’s liberals in opposition to the
Court’s hostility toward campaign finance decisions (Tushnet 2013, 280; Knowles and Lichtman
2015, 245). Yet the emerging pattern reveals Justices Ginsburg and Kagan penning or joining
concurrences that resonate with Breyer’s fairly consistent conception of the judicial role as one
of balancing rather than following various formulas. This interpretation is underscored by the
finding that the Court’s liberals have voted together in all cases during this period, while the
record of the Court’s conservatives is more heterogeneous.
Returning to the model specified in Figure 4.2, this analysis of the constitution of Roberts
Era free speech protections provides little support for the idea that abstract, philosophical
justifications for freedom of speech have resulted in a speech-protective Court. To the extent
that such justifications as the search for truth (or “marketplace of ideas” theory) matter, they
have been invoked strategically or, even more cynically, been paid lip service in nearly all
decisions. In the campaign finance context, it may be characterized as a democratic mean to a
Platonic end. Another theoretical proposition, that self-governance in a democracy is possible
only when political speech is stringently protected, has sometimes appeared in opinions seeking
to curtail free speech protections, from Alito’s decisions in Stevens, Phelps, and Alvarez, to
Thomas’s decisions in Frederick and Entertainment Merchants Association.
To be clear, this assessment does not mean that philosophies of free speech do not matter
– the justices clearly think it is important to couch decisions in language that echoes the
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understandings of Milton (1644), Mill (1993 [1859], 84-88), and Meiklejohn (1948). This
speech protective language also constitutes the U.S. free speech tradition, as the justices struggle
to trace the fluctuating limits of speech protection – language that in turn structures the dicta and
rationales for future political and legal controversies. But what these philosophical theories
rarely do is function as testable predictors of how the justices will vote in free speech
controversies – they are malleable to the point of being put into service of votes for and against
claimants seeking to strike down campaign finance regulations, and for or against claimants
more closely resembling the lonely soapbox orator.
This finding is admittedly consistent with what judicial behavioralists and attitudinal
scholars have long claimed, but philosophical justifications for speech represented only one part
of the model specified above. As for ideological heterogeneity within the monolithic label of
“conservatism,” Thomas’s dissents, as one example, are instructive. This heterogeneity that is
not readily apparent from the assignment of editorial-based preference scores to the justices at
the time of appointment or scores that take into account previous votes via simulation methods.
Much as chapter two argued for taking into consideration a number of theoretically relevant case
factors when assigning an ideological direction to a vote, this chapter has argued (and found
supporting evidence) for making distinctions among justices often characterized as voting in
conservative or liberal blocs. This finding, in turn, bleeds into the finding that differing
conceptions of the judicial role can have meaningful effects on decisions exogenous to
ideological preferences.
Put another way, Justice Breyer’s position as the most ideologically moderate member of
the Court’s liberal bloc during the Roberts Era may be as much a reflection of his view of
judging as a pragmatic, balancing exercise. Breyer’s explicit and fairly consistent aversion to a
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jurisprudence of labels – found in his written opinions and lines of questioning during oral
arguments in Frederick, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Reed – has resulted in unexpected
departures from the Court’s liberal bloc in Golan, Entertainment Merchants Association, and
Morse, and has been a mainstay of concurrences, as found in Williams-Yulee, Reed, Summum,
and dissents in Pocatello and McCutcheon. Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts has parted company
with the Court’s conservatives in terms of voting and rationale employed in Williams-Yulee, and
McCullen. This pattern – especially when considered in light of his votes in the two decisions
upholding key provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 – can be
characterized as a reflection of his view of the Chief Justice’s role as one of institutional
maintenance. This too, however, is a pattern that has emerged only during the most recent period
of the Court’s free speech project, suggesting claims that Roberts was “at the helm” of the
Court’s constitution of free speech were prescient, but ultimately premature (Collins 2013, 452).
Taken together, these findings suggest that the attitudinal understanding of judicial decisionmaking understates the effect of different conceptions of the judicial role held by the justices.
Other justices have played a much more subdued role in the Roberts Court’s constitution
of free speech. As this descriptive explanation relies heavily on the reasoning of justices as
revealed through their respective opinions, there is something of a missing data problem here.
Due to this issue, this account shares with other recent efforts an emphasis on the patterns of
Justices Breyer, Alito (Tribe and Matz 2014, 141-142, 153), and Thomas, as well as Chief
Justice Roberts (Gans 2015). In this analysis, disproportionate focus is an artifact of the data
collection process and availability. Justice Ginsburg has only infrequently revealed her approach
to free speech adjudication, though recent decisions suggest an emerging affinity with Justice
Breyer’s pragmatism. Earlier opinions suggest either a circumspect role for speech, especially
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when conflicting doctrinal strands are present (state-local relations in Pocatello and equality in
CLS) or security is a concrete, particular concern (which might explain her opinion in Moss
while also joining Breyer’s dissent in the more abstract threat presented by HLP).
The same growing warmth toward pragmatism might be said for Justice Kagan as evident
in her concurring opinion in Reed and joining Breyer’s concurrence in Alvarez, though attention
to date has largely focused on her dissent in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC.
Justice Sotomayor has generally operated within conventional jurisprudential structures in her
opinions for the Court in Milavetz and Lane (both unanimous in result), though she has
concurred separately to address Justice Alito’s opinions twice, first in Doe and again to criticize
perceived overreach in Knox (joined by Justice Ginsburg in the latter). These limited data points
are also consistent with the explanation offered here: Namely, that the content-neutrality regime
is undergoing a slow, sporadic erosion. These patterns may become more clear as the Court
populates its plenary docket with additional free speech controversies.
What then, can be said about the outcome of interest – the Roberts Court record on free
expression?

If understood as the product of multiple layers of institutional concerns and

individual level preferences, this period is best characterized as one of transition rather than
stasis. Whatever benefits may be wrought from a content neutrality principle built on suspicion
of legislative and government official actions, the alignment of justices during this period –
reflecting a variety of political commitments and each with a preferred interpretive philosophy
and vision of the judicial role – suggests the foundations of this longstanding order are being
slowly eroded. Much as Grayned and Mosely represented a moment of synthesis of strands of
free expression and equal protection jurisprudence, voting patterns and opinion language
suggests the potential for an ad hoc rather than “definitional” balancing jurisprudential regime,
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one that views speech not only as an individual liberty but a collective right. Such a regime
appears to be more concerned with scrutinizing the purposes of legislation and harms addressed,
as well as the purported liberty interest cited by individuals bringing free expression suits. This
approach resonates with recent normative theory work by Sonu Bedi, who has highlighted the
benefits of focusing on legislative purpose and taking seriously the idea of concrete harms
visited upon legislative subjects.

The upshot of this approach, while less formally speech

protective in the civil libertarian tradition, is negotiating the breakwaters of the harbor imposed
by the knee-jerk emphasis on “rights,” a general social and political paradigm that often makes
the experiment of democratic government impossible (Bedi 2009).
Taken as it is, the Roberts Court is undeniably Janus-faced, though this nature extends
beyond news coverage pitting the Court’s conservative justices against the liberal bloc. There are
more than two faces to the contemporary Court.

Some decisions appear consistent with

ideological explanations, such as the campaign finance cases and, at times, the union decisions.
Others are less compatible with that explanation.

Yet it would be an overstatement to

characterize the enterprise as one of total uncertainty (Tribe and Matz 2014, 152-153). Closer
readings of opinions – perhaps the only insight we have into the judicial understanding of what
doctrine requires – reveals deeper disagreements about the application of jurisprudential tests and
what judging requires.

We are left simultaneously with a “categorical” commitment to

protecting certain types of speech (Collins 2013; Tushnet 2013, 215-231), a recurring yet
inconsistent concern for political speech (Tribe and Matz 2014, 91, 133), and stewardship that
sometimes searched for unity in politically divisive controversies.
On the notion of moving forward, on February 13, 2016, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia
passed away in his sleep while visiting a west Texas hunting estate. A month later, President
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Obama announced the nomination of D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Merrick Garland to Scalia’s seat.
Senate Republicans quickly announced they would refuse to meet with or hold confirmation
hearings for Garland, with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell of Kentucky declaring that
“The nomination should be made by the president the people elect in the election that's underway
right now," adding that “This nomination should not be filled, this vacancy should not be filled
by this lame duck president." (Davis 2016). Beyond being the latest entry in this period of
ideologically polarized, partisan politics, the appointment of Neil Gorsuch may be most relevant
for the two clear political projects within the broader constitution of Roberts Era freedom of
speech: campaign finance and union fundraising cases.
The lack of a ninth vote on the Court defused what was anticipated to be a blow to public
sector union fundraising in Friedrich v. California Teachers Association (136 S.Ct. 1083
(2016)), a 4-4 split decision decided by a brief per curiam opinion that had the effect of allowing
the Ninth Circuit’s decision to stand. In addition, it is unclear what will become of the Court’s
campaign finance agenda - though there are potential hints. In a counterfactual world where
Merrick Garland was confirmed by the Senate, anecdotal evidence would suggest a second life
for campaign finance regulations. In SpeechNow.org v. FEC (599 F.3d 686 (D.C., 2010)),
Garland joined the D.C. Circuit’s unanimous opinion striking down BCRA amendments to
federal campaign contribution limits (2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C) and 441a(a)(3)). as applied to the
pro-First Amendment, “527” political advocacy group SpeechNow ( a decision, when paired
with Citizens United, allowed for the rise of so-called “Super PACs”).

Gorsuch’s First

Amendment principles have been overshadowed by his statements on the sanctity of life, though
there is some evidence that he strongly supports preserving well-established free speech
traditions (Liptak 2017). Again, compared to a world where Garland filled Scalia’s seat, free
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speech claims brought by union nonmembers objecting to fee assessments may find a
sympathetic tribunal. The effect of Gorsuch’s appointment on the newest era of the Roberts free
speech project remains to be seen.

Conclusion
Explaining the constitution of freedom of speech in the modern era has proven to be a
slippery subject for scholars and commentators. This inability to gain traction can be attributed to
non-comprehensive assessments or a tunnel-vision like focus on ideological preferences. This
chapter demonstrates that the Court is divided not only by fairly heterogeneous ideological
preferences but also differing judicial interpretive methodologies, or what I have referred to here
as different conceptions of the judicial role. The justices, at times, also appear to differ in terms
of modes of analysis and core First Amendment theoretical principles.
The more relevant distinctions among the justices, however, involve their relative
willingness to protect core versus peripheral speech, and modes of reasoning engaged in the
course of reaching a decision. Studies of the Court’s free speech project have, to date, focused
on important subsets of the free speech universe but have often done so at the expense of
comprehensiveness (a case selection issue) or theoretically relevant causes of judicial decisionmaking offered in previous scholarship. No single, univariate theory, absent a considerable
amount of straining and conceptual stretching, explains the modern Court’s constitution of free
speech. The model presented here is agnostic on the exact order or precise formula needed to
produce a result; instead, it offers a configuration that accounts for theoretically relevant
considerations offered by previous scholars and assesses its performance through chronologically
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structured, case and justice-centric description of the relevant issue subset of the Court’s docket
and contrasts these empirics with the components of the model. This detailed analysis attempts
to balance an overarching concern with determining patterns across cases with more in-depth
evaluations of rationales offered in individual cases; it is an exercise in what King, Keohane, and
Verba label “descriptive inference.” (1994, 34-49; see also George and Bennett 2005, 92-98).
The findings are complex, but can be summed up as follows: A majority of the current
Court’s justices – albeit sporadically - appear to be motivated by concerns beyond the preference
measures conventionally assigned to them by political scientists, and this motivation occasionally but not infrequently - leads to surprising decision coalitions and outcomes. Justice
Kennedy’s libertarian streak (Knowles 2013) and Chief Justice Roberts’s apparent special
concern for free speech (Gans 2015) have been referenced in assessments of this important
subset of the Court’s merits agenda, though across all cases it appears that the preferred
conceptions of adjudication adopted by Justices Breyer and Alito – and to a lesser extent, Justice
Thomas and Chief Justice Roberts – have the potential to cut against the preferred ideological
positions measured by political scientists.
This review of the Roberts Era constitution of speech also suggests that the foundational
content-neutrality regime structuring a great deal of the Court’s free speech decision-making
may have far more cracks than previously understood. While Collins (2013) and Richards
(2013) pointed to Alvarez and a handful of other decisions in underscoring the limits of the
regime, a growing number of justices are increasingly hesitant to wield the sword of contentneutrality in the face of free speech claims. Even in the most politically salient cases – usually
concerning campaign finance regulations and union fundraising – the written opinions of justices
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suggest emergent trends that may usher in new jurisprudential regimes, the most visible being
the collective vision of positive free speech liberty linked with Breyer’s pragmatism.
Chapters three and four have operated within the structures of modern judicial decisionmaking studies, with a near-exclusive focus on votes, opinions, and decisions in cases accepted
by the Supreme Court for argument and placed on the plenary docket. This institutional process,
however, is non-random. In the next chapter, I integrate the Roberts Court’s free speech
certiorari docket with the analyses conducted thus far – a contribution to the study of the issue
area of free speech and the study of Supreme Court decision-making in general.
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Chapter 5
A Tale of Two Dockets: Certiorari, Free Expression, and the Roberts Court Era

U.S. Supreme Court Justices influence the development of law at the merits and agendasetting (certiorari) stages of the decision-making process. Judicial decision-making scholarship
has found that judicial decisions are motivated by a confluence of legal principles and political
preferences at both stages of the decision-making process. Assessments of the Roberts Court’s
record, however, have focused exclusively on the merits voting patterns of the justices. In First
Amendment freedom of speech controversies, these assessments often point toward the Court’s
record of striking down campaign finance laws in support of ideological explanations of the
Court’s behavior (Clayton and McMillan 2012; Collins 2013). In Randall v. Sorrell, FEC v.
Wisconsin Right to Life (II), Davis v. FEC, Citizens United v. FEC, Arizona Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, and most
recently in McCutcheon v. FEC, the Roberts Court has struck down provisions of federal and
state laws that either limit campaign contributions, expenditures, and electioneering advocacy, or
have sought to equalize competition by subsidizing the speech of publicly financed candidates in
various forms (Sullivan 2010). 25
During the same period, however, the Court has also let stand a number of appellate court
decisions upholding campaign finance regulations. In Flint v. Dennison (488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir.,
2007)), for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a free speech claim

548 U.S. 230 (2006); 551 U.S. 449 (2007); 554 U.S. 724 (2008); 558 U.S. 310 (2010); 564 U.S. 721 (2011); 132
S. Ct. 2490 (2012); 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). The lone exception to this pattern has been Chief Justice Roberts’ fivejustice majority opinion in Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015), which upheld a state canon of
judicial conduct restricting direct campaign solicitations under the First Amendment.
25
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raised by a student running for the Associated Students of the University of Montana (ASUM), 26
a legislative body with a “primary responsibility…to serve as an advocate for the general welfare
of the students.” (488 F.3d 816 (9th Cir., 2007)). During his ultimately victorious campaign for
president of that legislative body, Aaron Flint twice exceeded the $100 campaign expenditure
limit imposed on ASUM students running for office, racking up electioneering expenses of $300
and $214.69. After being warned that the lavish spending was in violation of ASUM bylaws,
Flint was denied office by ASUM and filed a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Flint’s claim
was that the $100 expenditure limits violated his First Amendment right to free speech.
Writing for a unanimous panel of the Ninth Circuit, George W. Bush appointee Carlos
Bea held that Flint’s claim did not apply to elections at public universities, describing ASUM as
a “limited public forum…a forum opened by the University to serve viewpoint neutral
educational interests” which outweighed the free speech interests of the students campaigning
within that forum. The panel was unpersuaded by Flint’s invocation of Buckley v. Valeo (421
U.S. 1 (1976)), the court-constructed doctrinal wellspring for nearly all controversies concerning
contribution and expenditure limits in election campaigns. Subsequently, Flint appealed to
SCOTUS via a petition for certiorari (cert. petition). On January 7, 2008, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied certiorari (552 U.S. 1097 (2008)).
Flint’s relevance becomes clearer once the case is contextualized within an emerging
narrative invoked to explain protection for free expression during the Roberts Era: A
conservative Supreme Court with a penchant for striking down various measures designed to
equalize political campaigns and deter corruption decided not to decide a case that could have
been a vehicle for accelerating the demise of democratically enacted (and generally, Democrat26

James Bopp, frequent litigator in campaign finance free speech controversies, represented Flint.
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supported) restrictions on campaign expenditures. And though the denial of certiorari in Flint
did not establish a binding federal precedent, the effect of denying certiorari was to let stand an
important precedent within the expansive Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. This result,
like many others, represents a shift in the availability of doctrinal resources available to students
claiming free speech protections and schools seeking to maintain an ordered environment for
learning (NeJaime 2013). This scenario raises a number of questions about the Roberts Court
agenda that, to date, have been left unaddressed. These questions are both descriptive and
causal: What does the population of certiorari denials in Roberts Era free expression
controversies actually look like? Which litigants have been the winners and losers at the Court’s
gatekeeping stage? Do ideological preferences explain patterns observed in denials and grants of
certiorari? On the subject of freedom of expression, does the Court’s “hidden” certiorari docket
mirror the far more visible merits docket?
This chapter is an effort to bridge the gap between the certiorari and merits stages of
judicial decision-making. A large body of literature has examined determinants of judicial
behavior at the certiorari stage, but far less attention has been given to the relationship between
discretion in agenda-setting and broader effects on law and society. If scholars wish to make
accurate inferences about what motivates judicial behavior within specific legal issue areas – as
scholars have done with freedom of speech (Richards 2013; Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013;
Tushnet 2013; Tribe and Matz 2014; Knowles and Lichtman 2015; Pettys 2015), federalism
(Banks and Blakeman 2012), search and seizure (Segal 1984), and others – then patterns
observed on the certiorari docket must also be considered. To describe and assess how the
certiorari decision influences the development of law and litigation, I develop an original dataset
of 309 First Amendment, free expression cases for which certiorari was petitioned during the
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2005-2014 Supreme Court terms. The assessment is comprised of two parts: First, following
conventional scholarship, I model the certiorari decision as a binary choice via logit regression.
The purpose of this analysis is to determine the extent to which ideological and jurisprudential
considerations explain the variance observed in grants of certiorari in Roberts Era free
expression cases.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the degree to which the Court’s free
expression merits docket reflects the certiorari docket. While the relationship between issue area
“percolation” and granting certiorari is unclear, I begin with the premise that the Court will be at
least somewhat responsive to the frequency of issues appearing in petitions for certiorari. If so, a
degree of congruency between the two dockets might be expected so that if government
employee cases are frequently petitioned to the Court, the merits docket will be comprised of a
comparable proportion of government employee speech cases. Instead, I find substantial
disparity between the two dockets, such that the Court appears to be actively hunting for cases
featuring claims against unions and campaign finance regulations. These two issue areas are the
most overrepresented on the Court’s merits agenda, while those involving claims brought by
government employee whistleblowers and student speakers are the most underrepresented.
Somewhat surprisingly, within-case analyses of these issue areas suggest the role of ideology in
the decision to grant certiorari varies considerably and its effect is not always in the expected
direction.
One of the key claims advanced here is that certiorari decisions have untapped analytical
potential: They represent additional “dataset observations” or “causal process observations” that
can be employed in assessing these theoretical claims (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). Inference
always entails “using the facts we know to learn about facts we do not know,” but the failure to
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connect the certiorari and merits stages in studies of Supreme Court decision-making – or even
account for case selection issues in those studies – highlights just how little scholars actually
know about the universe of cases before the Court (Epstein and King 2002, 21). The failure to
account for the certiorari decision presents two related but distinct issues. Methodologically, the
exclusive focus on cases granted certiorari and formally decided on the merits essentially
constitutes a truncated, non-random sample. More formally stated, the problem is that all cases
denied certiorari are dropped from the sample even though characteristics of the independent
variable are available for all cases (Long 1997, 187, 199-201; Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999,
552).
More substantively, ignoring the certiorari docket is to ignore normative concerns about
the availability of the free speech clause’s protection for various interests and individuals in
society (Fischman 2013, 120). For many litigants, the denial of review by the nation’s high court
is effectively the end of the line. As Yates, Cann, and Boyea point out, “By focusing primarily
on decisions on the merits…the attitudinal model overlooks the fullness of the extended
litigation process that leads to legal outcomes” (2013, 850). More than mere docket management,
certiorari is a process by which the contours of law can be shaped to the benefit or detriment of
various classes of individuals across geographically expansive federal judicial circuits. This
effort, then, carries important implications for judicial decision-making studies seeking to make
inferences about causes of judicial behavior across different time periods and within particular
issue areas.
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Free Expression and Certiorari: A Primer
As described in previous chapters, general reverence for the First Amendment is both a
cause and effect of the scrutiny following Roberts Court’s decisions defining the scope and
coverage of that fundamental protection. This scholarly focus has, in turn, generated numerous
and contradictory descriptions of the Court as simultaneously “the most pro-speech Court in
history,” “not a free speech Court,” a Court motivated by in-group bias, and a Court that has
“really landed the plane” in difficult free expression cases (Ken Starr, quoted in Chemerinsky
2011; Epstein, Parker, and Segal 2013; David Hudson Jr., quoted in Liptak 2012). For example,
Chemerinsky has strongly denounced the Court’s decisions in student speech, prisoner speech,
and campaign finance decisions in concluding the Court is “not a pro-speech Court”
(Chemerinsky 2011). Similar efforts have varied considerably in terms of the number and types
of cases evaluated in making inferences about the Court’s motivations in this area (Tribe and
Matz 2014, Coyle 2013), but they have not featured systematic case selection and analysis. Some
scholars have also suggested that the Roberts Court record on free expression is not wellexplained (or exclusively explained) by the ideological preferences of the justices (Tushnet 2013,
215; Richards 2013; Knowles and Lichtman 2015, 242). Common to all recent scholarship on
free expression and the Roberts Era is the failure to even mention the Court’s discretionary
powers in shaping the merits agenda.

The Court’s Criteria: Rule 10
The Court’s near-total discretion over its merits docket is the institutional rule that at
once creates opportunities and problems for judicial decision-making scholarship. As Crowe
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explains in his study of the development of the federal judiciary, “The Judicial Act of 1925 gave
the Court near-complete control over its docket for the first time in history” (Crowe 2012,
211). 27 Certiorari, now the most common path to nation’s highest Court, is the decision by at
least four members of the Court to accept a case to the Court’s docket for oral argument. Denials
of certiorari have the formal effect of allowing the lower court decision to stand with limited
precedential value (Baum 2008, 33). The Court’s self-imposed, official guidelines for granting
certiorari are now known collectively as Rule 10 (previously Rule 19), which suggests grants
will occur when:
“A United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter; has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last
resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
or sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s
supervisory power;” or,
“A state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that
conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a United States
court of appeals;” or,
“A state court of a United States court of appeals has decided an important question of
federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an
important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant decision of this Court.” 28

Rule 10 is prefaced by the reminder that certiorari is “not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion.” As should also be apparent, “the criteria in Rule [10] are sufficiently vague and
various to prevent even likely guesses about reasons for denial” (Provine 1980, 53-54). Further

27 Crowe also notes that, “The docket control was only “near-complete” because the act did preserve mandatory
jurisdiction in a few select types of cases – notably, those relating to rulings by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and injunctions against administrative agencies. In 1988, the right of appeal to the Court was virtually
eliminated; 102 Stat. 662 (June 27, 1988)” (Crowe 2012, 211 (fn. 89)).
28 “Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States.” Last accessed Oct. 12, 2016.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/ctrules/2013RulesoftheCourt.pdf
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complications arise from the lack of transparency endemic to this stage of judicial decisionmaking: Due to the “insane secrecy” surrounding the process (Cordray and Cordray 2008; see
also Segall 2015), comprehensive data on the relationship between agenda-setting and merits
votes is not available beyond those studies reliant on the released papers of a handful of justices
during the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Eras (Provine 1980; Caldeira and Wright 1988; Ulmer
1984; Brenner, Whitmeyer, and Spaeth 2006; Black and Owens 2009; see generally Brenner
2000). 29
The problems associated with the lack of judicial transparency are exacerbated by the
decision rule for certiorari: Unlike votes on the merits, it takes only four votes for a grant of
certiorari by the Supreme Court. It could be the case that the Court’s four liberal justices
frequently deny certiorari to prevent an expected conservative win on the merits of a case (a socalled defensive denial) or that the Court’s conservatives deny based on uncertainty surrounding
Justice Kennedy’s swing vote. This may be especially true in free expression cases, where
Justice Kennedy’s vote and libertarian streak have been important considerations (Knowles
2015, 177-184). Without access to records of individual judicial votes at the certiorari stage,
however, the data generated by the certiorari process present an ecological inference issue that is
difficult to surmount (King 1997, 1-6).
The missing data problem for different periods of the Court’s history has led some
political scientists to caution against attributing outcome oriented voting to justices in all but the
most narrow of decisions to deny certiorari (Brenner, Whitmeyer, and Spaeth 2006, 225). As
Brenner, Whitmeyer, and Spaeth have shown, attribution of outcome oriented voting without

29 Provine (1980) and Ulmer (1984) rely on the papers of Justice Burton, while Black and Owens (2009) mine the
papers of Justice Blackmun.
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individual voting data through the use of simulation techniques has overstated the degree to
which outcome considerations drive the Supreme Court’s agenda (2006, 233). Still, other
scholars have examined the personal papers made public by former justices and found that
strategic, outcome oriented voting is a “substantial” element of the case selection process while
also acknowledging the importance of jurisprudential and institutional concerns (Cordray and
Cordray 2008).
The struggle to give meaning to and extract inferences from the decision on certiorari is
not limited to research design issues, however. In response to a question posed by Law Professor
A.E. Dick Howard, “If you decide not to take a case, isn’t there an implicit affirmation of the
result of that case below?,” then-Associate Justice O’Connor responded, “There isn’t. It has no
precedential value, a denial of certiorari.” Justice Clarence Thomas followed with, “I think some
of the public reporting on what we say confuses what we’ve done in the cert. process. When we
don’t take a case, often it is reported that ‘The Supreme Court today upheld…’ or ‘The Supreme
Court today ordered…’ when in fact we’ve done no such thing.” 30 These explanations, however,
wink at reality. They do not adequately account for the experiences of individuals seeking
redress by the Court: For many litigants, the denial of review by the nation’s high court is
effectively the end of the line. Nor do they adequately account for the citizens residing within the
federal circuits for which the decision left standing often takes on precedential value. As
Hellman noted, “the cases that become ‘Supreme Court cases’ do so as the result of a selection
process that is no less interesting and important than the decisional process that follows”
(Hellman 1985, 948; see also Ulmer 1972, 435).

30 Portions of this documentary are available on YouTube; the link to the relevant videoclip is “SCOTUS Video Part
1,” scotusfan, Feb. 18, 2009 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_6Noye3MKkg&spfreload=10 Last accessed Aug.
31, 2016.
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From this perspective, the ability of the justices to powerfully yet fractiously shape law
through certiorari docket management comes into focus. Seasoned justices surely understand that
denials of certiorari have important political and legal effects; though lacking scalpel precision, a
conservative judicial bloc can craft law to conservative preferences by consistently refusing to
grant certiorari for prisoners alleging free expression violations. In that same scenario, liberal to
moderate justices may deny certiorari for fear of judicial conservatives setting a more speech
restrictive precedent for prisoners. More unusual, however, would be for judicial conservatives
to consistently deny certiorari in a way that is either damaging to conservative political interests
or beneficial to liberal political interests. If a conservative Court consistently denies certiorari in
school speech cases featuring mainstream religious claimants, then the ideological explanation
for judicial behavior has failed a fairly easy test, a result that casts doubt upon or further narrows
the scope of ideological attributions of judicial behavior.
Even without access to the justices’ individual certiorari votes, earlier work concerned
with determinants of Supreme Court agenda setting suggests the untapped potential of the
Court’s certiorari docket. Songer’s early study of the political considerations in play at the
certiorari stage noted the problem of missing individual votes and the reliance on the papers of
retired justices, yet still offered measures of association and data in support of the position that
political cues are at least as relevant as jurisprudential ones in deciding whether to grant
certiorari (1979, 1189-1192). 31 The inferential object of Songer’s study and others examining
votes on certiorari has been the motivations of the justices at the certiorari stage across issue
areas and across time. In other words, these scholars were more concerned with developing
31 Songer assigned decision direction codes (liberal or conservative) to all economic regulation cases decided in the
1935, 1941, 1967, and 1972 terms, finding that conservative Courts tended to grant certiorari more often for liberal
lower court decisions and that liberal Courts tended to grant when lower court decision favored conservative
claimants.
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general explanations for behavior at the gatekeeping stage, whether the relevant cues were
ideological or jurisprudential. These theoretical insights, however, can also help scholars
connect the two stages of the Court’s decision-making process within particular issue areas: The
inference that the Roberts Court favors a conservative vision of free expression becomes much
stronger if it can be shown that the Court also denies certiorari at higher rates when litigants
petition to challenge lower court, conservative “wins.” If this pattern is not observed, however,
judicial decision-making scholars may need to be far more circumspect when making inferential
claims.

Research Design
Questions and Hypotheses
To gain additional leverage on the question of which factors help explain the Roberts Era
free expression agenda, this chapter employs a multi-method research design combining
conventional quantitative analyses commonly specified in studies of Supreme Court agendasetting with a less conventional series of within-case studies of particular issue areas of the
Court’s certiorari docket. The purpose of these analyses is to address the following research
questions and related hypotheses:
Q1: To what extent do ideological preferences help explain the Court’s free expression agenda?
H1: The likelihood of a grant of certiorari increases when the lower court decision direction is
liberal and/or issued by Democratic-appointed judges. Conversely, the likelihood of a grant of
certiorari decreases when the lower court decision is conservative and/or issued by GOP-
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appointed judges. Confirmation of this hypothesis represents additional evidence in support of
the claim that ideological considerations have driven the free speech agenda of the Roberts
Court.
Q2: To what extent to do jurisprudential preferences help explain the Court’s free expression
agenda?
H2: The cases granted certiorari by SCOTUS are those presenting “jurisprudential cues,”
including square conflict, the U.S. as a litigating party, amicus briefs, and the presence of a
dissenting opinion in the court from which certiorari was petitioned. Confirmation of this
hypothesis represents additional evidence in support of the claim that legal considerations have
driven the free speech agenda of the Roberts Court.
Q3: To what extent does the Roberts Court’s free expression merits docket reflect the certiorari
docket?
H3: The cases granted certiorari by SCOTUS are more likely to be those that have sufficiently
“percolated” in the lower courts. Confirmation of this hypothesis would suggest that the Court
is responsive to litigation below, and that its record generally reflects the contours of legal
contestation.

Data Collection
To identify all free speech denials of certiorari during the Roberts Court era, I used the
search function of Lexis-Nexis Academic database. I searched for all federal appellate decisions
from January 1, 2005 to August 30, 2015 under the search term “free speech,” which returned
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3,018 decisions. I repeated this process for all state high courts during the same time period,
yielding a total of 958 decisions. On the search results screen, Lexis-Nexis provides a brief case
history of the decision, including citations, dates, and prior/subsequent court decisions. I
scanned these results screens for those decisions that noted the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
For these cases, I recorded the citation for the federal appellate court decision, date of cert.
denial, and the federal circuit deciding the case (1st, 2nd, D.C., etc.). I then read each opinion to
identify the speech claimant (speaker), type of speech (commercial, anti-union, etc.), and the
government entity suppressing the speech in the case (federal, state, local). In order to exclude
non-comparable cases that might be considered “frivolous” or would have an exceedingly low
chance of being granted certiorari, I also read opinions to determine whether the appellate court
assessed the free speech claim on the merits.
To ensure comparability between free expression cases decided by the Court and those
denied certiorari, I excluded cases where plaintiffs did not appeal a decision on First Amendment
free expression grounds, the case was considered not properly before the Court, the question in
the case was determined to be non-justiciable on ripeness, mootness, or standing grounds, cases
decided on statutory grounds, claims failing to meet the threshold (failure to state a First
Amendment claim), and cases resolved on Younger-Huffman and Rooker-Feldman grounds doctrinal rules generally concerned with justiciability of case in federal courts. These
theoretically replicable coding rules are employed to limit the universe of potential cases to those
that have achieved a degree of “certworthiness” so as to avoid conceptual stretching and ensure
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docket comparability via “the careful selection of cases that fit the research problem” (Ljiphart
1975, 167). 32
After applying the above criteria to the search, the resulting dataset contains 309 free
speech cases decided by a federal appellate court or state high court where petitions for certiorari
were filed since the 2005 term. The dependent variable of interest is the Supreme Court’s
decision to grant certiorari in a free speech controversy decided by a lower federal appellate
court or state high court. Because the votes of the individual justices to grant certiorari are not
made public, the nature of the analyses conducted here are necessarily limited. However, they
still provide insight as to whether the Roberts Court can be accurately characterized as a
conservative, pro-speech Court, and whether the Court’s free speech decisions on the merits are
representative of the body of cases that have percolated through the lower federal courts.

Variables Overview
Previous scholarship reveals that judicial behavior at the certiorari stage is motivated by a
mixture of jurisprudential and ideological “cues” or signals that justices use to help decide
whether a case should be added to the merits docket. Here, the term “jurisprudential cues” refers
to those case factors that generally indicate a case presents important legal questions that should
be addressed. Conventional jurisprudential cues include the presence of conflict between sister
circuits, the presence of a dissenting opinion (which may indicate disagreement about the

32 This approach is not without its own infirmities, as “certworthiness” is a highly subjective concept that not even
the Justices can agree upon or sharpen beyond a certain degree of abstraction. The inclusion rules described here,
however, theoretically allow for replication tests by scholars wishing to compare cases on either side of the certiorari
decision. See also Mak, Sidman, and Sommer (2013) for similar concerns and response in the context of selection
bias in litigator decisions to file petitions for cert.
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application of the proper legal standard to the facts of a particular controversy), and the presence
of the United States as a litigating party in the case. “Ideological cues” refers to case factors that
indicate a particular policy position, speaker, speech type, or even speech suppressor is at stake
in a particular case. These cues include the direction of the lower court decision from which
certiorari is petitioned and the political composition of the panel majority or en banc Court from
which certiorari is petitioned. Admittedly, this categorical distinction has its limitations. The
signals that have been characterized as jurisprudential-related may be as much an indication of
the ideological divisiveness as the legal importance of an issue. This may be most problematic
for the number of amicus briefs filed with the Court at the certiorari stage, described in further
detail below. Each of these italicized terms or phrases represents a covariate included in the logit
model specified in Table 5.1. I also operationalize an issue area preference variable to gauge the
extent to which the court’s certiorari docket is congruent to the merits docket. In the paragraphs
that follow, I describe the process for coding each of these variables.

Variables: Square Conflict
Previous work on certiorari has found that the existence of conflicts among circuits has a
statistically significant effect on the likelihood of the Court granting certiorari (Ulmer 1976;
1984). Anonymous interviews with justices and clerks have also suggested that the existence of
conflict among circuits increases the chance of a cert. grant. Yet coding cases for the existence
of conflict is not as straightforward as it may first appear. Litigators wishing to have their case
heard by the Court – knowing this concern – are likely to frame their dispute as one where
conflict exists among federal circuits. Ulmer’s work itself, often referenced in scholarship
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concerned with the Court’s agenda-setting power, notes the problem of discerning “claimed”
from “genuine” assertions of conflict but does not clearly state the coding rules for scoring cases
as featuring genuine conflicts (Perry 1991; Ulmer 1984, 904). 33 In addition, Perry was careful to
note that conflict is no guarantee of a grant of certiorari, instead packaging it with other
considerations (frivolity, important legal question, percolation) that are neither necessary nor
sufficient for granting certiorari. More recent work by Mak, Sidman, and Sommer (2013)
ignores the conflict variable in its entirety, citing a lack of data and the incentive for litigators to
find conflicts when none may exist (65-66).
Despite and because of these difficulties, I specify a conflict indicator based on the idea
of “square conflict” defined by Estreicher and Sexton (1984). A square conflict “occurs when
two or more courts – federal courts of appeals or state courts of last resort – take contrary
positions on the same legal issue” (732). To determine whether square conflict exists in Roberts
Court Era free expression cert. denials, I read each opinion via citation search on Lexis-Nexis
and code “1” for conflict when opinion authors reference disagreement in approaches with
“sister circuits,” or explicitly note the presence of intercircuit conflict. 34 The latter is most likely
to occur in dissenting opinions, as a circuit or state high court judge preferring a contrary result is
more likely to state a case for conflict than the majority in a given case. This reliance on
dissenting opinions is open to the charge that a judge in such a position has an incentive to allege
conflict when none exists – as Perry notes is the case for litigators – but in practice, both
majority opinion authors and dissenters have noted the presence of intercircuit conflict. Just as
33 Ulmer references the work of Feeney (1975), and collapses that framework to two categories of “genuine conflict”
and “no genuine conflict.” For Ulmer, genuine conflict occurs when either “direct conflict” (decision below deals
with same explicit point as some other case and reaches a contradictory result) or “strong partial conflict” (decision
below is in the same general area of the law as some other case and where the implications of the doctrine followed
in one case would compel an opposite result in the other) is present.
34 Another type of conflict occurs when a decision is arguably at odds with Supreme Court precedent. Due to the
general indeterminacy of precedent as applied to novel fact patterns, I do not code for this form of conflict.
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majority authors do not always “distinguish” cases instead of noting conflict, dissenters do not
always claim square conflict exists.35 A word of caution is needed, however, as this approach is
not without shortcomings: Federal judges with preferred policy outcomes surely have incentives
to use the language of conflict instrumentally. However, it is not subject to the same degree of
“fluffing” as the claims filed by litigators in petitions for certiorari.
Because of the incentive and documented tendency of petitioning attorneys to claim (or
overstate) conflict when none may exist, I err on the side of caution in scoring cases for conflict.
Square conflict cases feature such language as that in Judge Clay’s dissent in Discount Tobacco
City and Lottery v. United States (2013), stating, “The recent decision from the D.C. district
court also supports my analysis and conclusion that the color graphic warning requirement
constitutes compelled speech which violates the First Amendment” (majority in conflict with
D.C. Court)( 674 F.3D 509, 530 (Clay, J., dissenting)), Judge Benavides’ majority opinion in
Morgan v. Swanson (2011), noting that on the question of whether First Amendment law
requires a “categorical ban on all viewpoint discrimination in public schools,” that, “our sister
circuits have divided over the question. Indeed, as we have previously recognized, ‘[a] split
exists among the Circuits on the question of whether Hazelwood requires viewpoint neutrality"
in public schools’” (659 F.3d 359, 379), and Judge Lynch’s concurring opinion in Locke v.
Karass (2007), stating that, “The National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation,
representing non-unionized Maine state employees, brought this case in the hopes of persuading

35 There is no single accepted method in contemporary scholarship for determining the existence of actual – rather
than alleged – conflict among circuits. For example, Black and Owens (2009) code for “strong conflict,” “weak
conflict,” and “alleged conflict” variables, with the former two determined by clerk notations found in the papers of
Justice Harry Blackmun and the latter found by reviewing the petitioner’s brief for certiorari (1073). Caldeira,
Wright, and Zorn (2012) also code for alleged conflict based on the brief of the petitioning attorney, but do not
include a description of how they coded for actual conflict (11).

229
the Supreme Court to resolve an issue that the Court left unanswered in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n and on which the circuit courts differ.” (498 F.3d 49, 66 (Lynch, J., concurring)). 36

Variables: Amicus Curiae Briefs as Cue
Scholars have found that amicus briefs tend to correlate with grants of certiorari.
According to Caldeira and Wright, the amicus-as-cue theory “assumes that the potential
significance of a case is proportional to the demand for adjudication among affected parties and
that the amount of amicus curiae participation reflects the demand for adjudication” (1988,
1112). Importantly, the authors found that the direction of the brief – for or against the grant of
certiorari – matters less than the presence of the brief itself. In other words, amicus briefs filed
before the certiorari cut-point function primarily as signals to the justices regarding the policy
importance of a case. 37
To determine the presence and number of amicus briefs in a case prior to the certiorari
cut-point, I entered the docket number assigned to cases by the Court in the search tool at
supremecourt.gov. The docket results for each case provides general case details, including the
timeline of the case from the point at which a petition for certiorari was filed, all the way to the
decision on the merits (for those cases granted certiorari.). Following the work of Black and
Owens (2009), I code the variable continuously with an expected positive relationship between
number of amicus briefs and the probability of a grant of certiorari.

36 In addition, Judge Lipez’s majority opinion discusses the results reached the Third, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits that
created a conflict on the issue of union “pooled resources” (498 F.3d 49, 60-64).
37 It is not clear whether the findings presented by Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn (2012) confirm a steadily declining
trend in amicus relevance to cert. grants, whether scholars should continue to rely on amicus briefs in opposition to
cert., or interest group maintenance as the primary reason for filing cert. stage amicus briefs (8).
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Variables: Composition of Lower Court Panel as Ideological Cue
The most readily apparent signal to Supreme Court judges (the “principals” in the
principal-agent relationship between the U.S. Supreme Court and federal appellate courts) is the
proximate ideology of the appointing president (see Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994, 679-680
for additional indicators). In this project, the question is not whether congruence or
responsiveness exists between doctrinal goals of courts situated in a hierarchical relationship, but
whether a relatively stable Roberts Court’s free expression agenda is marked by ideological
considerations at the agenda-setting stage.
If ideological cues are an important consideration when considering cert. petitions, then
we should expect the Court to be more likely to grant review when the majority decision below
is issued by Democratic appointees and less likely when the decision is issued by Republican
appointees. As Sisk and Heise (2005, 783-790) have noted, the appointing president proximate
measure of ideology is imperfect. However, the differences between the measure and Judicial
Common Space scores (which take into account the norm of senatorial courtesy) also appear to
be marginal (see also Fischman and Law 2009, 36-40).
To determine the composition of the panel, Court en banc, or state high court deciding
the case from which certiorari was petitioned, I searched for each judge’s appointing president at
the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Federal Judges. 38 Each decision was
then coded as Democratic (majority decision of panel or en banc Court by Democratic
appointees), Republican (majority decision of panel or en banc Court by GOP appointees), or
Mixed/Unknown (majority decision of panel or en banc Court evenly split between Democratic

38 Federal Judicial Center, “Biographical Directory of Federal Judges,” Last accessed May 18, 2016.
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/judges.html
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and Republican appointees). Because state high court judges are often (though not always)
elected in “non-partisan” elections or retain party affiliations that may not always be comparable
to the interests of the appointing national party regime, these panels are also scored as Mixed or
Unknown.

Variables: Issue Area Frequency as a General Proxy for “Percolation”
One point of emphasis in Perry’s account of the Supreme Court’s agenda setting was the
idea of percolation, and its effect on the likelihood of a grant of certiorari:
Justices like the smell of well-percolated cases. A case that has not percolated through
various courts will usually be considered uncertworthy. The concept is one well known
in jurisprudence. The Supreme Court exists primarily to clarify the law. Once it speaks,
however, its interpretation is final, so justices want to make sure that when they do speak,
they can do so as intelligently as possible. It is good jurisprudence and makes good sense
to put off rendering an interpretation as long as possible – or more precisely, as long as
the benefits of avoidance outweigh the problems – so that the Court can benefit from
analysis by others (Perry 1991, 230-231).
The idea that particular issues must be sufficiently percolated – heard by lower courts and
discussed in other forums – is perhaps one of the most subjective indicators of certworthiness
(Perry 1991, 232). Recently, scholars have interrogated the relationship between the percolation
of inter-circuit conflicts and the “optimum” time for the Supreme Court to wait until resolving
the conflict (Beim and Rader 2015; Clark and Kastellec 2013). Alternatively, percolation may
rest on a broader definition of issue area: “The Court had decided to stay away from certain
areas. For example, they decided to stay away from double jeopardy cases…they had decided
several cases the year before, and they wanted to see how it was beginning to work its way out”
(Perry 1991, 233).

232
From a theoretical perspective, the relationship between the Court’s docket and the
litigation that has percolated in the lower courts is unclear. At a fundamental level, issue areas
that have been more heavily litigated – as reflected in the number of cert. petitions filed – might
be more likely to be reviewed than those that have not. Recent work by scholars does not
attempt to control for frequency within particular issue areas (Lindquist and Klein 2006; Mak et
al. 2013; Beim and Rader 2014), perhaps due to the immense undertaking of disaggregating not
only by general issue areas (First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, capital cases, etc.) but also
specific issue areas within each of those subjects. In addition, Perry’s interviews with justices,
clerks, and other Court actors pointed in different directions. Some issues, for example, were
deemed certworthy due to adequate “percolation” in lower courts due to the perception of
intercircuit conflict. Others reached certworthiness via percolation because a decision by the
U.S. Supreme Court had been applied by lower courts and the Court wished to revisit or adjust
its approach based on observable results. Generally, the certiorari function is a way for the
justices to clarify law or correct perceived errors by lower courts (230-233). Less has been
written about how the Court’s filtering process and concern for percolation relates to entire
classes of litigants within particular issue areas.
If the Court is concerned with making clear legal rules for lower courts to follow,
engaged in error correction, or creating a rule that favors certain classes of litigants over others,
then the relationship between issue area frequency and the likelihood of certiorari is at least an
interesting empirical question. In order to better understand this relationship, I count the
number of cases petitioned to the Court within each inductively determined issue area from 2006
to 2015. Generally, the modal categories for each year were assigned a code of “high
frequency,” issue areas appearing less frequently were coded as “medium frequency,” and issue
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areas petitioned only once or twice each year were coded as “low frequency.” Appendix G
provides the counts for each issue area by year, as well as whether codes of high frequency (H)
or medium frequency (M) were assigned. All others received the low frequency code.
Additional details on the coding choices and assumptions employed in scoring these indicators
are provided in chapter two, Appendix A, Appendix G, and Appendix H.
Issue areas were inductively derived on the basis of jurisprudential, speaker, and speech
considerations. 39 For example, religious student speech claims stand apart from “traditional”
student speech claims due to the former involving additional jurisprudential considerations
beyond the application of the Court’s line of Tinker v. Des Moines (1969) cases, such as
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Similarly, government speech cases – usually involving
claims of retaliatory actions for speech or so-called whistleblower claims – generally fall into the
Court’s Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) or Bivens (1971) streams of jurisprudence. 40
“Free market” electoral speech claims – challenges to expenditure or contribution limitations –
differ from traditional political, electoral, or policy speech claims due to the divergent
interpretations of what constitutes speech, as well as jurisprudential considerations; free market
electoral speech claims are generally governed by a restrictive burden test in light of the
government interest in regulating elections, while the latter is often – though not always - framed
as a subject matter restriction controversy.

39 The “Controversial Ideology” category captures claims that could broadly be captured under the labels of “liberal”
or “conservative,” but for concerns about harmful and/or inaccurate stereotypes mentioned by Pettys (2014) they are
placed in this residual category. This includes racist (KKK rallies), anti-war, animal rights, and pro-environmental
speakers and speech.
40 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), holding that
individuals may bring suits for damage against federal agents acting under the color of law but acting
unconstitutionally.
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Additional Variables: U.S. as Litigating Party and Dissent
Scholars have found correlations between a number of other variables and the decision to
grant certiorari. Tanenhaus et al. examined certiorari petitions from the 1947 to 1953 terms and
found a number of cues increasing the chances for a grant of certiorari, including the presence of
the United States as a petitioner, dissent among judges at the Court from which certiorari was
petitioned, and the presence of a civil liberties issue (1963, 111). These associations were
confirmed by Armstrong and Johnson (1982), who examined samples of certiorari petitions from
four terms during the mid-1960s and 1970s. As such, I code the theoretically relevant “cue”
indicators dichotomously. I depart from Tanenhaus et al. and Perry in that I code the U.S.
variable as “1” when the United States is either a petitioner or respondent in a particular case
(Perry and Tanenhaus et al. code only for the U.S. as a petitioner). Perry (1991) found a cert.
grant rate of 100% for grants where the U.S. was petitioner, compared to just 4% when a
respondent (136-137). The choice to code for the presence of the U.S. as a litigating party
(petitioner or respondent) was informed by work that has found a emergent hostility toward
Congress in First Amendment free speech cases (Keck 2007, 332-333); cases presenting conflict
between U.S. statutes and rights claimants often take a form such that the U.S. is a respondent in
these cases.
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Table 5.1 – Summary Statistics: Certiorari Docket and Free Expression (2005-2014 Terms)
Independent Variable

Denials
(Mean)

Grants
(Mean)

Overall
(Mean)

Coding

Ideological Direction (Case)
Liberal
Undetermined
Conservative

.3774
.2906
.3321

.5682
.2045
.2273

.4045
.2783
.3172

=0
=1
=2

Lower Court Composition
Democratic
Mixed/Unknown
Republican

.3472
.0755
.5774

.3864
.2273
.3864

.3528
.0971
.5502

=0
=1
=2

Ideological Direction
(Speaker)
Liberal
Undetermined
Conservative

.4528
.1623
.3849

.4091
.0909
.5000

44.66
15.21
40.13

=0
=1
=2

Speech Claim Vote Direction
AntiMixed
Pro-

.7321
.0792
.1887

.4545
.0682
.4773

.6926
.0777
.2298

=0
=1
=2

Conflict

.0830

.2045

.1003

=1

Amicus Briefs

.8576

.1424

.6246

=0 to 16

Dissent

.1736

.4091

.2071

=1

U.S. as Litigating Party

.1811

.2955

.1974

=1

Issue Area Preference
Low Frequency
Medium Frequency
High Frequency

.4000
.2943
.3057

.6136
.2045
.1818

.4304
.2816
.2880

=1
=2
=3

N

265

44

309

Results
The summary statistics in Table 5.1 provide ideological proportions of the lower court
decisions from which certiorari have been petitioned. At this basic level, there is no clear
ideological component to the Roberts Court’s free speech agenda – nearly 40% of the Court’s

236
denials of certiorari have let liberal lower court decisions stand, while just over 30% of denials
have been for conservative lower court decisions. While unobserved, strategic voting may play a
role in some cases, at this aggregate level a Court motivated by political outcomes might
generally be expected to deny certiorari at a greater rate for conservative decisions, or decisions
issued by GOP-appointed appellate judges.
Table 5.2 – Logit Regression, Grants of Certiorari (2005-2015)
Variable

Coef.
R.S.E.
(Full Model)

Coef.
R.S.E.
(Restricted Model)

-.8316
-.9211
---

.5145
.5200
---

-.7926
-.7612
---

.4197
.4271
---

1.516***
.6174
---

.4086
.7251
---

Panel Composition Below
Majority GOP
Mixed/Undetermined
Majority Dem. (Baseline)

-.3489
.8672
---

.4390
.6420
---

-.4755
1.097*

.3763
.4723

Jurisprudential Cues
U.S. Litigating Party
Amicus Briefs
Conflict
Dissent Below

1.024*
.2624*
1.124*
.0079

.4985
.1151
.5135
.5522

Agenda/Issue Preference
Low Frequency (Baseline)
Medium Frequency
High Frequency

---1.164*
-.6706

--.5575
.5502

-2.089***

.4805

-1.305***

.2902

Direction
Conservative
Undetermined
Liberal (Baseline)
Speech Claim
Pro-Speech
Mixed
Anti-Speech (Baseline)

Constant
N = 309

Note: Logit coefficients with robust standard errors
(R.S.E.); p<.001***, p<.01**, p<.05*. Log Likelihood
Reduction: -126.47 to -98.58 (full), -126.47 to -118.54
(restricted); Pseudo R2: 0.22 (full), 0.06 (restricted).
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Table 5.2 represents a more rigorous test of H1 via logit regression analysis. In Roberts
Era free expression cases, the effect of ideology on the likelihood of a grant of certiorari does not
register at conventional levels of statistical significance: This is true for the direction of the lower
court decision from which certiorari is petitioned as well as the composition of the panel or en
banc court majority for that decision. All of the jurisprudential cue coefficients are in the
expected positive direction, and all with the exception of the presence of a dissenting opinion
below register at conventional levels of statistical significance.
Figure 5.1 – Predicted Probabilities, Grants of Certiorari (2005-2014 Terms) 41

-.09
Undetermined Direction
-.083
Conservative Direction
.055
Mixed/Undetermined Speech Vote
.17
Pro-Speech Vote
-.032
GOP Majority Panel
.11
Undetermined/Bipartisan Majority Panel
.11
U.S. Litigating Party
.025
Amicus (Amici) Briefs
.13
Conflict
.00075
Dissent Below
-.1
Medium Frequency
-.068
High Frequency

-.2

.2
.1
0
-.1
Cert. Grant Probabilities (AMEs)

.3

41 The probability of a grant of certiorari is represented by labeled dots, while the brackets represent 95% confidence
intervals around those probabilities.
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To better visualize these relationships, Figure 5.1 provides the predicted probabilities of
grants of certiorari via the average marginal effects of changes in each variable while holding all
others constant at their means. Setting liberal lower court decisions as the baseline category,
conservative lower court decisions are 8.3percentage points less likely to be granted certiorari,
while ideologically undetermined decisions are 9.0 percentage points less likely to result in a
grant. However, these relationships do not register at conventional levels of statistical
significance. At some level, whether the direction of the decision below affects certiorari is an
artifact of statistical conventions. While the p-value for the conservative direction coefficient is
not less than the .05 threshold commonly set in regression results tables (and was chosen here
prior to calculating results), it does pass the .10 threshold less commonly used. In other words,
the choice of cut-off value selected here might have resulted in a “type two error,” or accepting
the null hypothesis (no relationship between the ideological direction of the decision below and
the decision to grant certiorari). Ultimately, the borderline significance of the conservative
direction coefficient is open to interpretation but it does at least partially address one important
caveat to this chapter: Strategic voting at the certiorari stage is not explored in great detail. This
is because, absent the individual voting information of the justices at the conference stage, there
is little way of knowing whether the justices were engaged in strategic grants or denials of
certiorari. However, the fact that the primary ideological variable (decision direction below)
approaches conventional levels of statistical significance, it suggests that it is an important cue
for the justices even while assuming strategic moves among the justices have occurred.
Of some interest, the Court is also more likely to grant certiorari for pro-speech decisions
issued by lower courts compared to anti-speech decisions (17.43 percentage points). Overall,
however, jurisprudential cues are the best predictor of grants of certiorari in contemporary free
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expression controversies, as the magnitudes of the effects indicate for U.S. as a litigating party
(11.37 percentage points more likely when the condition is present), amicus curiae (2.5
percentage points more likely for each additional brief filed), and conflict (13.3 percentage
points more likely). Across the population of cases petitioned for certiorari, there is statistically
significant support for non-ideological explanations of judicial behavior in free expression
controversies (H2), and less support for ideological explanations (H1).

Hunting for Cases: Disaggregation by Issue Area
The coefficients displayed in Table 5.2 suggest that ideological cues are less important to
the Justices than jurisprudential ones, as neither the direction of the lower court decision nor the
composition of the panel majority for the decision from which certiorari is petitioned are
statistically significant predictors of certiorari grants for free expression cases before the Roberts
Court. If it is the case that ideological characteristics of cases below do not correlate with the
certiorari decision and, more subtly, that the Court’s merits and certiorari dockets reflect some
degree of congruency, then scholars claiming a non-ideological explanation for the Court’s
behavior in free expression cases have another analytical leg to stand on (H2). If, however,
disparities between the two dockets exist, there may be reason to believe the Court does respond
to ideological cues but only within particular issue areas. In fact, the probabilities reported in
Figure 5.1 for issue area presence on the Court’s certiorari docket suggest such disparities. Issue
areas coded as medium frequency are 9.9% points less likely to be granted certiorari and those
scored as high frequency are 7.6% points less likely than those characterized as low frequency
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to be granted certiorari, though the latter does not register at conventional levels of statistical
significance.
Table 5.3 sorts issue area categories in descending value of the difference between
composition of the Court’s free speech certiorari docket and free speech merits docket. The
issue areas with the greatest positive difference (indicating overrepresented areas) are those
concerning “Free Market Electoral” speech (challenges to campaign finance regulations), speech
claims involving unions and/or union (non)members, and controversies featuring nonmainstream ideologies (controversial ideologies such as white nationalism, anti-war, animal
rights, and others that may represent extreme conservative or liberal positions but do not
comfortably fit within the mainstream of American politics). Conversely, the issue areas
featuring the greatest negative difference include prisoner speech claims, government
employee/whistleblower speech claims, and (non-religious) student speech claims. If student
speech claims involving religion – a separate issue area due to the additional jurisprudential
consideration of Establishment and/or Free Exercise Clauses – are added to the student speech
category, it becomes the most underrepresented issue area on the Court’s merits docket.
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Table 5.3 – Comparison of Certiorari and Merits Dockets, 2005-2015 (Free Speech)
Issue Area
Free Market Electoral

Grants
13.64

Denials
3.77

Union

11.36

2.26

9.1

Non-Mainstream Ideology

11.36

4.15

7.21

Petition Circulation/Ballot Access

6.82

3.02

3.8

Elected Official Speech

4.55

1.51

3.04

Sex/Gender, Women's Health

4.55

2.64

1.91

Sex/Gender, LGBTQ Equality

2.27

0.75

1.52

Electoral/Political Speech

9.09

8.68

0.41

Religious

6.82

6.42

0.4

Media

2.27

1.89

0.38

Terrorism/Security

2.27

2.26

0.01

Faculty Speech

2.27

2.64

-0.37

Lawyer

2.27

3.77

-1.5

Libel, Related Torts

Difference
9.87

0

1.51

-1.51

2.27

4.53

-2.26

0

2.64

-2.64

Religious Student Speech

2.27

5.66

-3.39

Commercial/Business

2.27

6.04

-3.77

0

4.15

-4.15

Government Employee/Whistleblower

9.09

14.34

-5.25

Non-religious Student Speech

2.27

8.68

-6.41

Prisoner Speech

2.27

8.68

-6.41

Child Pornography
Sex/Gender, Adult Ent./Pornography

Miscellaneous

Note: N for each category by year is noted in Appendix G. Percentages indicate
proportion of overall certiorari docket from the 2005 through December of the
2015 term.

The overrepresentation of campaign finance and union speech claims on the merits
docket, which have overwhelmingly been anti-union and anti-campaign regulation, is consistent
with the conservative Court narrative advanced most forcefully by Erwin Chemerinsky (2011),
Monica Youn (2011), and David Kairys (2013). Continued litigation in the underrepresented
areas focusing on the application of strands of the Tinker standard (student speech), the Turner
test (prisoner speech), and the Ceballos framework (government employees) – have attracted

242
similar criticism. Chemerinsky (2011) singles out the Court’s merits decisions in these areas for
pointed criticism as evidence of the Court’s unwillingness to protect the interests of the relatively
powerless in society. David Cole (2010) and Youn (2011) have offered similar criticisms,
pointing to the Chief Justice’s opinion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S. 1
(2010)) and the Court’s emergent anti-union streak (ruling for non-members’ compelled speech
claims and against union fee collection efforts) as additional support for the ideological
explanation narrative.
In the sections that follow, I sketch a more Janus-faced portrait of the Court that at once
supports and casts doubt on ideological explanations for judicial behavior in contemporary free
expression controversies. To demonstrate how and why scholars can connect the two dockets to
reach better inferences about judicial behavior, I conduct within-case analyses of substantially
overrepresented issue areas on the Court’s certiorari docket: government employee and student
(religious and non-religious) speech claims. These issue areas have been chosen because they
have been flashpoints for scholarly criticism on the Court’s merits docket. For each issue area, I
examine three themes: The extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court has responded to the
petitioning of each issue area preference, any patterns that may exist concerning the ideological
direction of lower decisions from which certiorari is petitioned, and the contours of cases denied
certiorari in order to illustrate their geographically limited but substantial impacts on particular
social and legal classes. Overall, I find that the Justices are clearly hunting for vehicles to further
a conservative, Republican agenda in the context of union and campaign finance speech claims,
but that pattern has not been replicated within all of the underrepresented issue areas that
scholars have singled out for criticism.
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Government Employee Speech: Whistleblowers and Retaliation
The Court’s government employee speech jurisprudence has historically attempted to
balance the First Amendment rights of those employed by the government with the ability of
government organizations to function. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ 1892 decision in
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, a Massachusetts free expression decision against a local
police officer for “talking politics” and notable for the line, “The petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman,” stands
for the principle that government employment is a privilege rather than a right (155 Mass. 216,
220 (Mass., 1892)). This sentiment has been rejected or at least severely qualified by a series of
subsequent decisions, most notably Pickering v. Board of Education (1968) and Connick v.
Myers (1983) in order to both protect free expression and ensure government organization
functionality. 42
Generally speaking, the Court has adopted the “privilege” line of thinking in recent
decisions, though all justices appear to accept the premise that government employees receive
some level of First Amendment protection. Garcetti v. Ceballos, decided in 2006, is a recent
example of the Court’s approach to claims brought by whistleblowers for alleged retaliation.
Richard Ceballos, assistant district attorney for Los Angeles County, faced a series of retaliatory
actions after discovering (and sharing with defense attorneys) problems with a legal affidavit that
was the basis for the issuance of a search warrant in an ongoing criminal case. The Court,
42 391 U.S. 563 (1968), holding that the firing of a school district teacher for a letter published in a local newspaper
critical of the school board’s attempts to raise revenues violated the First Amendment rights of government
employees), and 461 U.S. 138 (1983), holding that a New Orleans’ ADA’s circulation of a workplace morale
petition after being transferred to another position and resulting in her termination was not speech on matters of a
public concern protected under the First Amendment.
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through Justice Kennedy in a 5-4 decision split along ideological lines, interpreted the precedent
established in Pickering v. Board of Education as allowing for retaliatory actions within
government hierarchies only when a government employee speaks on matters of public concern
as a citizen. Put another way, the Court held that to give government organizations breathing
room in the execution of duties, a free speech challenge can only stand when a government
employee’s speech on matters of public concern (here, alleged corruption in the Los Angeles
County District Attorney’s Office) is separate from that employee’s official duties. Writing for
the Court’s liberal bloc in dissent, Justice Souter assailed the formalistic, “false distinction”
between speaking as a government employee and speaking as a citizen.
In 2014, the Court appeared to backtrack a bit on the Ceballos holding in Lane v. Franks
(134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014)), which held that a government employee’s testimony in a federal
corruption investigation of a faculty member (and former legislator) at an Alabama community
college was protected by the First Amendment. Justice Sotomayor’s expression of pro-speech
principles was somewhat diminished by the simultaneous holding that the president of the
community college who had refused to rehire Lane was protected under the doctrine of qualified
immunity. Though the Ceballos decision has been maligned by some scholars (Chemerinsky
2011; Youn 2011), less is known about the Court’s broader government employee speech
agenda.
Though Table 5.4 reveals a generally unsympathetic trend toward government speech
claimants, the Court’s hostility to government employee speech claims has been marked by
important exceptions. Consider Jackler v. Byrne, where a 2nd Circuit panel vacated a lower court
decision that relied on Ceballos in dismissing a free speech claim brought by a police officer
who refused to make false statements relating to an excessive force complaint brought by a New
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York citizen (658 F.3d 225 (2nd Cir., 2011)). Jason Jackler, responding to a call for assistance by
fellow officer Greg Metakes, arrived to find suspect Zachary Jones in custody. Jackler described
Jones as having “multiple abrasions on his face” and indicated that he was subsequently “struck
in the face” by Officer Metakes after directing an obscenity toward him. After Jackler filed his
report in the course of Jones’ official complaint against Metakes, Jackler’s superiors pressured
him to withdraw his supplementary report – which he refused to do. Jackler, a probationary
officer at the time, was subsequently denied promotion to permanent officer in the Middletown
Police Department.
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Kearse noted that while the Ceballos decision was
controlling, the filing of a supplementary report concerning police misconduct was not simply
speech in the course of Jackler’s official duties as an agent of the state. Instead, “Jackler had a
strong First Amendment interest in refusing to make a report that was dishonest. We think it
clear that his refusals to change his statement as to what he witnessed when Metakes struck Jones
were directed at a matter of public concern, rather than an effort to further some private interest
of Jackler personally. The use of excessive force by a police officer is a matter of serious public
concern...Metakes's use of force against Jones did not implicate Jackler's ability to do his own
job properly…” (658 F.3d 225, 240). As such, the stated government interest in Ceballos – “the
proper performance of government functions” and the “integrity” of the Middletown Police
Department – was distinguished from the context of Jackler’s speech.
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Table 5.4 – Government Employee Speech Cert. Denials [Merits Decisions], 2005-2015
Liberal
Undetermined
Conservative
Totals

Anti-Speech
5
(12.82%)
7
(17.95%)
16 [1]
(41.03%)
28
(71.79%)

Mixed
0
3
(7.69%)
0

Pro-Speech
5 [2]
(12.82%)
3
(7.69%)
0

3
(7.69%)

8
(20.51%)

Totals
10
(25.64%)
13
(33.33%)
16
(41.03%)
39
(100%)

Beyond the Supreme Court decisions in the area of government speech which have
generally made such claims more difficult to prevail upon (Ceballos) or removed the teeth of
redress via qualified immunity (Lane), the frequency of government employee speech claims
illustrates the importance of accounting for certiorari decisions prior to advancing broad-brush
claims about the U.S. Supreme Court agenda. Table 5.4 illustrates that there is a conservative
cast to the Court’s agenda-setting decisions in this frequently litigated issue area. The Court has
been far more willing to deny certiorari for lower court decisions that have been decided in a
conservative direction, though a handful of less restrictive, liberal decisions have been left
standing. If, instead of a closer contextual reading of the identity of the government employee in
a case, the liberal outcome of interest is simply whether government employees prevail on free
speech claims, then the effect of the Court’s cert. denials has been generally anti-speech (71.79%
of all government employee cases). Still, decisions like Jackler that the Court has declined to
revisit in order to settle conflict signaled by lower court judges are useful legal resources for
employees bringing whistleblower actions against government employment hierarchies and draw
attention to how doctrinal standards can be meaningfully affected by the certiorari vote alone.
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Student Speech
In Morse v. Frederick, the Court considered the constitutionality of a school principal’s
suspension of Joseph Frederick, who had displayed a “pro-drug” banner near school property
during the passing of the 2002 Olympic Torch Relay through Juneau, Alaska. Frederick, along
with other students, unfurled a banner reading “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” during the event, for
which students were released from classes to attend. Frederick was not on school property
during the event, but the banner was clearly visible from the school. In his opinion for the Court
– again, mostly divided along ideological lines – Chief Justice Roberts argued that the school’s
interest in maintaining an environment free of disorder and “pro-drug” messages outweighed
Frederick’s countervailing interest in free expression under the First Amendment. The decision
was the latest in a line of student speech decisions that have incrementally chipped away at the
robust protection for student speech articulated by Justice Fortas in the Vietnam War protest case
of Tinker v. Des Moines (393 U.S. 503 (1969)). 43 Mary Beth Tinker, her brother, and another
student who chose to wear black armbands as a way to silently yet symbolically protest the
Vietnam conflict and was subsequently suspended for doing so. In ruling for Tinker and against
the school district armband policy, Justice Fortas made clear that students do not shed their
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate (393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).

43 The Court qualified the Tinker holding in subsequent decisions against student speech claims in Bethel School
District v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), which held that a school’s suspension of a student for a sexually explicit
student election nomination speech did not violate the First Amendment because it was unrelated to any political
viewpoint expressed, and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1987), which held that because schools were not
traditional public forums, the school’s removal of parts of a student news publication entailed a more deferential
level of First Amendment scrutiny. The Roberts Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007)
represents a similar narrowing of student speech rights.

248
Decisions on the merits represent only one vehicle by which the Court has adjusted the
boundaries of student speech protection. Most notably, in 2005 the Court denied certiorari in
Hosty v. Carter, a Seventh Circuit en banc decision that applied the Supreme Court’s Hazelwood
v. Kuhlmeier standard for restricting high school student speech to a university’s student
newspaper (412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir., 2005)). In the case, Jeni Porche and other members of The
Innovator, including Margaret Hosty, published articles critical of the Dean of the College of
Arts and Sciences (Roger K. Oden) following the university’s dismissal of The Innovator’s
faculty adviser, Geoffrey de Laforcade. Following requests by college administrators to retract
allegedly defamatory and false statements printed by the Innovator – requests falling on deaf ears
– Dean of Student Services Patricia Carter called the printer of the Innovator and asked that
printing cease for any issues not approved by the administration in advance. Due to the
uncertainty of funding for the printing of the paper, the printer complied and the student
newspaper brought suit in federal court under the First Amendment’s free speech and press
clauses. Following a finding of summary judgment for all officials except Patricia Carter, Carter
appealed the affirmance of a Seventh Circuit panel citing qualified immunity to the First
Amendment claim.
A divided Seventh Circuit ruled that SCOTUS’s Hazelwood precedent favored Carter’s
defense of qualified immunity, and that the Innovator’s First Amendment claim failed under the
Court’s line of student speech cases. Despite finding that the Innovator constituted a designated
public forum and was therefore shielded from ex post censorship or punishment for printing
materials the administration did not approve of, Judge Easterbrook’s opinion made clear that
Carter was protected from the suit under the doctrine of qualified immunity. In other words,
Carter could not have “reasonably” been expected to know the limits of the Court’s Hazelwood
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decision, which Easterbrook interpreted as hinging on whether student speech occurred in a
public forum or not, rather than whether the student speech at issue was that of a high school or
college student (412 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir., 2005)). Writing in dissent, Judge Evans argued that
the high school-college distinction was the rule articulated by the Court in Hazelwood rather than
the forum analysis rule relied on by Easterbrook and the majority, and noted that the decision put
the Court at odds with at least two other federal circuit courts (412 F.3d 731, 743-744 (Evans, J.,
dissenting)).
Table 5.5 – Student (Non-religious) Speech Cert. Denials [and Grants], 2005-2015

Liberal
Undetermined
Conservative
Totals

Anti-Speech
7
(29.17%)
1
(4.17%)
6 [1]
(25%)
14
(58.33%)

Mixed
__
2
(8.33%)
__
2
(8.33%)

Pro-Speech
3
(12.5%)
2
(8.33%)
3
(12.5%)
8
(33.33%)

Totals
10
(41.67%)
5
(20.83%)
9
(37.5%)
24
(100%)

The upshot of Hosty was a shrinking of the First Amendment protective sphere for
students at public universities, continuing the backslide of student speech rights since the Court’s
Tinker decision. Paired with Frederick, there is at least some congruency between the Court’s
certiorari and merits dockets when it comes to speaking in schools: According to Chemerinsky,
“It is difficult to read [Frederick] and see the Roberts Court as protective of free speech” (2011,
728). Out of the 44 free expression decisions on the Court’s merits docket during the period of
analysis, Frederick is the only source of light on that subject. But expanding the scope of
inquiry from merits decisions alone to the certiorari agenda suggests that this is an
overstatement.
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Table 5.5 reveals the Court’s student speech certiorari decisions as generally evenhanded
– liberal and conservative claims have either been rejected or granted at roughly the same rate. 44
The Court has left standing decisions upholding the constitutionality of school bans on displays
of the Confederate flag as well as holding unconstitutional school disciplinary actions for the
wearing of a shirt that portrayed President George W. Bush and the Iraq War in an unfavorable
light. 45 In two cases decided by the 3rd Circuit and denied certiorari in the 2011 term, the en
banc decisions asserted that the Tinker precedent was not limited to “brick and mortar”
schoolhouses, but also student speech originating on non-school district computers. 46 If the
assignment of more contextual, ideological codes for these claimants – a student speech claim
brought by a student for such right-wing speech as Confederate Flag displays is not clearly a
liberal win in the in-group bias account – is put aside and instead the liberal outcome of interest
is the availability of free speech claims for all students, the effect of cert. denials is pro-student
just over 33% of the time. Again, however, for students across multiple federal jurisdictions, the
Court’s Frederick precedent is not necessarily the most significant decision on the issue of
student speech protection. Certiorari denials have carved out notches of First Amendment
protection that exist alongside the Frederick line of cases, creating flexibility and uncertainty in
the law for would-be litigants.

Frederick has been cited in support of the storyline that argues a double standard exists in the Roberts Court’s
treatments of some free speech litigants. Monica Youn (2011) and Adam Liptak (2012) have both cited Erwin
Chemersinky’s “Not a Free Speech Court” (2011) in presenting this argument.
th
45 Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324 (6 Cir., 2010), upholding Tennessee school district policy prohibiting displays of
the Confederate Flag in light of historical and contemporaneous racial tension at the school; Guiles v. Marineau, 461
F.3d 320 (2nd Cir., 2006), ruling in favor of student suspended for wearing shirt critical of President Bush, the Iraq
War, and featuring drug references; Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554 (6th Cir., 2008), upholding a school district ban on
the Confederate Flag and other racially divisive symbols as permissible, content-based (rather than viewpoint-based)
restrictions in applying the Tinker standard.
rd
46 Layshock v. Hermitage Area School District, 650 F.3d 205, 216 (3 Cir., 2011); J.S. v. Blue Mountain School
rd
District, 650 F.3d 915 (3 Cir., 2011).
44
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Religious Speech and Schools
Writing shortly after the conclusion of the Court’s 2014 term, Linda Greenhouse noted:
“The court of Chief Justice John G. Roberts has been one of the most religion-friendly Supreme
Courts in modern history. Nearly every religious claim presented to the court has emerged a
winner, from explicitly sectarian prayer at town board meetings, in last year’s closely
divided Town of Greece decision, to beards for Muslim inmates in a prison system that banned
facial hair — a unanimous decision that defied the court’s tradition of deference to prison
officials and their rules” (Greenhouse 2015). Speech claims involving religion have appeared on
the Court’s docket with some regularity, beginning with the Court’s decision in Pleasant Grove
City v. Summum (555 U.S. 460 (2009)), the unanimous 2009 decision holding that a city’s
refusal to place a Gnostic Christian statue depicting the sect’s “Seven Aphorisms” in a public
park – while also choosing to accept a Ten Commandments statue for display in the same park –
did not violate the First Amendment. The decision was noteworthy for building on the so-called
government speech doctrine, which would be elaborated upon in the Court’s Sons of Confederate
Veterans decision in 2015.
Later, a 5-4 Court through Justice Ginsburg would uphold the University of California’s
“take all comers” policy against a challenge by a Christian student organization, which sought to
exclude members based upon certain characteristics, including sexual orientation (561 U.S. 661
(2010)). Perhaps most famously, an 8-1 Court struck down a jury award of damages for the
intentional infliction of emotional distress to the father of a marine killed in Iraq, whose funeral
was picketed by the Westboro Baptist Church of Topeka, Kansas (562 U.S. 443 (2011)). And
most recently, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert (135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)), a unanimous Court voted to
invalidate an Arizona municipality’s sign ordinance that – arguably – treated roadside signs
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differently on the basis of content. The victorious party in the suit, Pastor Clyde Reed and his
Good News Presbyterian Church congregation had protested the town’s treatment of
noncommercial signs as a content-based burden on speech. The invalidated ordinance held that
such signs be displayed no more than 12 hours before and one hour after an event – and be only
six square feet in size – while political signs were regulated less stringently (Margolin 2015).
Viewed in light of the Court’s certiorari docket in student religious speech cases (or
religion and schools generally), Greenhouse’s claim is clearly overstated. It is true that the
Court’s decisions in Summum, Phelps, and Reed were victories for mainstream Christian and
conservative religious speakers, while only Christian Legal Society placed liberal antidiscrimination and equality principles before the expression and association claims of a
conservative Christian university organization. A review of the Roberts Era certiorari docket
demonstrates the Court has consistently ruled against religious speakers or for the secular
position.
Table 5.6– Religious and Non-religious Student Speech Cert. Denials [and Grants], 20052015
Liberal
Undetermined
Conservative
Total

Anti-Speech
18 [1]
(47.37%)
3
(7.89%)
6 [1]
(15.79%)
27
(71.05%)

Mixed
4
(10.53%)
4
(10.53%)

Pro-Speech
2
(5.26%)
1
(2.63%)
4
(10.53%)
7
(18.42%)

Total
20
(52.63%)
8
(21.05%)
10
(26.32%)
38
(100%)

Adding religious student speech cases to the analysis confirms that across all student
speech claims on the certiorari docket, the pattern has been anti-speech and liberal (against
religious freedom claims brought by parents and/or students): Nearly 50% of cert. denials in this
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area have been both anti-speech and let liberal decisions standing. These cases have generally
featured students – or parents filing suit on their behalf – facing adverse actions by school
administrators for making religious statements in various forms, from art projects to
commencement addresses. In these conflicts, the liberal position is generally that of school
administrators taking a secular position against religious claimants, conventionally a
conservative First Amendment claim. In Morgan v. Swanson (659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir., 2011)), for
example, parents of a student unsuccessfully brought a free speech claim against a local school
after a teacher prevented distribution of a student (and apparently, parent) designed Christmas
card retelling the Christian "story of the candy cane." Here, the Court had an opportunity to
expand the sphere of First Amendment protection available to religious speakers and resolve an
inter-circuit conflict in the process, but chose not to.
Occasionally, the Court has also denied certiorari to the benefit of conservative positions.
Consider Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School District (426 F.3d 617 (2nd Cir., 2005)), where a
student project (completed with the aid of a parent) included overt Christian references on a
kindergarten poster. The theme for this elementary school assignment was saving the
environment. After the poster was rejected by the student’s teacher and the school principal, the
student (and parent) completed a second poster – a poster that was displayed but partially
censored at the discretion of the same officials. By allowing the 2nd Circuit’s conservative
decision to stand and assuming the justices vote preferentially at the agenda-setting stage, the
Court’s conservative Justices may have viewed a denial as an effective vehicle to furthering the
protection of mainstream religious speakers in public schools.
Alternatively, a grant in this case might have resulted in a merits decision that more
strongly protects student religious claims, authoritatively and across the federal judiciary while
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also resolving an inter-circuit conflict. To be clear, the claim is not that a conservative Court,
apparently sympathetic to constitutional claims by religious speakers, must always grant
certiorari to the benefit of conservative religious claims or chagrin of liberal, secular causes. But
the substantial pro-secular trend in this area of free expression suggests that the Court is satisfied
with the religious speaker and school forum standards established during the Rehnquist Era, or is
actually less conservative on that issue and willing to allow gradual yet important adjustments
via decisions on certiorari. It could also be the case that the Court simply does not care as much
about religion in this context, or at least not as much as recent commentary suggests.

Discussion
Compared to the Court’s merits docket, denials of certiorari command far less attention
from commentators and scholars, and have a more limited effect due to the formal geographical
and legal limits of the state and circuit holdings left standing. However, the within-issue area
comparisons between the certiorari and merits dockets draw attention to the important effects of
denials of certiorari on law and society. The actions of the justices at certiorari shape doctrinal
rules within particular issue subsets of First Amendment law, sometimes allowing circuits to
walk back harsh standards imposed on claimants – as with government speech in Ceballos and
Jackler – and other times further tightening speech-restrictive doctrines, as with student speech
in Frederick and Hosty. While recent work has examined how and when conflicts among
circuits lead to grants of certiorari by the Court, these accounts tend to ignore how law and
society are meaningfully shaped by certiorari decisions in their own right. In the future – and if
eventually made available by one of the Court’s current justices - the degree to which
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“aggressive grants” and “defensive denials” influence the free expression docket will become
much clearer (Boucher and Segal 1995, 835).
Compared to union speech and free market electoral speech (campaign finance law),
cases, government employee and student speech cases are substantially underrepresented on the
Court’s merits docket. The relatively high proportion of cases in the latter issue areas that
continue to be petitioned to the Court post-Ceballos and Frederick is interesting, as the
infrequency of cert. grants and the direction of the subsequent merits decisions suggest that the
justices are less interested or hostile to these issues (Hurwitz 2006, 327). In addition, available
evidence demonstrates that there has not been one clear ideological winner, either. Government
speech denials of certiorari have generally been conservative, there is no clear ideological winner
in non-religious student speech cases, and religious student speech cert. denials have generally
been liberal (for school administrators or the “secular” position in the case). This finding that the
Court actively hunts for some types of cases – cases that are infrequently petitioned yet are
overrepresented on the merits docket – is consistent with ideological explanations of Court
behavior.
While there is less support for the ideological in-group explanation once accounting for
patterns within those issue areas that commentators have singled out for criticism, the
underrepresentation of cert. grants in the modal issue areas gives some reason for pause. This
apparent lack of responsiveness to certain classes of litigants on the merits docket raises some
questions about the extent to which continued, “upstream” efforts at agenda-setting – much like
lower courts (Hurwitz 2006, 338), litigators (Baird 2004; 2007), and broader social and political
trends (Pacelle 1991) - can be effective first-movers of sorts in influencing the US Supreme
Court agenda outside of such areas as union non-member and campaign finance challenges.
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Building upon recent work by scholars examining the ways in which unelected judges can
produce quasi-democratic decisions in heavily litigated areas (Keck 2014), future research may
also expand beyond free expression litigation in order to better understand how and the extent to
which sustained, bottom-up litigation across different issue areas can secure a foothold on the
Court’s limited merits docket. Within the general legal area of the First Amendment and an eye
toward theoretical development, the next step for this analysis is to look beyond the Roberts Era
and compare certiorari patterns with the previous Rehnquist Era in order to better understand
how these relationships have evolved over time.

Conclusion
The free expression agenda of the Roberts Court has been the subject of sustained
scrutiny by scholars and legal commentators. To date, studies of the Court’s free expression
agenda have been limited to votes on the merits of cases, with varying degrees of systematic case
selection and vote analysis. Scholars have examined these decisions in order to make claims
about the Court’s agenda, sometimes describing it as applying a double standard and ignoring
claims brought by vulnerable individuals. The conservative Court explanation, however, sits
uncomfortably beside a substantial proportion of the merits docket upholding free speech claims
brought by a menagerie of unpopular speakers. This study demonstrates how the certiorari
docket may be leveraged by scholars attempting to adjudicate between this series of claims and,
in doing so, offers a more nuanced picture of the Roberts Court’s free expression project.
In contemporary free expression controversies, access to the Court is most likely to occur
when jurisprudential cues are present, including conflict, amicus curiae briefs, and the U.S. as a
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litigating party. This finding replicates traditional cue theory analyses and is somewhat
unsurprising. The cues that do not register at conventional levels of statistical significance,
however, are the ideological indicators which include the direction of the lower court decision
from which certiorari is petitioned and the political composition of the panel or en banc court
issuing that decision. Once disaggregated by issue area, however, certiorari voting patterns
provide support for and against ideological explanations of Court behavior, with patterns
observed in student speech cases (religious and non-religious) perhaps the most counterintuitive.
These findings at once demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of the conventional
quantitative models often specified in studies of certiorari. First, modeling the effects of case
factors on the certiorari vote provides additional leverage to scholars seeking to make broad
claims about the Court’s motivations in particular issue areas. Due to the issue of missing
certiorari voting data for the individual justices in contemporary cases, scholars must remain
wary of ecological inference barriers. The second point underscores a weakness of studies
employing aggregate data: Disaggregating the Court’s free expression certiorari docket by issue
area reveals that the Court has not been monolithic in furthering a conservative, Republican
agenda. The Court has had numerous opportunities to more effectively circumscribe free
expression rights in the contexts of student (religious and non-religious) and government
employee speech. Future efforts can and should expand beyond single issue areas and particular
historical Courts to analyses that compare across these categories.
Beyond methodological concerns, it is clear that judicial behavior at the certiorari stage
meaningfully shapes law across broad swaths of society, by virtue of the geographic sprawl of
circuit court jurisdictions and the many individuals within institutional contexts shaped by these
decisions. Extant scholarship has remarked on the importance of choices at the certiorari stage,
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but these efforts rarely describe what those effects are or how they impact classes of citizens and
litigants in practice (see Black and Owens 2009). This chapter sketches one approach scholars
may follow in putting “’jurisprudence’ back into ‘political jurisprudence,’” by describing what
choices at the certiorari stage actually look like in practice and some potential effects on classes
of litigants and citizens. Ceballos was a doctrinal shift that placed the onus on government
employees seeking to win First Amendment whistleblower and/or retaliation suits, yet lower
circuit decisions like Jackler serve as a legal resource for many employees seeking redress for
unconstitutional actions by employers. In cases involving offensive or disruptive speech by
students – the classic Tinker speakers – the Court’s certiorari docket reveals that Frederick was
not the last nor perhaps the most important word on the scope of student speech protections.
Finally, the degree to which the label of “conservative” can be applied to the current Court’s free
expression agenda appears to vary substantially across the issue areas scholars have identified as
indicators of the Court’s commitment to protecting expression. The considerable variation within
various issue areas on the discretionary certiorari docket suggests that U.S. Supreme Court
observers and contemporary free expression scholars should be more circumspect in making
inferences about the motivations of the justices.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Review of the Findings
This dissertation has been motivated primarily by the sustained attention to the Roberts
Court’s puzzling constitution of U.S. First Amendment rights to freedom of expression. As such,
the dissertation focuses squarely on the actions and study of the justices in the contemporary era.
A number of findings have emerged in each of the project’s chapters, beginning with rethinking
concept measurement. In chapter two, I developed and provided an initial assessment of a new
composite directional variable based on the idea of “INUS” conditions, defined as “an
insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the
result.” (Mackie 1965, 245; see also Mahoney and Vanderpoel 2015, 79-82). This composite
indicator incorporated the identity of the speaker, speech act, and speech suppressor in assigning
an ideological direction to judicial votes – each a necessary piece of information for determining
the direction of a decision but none alone sufficient for characterizing a decision as liberal,
conservative, or undetermined. I assessed this variable’s performance in relation to the basic
bivariate attitudinal model, finding that the relationship between values and career voting
percentages in freedom of expression cases grows more tenuous as this indicator is refined to
better capture the concept of interest: the ideological direction of decisions. This finding is true
for the Rehnquist and Roberts Court Eras under comparison, though particularly visible for the
latter. The upshot of this chapter is that additional work needs to be done in developing the
indicators commonly employed in statistical analyses of judicial decision-making.
Chapter three answered the question of whether a relationship exists between the
conservative attitudes of the justices and votes on First Amendment freedom of expression
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claims for two Courts in the modern era. Somewhat unexpectedly, the Roberts Era is distinct in
that the likelihood of pro-speech claim votes is strongly predicted by the ideological preferences
of the justices, whereas the votes of the stable Rehnquist Court Era preceding the Roberts Court
cannot be explained by those preferences. This finding holds for both Segal-Cover and MartinQuinn operationalization of judicial preferences, and is not affected by the inclusion of various
case-level factors in the regression models. I did not anticipate this finding, particularly in light
of previous work that found such a relationship.
In chapter three, I also argued for greater attention to the voting coalitions in cases as the
key dependent variable of interest, rather than the probability of a pro-speech or anti-speech vote
occurring given an aggregation of judicial votes. I find that a greater percentage of Roberts Era
decisions (67%) are inconsistent with core assumptions of the attitudinal model of judging
compared to the Rehnquist Era (62%). A closer examination of conceptual typologies of Roberts
and Rehnquist Era decisions finds support for the polarization paradox described by Brandon
Bartels (2015, 24-27): Fewer decisions in the current era are marked by weaker cases of voting
order and disorder, yet more decisions are characterized as either unanimous or strong
ideological ordering of the justices.
Chapter four shifted away from quantitative relationships between values and votes and
instead adopts an internal view of judicial decision-making. The period of analysis was the
Roberts Court from the 2005-2014 terms, and the subject of interest was First Amendment free
speech decisions. While I did not enter this stage of the research with firm expectations,
previous scholarship suggested that special attention be paid to conceptions of the judicial role,
the role of various free speech theories, and the role of jurisprudential structures like the content-
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neutrality regime. Chapter four took seriously the idea that the content of judicial opinions can
provide valuable insight to the practice of judicial decision-making.
In drawing upon the method of process tracing and the use of “hoop tests” to highlight
when and how the Roberts Court’s free expression decisions are particularly problematic for the
attitudinal paradigm of judging, I found evidence that the Roberts Court’s make-up is actually
fairly heterogeneous in terms of conceptions of the judicial role held by the justices and the types
of ideological commitments held by those justices. Furthermore, this comprehensive and
detailed diagnosis of the Roberts Court justices’ constitution of freedom of expression revealed
that the jurisprudential regime commonly known as “content neutrality” has been eroded by a
competing, pragmatic approach regularly expressed by Justice Breyer (and now joined by
members of the Court’s liberal bloc, including Justices Kagan and Ginsburg) and ideological
fractures within the Court’s conservative bloc. The latter finding is illustrated most prominently
by the opinions of Justices Alito and Thomas, as well as Chief Justice Roberts’ apparent
commitment to preserving the institutional legitimacy of the Court. These results may be
attributable to the types of cases the Court chooses to review compared to the Rehnquist Era,
where fewer controversies focus on the rights of the traditional soapbox speaker embedded in
First Amendment jurisprudence and more concern the emerging government speech doctrine and
efforts to expand the meaning of speech under the First Amendment.
Chapter five offered an innovative approach to interrogating the purported ideological
motivations of the Roberts Court, leveraging the certiorari process in evaluating claims that the
Court has been generally conservative. I developed an original dataset of all fairly comparable
denials of certiorari in free speech cases from the 2005 to 2014 terms (and some early 2015 term
decisions prior to the death of Justice Scalia), and through the use of a logit regression model
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find support for both ideological and jurisprudential considerations at the agenda-setting stage.
Through case studies of the issue areas frequently petitioned before the Court, I also find that
narratives critical of the Court’s decisions in cases involving students, government employees,
and religious student claimants may be in need of revision. While jurisprudential considerations
appear to explain more grants of certiorari in aggregate, a closer examination of particular issue
areas on the Court’s certiorari docket reveals both predictable and surprising ideological trends.

External or Internal?
This project was motivated, in part, by scholarship seeking to integrate two perspectives
on judicial decision-making that have often stood in opposition to one another: the external and
internal approaches. The external approach privileges observable behavior – judicial votes –
over the content of opinions and generally seeks to establish correlations between judicial
attitudes and patterns across decisions. The internal approach emphasizes the institutional norms
and rules that structure decision-making, viewing the constraining (or enabling) language of law
as an important factor in evaluating the work of judges. Here, scholars tend to take the content
of opinions and organizing force of jurisprudential structures seriously – without denying the
role played by ideological attitudes.
Beginning with the general premise that the judicial constitution of free expression may
be an ideological or more nuanced, legal practice, this dissertation cannot claim to definitively
settle this ongoing debate. I am not even confident stating, as Feldman does, that in terms of
prediction the more effective view is “ the external view, maybe (and I mean maybe ).” (2005,
118). This is due to the essentially contested nature of what the judicial enterprise is, and the
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Rorschach nature of the enterprise of Supreme Court judging in particular. Even with the
caution in measurement expressed in chapter two and the effort to develop more valid indicators,
scholars interested in the bottom line may view the key takeaway from this project as
conservatism predicting the decisions observed in free expression controversies. This claim is
supported by the data, and there is nothing inherently wrong with it.
It is, however, an incomplete claim. Deviations from expected voting patterns happen
frequently enough that more detailed analyses giving attention to the so-called legal elements of
the enterprise are warranted, even recommended. After looking from both perspectives and in
light of the data offered in this project, my position is that scholars interested in high court
politics should give weight to both approaches. If nothing else, an external view sympathizer
will gain context beyond the bottom line and better understand the limits of such dominant
paradigms as the attitudinal conception of judging. Similarly, those who see judging as a
particular form of bottom-up reasoning embedded in and constrained by the specific institutional
context of the Court can gain a richer understanding of how the inevitable need for discretion in
hard cases where ‘the law runs out’ opens the door for the insights of the external approaches. In
that regard, I provisionally accept Feldman’s more basic argument: “Both [approaches] are valid
and…intertwine.” (2005, 129).
Beyond the broader contributions noted in each chapter, it is hoped that this project will
serve as a more comprehensive, empirical model for other scholars seeking to understand how
the two approaches intertwine in practice. Despite my efforts here, I also recognize this account
is underinclusive in that additional areas of the decision-making process can be leveraged in
understanding the relative roles of ideology and legal structures. For example, another direction
this project may take as it develops is accounting for the strategies employed by litigators as they
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seek review and adjudication of freedom of expression controversies. Judges need law to justify
decisions, no matter the grounds on which the decisions are actually reached. And in the case of
the Supreme Court, those legal options are presented to the justices by litigators. These litigators
have an institutional capacity “to think and act independently, and thus to challenge official state
law…especially true within the United States’ decentralized governmental and adversarial legal
systems” (Wilson 2013, 22). Litigators transform claims into rights, and understanding their
arguments sheds light on claims about the principled or power-politics views of law (Brigham
1987; McCann 1996).
Though it is true that judges ultimately decide the content of rights, they are only one
type of what Ran Hirschl terms “strategic legal innovators” who “determine the timing, extent,
and nature” of constitutional guarantees (Hirschl 2004, 43). Litigators provide information to
the justices (McAtee and McGuire 2007), locate a case within a particular constitutional tradition
(Wedeking 2010), and drive the agenda of the Supreme Court. A key difference between the
Supreme Court and the other branches of the federal government is that unlike members of
Congress and the President, the justices are relatively passive actors. They require litigators to
articulate claims before them, to petition for certiorari in a complex, adversarial process (Perry
1991), and to sharpen arguments made in briefs during oral advocacy (Johnson et al. 2012).
Theories of judicial decision-making are explicitly judge-centric: concerned with the
determinants of the behavior of judges. The general preferences of judges are inferred from
observable behavior, as captured by the effect of a cause or package of causes within a single
case or across a population of cases. It is true that litigators craft persuasive legal arguments in
the course of Supreme Court adjudication, yet the longstanding realist assumption is that legal
doctrine does not offer a definitive, correct answer in particular cases (Tamanaha 2010; Holmes
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1897), especially due to the method by which the Supreme Court is constituted. For external
view adherents, complicated free speech doctrinal rules such as public forum analysis, low v.
high value speech, and speech v. conduct distinctions merely frame disputes for justices – it is
somewhat problematic to suggest that law alone caused a result in a particular case or provided a
definitively “correct” answer (Horwitz 2013).
Litigators then, whether motivated by winning a case for a particular client or seeking to
establish case precedents favorable to broader partisan movements, must be intimately familiar
with the preferences of the justices. It follows that litigators should be expected to craft
strategies based on the perceived preferences and motivations of judges. While it is the case that
lawyers need law (Price 2013), it is also true that judges need litigators to do more than simply
frame cases within the appropriate area of law. If theories of judicial decision-making do reveal
something about the actual preferences of justices, then it stands to reason that litigators will
appeal to those preferences in order to increase the likelihood of winning cases.

Free Speech in U.S. Society
This dissertation is U.S. Supreme Court-centric. I also recognize that however important
the role of the Court in establishing the contours of this area of law, freedom of expression is not
a value cabined by high court politics. This recognition points toward additional, future research
avenues. During the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election campaign, freedom of speech became a
hotly contested issue. Donald Trump began his campaign, in part, on a platform opposed to
liberal, politically correct (or “PC”) culture in society (Itkowitz 2015). In the immediate
aftermath of the election, the news cycle focus shifted to the spread of so-called “fake news” – a
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term which now encompasses everything from stories that are literally untrue, to stories based on
anonymous, unverified sources, to others that clearly reflect a set of partisan or ideological
commitments (Holan 2016). Following inauguration on Jan. 20, 2017, President Trump has
regularly been at odds with mainstream media outlets, in one example calling such outlets the
“enemy of the people.” (Jackson 2017).
Concurrent with President Trump’s sparring, college campuses have witnessed new
unrest in light of student efforts to organize talks by conservative or “alt-right” speakers. The
violent response by Berkeley students and other members of the community to a scheduled Milo
Yiannopoulos appearance in late January 2017 (Fuller and Mele 2017), followed by the
cancellation of a scheduled talk by controversial political scientist Charles Murray at Middlebury
College (Volokh 2017), have tested the broader social commitment to free expression in the
American polity. Speech in protest of conservative guest speakers on college campuses has
rarely taken the form of the counterspeech Mill argued would strengthen truth in his canonical
account, and has at times been accompanied by violent conduct. Other American institutions and
ideological orientations have not been immune to free speech controversies either, as members of
the U.S. Senate learned in February 2017 following Senator Elizabeth Warren’s attempt to read
Coretta Scott King’s letter against Jeff Sessions’ nomination to a federal district judge position
nearly a generation ago (Chappell 2017).
These controversies underscore the role of freedom of expression as a political value
often put in the service of competing ideological and partisan camps. In the contemporary era,
freedom of expression has at times been framed as in opposition to the goal of social and
political equality for historically oppressed members of society. Though a number of these
battles involve disputes between bitterly opposed, private associations and interests, in recent

267
years freedom of speech has also been a mainstay on the nation’s legal agenda. The justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court are ultimately charged with constituting the content of our First
Amendment protection as individuals come into conflict with government actions. The opinions
of the justices often remind us of why it is that freedom of expression is an important value
beyond immediate instrumental use by political adversaries. Further interrogation of the social
constitution of U.S. free expression is one direction this study may take in the future: Laura Beth
Nielsen’s (2004) assessment of the role of harassing speech of women in the public sphere and
Josh Wilson’s (2013) study of the tactics engaged in by pro-life protestors are potential models
for moving beyond courts and to broader society.

Beyond the U.S. Context
In one notable respect, this dissertation is limited by the fact that the U.S. free expression
tradition is only a single case study: It is an explanation for a single important event (the scope
and coverage of contemporary free expression law) but it is unclear what, if anything, may be
generalizable to the broader question of how constitutive rules of constitutional law structure
judicial decision-making. Throughout the project, the Rehnquist Court Era (1994-2004) has
served as a comparison point for inferential leverage, and to assess what relative changes the
Roberts Court has brought to the constitution of freedom of expression law. I have also
compared the merits agenda of the Roberts Court to its certiorari docket in an effort to assess
various explanations for the Court’s behavior.
Moving forward, I intend to compare the Roberts Court Era to a similarly situated
tribunal to better understand the interplay between ideology, legal structures, and case outcomes.

268
The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) frequently considers freedom of expression controversies
brought under Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. A package of
associated rights, Section 2 states that “Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a)
Freedom of conscience and religion; (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication; (c) freedom of peaceful
assembly; and (d) freedom of association.” Unlike the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment or
accompanying text, the Canadian Charter also contains a clear qualification to this package of
related rights: Section 1 states, “The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”
As Richard Moon notes, Section 2(b) “roughly parallels the distinction in American
jurisprudence between content restrictions and time, place, and manner restrictions.” (Moon
2000, 34). In terms of the two-step analysis which first requires the Supreme Court of Canada to
determine whether the government has infringed on the fundamental freedom of expression and
then calls for scrutiny under Section 1 (“The court asks whether the restriction represents a
substantial purpose, advances this purpose rationally, impairs the freedom no more than is
necessary, and is proportionate to the impairment of freedom.” (Moon 2000, 35)), the Court’s
analysis approximates the heightened and/or strict scrutiny regime adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court in cases where the government regulates speech on the basis of the message being
conveyed.
Previous scholarship has also found another similarity between the Supreme Court of
Canada and the U.S. Supreme Court: the justices political preferences emerge as statistically
significant explanations for career voting patterns. Songer and Johnson (2007) found that the
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party of the prime minister appointing a justice was positively correlated with career liberal
voting percentages in cases involving economic disputes, though not in criminal or civil rights
and liberties cases (928, 930-931). This effort stood in contrast to the work of Tate and
Sittiwong (1989), who found appointee partisanship as one of a series of judicial attributes
related to voting percentages. Still others have argued that the Supreme Court of Canada is not
motivated primarily by partisanship: Alaire and Green (2009) assess the relationship between
Segal-Cover score approximations for the Canadian justices and career liberalism voting
percentages across five different case types – including Charter controversies – and find that “the
attitudinal model of decision-making does not apply straightforwardly to the Supreme Court of
Canada.” (33-36, 43).
C.L. Ostberg and Matthew Wetstein provide an assessment of the relationship between
the Canadian justices and votes in free expression cases from 1994-2003 and find that the
Supreme Court of Canada’s decisions in this area of law do not follow the same ideological
patterns as U.S. cases (2007, 144). Left unanswered is whether this finding is time-bound, and
whether that difference may be attributed to the differences in constitutional language and
jurisprudential structures. Recent work on additional ideological dimensions of decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court beyond “liberal” and “conservative” suggests this is a topic that may benefit
from a comparative study (Robinson and Swedlow 2015). Unsettled as this debate may be, the
Supreme Court of Canada’s record on freedom of expression would be an interesting comparison
point for the U.S. Supreme Court in the modern era, particularly as the former has heard a
number of cases related to campaign finance law and the practices of workers’ unions. Earlier
comparative work in terms of U.S.-Canada freedom of expression law focused on a narrow slice
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of cases - hate speech and subversive speech – and at a an earlier point in the Canadian Court’s
life (Greenawalt 1992).
Early data collection in connection with the Global Free Speech Repository project at
Syracuse University has also found that, despite the comparatively short period of development
for Canadian free speech jurisprudence, the justices often cite to the U.S. Supreme Court in the
course of their opinions. On multiple fronts, then, the debate between the external and internal
perspectives may be fruitfully informed by a comparative angle in terms of patterns of decisionmaking across aggregations of votes, patterns across subsets of Canadian free expression law,
and the role of extra-ideological factors including the conceptions of the judicial role held by the
justices. It will also speak to Ran Hirschl’s call for “a more holistic approach to the study of
constitutions across polities.” (Hirschl 2014, 15). Though in its early stages, this comparison
represents a logical next step as this project moves toward publication as book length project.

271
Appendix A – Supplementary Data Collected on Federal Statutes, 1994-2015 47
Case/Statute
Turner Broadcast System,
Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622
(1994)
Cable Television
Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of
1992, 47 USCS
534 and 535 (the "mustcarry" provisions); Pub. L.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460

Coding Choice Details
Decision: For FCC (Anti-Speech)
Speaker: Turner Broadcast Systems; Cable companies
(Conservative)
Speech: General anti-regulation; pro-free market (Conservative)
Suppressor: Dem/Liberal
Note that Congress overrode Pres. Bush veto
S.12 bill enacted by 73-18 (GOP: 27Y, 14N; Dems: 46Y, 4N);
initial vote on bill (pre-veto) was 74-25
House vote on override: 308-114 (GOP: 77Y, 85N; Dems: 230Y,
29N)(similar pattern in initial vote on conference report)
C.Q. Almanac suggests that this was a Democratic-led effort with a
pro-consumer valence that attracted substantial, though less firm,
GOP support. Close call, but coded as Dem/Liberal (171-183,
1993).

Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. and Elliott, Inc., 521
U.S. 457 (1997)
Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937
(AMAA), P.L. 75-137
NEA v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569 (1998)
National Foundation on
the Arts and Humanities
Act, As Amended in the
Department of the Interior
and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 1990,
Pub. L. 101-121, 103 Stat.
738, 738-742.

Direction Coding: Liberal
Decision: For Glickman (Anti-Speech)
Speaker: Wileman Bros. and Elliott, fruit distribution business
(Conservative)
Speech: Advertising; compelled speech claim (Conservative)
Suppressor: AMAA advertising fee assessments
Direction Coding: Liberal
Decision: For NEA (Anti-Speech)
Speaker: Karen Finley, other performance/controversial artists
(Liberal)
Speech: Funding of controversial performance art (pro-feminism,
etc.; anti-religious)(Liberal)
Suppressor: Bipartisan (Williams/Coleman; 1990 Act)
According to opinion, Congress adopted bipartisan
“Williams/Coleman Amendment” that would not impose funding
restrictions, but would provide agency guidance on acceptable
decency standards
Direction Coding: Conservative

47 A number of cases during the Rehnquist Era were coded previously in Keck (2007), specifically Rehnquist
decisions striking down federal statutes. I adopt those codes for cases included in this paper.
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Ashcroft v. ACLU (I), 535 Decision: For Ashcroft (Anti-Speech)
U.S. 564 (2002)
Speaker: ACLU and other individuals groups purveying adult
Child Online Protection
entertainment
Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § Speech: Sex/Gender; adult pornography
231 (Oct. 21, 1998, P.L.
Suppressor: GOP/Conservative
105-277)
HR 3783: Voice vote (bipartisan)
-Language of COPA rolled into Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999
-Note that 2000 GOP Platform calls out pornography as “not a
question of free speech,” language about porn addicts in libraries
and need to protect children
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849)
No add’l information found; consistent w/GOP regime commitment

Eldred v. U.S., 537 U.S.
186 (2003)

Direction Coding: Conservative
Decision: For U.S. (Anti-Speech)

Speaker: Artists, businesses, others making use of copyrighted
Copyright Term Extension works in public domain (Unspecified)
Act (CTEA), Pub. L. 105- Speech: Artistic (Liberal)
298, § 102(b) and (d), 112 Suppressor: Undetermined
Stat. 2827-2828
Introduced by Hatch (S. 505), discharged out of Senate Judiciary
Committee, passed by suspension of rules in October, signed by
President. No additional information available in almanac.
Direction Coding: Unspecified/Undetermined
FEC v. Beaumont, 539
U.S. 146 (2003)

Decision: For FEC (Anti-Speech)

Speaker: Elizabeth Beaumont and NC pro-life group (Conservative)
Federal Election
Speech: Free market (contribution limits); pro-life advocacy
Campaign Act, § 441(b) – (conservative)
Suppressor: FECA regulations; campaign finance (Dem/Liberal)
Corporation contribution
ban
Direction Coding: Liberal
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United States v. American
Library Association, 539
U.S. 194 (2003)
Children’s Internet
Protection Act
(CIPA), 20 U.S.C.S. §
9134(f) and 47 U.S.C.S. §
254(h); Dec. 21, 2000,
P.L. 106-554

Decision: For U.S. (Anti-Speech)
Speaker: American Libraries (Liberal)
Speech: No defined act (academic freedom)(Liberal)
Suppressor: GOP/Conservative
According to CQ, originating in amendment by Ernest Istook, ROK, approved by House Education and Workforce Committees by
voice vote…
Congress.gov has CIPA originating w/Charles Pickering (R-MS) on
June 8, 2000
McCain supported Senate version (S.97) though little information
available beyond six of seven co-sponsors being Republican
(exception was Fritz Hollings, SC (D)).
Adopted as part of Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001
Consistent w/2000 GOP Party Platform language
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849)

Ashcroft v. American
Civil Liberties Union, 542
U.S. 656 (2004)

Decision: For ACLU (Pro-Speech)

Speaker: ACLU and other individuals groups purveying adult
entertainment
Child Online Protection
Speech: Sex/Gender; adult pornography
Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § Suppressor: GOP/Conservative
231 (Oct. 21, 1998, P.L.
105-277)
HR 3783: Voice vote (bipartisan)
-Language of COPA rolled into Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999
-Note that 2000 GOP Platform calls out pornography as “not a
question of free speech,” language about porn addicts in libraries
and need to protect children
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849)
No add’l information found; consistent w/GOP regime commitment
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Johanns v. Livestock
Marketing Association,
544 U.S. 550 (2005)
Beef Promotion and
Research Act of 1985

Decision: For Johanns (Anti-Speech)
Speaker: Conservative (livestock businesses)
Speech: Compelled; commercial (objection to fees); Conservative
Suppressor: Bipartisan
Close call: Act passed House (HR 2100) on Dec. 18, 1985

Dec. 23, 1985, P.L. 99198

R: 131-47
D: 194-49
Senate: 55-38
R: 33-15
D: 22-23
According to 1985 CQ Weekly (Index edition), virtually none of
the debate focused on the Beef Promotion Act inclusion (never
mentioned). Close, but coding as bipartisan.

Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547
U.S. 47 (2006)
Solomon Amendment, 10
U.S.C. Section 983 (b)(1)

Decision: Against FAIR (Anti-Speech)
House Amendment 569 to National Defense Authorization Act of
1995 (H.R.4301), sponsored by Rep. Gerald Solomon, R (NY-22)
Purpose:

National Defense
Authorization Act for FY
1996

An amendment to prohibit the Defense Department from making
grants to, or contracting with, educational institutions that deny access to military
recruiters.

103rd Congress
HoR Roll Call no. 191 (5/23/1994)
R: 162/1/14 (Majority GOP Support)
D: 109/124/27 (Minority Dem Support)
I: 0/1/0
Source: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1994/roll191.xml (last
accessed 8/11/2015)
DOD policy extended to other federal funds in 1997, 1999; post2001 DOD policy codified by Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal year 2005 (P.L. 108-375); H.R. Rep.
No. 108-443
From 1994 CQ Almanac, p. 58-H: Adopted in the Committee of
the Whole 271-126: R 162-1; D 109-124 (N.D. 55-101, S.D. 5423); I 0-1; May 23, 1994.

275
Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 547
U.S. 47 (2006)
[continued]

Provision:

(Sec. 552) Requires that military recruiters be given access to
college or university campuses and students that is at least equal in quality and
scope to the access provided to any other employer. Includes funds made
available for the Department of Homeland Security, the National Nuclear Security
Administration of the Department of Energy, and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) among the funding sources that could be terminated if an institution is found
to have a policy of preventing military recruiter or Senior ROTC unit access.

GOP administration policy; no separate amendments; vote on the
final bill was bipartisan (no add’l info in 2004 CQ Almanac).
Source: http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004/roll528.xml (Senate gave
unanimous consent)
Partisan Suppressor Coding: GOP
Spaeth Ideological Direction: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity)
Infrequently litigated statutes
Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230 (2006)
Vermont Act 64
June 26, 1997

Democratic Regime Commitment (Campaign Finance)
https://www.sec.state.vt.us/elections/election-results/electionresultssearch.aspx?primaryFilterId=12449&secondaryFolderName=1996+
Election+Results&q=
HoR (6/12/1997)
121Y/17N
D: 78Y/5N
R: 36Y/11N
O: 4Y/1N
NV: 10

Senate (5/29/1997)
20Y/9N
D: 14Y/0N
R: 3Y/9N
D/R: 2Y/0N
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/1998/journal/SJ970612.htm
Y: Ankeney (D), Backus (D), Bartlett (D), Costes (R), Cummings
(D), Doyle (R), Greenwood (R), Hallowell (D), Hooker (D), Illuzzi
(R), Kittell (D), MacDonald (D), Mazza (D/R), McCormack (D),
Ptashnik (D), Ready (D), Rivers (D), Sears (D), Shumlin (D/R),
Spaulding (D)
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Randall v. Sorrell, 548
U.S. 230 (2006)
[continued]

N: Bahre (R), Bloomer (R), Brownell (R), Canns (R), Ehrich (R),
Ide (R), Maynard (R), Riehle (R), Snelling (R)
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic (CF regime commitment)
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment Campaign Spending
(Governmental Corruption), Constitutional Amendment: First
Amendment (speech, press, assembly)

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410 (2006)
Discretion of L.A. District
Attorney

Democratic D.A. (Garcetti)
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic
Speaker: ADA/Deputy Att’y, Democratic
Speech: Whistleblower
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press,
assembly)

Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S.
521 (2006)

Republican Regime commitment (Law and Order); Prison Officials
Partisan Suppressor: GOP

PA Prison Policy (LTSU
2)

Morse v. Frederick, 551
U.S. 393 (2007)
Juneau School
Board/Principal’s Actions

Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press,
assembly)
Partisan Suppressor: Liberal (school administrator)
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment (Protest demonstrations
based on First Amendment guarantees); Constitutional
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, assembly)

277
Davenport v. Wash. Educ.
Ass’n, 551 U.S. 177
(2007)

Republican Regime commitment (anti-union)
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545)
Partisan Suppressor: GOP

§42.17.760 (hereinafter
§760), which is a
provision of the Fair
Campaign Practices Act
(Affirmative Consent by
nonmember required
before agency shop fees
spent on election-related
purposes)
Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Rep. Party,
552 U.S. 442 (2008)

State initiative approved by voters in 1992
**Information not available on Wash. Sec. of State Historical
Election Results page**
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: Unions (union or closed shop: includes
agency shop litigation); Constitutional Amendment: First
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly)
Ruling against Washington State Republican AND Democratic
Parties, Grange Party is a populist component of Republican Party
Coding: Bipartisan/Undetermined

Washington Initiative I872

Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: Civil Rights (Ballot Access of Candidates
and Political Parties); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment
(association)

U.S. v. Williams, 553 U.S. House R.C. 127 (Conference Report):
285 (2008)
R: 225/1
D: 175/23/2 present (N.D. 123-19, S.D. 52-4)
18 U. S. C.
I: 0/1
§2252A(a)(3)(B); The
NV: 8
Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to end the Senate (S. 151; R.V. 132; 4/10/03): 98 YEA/0 NEA/2 NV
Exploitation of Children
Today Act (PROTECT) of Source: https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/senatebill/151/actions (unamended Senate Bill also unanimous vote)
2003
RC 127 (Conference
Report)
S. 151 (Conference
Report)

Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment (obscenity, federal);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press,
assembly)
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N.Y. State Bd. of
Elections v. Torres, 552
U.S. 196 (2008)
New York electoral
system for choosing
Supreme Court Justice
nominees; Act of May 2,
1921, ch. 479, §§45(1),
110, 1921 N. Y. Laws
1451, 1454, 1471.

Ysursa v. Pocatello
Education Ass’n, 555 U.S.
353 (2009)
Idaho state law §44–
2004(2), banning union
checkoffs for political
activities.

Pleasant Grove City v.
Summum, 555 U.S. 460
(2009)
Pleasant Grove City’s
rejection of religious
minority monument

Democratic Candidates, but decision for Democratic Party
New York electoral system for choosing Supreme Court Justice
nominees; Act of May 2, 1921, ch. 479, §§45(1), 110, 1921 N. Y.
Laws 1451, 1454, 1471.
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan/Unknown for now
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (association)

Republican Regime commitment (anti-union, right to work)
Partisan Suppressor: GOP
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78545)
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and
assembly)
Gnostic Christian: Religious Minority (left-wing)
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and
assembly)
Partisan Suppressor: Code as Bipartisan/Unknown for now

Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S.
207 (2009)
Maine State Law, Use of
Union Dues

Pro-Union (Democratic Regime Commitment)
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283)
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: Unions (union or closed shop, includes
agency shop litigation); Constitutional Amendment: First
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly)
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U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S.
460 (2010)

18 U. S. C. §48
Purpose:

(PL 106-152); 1999

Amends the Federal criminal code to prohibit, and set penalties for,
knowingly creating, selling, or possessing a depiction of animal cruelty with the
intention of placing that depiction in interstate or foreign commerce for commercial
gain. Makes an exception for any depiction that has serious religious, political,
scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic value.

H.R. 1887 (RC No. 514; 10/19/1999):
R: 177/35
D: 194/7 (N.D. 146-3, S.D. 48-4)
I: 1
NV: 19
Senate: Unanimous Voice (11/19/1999)
Introduced by Gallegly, R-CA; no other information found in CQ
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan
**Note that Stevens’ book, Velvet and Steel, noted that pit fighting
“should remain illegal,” brief frames him as somebody interested in
educating and training pit bulls for salutary purposes
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/08769bs.pdf
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Infrequently litigated statutes

Agency for International
Development v. Alliance
for Open Society
International, Inc., 133
S.Ct. 2321 (2013)

H.R. 1298 (RC 158; 5/1/2003):
R: 183/40
D: 191/1 (N.D. 140-0, S.D. 51-1)
I: 1/1
NV: 19

U.S. Leadership Against
HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis,
and Malaria Act of 2003

Senate: Voice Vote (5/16/2003)

(U.S.C.S. Section 7601)

Source: https://www.congress.gov/bill/108th-congress/housebill/1298/actions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C%22U
nited+States+Leadership+Against+HIV%5C%5C%5C%2FAIDS%
2C+Tuberculosis%2C+and+Malaria+Act+of+2003%5C%22%22%
5D%7D&resultIndex=1
Partisan Suppressor: GOP

280
Agency for International
Development v. Alliance
for Open Society
International, Inc., 133
S.Ct. 2321 (2013)
[continued]

The challenged provision was the Christopher Smith (R – N.J.)
Amendment requiring any group receiving funds pledge not to
support prostitution or sex trafficking. According to CQ Almanac
2003, “The vote was the only clear Republican win in the markup”
(10-6).
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press,
assembly)

Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S.
724 (2008)
Section 319(a) of the
Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), 116 Stat. 109, 2
U. S. C. §441a–1(a)

H Amendment 422 – “Millionaire’s”
-According to CQ Almanac, amendment offered by Shelly Moore
Capito, raised hard money contribution limits to gain support for
Shays-Meehan
Voice Vote, 2/14/02
Source: https://www.congress.gov/bill/107th-congress/housebill/2356/amendments?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22%5C
%22Bipartisan+Campaign+Reform+Act+of+2002%5C%22%22%5
D%7D&resultIndex=1
BCRA
H.R. 2356 (R.C. 34)
R: 41/176
D: 198/12 (N.D. 150-6, S.D. 48-6)
I: 1/1
NV: 6
Senate (R.V. 54; 3/20/2002):
R: 11/38
D: 48/2 (N.D. 40-1, S.D. 8-1)
I: 1
Source:
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_
cfm.cfm?&congress=107&session=2&vote=00054
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending
(Governmental Corruption); Infrequently litigated statutes;
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and
assembly)
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U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct.
2537 (2012)

S.1998 (9/7/2006): Unanimous Consent
HoR (12/6/2006): Voice Vote

Stolen Valor Act (2006)
PL 109-437
18 U.S.C.S. Section
704(b)

Per CQ Almanac: Introduced by Kent Conrad, D – N.D. on Nov.
10, 2005
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Infrequently litigated statutes

Milavetz, Gallop &
Milavetz, P.A., v. U.S.,
559 U.S. 229 (2010)
Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005
PL 109-8

S. 256 (3/10/2005; RV 44):
R: 55/0
D: 18/25
I: 1/0
NV: 1
HoR (S.256; RC 108; 4/14/2005)
R:229/0/0
D:73/125/0
I:0/1/0
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan (note that while the overall bill was
generally a GOP leadership effort – closed rule, etc. – the
provisions at issue here are generally consumer protection ones. No
separate votes found, but would seem to be in line with
Democratic/liberal support).
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: Attorneys (Attorneys, Commercial Speech);
Federal Statute: Bankruptcy Code, Act or Rules, or Reform Act of
1978
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Harris v. Quinn, 2014 U.S. Democratic Governor, Pro-Union (Democratic Regime
LEXIS 4504 (2014)
Commitment), Cannot find votes counts for legislature
Gov. Blagojevich’s
Executive Order 2003-08,
and subsequent
amendment to the Public
Labor Relations Act
(PLRA. Pub. Act no. 93204, §5, 2003 Ill. Laws p.
1930.), which unionized
PAs under the Illinois
Home Services program.

Partisan Suppressor: Democratic
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=78283;
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101961#restori
ng)

McCullen v. Coakley
(2014)

Democratic Regime commitment (pro-choice)
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101962)

2007 Amendment to
Massachusetts
Reproductive Health Care
Facilities Act, establishing
35-foot buffer zone

FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, 132 S.Ct. 2307
(2012)
2001 F.C.C. Policy
Statement on Indecency
(extension of Title 18
U.S.C. § 1464 bans the
broadcast of “any obscene,
indecent, or profane
language;” failure to give
fair notice to broadcasters
of what counts as patently
offensive and subject to
broadcaster liability.

Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: Unions (Labor-management disputes: Right
to Organize); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment
(speech, press, and assembly)

Partisan Suppressor: Democratic (pro-choice; Democratic Regime
commitment)
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: Privacy (Abortion: Including
Contraceptives); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment
(speech, press, and assembly)
Michael Powell: R seat (Clinton, 1997); Chair (Bush, 2001)
Susan Ness: Clinton, 1994
Gloria Tristani: D (Clinton, 1997)
Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth: Clinton, 1997
Coded: Bipartisan/Unknown for now
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: Due Process (Miscellaneous); Constitutional
Amendment: Fifth Amendment (Due Process)
Cert Grant: (131 S.Ct. 3065 (2011)). Sotomayor took no part in
grant decision. Cert explicitly notes Court limited to considering
First or Fifth Amendment violated by FCC indecency regulations.
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Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association,
131 S.Ct. 2729 (2011)

9/8/05, Floor Vote: 66 AYE/7 NO/6 NV

California Assembly Bill
1179 (2005), Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §§ 17461746.5

Gov. was Schwarzenegger (R), Brown (D) became party to suit
after winning

Partisan Composition of Assembly was majority Democratic

Partisan Suppressor: Dem/Liberal for now
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and
assembly)

Arizona Free Enterprise
Club’s Freedom PAC v.
Bennett, 131 S.Ct. 2806
(2011)

Citizens’ referendum (Prop 200), passed in 1998 following wave of
scandals

Arizona Citizens Clean
Elections Act (Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 16-940 et
seq.)

McCain and Jane Dee Hull also on ballot, both Republicans
(Turnout ~ 45%)

Passed: 481,963/459,373 (941,336)
(51.20%/48.80%)

Partisan Suppressor: Democratic (regime commitment)
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612)
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending
(Governmental Corruption); Constitutional Amendment: First
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly)

Sorrell v. IMS Health,
Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653
(2011)
Vermont Stat. Ann. tit. 18,
§ 4631(d)

http://www.azsos.gov/election/1998/General/Canvass1998GE.pdf
Prescriber Data provision
http://www.leg.state.vt.us/statutes/fullsection.cfm?Title=18&Chapt
er=091&Section=04631
Vote data not found
Coded: Bipartisan/Unknown for now
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Commercial Speech
Excluding Attorneys; Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment
(speech, press, assembly)
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Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Michael Carrigan –Member of Sparks, NV City Council (Involved
Carrigan, 131 S.Ct. 2343
in GOP)
(2011)
Source:
Nevada Ethics in
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?pers
onId=9104740&privcapId=1052525&previousCapId=1052525&pr
Government Law
eviousTitle=Truckee%20Meadows%20Water%20Authority
Nevada Ethics in Government Law – mid-1970s anti-corruption
reforms
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and
assembly)

Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(2010)
Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
18 U.S.C.S. § 2339B

AEDPA
HoR (18 April 1996), R.C. 126 (Conference Report)
R: 188Y/46N
D: 105Y/86N
I: 0Y/1N
NV: 7
Senate (17 April 1996)
91Y/8N
R: 51Y/1N
D: 40Y/7N
NV: 1
IRTPA
S.2845 (Scienter requirement, defining “expert advice” language in
enrolled bill)
H.R. 10 (Amendment to Senate Bill, insisted upon by House;
also contains language pursuant to amending 2339B(a))
R.C. 523 (10/8/2004)
R: 213/8/6
D: 69/125/11
I: 0/1/0
Agreement to Conference Report
HoR (R.C. 544; 12/7/2004)
R: 152/67/8
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Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1
(2010)
[continued]

D: 183/8/14
I: 1/0/0
Senate (R.V. 216; 12/8/2004)
89Y/2N/9NV
(Clearly bipartisan)
Partisan Suppressor: Bipartisan
*Language to change 2339B was in H.R. 10, adopting 9/11
recommendations, but all other parts of the eventual law approved
with bipartisan majorities (note Stone 2006, wartime suppression of
speech usually bipartisan); no specific amendments in record for
language in question

Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Federal or State Internal
Security Legislation: Smith, Internal Security, And Related Federal
Statutes; Infrequently litigated statutes; Constitutional Amendment:
First Amendment (speech, press, and assembly); Constitutonal
Amendment: First Amendment (association)
Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 Washington HoR (H.B. 1133, 4 March 2005)
(2010)
96Y/0N
Washington Public
Records Act (PRA),
Wash. Rev. Code §
42.56.001

Washington Senate (not found)
Signed by Christine Gregoire (D)
http://search.leg.wa.gov/search.aspx#document
Coding: Bipartisan

Snyder v. Phelps, 131
S.Ct. 1207 (2011)

Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: Privacy, Freedom Information Act and
Related Federal or State Statutes or Regulations; Constitutional
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and assembly)
Minority/Extreme Right Christian Group (Conservative)
Civil jury awards for IIED (Bipartisan/Undetermined)

Jury Finding of IIED for
Snyder

Coding: Bipartisan/Unknown for now
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: Protest Demonstrations/Demonstrations and
Other Forms of Protest Based on First Amendment Guarantees;
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press,
assembly)
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Borough of Duryea v.
Guarnieri, 131 S.Ct. 2488
(2011)

Police Chief (Republican, Law and Order), Anti-union (Republican
regime commitment) council directives
Partisan Suppressor: Conservative/GOP (Anti-union directives)

Police Officer bringing
union grievance,
subsequent issuing of
directives by Duryea
Council

Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (petition clause)

Reichle v. Howards, 132
S.Ct. 2088 (2012)

Secret Service for GOP VP (Republican), Republican regime
commitment (Law and Order) or undetermined?

Actions of Secret Service
Agents, detaining Reichle
for probable cause

Partisan Suppressor: GOP
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: Civil Rights, Liability, Civil Rights Acts
(Liability, Governmental and Liability, Nongovernmental, Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, Non-death Penalty); Constitutional
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and assembly)

Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. HoR (29 Nov 1994), R.C. 507
873 (2012)
288Y/146N
D: 167Y/89N
Uruguay Round
R: 121Y/56N
Agreements Act
I: 0Y/1N
Senate (1 Dec 1994), R.C. 329
76Y/24N
D: 41Y/14N
R: 35Y/10N
Coding: Bipartisan
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: Economic Activity, Patents and Copyright:
Copyright; Constitution, Article Section 8, Paragraph 8 (patent and
copyright clause); Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment
(speech, press, and assembly)
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Wood v. Moss, 2014 U.S.
LEXIS 3614 (2014)

Secret Service detail for GOP President…strictly from association,
GOP (but also Republican regime commitment to law and order)

Actions of Secret Service
Agents, relocating antiBush protestors

Would the Court have ruled the other way if it were a Democrat?
Seems extremely unlikely.
Partisan Suppressor Coding: GOP
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Protest Demonstrations:
Demonstrations and Other Forms of Protest Based on First
Amendment Guarantees; Constitutional Amendment: Fourth
Amendment

Lane v. Franks, 2014 U.S.
LEXIS 4302 (2014)

Franks, President of Community College; Lane = fired employee
for testifying in federal investigation
Partisan Suppressor Coding: Liberal
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and
assembly)

Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010)
Section 203(c) of
Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act

BCRA
HoR (14 Feb 2002) – Shays/Meehan (R.C. 34)
240Y/189N/6NV
R: 41Y/176N
D: 198Y/12N
I: 1Y/1N

PL 107-155
Senate (20 Mar 2002)
60Y/40N
R: 11Y/38N
D: 49Y/2N
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending
(Governmental Corruption); Constitutional Amendment: First
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly); Infrequently litigated
statutes
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Wisconsin Right to Life v.
FEC, 551 U.S. 449 (2007)

BCRA
HoR (14 Feb 2002)
240Y/189N/6NV
R: 41Y/176N
D: 198Y/12N
I: 1Y/1N
Senate (20 Mar 2002)
60Y/40N
R: 11Y/38N
D: 49Y/2N
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending
(Governmental Corruption); Federal Statute (Federal Election
Campaign); First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity)

Tennessee Secondary
School Athletic
Association v. Brentwood
Academy, 551 U.S. 291
(2007)

Against school district

Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971
(2010)

Hastings College of Law (Democratic), Christian group right to
Association (Republican)

Coding: Bipartisan/Unknown
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Miscellaneous (Comity);
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, and
assembly)

Partisan Suppressor: Democratic (Equality regime commitment)
Hastings CoL “Take All
Comers” Policy for
Registered Student
Organizations

Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Free Exercise of Religion;
Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment (free exercise of
religion)
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: Civil Rights (Sex Discrimination);
Constitutional Amendment: Fourteenth Amendment (equal
protection)
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McCutcheon v. FEC, 2014 FECA (1971)
U.S. LEXIS 2391 (2014)
Enacted on Feb. 7, 1972 as PL 92-225.

Aggregate Contribution
Limits of Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA), as
updated by BCRA
2 U.S.C.S. § 441a(a)(3)

Senate: S 382 Passed on Aug. 5, 1971 (Senate Vote 182); 88Y - 2N (both
Arizona Republicans).
Democrats: 51Y - 0N
Republicans: 37Y - 2N
(Information above from the 1971 CQ Almanac, Vol. XXVII (92nd Congress, 1st
Session): 883-896 "Major Congressional Action, and 31-S "CQ Senate Votes")
HoR: HR 11060 Passed on Nov. 30, 1971. Bill was nearly the same as S
382. Roll Call 283; 372Y - 23N.
Republicans: 153Y - 12N
Democrats: 219Y - 11N (Northern Dems 151Y - 2N, Southern Dems 68Y - 9N)
(HoR information from Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. XXIX, no.
50 (Dec. 11, 1971): 2580.)

BCRA
HoR (14 Feb 2002)
240Y/189N/6NV
R: 41Y/176N
D: 198Y/12N
I: 1Y/1N
Senate (20 Mar 2002)
60Y/40N
R: 11Y/38N
D: 49Y/2N
Partisan Suppressor: Democratic
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Campaign Spending
(Governmental Corruption); Constitutional Amendment: First
Amendment (speech, press, and assembly)
American Tradition
Partnership v. Bullock,
132 S.Ct. 2490 (2012)
Montana Campaign
Finance Law on Corporate
Contributions

Application of Citizens United holding to states, Democratic
Regime Commitment (anti-corporate spending in judicial elections)
( http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29612)
Coding: Democratic
Spaeth DD: Liberal
Issue/Legal Provision: First Amendment, Commercial Speech,
Excluding Attorneys; Constitutional Amendment: First Amendment
(speech, press, and assembly)
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Knox v. SEIU, Local
1000, 132 S.Ct. 2277
(2012)

Republican Regime Commitment (Anti-union)
(
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=101961#restori
ng)
Coding: Democratic
Spaeth DD: Conservative
Issue/Legal Provision: Unions, union-union member dispute
(except as pertains to union or closed shop); Constitutional
Amendment: First Amendment (speech, press, assembly)
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Appendix B – INUS Condition Combinations and Classifications
Identity of Speaker (A)

Type of Speech (B)

Speech Suppressor (C)

Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative

Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Conservative
Conservative
Conservative
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Liberal
Liberal
Liberal

Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP
Liberal/Democratic
Undetermined/Bipartisan
Conservative/GOP

Coding of Pro-Speech
(Anti-Speech) Holdings
Liberal(Conservative)
Liberal(Conservative)
Liberal(Conservative)
Conservative(Liberal)
Undetermined
Liberal(Conservative)
Undetermined
Undetermined
Liberal(Conservative)
Undetermined
Undetermined
Liberal(Conservative)
Conservative(Liberal)
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Undetermined
Conservative(Liberal)
Conservative(Liberal)
Conservative(Liberal)
Conservative(Liberal)
Undetermined
Undetermined
Conservative(Liberal)
Undetermined
Liberal(Conservative)
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Appendix C – Ideological Content of Roberts Court Free Expression Cases and Direction Assignments
Case (Claimant)

Speaker Identity

Speech Suppressor

Nature of
Expression

SCOTUS
Decision

Composite
Coding of
Decision
Direction

SCDB Coding of
Decision
Direction

Epstein, Parker,
Segal Decision
Direction

Areas of
Disagreement

WRTL (I)

Pro-Life, Nonprofit Interest
Group
(Conservative)

BCRA, § 203
(Dem/Liberal)

Electoral Speech,
Criticism of
Democratic U.S.
Senators
(Conservative)

For WRTL
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor
(EPS = No
Direction); SCDB
Direction

FAIR

Law School
Consortium
(Liberal)

Solomon
Amendment, 10
U.S.C. Section
983(b)(1)
(Bipartisan)

Equality; Protesting
“Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell”
(Liberal)

Against FAIR
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Ceballos

Deputy District
Attorney Ceballos;
Gov’t
Employee/Lawyer
(Liberal)

District Attorney
Gil Garcetti
(Dem/Liberal)

Gov’t Employee
Speech;
Whistleblowing
(Liberal)

Against Ceballos
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

Randall

Vermont Right to
Life, Vermont
Republican State
Committee;
Vermont
Libertarian Party
(Conservative)

Vermont Pub. Act
64 (2002)
(Dem/Liberal)

Free Market;
Protesting
Contribution Limits
(Conservative)

For Randall
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

Banks

Prison Inmate
(Liberal)

LTSU Policy
(GOP/Conservative)

Equality Speech;
Access to
Information
(Liberal)

Against Banks
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)
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Washington
Education
Association

Union
(Liberal)

WA Fair Campaign
Practices Act,
Section 760
(GOP/Conservative)

Union Speech;
Protesting
Affirmative
Consent
requirements
(Liberal)

Against WEA
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Brentwood
Academy

School Employee
(Liberal)

State Athletic
Association
(Undetermined)

Faculty Speech;
Recruitment Letter
(Undetermined)

Against
Brentwood
(Anti-Speech)

Undetermined

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Frederick

High School
Student
(Liberal)

School Official
(Liberal)

Student Speech;
Pro-drug
(Liberal)

Against Frederick
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Wisconsin Right
to Life (II)

Pro-Life, Nonprofit Interest
Group
(Conservative)

BCRA, § 203
(Dem/Liberal)

Electoral Speech,
Criticism of
Democratic U.S.
Senators
(Conservative)

For WRTL
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Lopez-Torres

Non-establishment,
Democrat
(Liberal)

N.Y. State Act of
1921, ch. 479,
sections 45(1), 110;
Parties choose
candidates
(Undetermined)

Electoral Speech;
Equality of Ballot
Access
(Liberal)

Against LopezTorres
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Washington State
Republican Party

Republican,
Democratic,
Libertarian Parties
(Undetermined)

WA Initiative (I872); Candidates
declare affiliation
(Undetermined)

Electoral Speech;
Restricting Ballot
Access
(Conservative)

Against WSRP et
al.
(Anti-Speech)

Undetermined

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Speaker
(EPS=Conservative);
SCDB

Williams

Purveyor of Child
Pornography
(Undetermined)

PROTECT Act (18
U.S.C.
2252A(a)(3)(B)
(Bipartisan)

Extremist Speech;
Pictures of Children
Engaged in Sexual
Acts
(Undetermined)

Against Williams
(Anti-Speech)

Undetermined

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Speaker
(EPS=Liberal);
Suppressor
(EPS=Conservative);
SCDB

Speaker
(EPS=Conservative);
SCDB

Suppressor
(EPS=No Direction);
SCDB
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Davis

Democratic
Candidate, NY
House District
(Liberal)

Section 319(a) of
the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform
Act of 2002
(BCRA), 116 Stat.
109, 2 U. S. C.
§441a–1(a)
(Dem/Liberal)

Free Market;
Protesting
“Millionaire’s
Amendment”
Contribution
Formula
(Conservative)

For Davis
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Liberal Claimant
(Liberal)

Locke

Union NonMembers
(Conservative)

Maine State
Employees
Collective
Bargaining
Agreement
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-union Speech;
Objection to paying
fee for national
collective
bargaining
(Conservative)

Against Locke
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Pocatello
Education
Association

Public Employee
Union
(Liberal)

Idaho Right to
Work Act, Idaho
state law §44–
2004(2)
(GOP/Conservative)

Union Speech;
Protesting
prohibition on
collecting union
dues through
paychecks
(Liberal)

Against Pocatello
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Summum

Religious Minority,
Gnostic Christians
(Liberal)

Pleasant Grove City
Council’s rejection
of Seven Aphorisms
while accepting 10
Commandments
Monument
(GOP/Conservative)

Religious Speech;
Placing a nonmainstream
monument in public
park
(Liberal)

Against Summum
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Suppressor
(EPS=Conservative)

Citizens United

Non-profit, interest
group
(Conservative)

BCRA, Section
203(c)
(Dem/Liberal)

Electoral Speech;
Documentary
critical of Hillary
Clinton
(Conservative)

For Citizens
United
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor
(EPS=No Direction)

Milavetz, Gallop,
and Milavetz

Law Firm
(Liberal)

Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and
Consumer
Protection Act of
2005
(Bipartisan)

Commercial
Speech, Advertising
(Conservative)

Against Milavetz
(Anti-Speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB
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Stevens

Distributor of
Videos featuring
animal cruelty
(Undetermined)

18 U.S.C.S. § 48
(Bipartisan)

Extremist Speech;
Depictions of
animal cruelty
(Undetermined)

For Stevens
(Pro-Speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Speaker
(EPS=Conservative);
Suppressor
(EPS=Liberal);
SCDB

Humanitarian
Law Project

Non-profit, human
rights organization
(Liberal)

Antiterrorism and
Effective Death
Penalty Act of
1996; (AEDPA) 18
U.S.C. § 2339B and
Amendments
(Bipartisan)

Academic Speech;
Instructing terror
groups on how to
peacefully use law
to resolve disputes
(Liberal)

Against HLP
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Suppressor
(EPS=Conservative)

John Doe #1

Private individuals
opposed to samesex equality
(Conservative)

Washington Public
Records Act (PRA),
Wash. Rev. Code §
42.56.001
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-Equality
Speech; Compelled
disclosure of
petition signatories
(Conservative)

Against Doe
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Christian Legal
Society

Christian Student
Organization
(Conservative)

Hastings College of
Law “Take All
Comers” Policy
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-Equality
Speech; Excluding
students on basis of
sexual orientation
and religion
(Conservative)

Against CLS
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Undetermined

Authors Have Not
Coded

SCDB

Phelps

Far-right, Christian
Church
(Conservative)

Jury Verdict for tort
of IIED; Damages
Award
(Undetermined)

Anti-Equality
Speech;
Denouncing
homosexuals
(Conservative)

For Phelps
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB

Carrigan

Elected member of
Sparks, NV City
Council holding
GOP leadership
position
(Conservative)

Nevada Ethics in
Government Law
(Dem/Liberal)

Free Market;
Carrigan’s vote in
favor of economic
development owned
by friend
(Conservative)

Against Carrigan
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor
(EPS=No Direction);
SCDB
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Guarnieri

Chief of Police of
Duryea, PA
(Conservative)

Council Directives
relating to
Guarnieri’s job
(Undetermined)

Gov’t Employee
Speech;
Whistleblower/
Union
(Liberal)

Against Guarnieri
(Anti-Speech)

Undetermined

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Speaker
(EPS=Liberal);
Suppressor
(EPS=Conservative);
SCDB

IMS Health, Inc.

Corporation of
pharmaceutical
companies and data
miners
(Conservative)

Vermont Statute
Ann. Tit. 18,
Section 4631(d);
protection of
prescriberidentifying info
(Undetermined)

Commercial
Speech; access to
pharmacy records;
Deregulation
(Conservative)

For IMS Health
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor
(EPS=Liberal);
SCDB

Arizona Free
Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club
PAC

AFECFCP;
Arizona Taxpayers
Action Committee,
Arizonans for a
Sound Economy;
GOP Candidates
for Office
(Conservative)

Arizona Citizens
Clean Elections
Act (Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 16940 et seq.); Ballot
Prop 200 (1998)
(Dem/Liberal)

Free Market;
Protesting equalitybased expenditure
limits/formula
(Conservative)

For AFECFCP
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Entertainment
Merchants
Association

Business
association of
software and
videogame
industries
(Conservative)

California
Assembly Bill 1179
(2005), Cal. Civ.
Code Ann. §§ 17461746.5; restricting
sale of violent
videogames to
minors
(Dem/Liberal)

Extreme Speech;
Violent depictions
(Undetermined)

For EMA
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Golan

Orchestra
conductors,
musicians, others
(Liberal)

Uruguay Round
Agreements Act
Section 514
(Bipartisan)

Equality Speech;
Use of works in
public domain
(Liberal)

Against Golan
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded

SCDB
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Howards

Private Individual;
opposed to Iraq
War
(Liberal)

Arrest by Secret
Service Agents
(Conservative)

Electoral Speech;
Criticism of VP
Cheney, Bush
Administration’s
Iraq Policy
(Liberal)

Against Howards
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded

Knox

Union non-member
(Conservative)

SEIU temporary fee
for
ideological/electoral
purposes
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-union Speech;
Protesting fee
assessment for
ideological/electoral
fund of public
employee union
(Conservative)

For Knox
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded

Fox Television
Stations

Mainstream
Broadcast Media
(Fox and ABC)
(Liberal)

2001 F.C.C. Policy
Statement on
Indecency
(extension of
Title 18 U.S.C. §
1464)
(Undetermined)

Sex/Gender Speech;
Airing of two brief
expletives in award
shows, brief male
nudity
(Liberal)

For Fox
Television
(Pro-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Authors Have Not
Coded

American
Tradition
Partnership

Pro-business
association
(Conservative)

Mont. Code Ann.
§13-35227(1) (2011);
Restrictions on
Corporate Spending
(Dem/Liberal)

Free market;
Protesting
expenditure
prohibition in
judicial elections
(Conservative)

For ATP
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Authors Have Not
Coded

SCDB

Alvarez

Local Politician;
Three Valley Water
District Board of
Directors
(Undetermined)

Stolen Valor Act of
2005; 18 U.S.C.S.
Section 704(b)
(Bipartisan)

False Speech; Lying
about military
service
(Undetermined)

For Alvarez
(Pro-Speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Authors Have Not
Coded

SCDB

Alliance for Open
Society Int’l, Inc.

Non-profit
organization
combatting AIDS
abroad
(Liberal)

U.S. Leadership
Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and
Malaria Act of 2003
(Bipartisan)

Sex/Gender Speech;
Adoption of antiprostitution
message to receive
funding
(Liberal)

For AOSI
(Pro-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Authors Have Not
Coded
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McCutcheon

Private individual,
donor to
conservative
politicians
(Conservative)

FECA Section
441a(a)(3) as
amended by BCRA
(Dem/Liberal)

Free market;
Protesting
aggregate
contribution limits
(Conservative)

For McCutcheon
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded

Moss

Anti-war
protestor(s)
(Liberal)

GOP President’s
Secret Service
relocation of antiwar protestors
(GOP/Conservative)

Anti-war Speech;
Speech/protests
critical of President
George W. Bush’s
policies
(Liberal)

Against Moss
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded

Lane

Academic Faculty;
Director of
underprivileged
youth program at
Central Alabama
Community
College
(Liberal)

President of CACC
terminating Lane
after testifying in
federal fraud
investigation
(Dem/Liberal)

Gov’t Employee
Speech;
Whistleblower
(Liberal)

For Lane
(Pro-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Authors Have Not
Coded

McCullen

Private Individuals;
Pro-life “sidewalk
counselors”
(Conservative)

Massachusetts
Reproductive
Health Care
Facilities Act
(2007)
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-abortion
speech; Leafleting
and counseling
(Conservative)

For McCullen
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded

Harris

Union non-member
(Conservative)

Gov. Blagojevich’s
Executive Order
2003-08, and
subsequent
amendment to the
Public Labor
Relations Act
(PLRA. Pub. Act
no. 93-204, §5,
2003 Ill. Laws p.
1930.)
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-union Speech;
protesting payment
of collective
bargaining fee
(Conservative)

For Harris
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded
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Williams-Yulee

Criminal-Defense
Lawyer, Candidate
for Hillsborough
County Court
(Liberal)

Florida Supreme
Court Canon 7C(1)
of its Code of
Judicial Conduct
(Dem/Liberal)

Free market;
solicitation of
campaign
contributions
(Conservative)

Against WilliamsYulee
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Authors Have Not
Coded

Sons of
Confederate
Veterans

Non-profit interest
group
(Conservative)

Texas Department
of Motor Vehicles
Board
(Undetermined)

Anti-Equality
Speech; License
plate design
featuring
Confederate
flag/honoring
Confederate
servicemembers
(Conservative)

Against SCV
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Authors Have Not
Coded

SCDB

Reed

Pastor, Evangelical
(Good News
Community
Church)
(Conservative)

Gilbert, Ariz., Land
Development Code
(Sign Code or
Code), ch. 1, §4.402
(2005).
(Undetermined)

Religious speech;
directional signs for
service locations
(Conservative)

For Reed
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Authors Have Not
Coded

SCDB
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Appendix D – Ideological Content of Rehnquist Court Free Expression Cases and Composite Direction Assignment
Case (Claimant)

Speaker Identity

Speech Suppressor

Nature of Expression

SCOTUS Decision

Composite
Coding of
Decision
Direction

SCDB
Coding of
Decision
Direction

Epstein,
Parker,
Segal
Decision
Direction

Areas of
Disagreement

Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union

Union
(Liberal)

Honoraria ban of 5
U.S.C.S. Section 501(b);
Ethics Reform Act of
1989 (Dem/Liberal)

Academic speech;
receipt of small
honoraria (Liberal)

For Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union
(Pro-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

Suppressor
(EPS = No
Direction)

Coors Brewing Co.

Coors; Business
(Conservative)

§5(e)(2) of the Federal
Alcohol Administration
Act (FAAA or Act), 27 U.
S. C. §205(e)(2)
(Dem/Liberal)

Commercial speech;
labeling requirements
(Conservative)

For Coors Brewing
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

McIntyre

Margaret McIntyre,
anti-tax advocate
(Conservative)

Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
Section 3599.09(A)(Prodisclosure law)
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-tax/small
government advocacy
(Conservative)

For McIntyre
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

Hurley

Hurley; Boston
Veterans Parade
group/organizers
(Conservative)

Boston Alliance of
Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Individuals
(Liberal)

Anti-LGBT Equality;
Pro-military
(Conservative)

For Hurley
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction

Went For It, Inc.

Injury Attorneys
(Liberal)

Florida Bar; Florida State
Bar Rules 4-7.4(b)(1) and
4-7.8(a)
(Dem/Liberal)

Commercial Speech;
Advertising/Soliciting
(Conservative)

Against WFI
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

Pinette

KKK
(Conservative)

Capitol Square Review
and Advisory Board
discretion under Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. Section
105.41 (Undetermined)

Religious; Christian
symbol (Conservative)

For Pinette
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Do
Not Code
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Rosenberger

Christian Student
Organization
(Conservative)

University of Virginia
(Dem/Liberal)

Christian newspaper
(Conservative)

For Rosenberger
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

44 Liquormart, Inc.

Business
(Conservative)

Rhode Island Gen. Laws
§3–8–7 (1987) “Price
Advertising Ban”
(Dem/Liberal)

Commercial Speech;
Advertising
(Conservative)

For 44 Liquormart
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Colorado
Republican Federal
Campaign
Committee (I)

State Republican
Party Organization
(Conservative)

FECA, 2 U. S. C.
§441a(d)(3) “Party
Expenditure Provision”
(Bipartisan)

Electoral Speech (AntiDemocratic); Free
Market Speech
(Conservative)

For Colorado
Republican Federal
Campaign
Committee
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Denver Area
Educational
Telecommunications
Consortium

Cable Media;
Academic (Liberal)

Cable Television
Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992
(1992 Act or Act), 106
Stat. 1486, §§10(a), 10(b),
and 10(c), 47 U. S. C.
§§532(h), 532(j), and note
following §531
(Bipartisan)

Sex/Gender Speech
(Pornographic/adult
images)
(Liberal)

For Denver Area
Educational
Telecommunications
Consortium
(Pro-speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

O’Hare Truck
Service, Inc.

Government
Employee/Business
(Undetermined)

Mayor Reid M. Paxon
(Undetermined)

Electoral Speech;
Partisan support
unknown; whistleblower
(Liberal)

For O’Hare Truck
Service
(Pro-speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative),
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal)

Umbehr

Government
Employee/Business
(Undetermined)

Board of Commissioners
of Wabaunsee County
(Undetermined)

Electoral speech;
Whistleblower (Liberal)

For Umbehr
(Pro-speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative),
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal)

Schenck

Pro-life advocates
(Conservative)

Temporary Restraining
Order by Reaganappointee Judge Arcara,
Western District of New
York (GOP/Conservative)

Anti-abortion
advocacy/protesting
(Conservative)

Mixed; Fixed Buffer
Zones upheld,
Floating Buffer
Zones struck down
(Mixed)

Undetermined

Conservative
& Liberal
(Split Vote)

Conservative
Claimant
(Liberal)

Suppressor (EPS =
Liberal)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)
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Turner
Broadcasting
Systems (II)

Turner
Broadcasting
Systems
(Liberal)

Cable Television
Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992,
sections 4 and 5 “Must
Carry” Provisions
(Dem/Liberal)

Free market; compelled
speech
(Conservative)

Against TBS
(Anti-Speech)

Undetermined

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Conservative)

Wileman Bros. &
Elliott, Inc.

California Fruit
growers,
distributors
(Conservative)

Agricultural Marketing
Agreement Act of 1937, 7
U.S.C.S. section 601 et
seq. (subsequently
amended by 1966 31 Fed.
Reg. 8177; 36 Fed. Reg.
14381; 41 Fed. Reg.
14375, 17528 (1976))
(Undetermined)

Commercial Speech;
Compelled Advertising
(Conservative)

Against Wileman
Bros. & Elliott
(Anti-speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction

(Reno v.) ACLU

American Civil
Liberties Union &
Others
(Liberal)

Communications Decency
Act of 1996 (CDA), 47
U.S.C.S. Section 223
(Bipartisan)

Sex/Gender Speech
(Adult/Pornography)
(Liberal)

For ACLU
(Pro-speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

Forbes

Independent
Candidate and
former member of
far-right party
(Conservative)

Arkansas Educational
Television Commission
(Dem/Liberal)

Electoral Speech
(Conservative)

Against Forbes
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal),
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

Finley

Avantgarde/protest artists
(Liberal)

National Foundation on
the Arts and Humanities
Act, 20 U.S.C.S. section
954 (d)(1); grant-making
procedures
(Bipartisan)

Controversial art (i.e.
Serrano, Mapplethorpe)
(Liberal)

Against Finley
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

American
Constitutional Law
Foundation

ACLF
(Undetermined)

Colo. Rev. Stat. sections
1-40-112(1); 1-40-112(2);
1-40-111(2); 1-40-121
(Undetermined)

Pro-petition/ballot
access advocacy
(Liberal)

For American
Constitutional Law
Foundation
(Pro-Speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal)
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Greater New
Orleans
Broadcasting

Local media group
(Liberal)

18 U.S.C.S. section 1304
“Casino Advertising Ban”
(Bipartisan)

Commercial Speech;
Advertising for
gambling/casinos
(Conservative)

For Greater New
Orleans
Broadcasting
(Pro-Speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Conservative),
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

United Reporting
Publishing Co.

Business, private
publishing
company
(Conservative)

Cal. Gov’t Code Section
6254(f)(3)
(Undetermined)

Commercial Speech;
Advertising/Solicitation
(Conservative)

Against United
Reporting
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal),
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

Shrink Missouri
Gov’t PAC

Anti-tax/small
gov’t interest group
(Conservative)

Mo. Rev. Stat. Section
130.032.1(1)
(Dem/Liberal)

Free Market Electoral;
Electoral; support of
State Auditor Candidate
Zev David Fredman (R)
(Conservative)

Against Shrink
Missouri
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

Southworth

School students
(Liberal)

Board of Regents of
University of Wisconsin
imposition of student
activity fee
(Liberal)

Compelled Speech;
against subsidizing
liberal student groups
(Conservative)

Against Southworth
(Anti-speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Conservative),
Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

Pap’s A.M.
(“Kandyland”)

Adult
entertainment
business (Liberal)

City of Erie, PA
Ordinance 75-1994
“secondary effects”
ordinance
(GOP/Conservative)

Nude dancing; artistic
expression (Liberal)

Against Pap’s A.M.
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Playboy
Entertainment
Group

Adult
entertainment
media (Liberal)

Telecommunications Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104104, 110 Stat. 136 (47
U.S.C.S. Section 561
(Section 505)
(Bipartisan)

Sex/Gender (Adult
Entertainment;
Pornography)
(Liberal)

For Playboy
(Pro-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

Boy Scouts of
America

Traditional values
community group
(Conservative)

NJ public
accommodations law, N.J.
Stat. Ann. Sections 10:54, 10:5-5 (2000)
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-LGBT Equality
(Conservative)

For Boy Scouts of
America
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)
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Hill

Pro-life advocates
(Conservative)

Colo. Rev. Stat. Section
18-9-122(3)(1999)
(Dem/Liberal)

Anti-abortion
speech/protests
(Conservative)

Against Hill (AntiSpeech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Velazquez

Lawyers affiliated
with Legal
Services
Corporation
(Liberal)

Legal Services
Corporation Act, 88 Stat.
378, 42 U. S. C. §2996 et
seq., and funding
restrictions imposed by
Omnibus Consolidated
Rescissions and
Appropriations Act of
1996 (1996 Act), §504,
110 Stat. 1321–53
(GOP/Conservative)

Criticisms of welfare
system; pro-indingent
client speech
(Liberal)

For Velazquez
(Pro-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

Murphy

Prisoner/inmate
“law clerk”
(Liberal)

Montana state prison
policy
(GOP/Conservative)

Legal
assistance/representation
of prisoners
(Liberal)

Against Murphy
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Vopper

Vopper, political
radio commentator
critical of unions in
the past
(Conservative)

Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 82
Stat. 211, entitled
Wiretapping and
Electronic Surveillance
(Bipartisan)

Electoral/Policy speech;
anti-union – playing of
illegally obtained tape
capturing conversation
between teacher union
officials on air
(Conservative)

For Vopper
(Pro-speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Good News Club

Sponsors of
children’s private
religious
organization;
Christian
(Conservative)

Milford School
community use policy
restricting facilities to
non-religious activities
(Dem/Liberal)

Use of school facilities
for
worship/congregation
(Conservative)

For Good News
Club
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

Colorado
Republican Federal
Campaign
Committee (II)

State Republican
Party Organization
(Conservative)

FECA, 2 U. S. C.
§441a(d)(3) “Party
Expenditure Provision”
(Bipartisan)

Electoral Speech (AntiDemocratic); Free
Market Speech
(Conservative)

Against Colorado
Republican Federal
Campaign
Committee
(Anti-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)
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United Foods, Inc.

Large agricultural
distribution/grower
business
(Conservative)

Mushroom Promotion,
Research, and Consumer
Information Act, 104 Stat.
3854, 7 U. S. C. §6101 et
seq.
(Bipartisan)

Commercial; anticompelled speech (fee
assessments)
(Conservative)

For United Foods
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction

Lorillard Tobacco
Co.

Big tobacco
businesses
(Conservative)

940 Code of Mass. Regs.
§§21.01–21.07, 22.01–
22.09 (2000) , issued by
Democratic AG
(Dem/Liberal)

Commercial
speech/advertising of
tobacco products
(Conservative)

For Lorillard
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB
Direction/Issue;
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

Thomas

Windy City Hemp
Development
Board
(Liberal)

Chicago Park District;
maintaining and
advocating for public
property
(Dem/Liberal)

Speech/event to legalize
marijuana usage
(Liberal)

For Chicago
(Anti-speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

Free Speech
Coalition

California adult
entertainment
association
(Liberal)

Child Pornography
Prevention Act of 1996
(CPPA), 18 U. S. C.
§2251 et seq.
(GOP/Conservative)

Sex/Gender Speech;
“morphed images”
neither obscene nor
child pornography
(Liberal)

For Free Speech
Coalition
(Pro-Speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

Western States
Medical Center

Licensed
pharmacies
specializing in drug
compounding
(Conservative)

Section 127(a) of the Food
and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of
1997 (FDAMA or Act),
111 Stat. 2328, 21 U. S. C.
§353a (advertising
restrictions)
(Bipartisan)

Commercial
speech/advertising of
“compounded drugs”
(Conservative)

For Western States
Medical Center
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

(Ashcroft) v. ACLU
(I)

ACLU et al.
(Liberal)

Child Online Protection
Act, 112 Stat. 2681-736
(codified in 47 U. S. C. §
23
(GOP/Conservative)

Sex/Gender speech
(adult entertainment,
sexual health,
education)
(Liberal)

Against ACLU
(Anti-speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)
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Alameda Books

Adult
entertainment
establishments
(Liberal)

Los Angeles Municipal
Code §12.70(C) (1978);
“secondary effects”
(GOP/Conservative)

Sex/Gender speech; sale
of adult pornographic
videos and operation of
viewing booths
(Liberal)

Against Alameda
Books
(Anti-Speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Watchtower Bible
and Tract Society

Religious;
Jehovah’s Witness
(Conservative)

Village of Stratton, Ohio
Ordinance No. 1998–5
(Prohibiting private
property canvassing)
(Undetermined)

Door-to-door
solicitation/advocating
on behalf of Jehovah’s
Witnesses
(Conservative)

For Watchtower
Bible and Tract
Society
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal)

Republican Party of
Minnesota

Republican Party
of Minnesota;
Judicial candidate
Gregory Wersal
(Conservative)

Minn. Code of Judicial
Conduct, Canon
5(A)(3)(d)(i) (2000),
“announce clause”
(Dem/Liberal)

Announcement of views
on Minnesota Supreme
Court decisions;
criticism of abortion,
welfare, crime decisions
(Conservative)

For Republican
Party of Minnesota
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

Eldred

Individuals using
works in public
domain
(Undetermined)

Copyright Term Extension
Act (CTEA), Pub. L. 105–
298, §§102(b) and (d),
112 Stat. 2827–2828
(Bipartisan/Undetermined)

Pro-public domain use;
anti-property
(Liberal)

Against Eldred
(Anti-Speech)

Undetermined

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal),
Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

Black

Members of KKK;
far-right movement
(Conservative)

Va. Code Ann. §18.2–423
(1996); cross-burning
statute (Liberal)

Religious; far-right
speech (cross burning)
(Conservative)

For Black
(Pro-Speech)

Conservative

Liberal

Conservative
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction

Telemarketing
Associates, Inc.

Illinois for-profit
fundraising
corporations
(Conservative)

Fraud suit brought by
Democratic Illinois AG
Madigan (Dem/Liberal)

Solicitation of funds for
VietNow; false speech
(solicitation generally
funded corporation
rather than charity)
(Undetermined)

For Illinois
(Anti-speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)
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Beaumont

North Carolina
Right to Life; nonprofit advocacy
group
(Conservative)

Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA),
§441b “contribution
restriction”
(Bipartisan)

Sex/Gender speech;
anti-abortion; free
market electoral
(Conservative)

For FEC
(Anti-speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Hicks

Private individual;
non-resident of
Whitcomb Court
Housing
Development
(Undetermined)

Richmond Redevelopment
and Housing Authority
(RRHA) “trespass policy”
(Undetermined)

No concrete speech act;
general overbroad claim
(Undetermined)

For Virginia
(Anti-speech)

Undetermined

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction;
Speaker (EPS =
Liberal)

American Library
Association

Academic speaker;
American Library
Ass’n
(Liberal)

Children’s Internet
Protection Act (CIPA),
114 Stat. 2763A–335
(Bipartisan)

Compelled
speech/unconstitutional
conditions claim;
Sex/Gender speech
(requiring filters to
screen out websites
purveying obscene
material)
(Liberal)

For U.S.
(Anti-speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
Conservative)

McConnell

Mitch McConnell,
Senate Minority
Leader
(Conservative)

Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002
(BCRA), primarily Titles I
and II “soft money
contribution” ban and
“electioneering
expenditures” ban
(Dem/Liberal)

Free market electoral
speech; opposition to
expenditure limits and
other provisions
(Conservative)

For FEC
(Anti-speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

Suppressor (EPS =
No Direction)

Z.J. Gifts, Inc.

Adult
entertainment
business (Liberal)

Littleton City Code §§3–
14–2, 3–14–4 (2003),
“adult business licensing”
(GOP/Conservative)

Sex/Gender Speech;
adult entertainment
media
(Liberal)

For Littleton
(Anti-speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Conservative
(Liberal
Claimant)

(Ashcroft) v. ACLU
(II)

ACLU et al.
(Liberal)

Child Online Protection
Act, 112 Stat. 2681-736
(codified in 47 U. S. C. §
23
(GOP/Conservative)

Sex/Gender speech
(adult entertainment,
sexual health,
education)
(Liberal)

For ACLU
(Pro-speech)

Liberal

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)
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Roe

San Diego police
officer
(Conservative)

San Diego Police
Department
(GOP/Conservative)

Sex/Gender speech;
distribution of
pornographic videos
featuring respondent
(Liberal)

For San Diego
(Anti-speech)

Conservative

Conservative

Authors Do
Not Code

Livestock Marketing
Association

Livestock/cattle
business
associations
(Conservative)

The Beef Promotion and
Research Act of 1985
(Beef Act or Act), 99 Stat.
1597
(Bipartisan)

Commercial speech;
anti-compelled speech –
fee assessment
(Conservative)

For Johanns
(Anti-speech)

Liberal

Conservative

Liberal
(Conservative
Claimant)

SCDB Direction

Tory

Ulysses Tory,
former client of
Johnnie Cochran
for alleged civil
rights violation by
LAPD
(Liberal)

Superior Court of CA
injunction against Tory
(Undetermined)

Defamatory speech;
directed at Civil Rights
Attorney Johnnie
Cochran
(Conservative)

For Tory
(Pro-Speech)

Undetermined

Liberal

Liberal
(Liberal
Claimant)

SCDB Direction
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Appendix E – Martin-Quinn Ordering of Justices by Term (1994-2015 Terms)
Note: Martin-Quinn Scores have been rescaled and inverted to range from 0 (most liberal) to 1
(most conservative) so as to approximate Segal-Cover scoring. The line and justices’ individual
scores and initials are designed to approximate the distance between the justices. Ordering is the
basis for classifying degree of order in decisions (chapter three).

1994

1995

1996

(.266)

(.438)(.445)
(.446)

(.522) (.591)
(.523)

JPS

RBG DS
SB

SDO WHR
AK

(.249)

(.434)(.436)
(.444)

(.514) (.589)
(.522)

JPS

RBG SB
DS

AK WHR
SDO

(.242)

JPS

1997

(.419)(.428)
(.444)

SB RBG
DS

(.244)

(.415)(.436)
(.415)

JPS

SB DS
RBG

(.523) (.58)
(.532)

AK WHR
SDO

(.521) (.577)
(.538)

AK WHR
SDO

(.658) (.708)

AS

CT

(.676)(.713)

AS

CT

(.69)(.717)

AS

CT

(.694)(.717)

AS

CT

310

1998

(.244) (.405)(.428)
(.417)

JPS

1999

2000

RBG DS
SB

AK

WHR
SDO

(.247)(.378)(.401)
(.414)

(.525)
(.581)
(.538)

JPS RBG DS
SB

SDO

(.258)(.364)
(.383)
(.384)

JPS RBG
SB
DS

2001

(.528)
(.59)
(.531)

(.265)(.357)
(.372)
(.379)

JPS

RBG
DS
SB

WHR

(.693) (.718)

AS

CT

(.698)(.715)

AS

CT

AK

(.506)
(.577)
(.53)

SDO
AK

(.491)

SDO

WHR

(.536)
(.56)

AK
WHR

(.698) (.717)

AS

CT

(.688)(.715)

AS

CT
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2002

(.273) (.353)(.379)
(.364)

JPS

2003

2004

RBG SB
DS

2006

SDO

(.667) (.724)

AK
WHR

AS

CT

(.274)(.348) (.384)
(.355)

(.48) (.558)
(.516)

(.654) (.725)

JPS RBG
SB
DS

SDO WHR
AK

AS

CT

(.474)
(.563)
(.503)

(.639)

(.728)

SDO
AK

AS

(.276)(.352) (.394)
(.357)

JPS RBG

2005

(.483) (.525)
(.549)

SB
DS

WHR

(.279)(.359)(.382)
(.362)

(.499)(.558)
(.56)

(.635)

JPS RBG SB
DS

AK JGR
SA

AS

(.281) (.358)
(.37)
(.375)

JPS

RBG
DS
SB

(.496) (.56)
(.562)

AK

JGR
SA

CT

(.73)

CT

(.635)

(.727)

AS

CT

312

2007

(.289)(.354)
(.366)
(.381)

JPS

2008

(.278)(.352) (.388)
(.362)

JPS

2009

RBG SB
DS

(.278) (.356)(.379)
(.363)

JPS

2010

RBG
DS
SB

RBG SB
SS

(.33)(.36)
(.373)
(.375)

RBG SS
EK
SB

(.493) (.56)
(.568)

AK

(.626)

(.718)

AS

CT

JGR
SA

(.504) (.565)(.585)(.619)

AK

JGR

SA AS

(.501) (.557)(.587)(.618)

AK

JGR

SA AS

(.505) (.558)(.595)
(.607)

AK

JGR SA
AS

(.701)

CT

(.692)

CT

(.68)

CT
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2011

(.312) (.351)
(.374)
(.375)

(.486) (.545)(.595)
(.601)

RBG SS
EK
SB

2012

(.309)
(.326) (.376)

RBG
SS

2013

SB

(.309) (.36)
(.312) (.371)

(.302) (.357)
(.305) (.365)

SS
EK
RBG SB

2015

(.30) (.366)
(.304) (.372)

SS
EK
RBG SB

JGR SA
AS

(.482) (.539)(.579)
(.592)

AK

RBG EK
SS
SB

2014

AK

JGR AS
SA

(.469) (.517)(.569)
(.592)

AK

JGR AS
SA

(.447) (.503) (.563)
(.568)

AK

JGR

AS
SA

(.437) (.484) (.553)

AK

JGR

SA

(.678)

CT

(.674)

CT

(.675)

CT

(.675)

CT

(.676)

CT
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Appendix F – Voting Disorder Typologies, SCDB Directional Coding
Composite
Direction
Conservative

Strong
Ordered
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006)

Ordered

Unanimous Decisions

Disordered

Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006)

Beard v. Banks (2006)

Morse v. Frederick (2007)

Davenport v. WEA (2007)

U.S. v. Williams (2008)

Davis v. FEC (2008)

TSSAA v. Brentwood Academy
(2007)

Ysursa v. Pocatello Education
Association (2009)

New York State Board of Elections
v. Torres (2008)

Holder v. Humanitarian Law
Project (2010)

Pleasant Grove City v. Summum
(2009)

Walker v. Sons of Confederate
Veterans (2015)

Randall v. Sorrell (2006)

Strong Disorder

Totals

Washington State Grange v.
Washington State Republican
Party (2008)

Conservative Decisions:
61.36%

Golan v. Holder (2012)

Citizens United v. FEC (2010)
Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett
(2011)

Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, Local
1000 (2012)

Pro-Speech Decisions as
Proportion of
Conservative Decisions:
55.56%
Pro-Speech Decisions as
Proportion of All
Decisions: 34.09%

Harris v. Quinn (2014)
Nevada Commission on Ethics v.
Carrigan (2011)

McCutcheon v. F.E.C. (2014)

Duryea v. Guarnieri (2011)
Reichle v. Howards (2012)
Wood v. Moss (2014)
McCullen v. Coakley (2014)

Undetermined

Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez (2010)

Undetermined
Decisions: 13.64%
Undetermined
Proportion: 33.33%
All Decisions: 4.54%

Liberal

Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C.
(2007)

Doe v. Reed (2010)

Wisconsin Right to Life v. F.E.C.
(2006)

U.S. v. Alvarez (2012)
American Tradition Partnership
v. Bullock (2012)

U.S. v. Stevens (2010)

Hartman v. Moore (2006)

Snyder v. Phelps (2011)

Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Association
(2011)

Locke v. Karass (2009)
Agency for International
Development v. Alliance
for Open Society
International, Inc. (2013)

Sorrell v. IMS Health (2012)
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.
v. U.S. (2010)

Lane v. Franks (2014)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015)

(9.1%)

(36.36%)

(20.45%)

Pro-Speech Proportion:
30.00%
All Decisions: 6.82%

Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar
(2015)

F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations
(2012)

(22.73%)

Liberal Decisions:
22.73%

(11.36%)
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Rehnquist Court Era (1994-2004 Terms)
Strong Ordered
Conservative

Ordered

Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of
the University of Virginia (1995)

U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Employees
Union (1995)

Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC
(1997)

Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette (1995)

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)

Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee v. FEC (1996)

Unanimous
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. (1995)
Board of Regents, UW v. Southworth
(2000)

Disorder
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.
(1995)
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. &
Elliott (1997)

Shaw v. Murphy (2001)

LA v. Alameda Books (2002)

Thomas v. Chicago Park District
(2002)

Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000)
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2002)
U.S. v. American Library Association
(2003)

Strong Disorder
Denver Area Educational
Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC (1996)
Johanns v. Livestock Marketing
Association (2005)

Arkansas Educational Television
Commission v. Forbes (1998)
NEA v. Finley (1998)

Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates,
Inc. (2003)

Totals
Conservative
Decisions: 59.26%
Pro-Speech
Decisions as
Proportion of
Conservative
Decisions: 53.57%
Pro-Speech
Decisions as
Proportion of All
Decisions: 34.88%

LAPD v. United Reporting
Publishing Co. (1999)

Virginia v. Hicks (2003)
Good News Club v. Milford (2001)
Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts, Inc. (2004)
Eldred v. Aschroft (2003)
San Diego v. Roe (2004)

Undetermined

Undetermined
Decisions: 12.96%

Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997)

Undetermined
Propotion: 71.43%
All Decisions: 9.26%
Liberal
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Committee v. FEC (2001)
Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly (2001)
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
(2002)

O’Hare Truck Service v. Northlake
(1996)
Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr (1996)

Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston (1995)
44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island
(1996)

Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001)
Reno v. ACLU (1997)

McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission (1995)

Buckley v. American Constitutional
Law Foundation (1999)

Liberal Decisions:
27.78%%

Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Gov’t PAC
(2000)

U.S. v. United Foods, Inc. (2001)

Pro-Speech
Proportion: 26.67%

U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment
Group (2000)

FEC v. Beaumont (2003)
McConnell v. FEC (2003)
Tory v. Cochran (2005)

Greater New Orleans Broadcasting
v. U.S. (1999)

Hill v. Colorado (2000)
Legal Services Corp. v. Velasquez
(2001)

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
(2002)
Thompson v. Western States Medical
Center (2002)
Virginia v. Black (2003)
Ashcroft v. ACLU (2004)

Watchtower Bible & Tract Society
of NY v. Stratton (2002)

(15.09%)

(22.64%)

(22.64%)

(24.53%)

(15.09%)

All Decisions: 7.4%
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Appendix G - Frequency of Cases by Type, Certiorari Dataset

Prisoner
Electoral/Policy Speech

2005
2

2006
6
(H)
4
(M)
1

2007
1
0

2008
3
(M)
2

2009
0

2010
1
2

2011
6
(H)
4
(M)
2

2012
2
(M)
2
(M)
2
(M)

2013
0

2014
0

2015
3
(H)
1

Total
24

6
(H)

4
(H)

5
(H)
5
(H)

1

0

5
(H)

1

3
(H)

43

1

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

8

2

0

1

0

17

0

0

0

8

3
(M)
2

2

3

2
(M)
0

3
(H)
1

0

1

4
(M)
1

0

0

3
(M)
1

0

0

24

4
(M)
1

0

4
(M)
1

0

0

18

1

1

0

0

1

6

Govt Employee/
Whistleblower

5
(M)
7
(H)

Faculty

0

Religious

1

Terrorism/Espionage

0

4
(M)
3
(M)
2

Student

1

2

Religious (Schools)

1

1

3
(M)
1

Elected Official

0

1

1

0

5
(H)
0

Controversial Ideology/Extreme Speech (Violence, AntiWar, KKK, Threats, etc.)

2

1

4
(M)

0

2

2

1

0

1

2
(M)

1

16

Lawyer

1

1

1

0

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

11

Sex/Gender (Adult Ent.)

1

1

0

1

2

0

2

0

0

0

0

7

Sex/Gender
(Women’s Rights)

1

1

1

3
(M)

1

0

0

1

1

0

0

9

Sex/Gender
(LGBT Equality)

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

0

3

Sex/Gender
(Child Porn)

2

0

1

1

3
(M)

0

2

1

0

3
(H)

0

13

Union

1

1

1

1

1

1

0

0

1

0

0

7

Anti-Union/ Nonmember

0

0

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

1

0

4

Free Market Electoral
(Anti-CF Reg)

2

0

1

0

1

3

3

1

3

1

1

16

Petition/Ballot Access

1

0

2

1

1

1

3

1

1

0

0

11

Commercial/
Business

3

0

1

1

0

4
(M)

3

2
(M)

0

2
(M)

2
(M)

18

Libel/
Related Torts

0

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

3
(H)

0

4

Media

0

0

0

0

1

0

2

1

0

0

1

5

Miscellaneous

1

0

1

0

0

1

0

1

11

33

29

28

32

32

46

3
(H)
21

1

Totals

3
(M)
33

21

19

15
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7
(H)

6
(H)
3

26
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Appendix H - Case List, Grants of Certiorari (2005-2014 Terms)
NAAMP v. Castille, 799 F.3d 216 (2015)
Valencia v. De Luca, 612 Fed. Appx. 512 (2015)
Petrella v. Brownback, 787 F.3d 1242 (2015)
Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876 (2015)
Hines v. Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197 (2015)
Werkheiser v. Pocono Township, 780 F.3d 172 (2015)
Spence v. Nelson, 603 Fed. Appx. 250 (2015)
Dahlstrom v. Sun-Times Media, LLC., 777 F.3d 937 (2015)
Loscombe v. City Of Scranton, 600 Fed. Appx. 847 (2015)
United States v. Whittemore, 776 F.3d 1074 (2015)
Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232 (2015)
Baker v. Iowa City, 867 N.W.2d 44 (2015)
Heffernan v. City Of Paterson, 777 F.3d 147 (2015)
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, 2014 U.S. App. Lexis 24935 (2014)
Harnage v. Torres, 155 Conn. App. 792 (2015)
De Ritis v. Unemployment Compensation, Board Of Review, 2014 Pa. Commw. Unpub. Lexis
445 (2014)
Reed v. Town Of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057 (2013)
Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. Vandergriff, 759 F.3d 388 (2014)
Fla. Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So. 3d 379 (2014)
NAAMP v. Berch, 773 F.3d 1037 (2015)
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. San Juan, 773 F.3d 1 (2015)
U.S. v. Brune, 767 F.3d 1009 (2014)
U.S. v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414 (2014)
Hurst v. Lee County, Ms, 764 F.3d 480 (2015)
U.S. v. Anderson, 759 F.3d 891 (2015)
Liberty Coins v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682 (2014)
Fields v. Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000 (2014)
Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56 (2014)
U.S. v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104 (2014)
Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (2014)
Obsidian Finance Group v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284 (2014)
Harris v. Quinn, 656 F.3d 692 (2011)
Mccullen v. Coakley, 708 F.3d 1 (2013)
Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. College, 523 Fed. Appx. 709 (2013)
Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 711 F.3d 941 (2013)
McCutcheon v. FEC, 893 F. Supp. 2d 133 (2012)
Johnson v. Murray, 544 Fed. Appx. 801 (2013)
B.H. v. Easton Area School District, 725 F.3d 293 (2013)
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Chrzanowski v. Bianchi, 725 F.3d 734 (2013)
In Re: Ncaa Student-Athlete Name And Likeness Licensing Litigation v. Electronic Arts, 724
F.3d 1268 (2013)
Free Speech v. FEC, 720 F.3d 788 (2013)
U.S. v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411 (2013)
Iowa Right to Life Committee v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576 (2013)
State Emp. Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 718 F.3d 126 (2013)
Libertarian Party of Virgina v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308 (2013)
Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (2013)
Yoder v. University of Louisville, 526 Fed. Appx. 537 (2013)
Hardwick v. Heyward, 711 F.3d 426 (2013)
Minnesota Majority v. Mansky, 708 F.3d 1051 (2013)
Yolanda Arnold v. City of Columbus, 515 Fed. Appx. 524 (2013)
A.M. v. Taconic Hills Central School District, 510 Fed. Appx. 3 (2013)
Pg Publishing Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91 (2013)
Dixon v. University of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269 (2013)
Doe v. Boland, 698 F.3d 877 (2012)
OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F. 3d 1053 (2012)
In Re Gleason, 492 Fed. Appx. 86 (2012)
Asgeirsson v. Abbott, 696 F.3d 454 (2012)
United States v. Williams, 690 F.3d 1056 (2012)
U.S. v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388 (2012)
Haagensen v. Pa State Police, 490 Fed. Appx. 447 (2012)
Initiative and Referendum Institute v. USPS, 685 F.3d 1066 (2012)
United States v. Amster, 484 Fed . Appx. 338 (2012)
Brooks v. Arthur, 685 F.3d 367 (2012)
United States v. Stewart, 686 F.3d 156 (2012)
Alliance for Open Soc'y Int'l, Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 651 F.3d 218 (2011)
United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126 (2012)
United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678 (2012)
ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583 (2012)
Wersal v. Sexton, 674 F.3d 1010 (2012)
Discount Tobacco City and Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (2012)
Holloway v. Magness, 666 F.3d 1076 (2012)
National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, 669 F.3d 34 (2012)
Sherrod v. Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359 (2012)
Field v. Board of Water Commissioners, 453 Fed. Appx. 811 (2011)
United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198 (2010)
Western Tradition P'ship v. AG 2011 Mt 328, 271 P.3d 1 (2011)
Fox TV, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317 (2010); Abc, Inc. V. Fcc, 404 Fed. Appx. 530 (2011)
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Knox v. Cal. State Emples. Ass'n, Local 1000, 628 F.3d 1115 (2010)
Howards v. McLaughlin, 634 F.3d 1131 (2011)
Golan v. Holder, 609 F.3d 1076 (2010)
Obnigbene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174 (2011)
United States v. O'nan, 452 Fed. Appx. 280 (2011)
CBS Corp. v. FCC, 663 F.3d 122 (2011)
Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228 (2011)
Maslow v. Board of Elections in New York City, 658 F.3d 291 (2011)
Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359 (2011)
Bumpus v. Watts, 448 Fed. Appx. 3 (2011)
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936 (2011)
Frank Van Den Bosch v. Raemisch, 658 F.3d 778 (2011)
84 Video/Newsstand, Inc. v. Sartini, 455 Fed. Appx. 541 (2011)
Burnett v. Jones, 437 Fed. Appx. 736 (2011)
Lovette v. Paul, 442 Fed. Appx. 436 (2011)
National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34 (2011)
Dish Network Corp v. FCC, 653 F.3d 771 (2011)
Alpha Delta Chi-Delta Chapter v. Reed, 648 F.3d 790 (2011)
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, 652 F.3d 565 (2011)
Merrifield v. Board of County Commissioners for the County of Santa Fe, 654 F.3d 1073 (2011)
Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225 (2011)
Neighborhood Enterprises v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728 (2011)
Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 650 F.3d 205 (2011)
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District, 650 F.3d 915 (2011)
McKinley v. Abbott, 643 F.3d 403 (2011)
Bronx Household of Faith V. Board of Education of the City of New York, 650 F.3d 30 (2011)
Victory Through Jesus Sports Ministry Foundation v. Lee's Summit R-7 School District, 640 F.3d
329 (2011)
281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621 (8th Cir., 2011)
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334 (2011)
O'Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207 (2011)
Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515 (2011)
United States v. Dean, 635 F.3d 1200 (2011)
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185 (2011)
United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725 (2011)
Libertarian Party of New Hampshire v. Gardner, 638 F.3d 6 (2011)
Smith v. Arguello, 415 Fed. Appx. 57 (2011)
Dressler v. Walker, 409 Fed. Appx. 947 (2011)
Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Sergardia De Jesus, 634 F.3d 3 (2011)
United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127 (2011)
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